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A B S T R A C T 
The regional economic impact of the Channel Tunnel has engendered much public and 
private sector interest. Previous studies examining the regional implications of the Tunnel 
have argued that related development pressures will be largely confined to South East 
England, further widening the "North-South" divide. Economic Potential Analysis was 
earlier employed by Clark el. al. (1969) and Keeble et. al. (1982a) to model the 
geographical impact of the Tunnel on the relative accessibility of the U K regions. The 
conclusions drawn from these studies support the proposition that the South East would 
gain at the expense of the more peripheral regions. However, the important implications 
of a rail-only Tunnel have yet to be modelled. The results of the present study show that 
opportunities created by the Tunnel could be spread more evenly than had previously been 
predicted. However, following a review of the legislative and policy environment of the 
Tunnel and related infrastructure, it is argued that as a result of British Government 
inaction the more peripheral U K regions are likely to be unable to maximise any potential 
benefits created. Nonetheless, the overall regional economic impact of the Tunnel will 
depend ultimately on the reactions of the business community (Pieda 1989a&b). The 
findings of a questionnaire survey carried out for this thesis reveal a considerable degree 
of similarity in perceptions and anticipated usage of the Tunnel for companies in the South 
East and South West, including the "Far South West". If this similarity is apparent after 
the Tunnel opens, the regional economic structure of the U K might only be marginally 
affected. ' " " * ' 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
This chapter first establishes the main aims and objectives of the study. There then follows 
a brief introduction to the Channel Tunnel project, in terms of both its historical evolution 
and the operational characteristics of the present scheme. The 'Scope of the Study' is then 
set-out, relating the central hypothesis to the thesis structure. The following section on 
'Research Philosophy' highlights the essentially empirical nature of the current research 
project. Finally, discussion of the research methods will focus primarily on the Economic 
Potential Model developed for this thesis, as well as primary data collection and 
interpretation issues. 
1.1. Aims and Objectives 
The basic aim of the current research project is to examine the impact of the Tunnel on 
the so-called "North-South" divide. To this end the regional and local consequences of 
such a major transpon infrastructure project are analyzed. The central hypothesis of the 
present thesis is that the Tunnel represents an opportunity to redress the economic 
imbalance between the "Nonh" and "South". The "North-South" divide has generated a 
great deal of academic and political interest and it is not surprising, therefore, that the 
regional economic impact of the Tunnel is considered to be of great importance. This study 
utilises the commonly favoured "North-South" terminology to emphasize the diverse 
regional economic implications of the Tunnel. 
The economic implications of the Tunnel, particularly for the more peripheral UK regions, 
are still very uncertain. Except for Kent, no national and/or regional impact studies have 
been commissioned by the British Government. Existing academic involvement is also 
generally regarded as 'highly speculative' (Gibb. Knowles and Farrington 1992). The 
present thesis therefore aims to fill the gap in the existing literature by providing a 
- 1 -
substantive study on the regional economic implications of the Tunnel. Its originality can 
be identified in four main respects: fu-stly, the voluminous amount of literature on the 
present Tunnel project is drawn together for the first time; secondly, it questions the usual 
premise thai the South East will be the main beneficiary; thirdly. Economic Potential 
Analysis is employed in a novel manner in order to quantify the impact of the Tunnel on 
regional accessibility within the UK and on the Continent; and finally, a large amount of 
primary data is generated by a questionnaire survey and interviews with representatives of 
local economies. 
Even though the hypothesis states that the Tunnel represents an opportunity to narrow the 
"Nonh-South" divide, it is also argued that this opponunity is likely to be missed as a 
result of present Government policy. The Government's non-interventionist 'market 
solutions' approach to the Tunnel and related transport infrastructure has been criticised 
as an excuse for inaction (Comfort 1987). Unlike the policies adopted in France, especially 
within Nord-Pas de Calais, no anempt has been made in the UK to augment the 
opportunities created by the Tunnel. Therefore, a comprehensive review of the legislative 
and policy environment of the Tunnel within the UK and on the Continent is also an 
important component of the present study. The 'Scope of the Study' (section 1.3) will 
discuss the suucture of the current thesis in more detail, but first a brief introduction to 
the Channel Tunnel project is provided. 
1.2. The Channel Tunnel Project 
Even though the history and operational details of the Tunnel are well known, it is useful 
to set out the history of the fixed Channel link. Also aspects of the present scheme, 
especially the international train and so-called "Shuttle" services, need to be ouUined so 
that the reader is clear about the benefits offered by the Tunnel. As recognised by the 
House of Lords (1987), the regional economic impact of the Tunnel 'lies in the hands' of 
British Rail (BR). Thus, the current chapter also outiines the proposed level of service to 
the regions provided by iniemationai through trains, as well as the 'rolling road* offered 
by Eiu"oiunnei. 
1.2.1. The History of the Fixed Channel Link 
Tn 175L a report landed on Louis XV*s desk in which the author, one 
Nicholas Desmarei, claimed that "England and France were linked by a spit 
of land". His proof? "The wolves found in England could not have swum 
there...". Consequently, "we must restore that communication by requiring 
either a bridge, tunnel or dike".' 
(Conseil Regional Nord-Pas de Calais 1991, P.5) 
The earliest recorded scheme to link Britain and France by a permanent Channel crossing 
is attributed to Alben Mathieu, a French mining engineer, who in 1802 proposed that a 
submarine tunnel should be built for horse drawn carriages. Several other schemes were 
advanced in the following 80 years, before Thome de Gammond, another French mining 
engineer, submitted the first pracdcal plans for a rail tunnel to the French and British 
Governments. Actual construcuon commenced in 1881, with limited boring of the pilot 
tunnel at Shakespeare and Abbots Cliffs, near Dover, and Sangatte, near Calais. Political 
and strategic concerns led the British Government to abandon the project in 1883 (Gibb 
1986a). Following a revival of interest in the 1920s, the then Labour Government set-up 
a Committee of Inquiry in 1929. A 'double barrelled' rail tunnel was favoured, only to be 
later rejected by the House of Commons in 1930. 
Interest again revived after the Second World War, with an Anglo- French Channel Tunnel 
Study Group established in 1958. The former defence objections to a fixed Channel link 
had now largely disappeared (Comfort 1987). In 1960, the Study Group (a British-French-
American group of companies, in which BR and SNCF were indirectly involved) submitted 
a proposal for twin single-track rail tunnels, with a smaller service tunnel. Normal 
BR/SNCF services and a vehicle-carrying Shutde would be run through the tunnels. A road 
and rail bridge was proposed in the following year by an all-French Channel Bridge Study 
Group, which planned for 140 spans, mostly of 738 feet, but with 10 spans of 1447 feet 
over the shipping lanes. The British and French Governments set-up a joint working group 
to examine both schemes. The bridge was regarded as costly and a danger to shipping. The 
Tunnel was believed to offer cheaper services over existing modes of cross-Channel 
transport. However, Government fiscal guarantees were seen to be necessary to ensure 
financial backing. In November 1973, after extensive geological and technical feasibility 
studies, a treaty was signed by both Governments and an agreement made with the newly 
formed British Channel Tunnel Company and the Societe Francaise du Tunnel sous la 
Manche. Economic problems of the era led to the unilateral abandonment of the project 
by the British Government (Gibb 1986a). The escalating cost of the high-speed rail link 
between London and the Tunnel portal made the Government unwilling to proceed with 
the project as originally proposed. The private developers, as a result of the favourable 
escape clauses, exercised their right to withdraw from the entire tunnel project. 
However, a number of other proposals were subsequently put forward and, in 1981, a 
summit meeting between the British and French Govemments agreed that a joint study 
group should examine the technical and economic aspects of a fixed link. From the outset 
it was made clear that any future scheme would have to be privately financed without call 
on public money or even Government guarantees (Comfort 1987). The group's report 
(Department of Transport 1982) concluded that a fixed link could be economically 
advantageous. A twin-bored rail tunnel, with a vehicle Shuttle, again found support. In 
1984 both Governments reaffirmed their willingness to take the necessary steps to facilitate 
construction of a fixed link. The main dates in the evolution of the present Eurotunnel 
project are shown in Figure 1.1. 
A joint working group of officials was commissioned to draw up guidelines setting out in 
detail the undertakings the Governments would be prepared to give, the legal and 
commercial framework, and the various requirements (technical, safety, financial, 
environmental and, where applicable, maritime) which the promoters would need to satisfy. 
The guidelines were published in April 1985, entitled the 'Invitation to Promoters' 
(Department of Transport 1985) and submissions requested by 31 October. By 20 January 
1986, the two Govemments announced their support for the Channel Tunnel Group-France 
Manche (CTG-FM) rail tunnel scheme: two single-track bored rail tunnels for through 
services and shuttles (essentially a resumption of the 1972/1975 project). Construction 
began just over a year later on the CTG-FM (now Eurotunnel) rail tunnel. 
31st October 1985 
Submission of proposals 
20th January 1986 
Governments' decision = C.T.G./F.M. 
12th February 1986 
Signature of Anglo-French treaty 
Spring 1986 
Agreement on terms of concessions 
Governments/C.T.G./F.M. 
1986/87 Session of UK Parliament 
Government sponsored'hybrid bill' 
introduced in the United Kingdom 
Mid 1987 
Construction begins 
Spring 1991 
Completion of main tunnels 
December 1993 
Operations begin 
Figure 1.1 Eurotunnel Project; key dates 
1.2.2. The Present Scheme 
The Channel Tunnel project involves the construction of twin rail tunnels, to cany both 
through rail services and the Shutde service (see Figure 1.2). In addition, supporting 
infrastructure includes the terminals at Cheriton, outside Folkestone, and at Coquelles, near 
Calais, with associated road and rail connections. The purposely designed Shuttle train is 
set out in Figure 1.3 and the general lay out of the terminals and freight depots is shown 
in Figure 1.4. 
The Concessionaires, Eurotunnel (originally a consortium of banks and construction 
companies) are responsible for the design, construction and operation, initially for 55 years, 
of the Tunnel. Investment capital of over £8,100 million has been raised by Eurotunnel, 
£7,000 million through credit facilities arranged by an international banking consortium 
of more than 200 banks and £1,100 million from a shares issue. The contractor for the 
project is Transmanche Link (TML), a joint venture of ten major construction companies: 
from Britain, Balfour Beatty Construction Ltd, Costain Civil Engineering Ltd, Tarmac 
Construction Ltd, Taylor Woodrow Construction Ltd and Wimpey Major Projects Ltd; and 
from France, Bouygues SA, Dumez SA, Soci^t6 Auxiliaire d'Entreprises SA, Society 
Gdn^rale d'Entreprises SA and Spie Batignolles SA. TML operates under the supervision 
of Eurotunnel and an independent 'Maitre d'Oeuvre' (comprised of two companies of 
consulting engineers). The Maitre d'Oeuvre reports to Eurotunnel, the Inter-Governmental 
Commission and the lending banks. The relationships between the major actors in the 
Tunnel project are depicted in Figure 1.5. 
Shutde trains will be operated by Eurotunnel between the terminals eitiier side of the 
Tunnel, the journey taking 33 minutes. The ShutUe service is being designed for 
convenience, with no pre-booking necessary and departing every 20 minutes for passenger 
Shutdes and 30 minutes for freight Shutdes (every 12 and 15 minutes respectively during 
peak periods). The track lay-out incorporates a 'return-loop' at both terminal sites to 
simplify continuous running. Shutdes can tiierefore arrive and depart without reversing (see 
Figure 1.3). At bodi terminals new road connections will be built giving direct access to 
and from motorways. Al l vehicles will drive on/off Shuttles through special 
- 6 -
Piston Relief Duct 
Running Tunnel Running Tunnel 
I 
I 
Evacuation 
Cross Passage 
I 
Evacuation 
Cross Passage 
Service Tunnel 
Figure 1.2 Typical tunnel cross section Source ;TML 1991 
Space for Overhead 
Line and Pantograph 
Structure Gauge 
(limit that signals, etc. 
protude into tunnel) 
Tunnel Lining 
Lower Chalk Environment 
Standard Gauge Track 
1.432m (4' 8V2") UK/Continent 
Eurotunnel Shuttle Train 
SNCF 
British Rail 
London Transport Tube' 
Figure 1,3 The Shuttle Train Source ;TML 1991 
UK 
Ashford 
Terminal 
Folkestone 
Terminal 
Dol lands 
Moor M20 (project) 
Rolkestone 
Motorway 
Railway 
Land Tunnels 
Undersea Tunnels 
ServiceTunnel 
NOT TO SCALE 
r 
f^^Shakeaoeare Cliff 
V 
^J|sangatte 
^ O ^ ^ e s s ah aft 
F R A N C 
N 
Term 
SNCF 
station 
Frethun 
Figure 1-4 Eurotunnel termini: Cheriton and Coquelles Source ;TML 1991 
French 
Government 
(DDE, Dtp, etc) 
[ = 
Shareholders 
UK 
Government 
(DOE, Dtp, 
HSE, etc) 
Inter-
Governmental 
Commission 
(Regulatory Body) 
Funding 
Banks 
Joint 
Consents 
Team 
Eurotunnel 
(Owner Operator 
of 55 year 
concession) 
Transmanche 
Link 
(Design & 
Construction 
Contractor) 
Maitre 
d'Oeuvre 
(Technical 
Auditor) 
Figure 1.5 Organisational structure of the tunnel 
Source ; TML 1991 
loading/unloading wagons at the rear end of each "rake" (nonnally 13 carrier wagons for 
a passenger Shuttle). A l l frontier controls will be carried out prior to departure, allowing 
vehicles to join immediately the national road network on leaving the Tunnel. The capacity 
of the Tunnel, at opening, wil l be 20 "paths" an hour in each direction, allowing a three 
minute "headway"*. During peak periods, 10 paths an hour wi l l be allocated to passenger 
and freight Shutdes, half the normal capacity. International through trains run by BR and 
SNCF wi l l occupy the other half. The capacity of the Tunnel, through technological 
improvements, is expected to increase to 30 paths an hour in each direction. 
The Tunnel wi l l link-up. for the first time, the national rail networks of Britain and the 
Continent, allowing direct international passenger services to run between the major cities 
(see Figure 1.6). Locomotives have to be specially designed for international day-time 
services, permitting speeds of up to 300 kms/hr and compatibility with the electrification 
systems in Britain, France and Belgium. However, as a result of delays associated with the 
construction of these locomotives, the introduction of international through trains has been 
postponed until 1994. BR (1989b) expects a typical summer service to consist of 15 
passenger trains per day in each direction between London and Paris (3 hrs), and London 
and Brussels (2 hrs 45 minutes). In addition, a number of beyond London international 
through services are envisaged. However, instead of the original proposal for an 18-coach 
train which was designed to split into two separate sections, BR adopted a cheaper 14-
coach basic train for international rail services. Thus, BR*s (1989b) original plans for 
international services to the regions have had to be altered. Figure 1.7 sets-out the revised 
pattern of day and night-time beyond London international services. The East Coast Main 
Line (ECML) wi l l be served between Edinburgh and the Tunnel by a return daily service 
to both Paris and Brussels (Gibb et al. 1992). The West Coast Main Line (WCML) will 
be served by a similar service from Manchester but only one of these trains wil l go via 
Birmingham. Night-time services for more distant journeys are planned for Glasgow and 
Swansea/Plymouth. Where possible. BR also plan for domestic InterCity services to 
connect up with international services. BR's proposed level of service to the regions 
outside the South East has been strongly condemned and is a primary focus of the present 
thesis. 
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Three types of through rail freight service are planned: trainload; wagonload, extending the 
former Speedlink's network of high-speed freight services to the Continent; and intermodal 
container services. In the years immediately following the opening of the Tunnel, BR's 
freight sector, Railfreight Distribution, expect to treble its current European business from 
approximately 2 to 6.1 million tonnes per year, of which more than 70 percent originates 
from beyond London (BR 1989b). BR is currently investigating the feasibility of new 
electric locomotives operating between the UK and Fr^thun, in Northern France. A much 
larger diesel locomotive fleet will handle international freight traffic with Britain. To carry 
the estimated 6.1 million tonnes of international freight per annum, BR initially plan for 
27 trains per day in each direction. In addition, BR proposed a system of 12 regional 
freight terminals, see Figure 1.8, to serve the main industrial and population centres of the 
UK. However, as a result of economic recession only nine are now envisaged, with the 
East Midlands, South Midlands and Avon terminals no longer regarded as viable (Gibb et. 
al. 1992). Independent consultants' reports (for example: Kent County Council (KCC) 
1989; Pieda 1989a&b) regard BR's freight forecasts as too conservative and proposed 
service levels as inadequate, hence capacity constraints are predicted as soon as the Tunnel 
opens. However, before examining such issues, it is first appropriate to discuss the 'Scope 
of the Study', as well as outline the 'Research Philosophy' and 'Research Methodology' 
of the current project. 
13. The Scope of the Study 
Figure 1.9 sets-out the organisational structure of the present thesis. Following the 
Literature Review in chapter 2, which identifies the issues raised at the national and 
regional level of analysis, the study will then divide into three strands of research; 
theoretical modelling, policy review, and primary data collection and interpretation. An 
Economic Potential Model is employed to quantify the impact of the Tunnel on the relative 
accessibility of UK regions vis-a-vis the Continent. These theoretical results are then tested 
in the "real" worid. Both the policy and legislative environment of the Tunnel, as well as 
the perceptions and reactions of companies, will influence the regional economic impact 
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of the Tunnel. Therefore, a critical review of the British Government's policy stance on 
the Tunnel and related transport infrastructure is undertaken. A questionnaire survey of 
large and/or exponing companies within the South East and South West then exartiines the 
perceived impact of the Tunnel and likely reactions of companies towards it. As Figure 1.9 
shows, attention then focuses on specific case studies. Case studies of East Kent and the 
"Far South West" (Devon and Cornwall) relate the findings discussed earlier in the study 
to the local level. Regional consultancy reports were drawn on, as well as information 
obtained through attendances at conferences and interviews, primarily with representatives 
of County/District Councils and local Chambers of Commerce and Industry. 
Other than the short-term construction impact, the economic benefits resulting from the 
Tunnel are primarily dependent on British companies taking advantage of improved 
accessibility to the Continent. I i is therefore important that the geographical impact of the 
Tunnel on regional accessibility is incorporated into any theoretical model. Economic 
Potential Analysis will measure the impact of the Tunnel on the relative accessibility of 
all UK regions vis-a-vis the Continent. Potential values can be used as a proxy 
measurement for regional economic development, identifying each regiorfs comparative 
advantage for economic growth. Potential analysis can accommodate changes in the 
transport network, allowing the re-evaluation of a region's relative accessibility. It is 
widely considered that the more distant regions of the European Community (EC) have 
been disadvantaged by their location in relation to the major Community markets, further 
peripheralising their regional economies (Keeble, Owens and Thompson 1982b). However, 
it is hypothesized in chapter 3 that the more peripheral UK regions could experience gains 
in relative accessibility the same as. or higher than, the South East. This assumption is 
based on the present pattem of trade between the UK and the Continent, with more than 
75 percent of UK expons to the Continent originating from outside the South East (Pieda 
1989b). The Tunnel may encourage British companies to change their distribution practices 
in favour of the rail network, since rail freight is able to compete more effectively with 
road haulage over distances in excess of 250/300 kms (Pieda 1989a&b). The Economic 
Potential Model is therefore intended to test the usual assumption that the South East will 
benefit the most from the Tunnel. 
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However, the limitations of Britain's supporting transpon infrastructure and the 
Govemment's present "hands-off * approach lo the Tunnel could work to the detriment of 
the regions. It is argued in the present study that the ability of the regions to maximise the 
benefits offered by the Tunnel will be restricted by Government policy, particularly 
through the tight control of the railways. The post-1979 Conservative Government proved 
to be a strong advocate of a fixed Channel link. The then Prime Minister, Margaret 
Thatcher, even added her personal support to the proposed scheme. Nevertheless, after 
hastiJy passing the necessary legislation, the Government has avoided any form of direct 
intervention, especially in the case of the high-speed rail link between London and the 
Tunnel portal. A comprehensive review of the British Government's policy towards the 
Tunnel is therefore fundamental to any examination of the regional economic implications 
of the Tunnel. Such a critique becomes even more vital in the light of the pro-active 
policies favoured on the Continent. The British Government's market solutions approach 
to the Tunnel contrasts strongly with the interventionist su-ategies promoted in France. The 
British Government is also at odds with the European Commission's (1990) proposed pan-
European high-speed rail network. The policy review will address the perceived inadequate 
nature of Britain's supponing transpon network and services, especially in temis of the rail 
network. Section 40 of the 1987 Channel Tunnel Act, which established a series of 
regional consultations between BR and local government, commerce and industry, 
highlights concerns that the benefits created by the Tunnel will be conflned to the South 
East, and not spread throughout the UK, as a result of an inadequate transpon network 
(Farrington, Gibb and Knowles 1990). 
The third strand of research identified in Figure 1.9, incorporates the analysis and 
interpretation of primary data generated by a questionnaire survey. Prior to the present 
study, only two published surveys of company attitudes toward the Tunnel were carried 
out: Eurotunnel and BR (1988) commissioned a survey of all UK regions, except for the 
South East; and the London Chamber of Commerce and Industry (1989) conducted a 
survey of London's business community. The usefulness of both surveys is limited due 
to the lack of inter-regional comparisons. The questionnaire survey undertaken for the 
current research project targeted 1.500 companies within the South East and South Westj 
the aim being to provide information on the general perceptions of British companies 
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toward the Tunnel and the wider regional economic implications, and to determine the 
anticipated demand for the Tunnel, via BR's international through services and 
Eurotunnel's Shuttle service. The questionnaire survey constitutes an important part of the 
present study, not only because of the original nature of the data produced but also in 
terms of how the data support the aims of the thesis. The overall findings are analyzed and 
discussed in chapter 5 and a regional analysis of the results in chapter 6. 
The questionnaire survey focused on the South East and South West to identify inter- and 
intra-regional similarities and differences in terms of company reactions to the Tunnel. As 
stated earlier, this project wil l examine the economic implications of the Tunnel on both 
core and peripheral UK regions. The South West, particularly the "Far South West", 
exhibits characteristics usually associated with the "North" (Champion and Green 1988, 
Green 1989). The Town and Country Planning Association (TCPA - 1990) also considers 
Cornwall, Devon and Somerset as part of the "North". Although "spatially" in the South, 
the "Far South West" is generally regarded as part of the "economic" North. Thus, it is 
apparent that analysis of the questionnaire results will allow important "Core-Periphery" 
comparisons to be made. Furthermore, the incorporation of companies in the South West 
region as a whole enabled any transition of perceptions as distance increases away from 
the Tunnel to the (South) West to be highlighted. Chapter 8 analyzes in more detail the 
economic structure of the "Far South West", drawing further comparisons between this 
peripheral part of the South West and the "North" in general. However, it must be stressed 
that time and financial restrictions prevented other peripheral UK regions being targeted. 
In addition, the questionnaire survey represents only one component of the present thesis, 
with Economic Potential Analysis (chapter 3) and the legislation and policy review 
(chapter 4) focusing attention on the broad regional economic implications of the Tunnel 
for both "North" and "South". Hence, the implied constraints of targeting only two regions 
are not consistent throughout most of this study. 
Following analysis of the questionnaire results, the present thesis then focuses on the case 
studies of East Kent and the "Far South West". Issues raised in the preceding chapters will 
be applied at this "local" level of analysis so that the specific hopes and fears of these two 
regions can be examined. East Kent was chosen as a case study since it is likely to be 
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affected significantly by the Tunnel in the short, medium and long-term. East Kent lies 
within the "prosperous" South East but is considered unlikely to benefit from the Tunnel 
to the same extent as the region as a whole (Gibb 1986b). The medium-term impact of the 
Tunnel on the existing cross-Channel ferry and port industry is of particular concern to 
East Kent. The Tunnel will detrimentally affect the largest, and only growing, industry 
within East Kent, stunting ftiture growth in the industry. However, East Kent is expected 
to benefit from improved accessibility to the Continent just like the South East in general. 
The impact of the Tunnel on the Far South West is likely to contrast sharply with the 
situation in East Kent given its isolation from the Tunnel. This isolation exists, not only 
as a result of pure geographical distance but also because of poor road and rail links. The 
implications of the Tunnel for the Far South West will therefore be "typical" of the 
prospects for many of the UK's peripheral regions. The direct impact of the Tunnel on the 
local economies of Devon and Cornwall is likely to be limited, since both counties are 
considered to be "insulated" ft-om the adverse effects. However, the "Third N4arket" impact 
of the Tunnel is of particular concern to such "isolated" regions because increased foreign 
competition in UK domestic markets is likely to affect detrimentally local manufacturers. 
The two case studies will therefore address the wide spectrum of hopes and concerns 
aroused by the Tunnel. 
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1.4. Research Philosophy 
Having established the research objectives and structure of the present thesis, it is now 
appropriate to discuss the research philosophy underpinning the project. Essentially the 
study has been based on an empirical analysis of the regional economic implications of the 
Tunnel. However, this needs to be put in a wider context. The empirical nature of the 
present study is undertaken within an eclectic philosophical framework, utilising both 
positivist and humanistic schools of thought. Therefore, any dogmatic dependence on one 
particular philosophy, and its implied limitations, is avoided. An empirically based 
positivist approach was considered necessary for the examination of the likely impact of 
the Tunnel on UK regional accessibility. However, when analyzing the legislative and 
policy environment, and the perceptions and likely reactions of companies toward the 
Tunnel, a humanistic approach was regarded as more appropriate. 
1.4.1. The Positivist Approach 
Empiricism is a philosophy of science which places emphasis on the importance of 
observations over theoretical statements (Bird 1979), only accepting theories as valid once 
they are empirically proven. However, the present study departs from pure empiricism. As 
argued by Johnston (1986), empirical observations do not always 'speak for themselves', 
since the methodology of empirical analysis only requires presentation of the experienced 
facts. Nonetheless, empiricism is a fundamental assumption of positivism. The positivist 
approach to research is concerned with empirical questions, exploring the 'direct, 
immediate and empirically accessible experience of the worid' (Johnston 1986). Positivism 
also assumes that methods usually associated with the natural sciences can be incorporated 
within the social science arena, and even the humanities, leading to a unitary scientific 
method and eventually universal l<iws. 
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The present study is based on conventional hypothesis testing which depends ultimately 
upon empirical validation. No attempt will be made to establish universal scientific laws 
based on empirically recognised generalisations. Tlie central hypothesis of the present 
research project that the Tunnel represents an opponunity to redress the economic 
imbalance between "Nonh" and "South" is tested within a theoretical framework, using 
Economic Potential Analysis (chapter 3). Economic Potential Analysis utilises primary and 
secondary data to quantify the impact of the Tunnel on the relative accessibility of the UK 
regions vis-a-vis the Continent. The present thesis is therefore grounded in both deductive-
mathematical and inductive-statistical methods of analysis. A criticism of the positivist 
philosophy stems from its dependence on the principle of verification, since verification, 
in turn, requires additional quantitative measurement of the observed. Hence, the 
information upon which a study is based becomes greatiy increased, without necessarily 
improving the explanation. 
I.4.2. The Humanistic Approach 
The current research project therefore avoids the dogmatic and *unreflective* approach of 
positivism (Johnston 1986). A humanistic approach within the study is also required to 
analyze the subjective nature of questionnaire results and the implications of the legislative 
and policy environment The reasons behind company perceptions toward the Tunnel and 
their current plans to use its services need to be examined in detail. Funhermore, an 
analysis of the legislative and policy environment of the Tunnel both within the UK and 
on the Continent enables a more comprehensive understanding of the regional economic 
implications of the Tunnel. Government policy on the Tunnel and supporting transport 
infrastructure cannot be examined in isolation from the effect of the Tunnel on regional 
accessibility and/or the perceptions and likely reactions of companies. So the relationship 
between the policy environment and the potential regional economic impact is a primary 
focus of the present thesis. 
Humanistic geography is distinguished firstiy, by the central role played by "man" and, 
secondly, by the subject matter under investigation. It is predominantly of a "subjective" 
nature and is suspicious of claims made about "objectivity". Humanistic philosophy 
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encompasses 'an expansive view of what the human person is and can do' (Tuan 1976). 
Examination of human activity and the cognitive processes emphasizes the individuality 
of the "place" and not just the spatial aspects of the location. The present thesis 
incorporates this approach in studying perceptions/beliefe of the main actors influencing 
the regional economic impact of the Tunnel (i.e. central and local government, as well as 
individual companies). 
Fieldwork is therefore an important element within the humanistic philosophy, as well as 
the interpretation of the findings. Fieldwork undertaken for the current study involved a 
questionnaire survey as well as both structured and unstructured interviews. The case 
studies of both East Kent (chapter 7) and the "Far South West" (chapter 8) both rely on 
interviews carried out with representatives of local govemment and/or industry. Such 
humanistic techniques of analysis can lead to ambiguities in the interpretation of the data 
generated since subjectivity and bias may well exist. An additional problem is that the 
researcher can influence the data gathering process. However, the questionnaire 
incorporated structured questions to avoid bias and subjectivity in the interpretation of the 
responses. Increasing objectivity is a primary aim of all research projects, the present one 
being no exception. The research methods employed in the current study, particulariy the 
questionnaire survey, are discussed in more detail in the next section and relevant chapters. 
1.5. Research Methodology 
After critically reviewing the relevant literature concerning the national and regional 
economic impact of the Tunnel (chapter 2), emphasis shifts towards finding a suitable 
regional economic development model and the generation of original data using 
questionnaire and interview techniques. A critique of the policy environment of the Tunnel 
and related transport infrastmcture is essentially based on an analysis of published 
statistics, Govemment and private sector consultancy reports and relevant legislation. Thus, 
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the present thesis wil l contribute to the debate about public and private sector policies 
towards the Tunnel as well as its regional economic implications. 
An appropriate regional economic development model has to assess the economic 
implications of the Tunnel for the UK, both nationally and regionally, vis-a-vis continental 
regions. As a direct result of earlier work by Keeble et. al. (1982a), Economic Potential 
Analysis was adopted as the most suitable technique, enabling new and comparative results 
to be analyzed. Economic potential is a measure of the nearness or accessibility of a given 
volume of economic activity to a particular point/region and can be interpreted as the 
volume of economic activity to which a region has access, after the cost/time of covering 
the distance to that activity has been accounted for. The potential model calculates the 
impact of the Tunnel on the relative accessibility of UK and continental regions, and thus 
regional proximity to European activity. For example, the relative accessibility of Scotland, 
before and after the Tunnel, to European-wide economic activity can be quantified and 
compared to regions such as the South East. Potential values can be interpreted as a 
measure of regional advantage for economic development in terms of relative accessibility 
in geographic space to economic activity. Potential analysis can accommodate new 
developments in the transpon network, and thus re-evaluate a region's changing relative 
accessibility. The potential model will therefore provide a useful theoretical framework 
from which to quantify the impact of the Tunnel on regional accessibility and a region's 
comparative advantage for economic development. The standard potential equation, as 
advanced by Rich (1980), is set-out in chapter 3, as is a detailed account of the modelling 
procedures and methodological issues. 
The questionnaire survey was carried-out in May/June, 1991, with more than 1,500 
companies within the South East and South West targeted. The methodological issues 
raised by the questionnaire survey are discussed in detail later on in the thesis, see chapter 
5. A postal survey of large and/or exporting companies was undertaken to target companies 
more likely to be affected by the Tunnel. The initial criterion employed specified that 
companies should be involved in industrial/distribution activities, with an annual turnover 
in excess of £20 million. Along with an introductory letter, stressing the importance of the 
survey and an assurance of complete confidentiality, a secondary letter was sent out to 
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encourage a higher response rate. A pilot survey was carried-out and the necessary 
amendments made to the questionnaire. Standard statistical techniques, including Chisquare 
test, are used to analyze the results. The questionnaire was designed to simplify 
computation and anaJyticaJ procedures, see Section 5,3. The results are inteqjreted in the 
light of the theoretical and policy framework established earlier in the present thesis. 
For the purposes of the case studies, the original data generated by the questionnaire 
survey was supplemented with interviews carried-oui among representatives of the local 
economies of East Kent and the Far South West County and District Council officials 
were interviewed to determine the likely reactions of the regions to the challenges created 
by the Tunnel. It was decided diat these interviews should be "open", i.e. the interviews 
were unstructured. Due to the wide ranging implications of the Tunnel, open interviews 
allow the localised hopes and fears to be property addressed. Interviews were also 
undertaken in France and Belgium to ascertain the policy responses of the two 
Governments, as well as with the national railway companies (SNCF and SNCB). A 
ERASMUS grant was obtained to finance fieldwork in both France and Belgium. Attention 
is focused on the Nord-Pas de Calais region, which has benefited from large-scale 
investment in the economic and transport infrasu-ucture. Again, open interviews were 
preferred. It was also necessary to conduct a series of interviews with BR Project 
Management to substantiate certain parameters used in the potential analysis. Pre-
determined questions were asked to satisfy the specific requirements of the interviews. 
Several regional conferences have been attended, panicularly in the South West These 
conferences proved useful in discussing the broad subject of the regional economic impact 
of die Tunnel. The interface between national, regional and local policy makers, 
industrialists and academics enabled a broad spectrum of opinions to be heard and 
analyzed. 
Notes 
1. Capacity of a railway line is determined by the number of "paths". Each path allows 
trains to operate unaffected by the train in front The time between successive trains, 
passing a given point, is termed the "headway". 
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CHAPTER 2: THE LITERATURE REVIEW 
A synthesis of the existing literature will underline the high degree of confusion that is still 
commonly associated with the regional economic impact of the Tunnel, On the whole, 
academic involvement has tended to be 'highly speculative' (Gibb et. al. 1992), generating 
very littie original data. This is very apparent for the national review of the literature, 
where the general assumption that the Tunnel will be good for the UK is unsubstantiated. 
The need for a comprehensive study on the regional economic impact of the Tunnel in the 
UK, based on empirical evidence, is therefore apparent. Nonetheless, the Tunnel has 
engendered a voluminous amount of academic and official publications. It is therefore 
practicable to concen^ate only on the literature conceming the present Tunnel project, A 
recommended reading list for pre-1980s fixed link schemes is provided in Appendix 1, 
The lack of consultation between national and local government has led to much anxiety 
about the economic implications of the Tunnel, particularly for the more peripheral UK 
regions. As will be examined in more detail in chapter 4, the British Govemment has not 
conceded to the calls for national and/or regional impact studies, except for the adjacent 
county of Kent. The use of a Hybrid Bill for the 1987 Channel Tunnel Act also removed 
the need for a public enquiry, the usual platform for consultation needed for major 
infrasuiicture projects. Regional interest groups fear thai the economic benefits created by 
the Tunnel will be predominately located within the South East, to the detriment of the 
more peripheral UK regions. It is widely argued that the inadequate nature of Britain's 
transpon infrastructure, particularly south of London, will act as a barrier to the spreading 
of these benefits (Simmons 1985, 1989, Gossop 1987, Harmen 1989, Town and Country 
Planning Association (TCPA) 1990). This issue is of fundamental importance to the 
regions and as such represents the main theme extrapolated throughout the literature 
review. 
As stated earlier, the aim of the current research project is to examine the potential 
regional economic impact of the Tunnel. It is generally assumed that the Tunnel will 
further exaggerate the "North-South divide" (Campaign for the North 1981, North of 
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England Regional Consortium (NOERC) 1988, Centre for Local Economic Studies (CLES) 
1989, Pieda 1989a&b, South East Economic Development Su-aiegy (SEEDS) 1989, South 
East Regional Planning Conference (SERPLAN) 1989). The Literature Review will 
therefore concentrate on the regional economic implications of the Tunnel, initially 
identifying the perceived opportunities and problems within the South East, before 
examining the main concerns of the more peripheral UK regions. However, it is first 
appropriate to discuss the potential impact of the Tunnel on the UK economy as a whole. 
Numerous national overviews are confident that the Tunnel will be good for Britain. 
However, the South East is generally regarded as the main potential beneficiary. It is 
therefore necessary to question whether regional considerations have been outweighed by 
the national interest. 
2.1. The National Economic Impact 
As a direct consequence of Government policy, the construction benefits brought about by 
the Tunnel have been spread throughout the UK. It is therefore appropriate to discuss the 
short-term implications of the Tunnel in the regional review of the literature. This section 
will focus on the long-term effects of the Tunnel on the British economy. Proponents of 
the Tunnel argue that increased efficiency and reduced operating costs for cross-Channel 
traffic will not be regionally biased but open to all UK manufacturers. However, it is 
important to highlight the perceived limitations of Britain*s supporting transport network. 
The national review of the literature will therefore initially concentrate on the potential 
opportunities created by the Tunnel, before focusing attention on the likely problems. 
2.1.1. The Opportunities 
It is generally assumed that the Tunnel will provide a much needed impetus for British 
commerce and industry and thus, numerous opportunities for the UK economy (CTG 
1985a&b, BR 1987, Eurotunnel 1987, Banham 1988). The importance of the improved 
cross-Channel communications even encouraged BR to suggest that: 
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'....Great Britain, i f it is to retain the word "great" in its title, can no longer 
afford to be an off-shore island of Europe.' 
(BR 1987, P.4) 
The Tunnel will link for the first time the road and rail networks of the UK and the 
Continent, considerably improving access between the main European markets. As reported 
by Kay, Manning and Szymanski (1989), the European Commission also regards the 
Tunnel as symbolic of its aspirations to bind Europe closer together. Moves toward a pan-
European high-speed rail network are a broader expression of the Commission's objective 
to achieve greater integration (European Commission 1990). The British Government's 
reluctance to commit public funds to the high-speed rail link between London and the 
Tunnel portal conflicts sharply with wider Community policy. Fyson (1991) argues that 
Britain's 'off-shore island' status within the EC is therefore likely to evolve into little more 
than 'branch line' mentality. Hence, the failure of the British Government to invest in the 
supporting transport network is generally considered as a missed opportunity (Gossop 
1987, TCPA 1990). The perceived inadequate nature of the supporting transport 
infrastructure is the central issue examined in this literary review. 
The Concessionaires, Eurotunnel (1987), have stated that through reduced transit times and 
costs for cross-Channel traffic, the Tunnel will stimulate economic development and 
encourage increased trade with the Continent. Eurotunnel found enthusiastic support from 
the highest offices of Government, with the Secretary of State for Transport announcing 
during the franchise award that: 
'The link in operation will bring direct benefits....lhese benefits can be 
expected to increase the level of UK's trade with continental Europe and 
contribute to economic growth and employment throughout the UK.' 
(Kay et.al. 1989, P.75) 
However, Pieda (1989a&b) believes that the lack of acknowledgement of the similar 
potential for continental imports penetrating UK markets is an all too common omission. 
The "double-edged" nature of improved accessibility and the "Third Market" impact will 
be discussed later in the regional analysis of the literature. Chapter 8 also examines the 
implications of increased continental penetration of domestic UK markets for the "Far 
South West". 
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In the British Business Supplement on the Tunne), the Chairman of the Confederation of 
British Industry (CBI), John Banham affirms his confidence in the potential which the 
Tunnel offers British companies: 
'By ensuring stronger geographical links between the UK and the continent, 
the Tunnel wil l represent another step along the path to European economic 
integration.' 
(Banham 1988. P.8) 
According to Banham. the Tunnel, in conjunction with the SEM, could revolutionise 
European industry, encouraging specialisation which would in turn permit the achievement 
of economies of scale. Four main benefits are identified by Banham which could accrue 
to British commerce and industry after the Tunnel becomes operational in 1993: 
(1) A revitalised UK rail freight industry; 
(2) A fillip for Britain's tourism and related industries; 
(3) An alternative transport mode for the business traveller; and 
(4) The diversion of traffic away from the existing 'congested* modes of 
iranspon. 
Banham points out that the Tunnel will allow rail freight to utilise its competitive 
advantage over road haulage for distances in excess of 300 kms. The close proximity of 
Britain's major cities in relation to each other is seen to limit the scope for domestic rail 
freight. As for tourism. Banham believes Uiose travelling to the UK will benefit from a 
more direct mode of transport, which is unaffected by the weather. Also business travellers 
to Europe are expected to enjoy faster services to near continental cities, such as Paris and 
Brussels. The advantages accorded to British tourism are generally seen as the main benefit 
of the Tunnel, especially in the South East (British Tourism Authority (BTA) 1988. 1989. 
SEEDS 1989. SERPLAN 1989). Finally, Banham regards the Tunnel as a means to relieve 
congestion in the air and on Britain's motorway network, which costs British industry an 
estimated £15 billion every year. 
However. Banham is aware that certain factors could dampen these potential benefits. 
Thus, it is argued that i f British business is to benefit fully, an adequate network of 
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supporting transport infrastructure has to be in place by 1993. The central hypothesis of 
the present thesis states that the Tunnel represents an opportunity to narrow the North-
South divide, with improved rail access for freight exports seen as paramount for the more 
peripheral UK regions. But it is also recognised that the Government's policy of non-
intervention is likely to limit this opportunity and even accentuate the regional economic 
divide. The constraints imposed on the regionalisation of potential benefits created by the 
Tunnel are discussed in the next section and the regional review of the literature. 
2.1.2. The Problems 
The problems associated with the Tunnel in part relate to the question who gains and how? 
But, more importantly, an inadequate supporting transport network is generally regarded 
as the obstacle preventing regions maximising the potential benefits created by the Tunnel. 
However, before focusing attention on these issues, it is first interesting to explore briefly 
the counterfactual argument postulated by Button (1989). 
The opportunity cost 
Even though Button accepts that the Tunnel could be advantageous to British industry, the 
construction of the Tunnel and related infrastructure is seen to represent a redeployment 
of resources from elsewhere in the economy: 
'At the national level it (the Tunnel) stimulates employment and production, 
although there is an obvious opportunity cost to be set against this in that 
resources are taken from other productive activities 
(Button 1989, P.IO) 
The concept of opportunity cost, in the case of the Tunnel, implicitly assumes that the £8.1 
billion needed to finance the project would have been productively used elsewhere in the 
economy. This approach is highly questionable. An international banking consortium made 
available loans of £7 billion and a further £1.1 billion was raised through a shares issue, 
of which more than 50 percent was accounted for by non-UK residents. Thus, the monies 
used to build the Tunnel, on the whole, represent a net addition to the UK economy. 
Hence, the counterfactual argument posed by Button does not apply. 
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Who benefits and how? 
In terms of "who" benefits, Eurotunnel (1987) maintains that improved accessibility to the 
Continent will promote economic growth and employment throughout the UK. However. 
EurotunneFs predecessor, the CTG (1985a&b), recognised that a region's relative 
accessibility to the Continent may prove to be more important. It is generally accepted that 
the South East by virtue of its geographic position will experience the greatest increase in 
accessibility relative to other UK regions. In addition, the CTG (1985b) quite correctly 
point out that the UK would not be the only European country to benefit from the Tunnel. 
Hence, France and other near continental countries may be in a stronger position to 
augment the advantages offered by the Tunnel. Within the UK, the South East's proximity 
to the Continent is also more likely to be enhanced to the detriment of the more peripheral 
regions. The impact of the Tunnel on regional accessibility within the UK and on the 
Continent is an important component of the present thesis (see chapter 3). 
The generally accepted benefits of the Tunnel for British industry, as outlined above, also 
need to be examined, i.e. how? Most commentators agree that the long-term impact of the 
Tunnel will be primarily determined by British companies realising the anticipated savings 
on journey time and cost over existing modes of cross-Channel transport. As observed by 
Pieda (1989a&b), this is dependent on companies sending freight exports via the rail 
network. EC legislation on permitted daily driving hours increases the attraction of rail 
freight over the road haulage sector, at least for regions outside the South East. While ferry 
crossings allow drivers their legally required rest period, Eurotunnel's Shuttle service does 
not. Thus, any initial time savings enjoyed by road hauliers when using the Shuttle service 
will in all probability be lost. Thus, to exploit the advantages created by the Tunnel most 
British companies will have to send freight exports via the rail network. However, 
Knowles, Farrington and Gibb (1989) highlight concerns, expressed in the Section 40 
regional consultations, about inadequate investment in rail infrastructure. Furthermore, Kent 
County Council (KCC - 1989) forecast capacity constraints on Kent main line cracks as 
soon as the Tunnel opens or shortly after. Companies are therefore less likely to adapt their 
distribution policies in favour of rail haulage. 
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Reduced transport costs are also expected to improve British competitiveness and increase 
UK trade with the Continent. However, Szymanski and Manning (1988) argue that the 
Tunnel is likely to result in higher prices. The TunnePs escalating debt burden is seen to 
restrict Eurotunnel's ability to set competitive tariff rates, at least as originally proposed 
by the CTG (1985a&b). Flexilink, a consortium of port and ferry interests, also stresses 
the positive response by P&O and Sealink to the challenge created by the Tunnel (Hall 
1987). Through a policy of rationalisation, and the introduction of new 'Super* ferries and 
new port technology. Hall points out that ferries will significantly lower their operating 
costs before the Tunnel opens, by up to 40 percent. It is therefore believed that the ferries 
will meet the increased competition 'head-on' (Hall 1987). Hence, the reduction in cross-
Channel tariff rates via the Tunnel is likely to be much less than originally anticipated by 
Eurotunnel. But i f Szymanski and Manning's (1988) analysis is proved to be correct, a 
general rise in the level of cross-channel tariff rates could be the result. Since Szymanski 
and Manning assumed that the opening of the Tunnel would be delayed until January 1994, 
it would seem that their predictions cannot be easily overiooked. 
Notwithstanding the above, it would be against the interests of the consortium of lending 
banks, or even the ferries, to make Eurotunnel uncompetitive (Kay 1989). It is reasonably 
safe to assume that the Tunnel will be able to undercut prices charged by the ferry 
companies, albeit less than initially planned. Even so, Kay et. al. quite correctly argue that 
cross-Channel crossings account for only a small fraction of total company costs. Hence, 
the impact of the Tunnel on the level of UK trade to the Continent is not expected to be 
significant. This assumption is supported by the European Commission's document on 'The 
Economics of 1992' which states that transport costs will only play a very minor role in 
the determination of Community trade (Kay et al. 1989). However, Vickerman (1989a) 
considers the possibility that transport costs could be influential in the size of company 
profit margins. It follows therefore that even though transport costs represent usually less 
than three to five percent of company costs, and cross-Channel costs much less, any cost 
savings could be important, particularly i f die Tunnel offers an improved service quality 
and reliability. Nonetheless, it can be seen that the general benefits of the Tunnel, as 
expressed by its proponents, are not definite or void of problems. The ability of British 
industry to maximise the opportunities created will also be limited by the perceived 
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inadequate supporting transport network. This issue is examined briefly in the next section 
and in detail in the regional review of the literature. 
Supporting transport infrastructure 
The Campaign for the North (1981) is concerned that as a result of inadequate transport 
infrastructure certain UK regions would be disadvantaged. It is considered that London acts 
as an effective barrier between the regions to the north and west and Continental Europe. 
In a petition to the House of Commons Transport Committee, the Campaign for the North 
states that: 
'....any fixed Channel link scheme which removes the Channel barrier 
between London and the Continent without also removing the London 
barrier....will greatly worsen the position of the regions of Britain north and 
west of London relative to that of London and South East England in 
respect of social and commercial intercourse with the Continent.* 
(House of Commons (Vol.DI), 1981, P.93) 
It is therefore argued that consideration must be given to the overall financial benefit or 
cost of the Tunnel for the UK economy as a whole. Since no quantitative assessments are 
possible until after the Tunnel becomes operational, the Campaign for the North believes 
that any generalisations would depend on: 
(1) The net generated flow of tourists between the UK and the Continent; 
(2) The net level of generated trade between the UK and the Continent; 
(3) Whether the sum of (1) and (2) was a generated net Balance of Payments 
surplus or deficit. 
Concern over the regional implications of the Tunnel led the Campaign for the North to 
focus attention on the potential adverse effects of the Tunnel: 
' I f the answer to (3) was a trade deficit, then the question must be asked as 
to whether the country as a whole could afford to pay in this way for the 
consequent non-material benefits to those Britons who would enjoy greater 
ability to travel abroad or to acquire foreign imported goods or services.' 
(House of Commons 1981, P.95) 
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Not surprisingly, the Campaign for the North concluded that the Tunnel represented a 
'gamble' for the UK. Furthermore, it was considered that the peripheral regions would 
have to bear the brunt of the ensuing adverse effects i f the gamble failed. Gossop (1987) 
considers Govemment policy to have done litUe to appease the fears of regional interest 
groups. The ability of the regions to take advantage of the benefits created by the Tunnel 
has been severely limited by the Government's apparent inaction. 
Nevertheless, national overviews generally portray an optimistic scenario of improved 
competitiveness and increased exports for British companies. The Tunnel's greater 
efficiency and lower marginal operating costs are expected to stimulate economic activity 
within the UK. However, it has been shown that this optimism could be misplaced, 
particularly with regard to the problem of a perceived inadequate transport network and 
the threat posed by continental imports. Whether this optimism is more or less applicable 
at the regional level can now be examined. The question marks raised by Banham (1988) 
and the Campaign for the North (1981) need to be more fully addressed. In addition, 
attention will focus on the concems of regional interest groups, particularly the fear that 
the benefits created by the Tunnel will be confined to south east England, further widening 
the economic divide that separates 'North' and 'South'. 
2.2. The Regional Economic Impact 
Consultancy reports recognise that in order to maximise regional opportunities. Britain 
needs an efficient supporting national transport network. The need to improve Britain's 
road and rail networks has been consistently stressed by academics and regional interest 
groups alike in an attempt to allow each region to fully realise the potential offered by the 
Tunnel (Simmons 1985, 1989, Gossop 1987. Harmen 1989, Knowles et. al. 1989. 
Farrington et. al. 1990, TCPA 1990). Several reports highlight the inadequacies of the 
South East's transport infrastructure, as a result of the 'over-heated' nature of the region's 
1980s 'economic boom' (KCC 1989. SEEDS 1989. SERPLAN 1989). However, it is also 
33 
recognised that the repercussions of such an inadequate transportation system would not 
be confined just to the South East (NOERC 1988. CLES 1989, Pieda 1989a&b). 
The British Government's view that the Tunnel will be 'good' for Britain as a whole is at 
odds with the widely held Continental belief that the Tunnel's hinterland in Britain does 
not stretch beyond north London (Holliday and Vickerman 1989). In fact, Holliday and 
Vickerman argue that cities outside the South East are generally expected to be adversely 
affected by the Tunnel. However, Pieda (1989a&b) points out that the reactions of 
Britain's business community to the challenges created by the Tunnel will ultimately 
determine the regional economic impact. Vickerman and Flowerdew (1990) do not foresee 
the Tunnel affecting significantly 'the location or relocation of existing or new businesses 
within the UK'. The manifestation of a southwards drift of industry as a result of the 
Tunnel, as feared by regional interest groups, is therefore considered unlikely. The 
opportunities for rail freight are likely to be spread throughout the UK, probably more so 
in the peripheral regions. Companies would therefore gain no competitive advantage by 
relocating closer to the Tunnel portal. However, the South East is generally seen as 
benefitting most from improved access to the Continent. Hence, attention will first focus 
on the implications of the Tunnel for the south east corner of England. It is then possible 
to examine the perceived prospects for the more peripheral UK regions. It is widely 
believed thai the short-term impact of the Tunnel will be advantageous to the more 
peripheral UK regions, albeit less than predicted. In the long-term, many anticipate the 
widening of the North-South divide. On the whole, regional interest groups believe that the 
national interest has eclipsed the potential adverse regional effects that the Tunnel could 
induce. 
2.2.1. The Potential Impact on the South East 
First, the findings of the survey undertaken by the London Chamber of Commerce and 
Industry (LCCI - 1989), which analyses the perceived impact of the Tunnel on London's 
business community are examined. These findings will then be contrasted with the main 
conclusions reached by SERPLAN (1989). Within the South East, London is regarded as 
the main recipient of the opportunities created by the Tunnel. The critique of the LCCI 
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report will provide a useful insight into the perceptions of London's business community. 
The confident forecasts as reported by the LCCI have to be analyzed in the light of the 
threat posed by the near Continent, in terms of both the attraction of Nord-Pas de Calais 
to British companies and likelihood of increased import penetration of UK markets. In 
addition, the adequacy of the region's transport network has to be examined. The South 
East's tourism industry is expected to receive a major ' f i l l ip ' from the Tunnel, and thus 
requires consideration. It should be again stressed that regional reports for the South East, 
on the whole, also disregard the prospect of increased import penetration by continental 
companies as a result of the Tunnel. Quite rightly, the main concern identified is the 
inadequate nature of the region's transport infrastructure, particularly the rail network. 
Constrained optimism 
According to a survey of London's business community, carried out by the LCCI (1989), 
the majority of respondents anticipate that the Tunnel will positively affect the South East. 
In addition, a significant proportion of companies surveyed intend to use the Tunnel: 
'A third of respondents in the production sector plan to use the Channel 
Tunnel for freight and a quarter plan to use it for passenger trips. The 
respective proportions in services are a fifth and a quaner.' 
(LCCI 1989, P.3) 
The LCCI expect these proportions to increase closer to the opening of the Tunnel. Of the 
170 companies that responded to the LCCI survey (a response rate of 36 percent) the 
majority anticipate 'positive effects on competitiveness in the European market and the 
level of foreign business', more so in the production sector. There is greater optimism in 
the service sector about the impact on domestic business and home competitiveness. But 
as pointed out by the LCCI this could intensify labour market and other pressures which 
the Capital is already facing. 
It is encouraging that, in both the production and service sectors, the anticipated negative 
impact on home competitiveness is much lower than the expected positive effect on 
European competitiveness, see Tables 2.1 and 2.2. This suggests that companies in London 
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believe that their export business will benefit more from the Tunnel than their domestic 
business will be harmed. 
Production (%) 
P o s i t i v e Negative 
S e r v i c e s 
P o s i t i v e 
Negative 
(%) 
L e v e l of Domestic 
Business 
12.0 7.2 11.5 3.4 
L e v e l of Exports/ 
Foreign Business 
33.7 1.2 17.2 6.9 
Competitiveness i n 
UK Market 
10.8 13 .7 9.2 8.0 
Competitiveness i n 
European Market 
36.1 1.2 18.4 4.6 
Table 2.1: Impact of the Tunnel on company competitiveness: all r^pondents. 
(Source: LCCI 1989. P. 11) 
Production (%) 
P o s i t i v e Negative 
S e r v i c e s 
P o s i t i v e 
Negative 
(%). 
L e v e l of Domestic 
Business 
20.6 14.7 17 .9 3.6 
L e v e l of Exports/ 
Foreign Business 
58.8 2.9 25.0 10.7 
Competitiveness i n 
UK Market 
20.6 23.5 25.0 7.1 
Competitiveness i n 
European Market 
67.6 2.9 37.3 3.6 
Table 2.2: Impact of the Tunnel on company competitiveness: respondents 
anticipating using the Tunnel. 
(Source: LCCI 1989, P.12) 
No explanations are given why companies in London tend to be so confident. It is 
therefore necessary to be cautious when interpreting these findings. Again, the need for a 
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substantive study on the regional economic impact of the Tunnel, based on sound statistical 
evidence, is highlighted. However, the report went on to explain that the Tunnel and 1992, 
at the time of the survey, were still regarded as distant events. Priority was sull given to 
the routine day-to-day difficulties of high costs and staff shortages. 
SERPLAN (1989) predicts that the economic impact of the Tunnel itself may have only 
a 'modest effect' on the South East, except possibly for the tourism industry. It is 
considered that the Tunnel will be largely neutral in its impact on the overall balance of 
trade between Britain and the Continent, improving speed and accessibility equally in both 
directions, and hence, only accelerating existing trends in imports and exports. Vickerman 
(1989a) is also of the opinion that the regional economic impact of the Tunnel will be 
neutral. Proponents of the Tunnel, and even the Government, have stressed the beneficial 
impact that the Tunnel will have on the UK's trade with the Continent. Thus, it seems that 
any positive effect on British exports will depend on which region and industry they 
originate from. Regional interest groups regard the benefits of increased trade with the 
Continent as being seriously flawed. 
However, SERPLAN does believe that: 
\...the 'combined effects' of the Tunnel, "1992" and other trends in 
production methods and in the region's economy could lead to significant 
economic growth in the South East; the region's economic geography is 
likely to alter, as the south east quadrant will benefit most from these 
factors.' 
(SERPLAN 1989, P.7) 
In terms of growth within the South East, SERPLAN has stated that: 
' I f growth occurs as a result of the Tunnel, the eastern part of the region 
will be well placed to benefit, subject to possible labour and transport 
constraints. Transport links of good quality and adequate capacity are seen 
as a necessary condition for achieving economic growth in areas which can 
accommodate i t ' 
(SERPLAN 1989, P.18) 
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Simmons is also in agreement: 
'The possibilities for economic growth transferring to eastern London and 
adjacent areas of Kent and Essex is steadily increasing. An adequate 
development structure, relating infrastructure to site provision to labour is, 
however, needed.' 
(Simmons 1985, P. 18) 
It follows therefore that the Tunnel is seen as a means to transform areas to the east of 
London but only i f the transport network is improved accordingly. The announcement in 
September 1991 giving the go-ahead for the East London River Crossing, the extended 
runway for London City Airport and several road improvement schemes, forms part of the 
Government's strategy to attract investment to the east of London (Hall 1991a<&b). 
Furthermore, it has been shown by Gibb and Smith (1991) that the decision in favour of 
Ove Arup's proposed eastern route for the high-speed rail link between London and the 
Tunnel portal is an important component of Government policy to create a 'linear city' in 
the East Thames corridor. Simmons (1985) argues that any such development in the east 
of the region would relieve pressure to the west of London along the M4 corridor, where 
there are problems associated with rapid and prolonged growth such as rising costs, 
congestion and encroachments on to the Green Belt. The CTJCC (I991a&b) shows that 
any such optimism would be misplaced for East Kent since the area will have to absorb 
most of the medium-term adverse effects. The Port of Folkestone has already ceased to 
operate traditional ferry services, even though the new SeaCat is in service to Boulogne. 
The problems and opportunities facing East Kent will be discussed in more detail in 
chapter 7. 
According to the LCCI (1989) report, only a low proportion of the respondents stated that 
the Tunnel would improve accessibility to Europe. This is surprising since improved 
accessibility is the main advantage of, and whole reason for, the Tunnel. This would imply 
that London's business community did not, at least in 1987, regard improved accessibility 
between the UK and the Continent as important to them. I f European companies react 
quicker and more favourably, the Tunnel could do more than accelerate existing trade 
patterns. Such a non-neutral effect would be detrimental to the South East and to the UK 
as a whole with more continental imports penetrating the home market 
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The continental threat 
Both the reports by SEEDS (1989) and SERPLAN (1989) agree that the prospect of UK 
firms migrating to the near Continent to realise the opponunities created by the Tunnel and 
1992, as well as the potential southward drift of industry within the UK, is groundless. But 
SERPLAN does expect companies with British and European interests, wishing to expand 
or diversify their activities, to realise the attractions of areas close to the Tunnel. However, 
SERPLAN neglects to outline these supposed attractions. Vickerman (1989a) argues that 
the perceived increase in accessibility could be more important than any actual 
improvement in cross-Channel transportation. It follows therefore that i f companies believe 
the Tunnel wil l improve accessibility to-and-from the Continent, they will respond in such 
a way to realise this improvement. 
If the South East's supporting transpon network does prove to be inadequate and a 
hindrance to growth, then industrialists may perceive the Continent as a more optimal 
location (Harmen 1989, Simmons 1985, 1989). As pointed out by Simmons (1985), 
northern France, as a relatively depressed region, is in receipt of Govemment and EC 
assistance. Hence, Nord-Pas de Calais and possibly even northern Belgium, with adequate 
inland transport infrastructure and sufficient development land, wil l have a comparative 
advantage over the South East. The Nord-Pas de Calais Regional Council aims to 
transform the region into the 'crossroads* of Europe, with good road and rail links 
spreading out to all parts of the Community. The Regional Council (1991) is confident that 
they will be able to create the right commercial environment to attract companies, needing 
a continental base, to locate within the region. The comparative advantages of Kent and 
Nord-Pas de Calais are examined in chapter 7. Whilst Nord-Pas de Calais aims to become 
the 'crossroads' of Europe, the capacity constraints on the road and rail networks in the 
South East will become more pronounced as the Tunnel encourages increased international 
traffic. 
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A direct link to the Continent 
BR's (1989b) proposed international freight services will offer vast opportunities for 
British industry, with reduced transit times, reduced costs and improved reliability: 
'For many, the most exciting potential created by the Tunnel is for 
rail-hauled freight. This is where the effect of pulling the British and 
continental conurbations together in joumey-time terms will be most 
significant.' 
(Simmons 1985, P.18) 
Pieda (1989a&b) expects regions outside the South East, which at present account for 
approximately 75 percent of all UK exports to the Continent, to be in a strong position to 
capitalise from increased accessibility to European markets. As discussed in chapter 3, rail 
hauled freight is more competitive than road haulage over distances in excess of 250/300 
kms. It is therefore argued that the South East will be unable to benefit fully from the 
advantages offered by rail freight, particularly to the near Continent. However, as argued 
by SERPLAN (1989), the South East will be the main beneficiary from Eurotunnel's 
shuttle service, for both passenger and freight traffic. Time and cost savings via the Shuttle 
service wil l be negligible for traffic originating from outside the South East. It is also 
believed that the advantages from BR's (1989b) proposed international passenger services 
are also likely to be concentrated within the South East, particulariy London, Regional 
interest groups regard BR's plans for international passenger services to the regions as 
inadequate (Pieda 1989a&b, Farrington et. al. 1990). BR is confident that intemational 
passenger services from London Waterioo and King's Cross to other European capital 
cities, especially Paris and Bmssels, will be highly competitive with existing air and ferry 
services. London to Paris in three hours and London to Brussels in two hours and 45 
minutes, should prove to be attractive to London's business community, as well as 
companies throughout the South East. However, the deregulation of the European air 
industry could undermine BR's ability to offer competitive prices, as well as joumey times. 
The 'Open Skies' policy recently endorsed by the EC, June 1992, will result in immediate 
price reductions after 1 January 1993, and enable more carriers to operate on previously 
restricted routes (Graham 1992). 
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Nonetheless, the advantages brought about through improved accessibility to the Continent, 
via the international through trains and the Shuttie service could be dissipated i f the 
independent traffic forecasts prove to be correct. KCC (1989) commissioned a consultancy 
report which identifies capacity constraints for both passenger and freight traffic on 
existing Kent main line tracks by 1993 or shortiy thereafter. The need for a high-speed rail 
link between London and Cheriton has been expressed in most relevant publications. 
Improved rail services are already needed for central London, which forms the heart of the 
UK's service economy and draws the majority of its workforce from outer London or 
beyond. Harmen (1989) also recognises that any potential for diverting air traffic growth 
away from crowded airport lounges on to the rail networic could be missed i f the British 
Government fails to complement TGV Nord. In addition, the opportunity to relieve 
congestion on the South East's road network could also be wasted if adequate international 
rail services are not provided. Most commentators therefore regard the high-speed rail link 
as essential if an effective international passenger and freight service is to be operated 
while maintaining domestic rail services within Kent. Harmen concludes that the problem 
is one of 'culture'; British planning is considered as indecisive and unco-ordinated as 
compared to the French corporate planning apparatus. Both Harmen (1989) and Simmons 
(1985, 1989) argue for transport planning to be incorporated within an holistic regional 
plan: 
' I t is surely vital that in the South East, which is at the same time Britain's 
most economically dynamic region but is also becoming increasingly 
congested and overheated, new transport infrastructure is conceived as an 
integral part of future development strategy. Only in this way will the future 
economic prosperity of die region be secured, so that it is not marginalised 
by Continental regions securing greater comparative advantage for future 
growth sectors of the economy.' 
(Simmons 1989, P.8) 
Hence, even for the South East certain constraints, such as the supporting transport 
infrastructure, could seriously disadvantage the region's companies; making the threat from 
the Continent even more real, in terms of both import penetration and the relocation of 
British companies. The contrasting policies of the British and French Governments are 
discussed in detail in chapter 4. However, an inadequate supporting transport network 
within the South East will also seriously disadvantage regions to the north and west of 
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London. Before it is possible to review the implications of the Tunnel for the more 
peripheral UK regions, attention will first focus on the impact of the Tunnel on the South 
East's toLuist industry. 
The tourist trade 
The Tunnel will provide a faster, more reliable and possibly cheaper, cross-Channel mode 
of transport for both the 'classic' and vehicle accompanied passenger. SERPLAN (1989) 
stated that the greatest opportunities for the South East lay in the tourism and leisure 
related sector. The BTA (1988. 1989) also foresees opportunities in the tourism industry 
for the whole of the UK but more so in the South East: 
'the impact of the Tunnel, and the opportunities it presents, will be 
obviously greatest in the Tourist Board regions of London and the South 
East, especially in Kent.' 
(BTA 1989. P.2) 
The South East and London specifically are seen as the main beneficiaries as a result of 
the region's proximity to the Tunnel and the attraction of the capital and the heritage that 
goes with it. However, the BTA points out that London is already deficient in the capacity 
of hotel/guest house rooms, especially budget accommodation. Present developments in 
East London could help to alleviate part of the shortage. 
The South East's tourism industry has also, on the whole, experienced years of 
under-investment. primarily due to the decline in the number of tourists visiting the region 
each year (BTA 1989). This spiral of decline is particularly true of the coastal towns; The 
continued under-investment and the developments taking place across the Channel could 
lead to a further demise of the regions tourist trade. The BTA highlights the case of 
northern France, where there has been substantial investment in the tourism industry: for 
example; the new resort at Le Touquet; the National Sea Centre at Boulogne-Sur-Mer; the 
proposed leisiu^ park on the theme of the wind near the Tunnel entrance; and several other 
theme park/exhibition centres. In addition. Eurodisney. outside Paris, has its own TGV 
station and hence direct access to London. The Nord-Pas de Calais Regional Council 
(1991), as with economic and transport infrasunicture. has been active in promoting 
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investment in the region's tourist attractions. The Regional Council has co-ordinated 
investment to allow the region to maximise the opportunities created by the Tunnel and 
the European high-speed rail network, the tourism industry included. 
Although more European tourists are likely to visit Lx>ndon and the South East after the 
Tunnel becomes operational, there could be a disparity in the number of UK residents 
travelling to France and the Continent in general. I f the Tunnel encourages more British 
residents to travel to the Continent, the South East could lose traditional visitors to the 
region. However, the BTA does believe that the South East is well positioned relative to 
other UK regions to benefit from any increase in the numbers of foreign tourists visiting 
the region. There is therefore general agreement that the Tunnel will further advantage the 
South East's tourism industry, even i f more intense foreign competition and inadequate 
investment do create some cause for concern. 
The South East: a summary 
In terms of the overall impact on the South East, the state of the transport network is 
considered as the main obstacle against the Tunnel becoming a catalyst for increased 
economic growth within the South East. After establishing Pariiamentary approval, SEEDS 
(1989) argues that the Government restricted its role to providing new roads and delegating 
other responsibilities to 'separate profit orientated enterprises', the result being the total 
disregard for the need for a co-ordinated development plan. SEEDS contrasts the different 
approaches of the British and French Governments: 
'....the U.K. government seems to regard the Tunnel part of the project as 
the first priority, and the road and rail infrastructure as secondary....In 
contrast, the French government regard the completion of the TGV i.e. 
development of the overall rail infrastructure, as a priority. The Tunnel is 
seen as an inter-dependent part of an integrated transport strategy.' 
(SEEDS 1989, P.9) 
SEEDS is in agreement with SERPLAN's (1989) conclusion that the Tunnel on its own 
will have only a marginal impact on the South East, since real reductions in transport costs 
will be negligible. The positive effects created by the Tunnel as identified in the LCCI 
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report (1989), seem lo be at odds with the more modest impact predicted by SERPLAN 
and SEEDS. 
The Literature Review will now focus attention on the implications of the Tunnel for the 
more peripheral UK regions. The perceived inadequate nature of the supporting transport 
network and the heavily criticised plans for international passenger services are again 
highlighted. 
2.2.2. The Potential Impact on the "North" 
This section will focus attention on the common fears and hopes for the more peripheral 
Uk regions, as expressed in the regional consultants* reports. Several issues are considered 
to be of prime importance, namely: the adequacy of the railway infrastructure and the 
proposed level of international services; the "double-edged" nature of improved 
accessibility; and the "Third Market" effect. Since the latter two are affected by the level 
of service provision and the general quality of the railway infrastructure, this issue requires 
investigation first. Related to the question of railway infrastructure and service provision, 
is the perceived opportunity to develop the "landbridge" market. The landbridge concept, 
for both transatlantic and Irish freight, has been advanced by Pieda (1989a&b) mainly for 
the Port of Liverpool, but their argument is applicable to all west coast pons. The short 
term impact of the Tunnel on the regions will also be examined before looking at the long-
term effects of increased foreign competition. 
Rail links to the "North" 
Regional consultancy reports are highly critical of BR's attitude towards international rail 
services for regions to the north and west of London. BR*s proposals, published in 
December 1989, for International Rail Services for the United Kingdom' fall short of 
expectations cited in the numerous regional reports (1989b). The Section 40 consultation 
process further highlights the limitations of BR's proposed international services for 
regions outside the South East, albeit due to the strict financial remit imposed on BR by 
the present GovemmenL It is generally regarded that the level of railway infrastructure and 
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service provision beyond London will restrict development pressures radiating out from 
the Tunnel: 
*A major concern with the infrastructural plans relating to the Channel 
Tunnel is that inadequate links with the North will severely limit any 
benefits from the Channel Tunnel.* 
(CLES, 1989. P.43) 
The proposed denationalization of BR also casts considerable doubt over existing plans for 
international services but this will be examined in detail in chapter 4. 
Nonetheless, Pieda correctly points out that the economic impact of the Tunnel will 
ultimately: 
.depend upon decisions made by indigenous firms and 'outside' firms in 
response to the new pattern of costs and competitiveness generated by the 
Tunnel.* 
(Pieda 1989b, P.5) 
However, the reactions of the business community throughout the UK will be determined 
by the level of service provision and the quality of the rail infrastructure, Alastair Morton 
(1988). Co-Chairman of Eurotunnel, in his speech at 'The Channel Tunnel Conference: 
Making the Most of the Link in the North', argued vehemently about the limitations of the 
rail network. To realise the potential created by the Tunnel, Monon believes that the North 
will require: the high speed rail link between London and Cheriion; better across-London 
rail links to the North; the development of intermodal road-rail interchanges, planned at 
the regional level; and further investigation into iniermodal technology. As outlined by BR 
(1989b), advances in intermodal technology/facilities have been made but the postponement 
of the high-speed rail link and poor across-London rail links are still a cause of much 
concern: 
'National government must recognise the crucial importance of enabling key 
rail infrastructure improvements to come about in the interests of economic 
prosperity.' 
(Morton 1988, P.6) 
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However, as pointed out by Gibb and Smith (1991), the Ove Arup east of London route 
could prove to be more advantageous to the peripheral UK regions, as compared to the 
rejected "New Kent Main Line" (NKML). The East London route incoiporates better links 
with the East and West Coast Main lines, i f not to the South West (see chapter 8). The 
East London route also encompasses a freight dimension which the N K M L failed to do. 
But the Ove Arup proposal is still in the draft stage and a long way from receiving 
Parliamentary approval. 
In a report commissioned by the Scottish Development Agency, Pieda re-asserts the 
importance of rail freight to regional manufacturers: 
'....exploiting the advantages of the Channel Tunnel is, for Scottish firms, 
synonymous with exploiting the advantages of enhanced rail freight 
services.* 
(Pieda 1989a, P.47) 
The advantages offered by the Tunnel for passenger traffic and road-hauled freight 
originating from beyond London are seen to be negligible. The Tunnel has been heralded 
for its employment creating opportunities but as CLES (1989) states, such optimism 
assumes that exporting companies will be encouraged to export freight by rail and that 
other companies will be persuaded to enter the export market. Post-1993, the rail industry 
wil l be in a position to achieve economies of scale with the direct haulage of freight to all 
the major cities in continental Europe. Railfreight Distribution, BR's freight division, will 
be able to offer quicker and more reliable services at much lower rates of tariff. Pieda 
(1989a), however, points out that continental firms have already 'geared up* to rail freight 
and so pose a real threat to the regions. The criteria for Section 8 grants which enable 
companies to attract up to 60 percent of Government financial assistance for private rail 
freight facilities have proven to be too strict (see chapter 4). Very few companies have 
successfully applied for the grant, thus companies in the UK compared to companies on 
the Continent are much less likely to operate their own private rail freight facilities, 
CLES (1989), and the other regional studies, have echoed the calls by Alastair Morton for 
Government and related public bodies to guarantee that adequate rail infrastructure is 
provided for regions north and west of London. It would be impracticable here to list the 
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problems as perceived by the consultants' reports with the rail infrastructure and service 
offered by BR. Nonetheless, this issue is of fundamental importance to each region. CLES 
(1989) regards the Tunnel as potentially a major contributor or antidote to the North-South 
divide. Inadequate rail services to the North could therefore exaggerate the economic 
disparity that exists between the South East and the rest of the UK. 
BR (1989b&c) is aware of the vast opportunities offered by the Tunnel for the 
development of inward toiuism and increased trade for British commerce and industry. 
However, BR quite rightly emphasizes its responsibility, under Section 42 of the 1987 
Channel Tunnel Act, to operate international services on a fully commercial basis, with no 
subsidies available from public funds. Therefore, certain parameters have to be placed on 
any proposed investment, namely an eight percent annual rate of retum. BR, unlike SNCF, 
is restricted by Section 42, setting-up a classic Catch-22 situation. BR has to base its plans 
on existing demand, while the commissioned regional reports state that better service 
provision would create its own demand. This argument would seem to be supported by the 
financial success of the provincial TGV services in France, i.e. TGV Sud Est (see: Berlioz 
et, al. 1985, Frybourg and Moisi 1985, Bonnafous 1987). NOERC therefore concludes that: 
'The North is likely, once again, to be trapped by the classic 'chicken and 
egg' situation. The regions cannot justify investment due to the high 
demand criteria practised by BR and yet due to a consistent lack of 
investment over many years the rail system offers little attraction, 
particularly to Northern companies.' 
(NOERC 1988, P.8) 
In fact, Pieda (1989b) regards BR's passenger forecasts as too low for the North West 
region, arguing that they should be increased by one third. Pieda was even more critical 
of BR's forecasts for unitised freight traffic, believing them to be 'extremely low'. The 
North West could represent the most important region in the UK for international rail 
freight services since a quarter of the UK market lies within 40 miles of Manchester. 
NOERC (1988) could only conclude that inadequate rail links would further peripheralise 
the North. The results from two surveys of regional business communities, carried out 
independently by BR and NOERC, support NOERC's conclusion and highlight the need 
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for a massive programme of investment in the rail network. From the preliminary results 
of BR's survey, NOERC shows that: 
45% of companies considered more rail investment would be required, 
44% considered more localised customs facilities would be necessary, and 
46% considered more road investment would be needed. 
BR did respond to these results by establishing a system of regional freight depots with 
customs facilities but the Section 40 consultation process re-affirms the perceived 
inadequacy of BR's international services, for both passenger and freight traffic. The above 
results show that neariy half of the companies surveyed believe they will be disadvantaged 
in some way. As a consequence of the extreme inflexibility of BR's investment criteria, 
CLES is pessimistic about the prospects for the regions: 
'....there seems to be little indication that BR will be able to make the 
necessary improvements although this will depend to some extent on the 
ability of the northern regions to continue to successfully lobby BR and to 
raise public awareness of their cause.' 
(CLES 1989, P.47) 
In conjunction with the perceived inadequate provision of rail infrastructure and services, 
load gauge differences between the UK and the Continent are also seen as reducing the 
relative accessibility of the North (Pieda 1989a). Backler's Ph.D thesis (Backler 1982) 
estimates that a Berne gauge trunk route would cost only £20,000 per mile (at 1983 
prices). Pieda is therefore dubious of BR's calculations that priced a Berne gauge trunk 
route from London to Scotland at £1,600 million, equalling £4 million per mile. A Berne 
gauge trunk route serving all the regions of Britain would be the optimal solution for the 
regions. Unfortunately for the North this is highly unlikely. Private wagon hire companies 
have examined the possibility of establishing a single gauge route, connecting the Tunnel 
to the main industrial centres of Britain, with extra vertical clearance to cover the 2.5 
metre width of a road trailer (NUR 1987). The NUR identifies a potential 'Intermodal 
Corridor', from the Tunnel to Glasgow, which meets the necessary criterion, where Leeds 
would act as the linchpin for intermodal activity to the North and South. This proposal has 
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remained at the draft stage even though EC funds could be used to partly finance the cost 
of such a massive undertaking. 
Therefore, under present legislation, there seems to be little hope that the expectations of 
regional interest groups will be satisfied: 
'Let us say to the Government that i f they do not take proper notice of the 
lessons offered by the French to exploit the Tunnel and give BR a greater 
ability to fulf i l its potential for the whole nation, then we may see an 
erosion of economic disparities in France accelerating the parallel disparities 
on our side of the Channel.' 
(NOERC 1988, P.9) 
The Government has ignored the calls by regional interest groups for improved rail 
services, believing current proposals to be more than adequate. The Government's refusal 
to allow rail investment criteria to encompass social and environmental considerations, and 
the generative demand effect of new services is likely to affect adversely the regions, more 
so than the South East. The fear that London will act as an effective barrier against any 
benefits created by the Tunnel being spread to the "North", as a result of an inadequate 
transport network, becomes ever more realistic as 1993 approaches. The present perception 
of regional interest groups is that the Government is not doing enough to ensure that such 
benefits are spread evenly around the regions. Increased investment in the rail network is 
considered necessary for regions outside the South East to benefit fully from the Tunnel, 
since infrastructural limitations and inadequate services could prevent companies realising 
the advantages of reduced journey times and cost to the Continent, The long-term impact 
of the Tunnel depends ultimately on the reactions of the business community. Therefore, 
if companies perceive international rail services as inadequate, regions to the north and 
west of London will not be a position to maximise the opportunities created. The delays 
associated with the high-speed rail link, poor across-London rail links and the lack of 
private sidings in the UK, will place constraints on the potential offered by the Tunnel. 
These, and other infrastructural limitations, will directly affect international rail services, 
and thus the regionalisation of Tunnel benefits. 
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Chapter 4 examines the legislative and policy framework of the Tunnel and related 
transport infrastructure in more detail. However, it is now appropriate to concentrate on 
several particular issues that have implications for most, i f not all, regions; these are, the 
"Landbridge" concept, the short-term impact, the "double-edged" nature of improved 
accessibility, and the "Third Market" impact. 
The landbridge market 
Related to the level and quality of railway services and infrastructure, is the 'Landbridge* 
concept. Pieda (1989b) is of the opinion that the Tunnel will offer opportunities for a 
landbridge service for high value North Atlantic traffic, but volumes are estimated to be 
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small. However, an 'Irish Landbridge', from the ports of Liverpool and Holyhead, is seen 
as offering more potential. 
'A 'lajidbridge' is typically an overiand haul of freight which would 
otherwise have made the journey by sea.' 
(Pieda 1989b, P.68) 
Since the Pon of Liverpool is the closest landfall port to North America, Pieda maintains 
that the Tunnel could make Liverpool more attractive as a hub port for North Atlantic 
container traffic. Hub ports generate considerable vessel time savings for shipping lines 
over muUiport itineraries, although transhipment times to fmal destinations are longer. 
Furthermore, once a landbridge service is established, economies of scale would also make 
Liverpool more attractive to container traffic from Central and South America. However, 
shipping lines remain sceptical that the Tunnel would significantly alter the economics of 
US-European container traffic to such an extent that a hub port, such as Liverpool, would 
be financially preferable or logisiically superior to a multiport itinerary. The basis of the 
Liverpool landbridge concept, as advanced by Pieda (1989b), is that shipping lines would 
save on steaming time over other European pons and, in particular, over Rotterdam, 
approximately 12 hours. Pieda's analysis shows that Liverpool could compete on time but 
not on cost, for both Atlantic and Irish traffic. In addition, the threat of the reverse 
landbridge effect was 'briefly' referred to: 
'The danger for UK ports is that the Channel Tunnel could result in a 
reverse landbridge effect, with UK import and expon containers being 
moved by rail to Continental ports and a reduction in calls at UK pons by 
transaUantic container carriers.' 
(Pieda 1989b, P.85) 
BR is not impressed by the landbridge concept, and so no specific Rail Freight services 
will be allocated to accommodate any transatlantic container traffic. 
'These (landbridges) were discussed at all working parties with major West 
or South Coast deep sea port interests. It was acknowledged that ports on 
the West Coast of Great Britain which already attract trans- atiantic calls 
could, in combination with the Tunnel, offer a time advantage over direct 
shipping between the United States and mainland Europe....However, it was 
agreed that the likely economics of deep sea shipping compared with 
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movement overland make it improbable that large volumes of traffic would 
pass through British ports in this way.' 
(BR 1989c, P.6) 
The scope for a dedicated rail service for a transatlantic cargo from west coast ports to the 
Continent would seem limited but the potential to develop an Irish landbridge market can 
not be totally disregarded. As with iniemaiional services to the regions. BR. under 
Government guidelines, are unable to base investment decisions on future demand levels. 
The current market is too small to justify a dedicated service but the SEM is likely to 
increase Irish trade with the rest of the Community. An Irish landbridge market could 
therefore be a realistic possibility in the long-term but only i f necessary investment is 
forthcoming. 
The shon-cerm impact 
Due to reasons of political acceptability, the CTG (1985a) announced that the South East 
would only receive 7.25 percent of the construction contracts, with 65 percent being placed 
in the Midlands. However, CLES (1989). utilising work carried out by Vickerman (1989). 
shows thai, by January 1989. the South East accounted for 40 percent, by value, of the 
£451 million of UK-placed contracts of over £50.000. The Midlands received only 14 
percent of such orders but Scotland and the Nonh accounted for 17 and 19 percent 
respectively. Contracts for rolling stock and locomotives have now been predominately 
won by the Midland's engineering industries. 
CLES supports Vickerman's conclusion that in any event the distribution of construction 
orders throughout the country would be spread too thinly to be of any real significance; 
'....the benefits from construction are only expected to have a short-run 
effect and it is unlikely that they will be concentrated enough to lead to an 
upturn in regional activity in any one region.' 
(CLES 1989. P.IO) 
From the CTG's (1985b) calculations, the North and North West would probably gain 
respectively only 780 and 230 jobs in 1989. as a result of construction orders. Furthermore, 
the NUR (1987) estimates that only 1000 jobs will be created in die rail industry by 
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mid-1993 for the whole of the UK. Therefore, CLES could only conclude that the 
short-term impact would at best be limited: 
'....the total job creation benefits for the North resulting from the building 
of the Tunnel and additional infrastructural projects are likely to remain on 
a small scale.* 
(CLES 1989. P.IO) 
The Government's pre-occupation with highlighting the construction benefits of the Tunnel 
for all UK regions has been based on political expediency not economic reality. More 
attention should have been placed on the long-term impact, particularly the threat posed 
by Continental imports in local and "Third" markets. 
The "double-edged sword" 
The construction benefits of the Tunnel are therefore too thinly spread to be of any real 
significance to the more peripheral UK regions. Other than the constraints imposed on 
these regions by an inadequate transport infrastructure, increased import penetration by 
continental companies poses a serious threat to their already depressed economies. The 
Tunnel is expected to improve the efficiency and competitiveness of all UK manufactures, 
as a result of increased accessibility to European markets. However, as regional reports 
correctly point out it is relative, and not absolute, accessibility changes that are of 
fundamental importance to the regions (see for example: NOERC 1988, CLES 1989. Pieda 
1989a&b). The Henley Centre (see: Ormerod 1988 - a paper presented at 'The Channel 
Tunnel Conference - Making die Most of the Link in the North'),-analyzed trade flows to 
and from the Continent in textiles, metal manufacturing, chemical and mechaiiical 
engineering. Two clear qualitative statements are made: 
'First, the North would suffer a decline in prosperity relative to the South. 
Second, some industries concentrated in the North would suffer absolute 
declines in output' 
(Onnerod 1988, P.2 ) 
Such definite predictions conflict sharply with the Government's view that the Tunnel will 
be 'good' for Britain as a whole. Of the four sectors, textiles and metal manufacturing are 
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the most concentrated in the North. The Henley Centre found that with a hypothesized one 
percent reduction in costs, as a result of the Tunnel, there would be a negative effect on 
the balance of trade in these products. However, chemicals and mechanical engineering, 
less prominent but still important in the North, are expected to benefit from a reduction 
in costs. A telephone survey also carried out by the Henley Centre (1988) indicates that 
the South would benefit more from the Tunnel than the North, and that even though the 
North is not expected to suffer comprehensive losses, some detrimental effects are 
perceived. The Henley Centre therefore concludes that: 
These two methods of analysis show that the Channel Tunnel will lead to 
a further widening of the gap in prosperity between the North of England 
and the South East.' 
(Ormerod 1988, P.3) 
Pieda (1989b) believes that for British and European exporters the opportunities are 
'symmetrical' but fears that, since European firms already 'geared-up' to rail distribution, 
the outcome to be not so symmetrical. 
'Regional differences in 'import impact' are likely to arise only to the 
extent that industries vulnerable to foreign competition are concentrated in 
particular regions.' 
(Pieda 1989b, P.7) 
The "double-edged" nature of improved accessibility will also affect tourism to peripheral 
regions. An increased number of tourists from near European countries wil l visit the more 
peripheral UK regions but the reverse is also true, with: 
'.,..an increase in UK residents taking short-break holidays on the near 
Continent, possibly at the expense of traditional short-break destinations in 
the UK.' 
(Pieda 1989b, P,12) 
Peripheral UK regions with daytime international services to and from the Continent are 
likely to fair better in terms of the number of foreign visitors to their regions. The South 
West, however, wil l have to rely on a single nighttime service to and from the region. 
Nonetheless, the real threat is posed by the proportion of domestic tourists from the South 
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East who usually travel to the West Country, the Lake District, the Scottish Highlands etc., 
Uiat will be encouraged to take future excursions^olidays on the Continent. Thus, even for 
the tourism industry, the "Third Market" effect is of prime importance. 
The "Third Market" impact 
"Third market effects' within the UK will operate to the disadvantage of 
the North West.' 
(Pieda, 1989b, P.8) 
Since European firms will become more competitive in all UK regions, peripheral 
regions' industries may not only lose contracts within their own regions but, more 
importanUy, they could also lose contracts within other UK domestic markets. This is 
particularly important in relation to the South East market because of the scale of that 
market in the UK context. Pieda believes that: 
'....the adverse impact of the Tunnel on the relative competitiveness of 
Scottish fuTTis in this market (the South East) would certainly be increased 
if a 'continental railhead' with a Berne Gauge link to the Tunnel was 
established in the South East.' 
(Pieda 1989b, P.46) 
A high-speed rail link between London and the Tunnel portal will improve the accessibility 
of continental companies to the South East relative to the more peripheral UK 
manufacturers. This is likely to accentuate the "Third Market" impact. However, it must 
be stressed that the regions have continually argued in favour of the high-speed rail link 
(Knowles et. al. 1989, Farrington et. al. 1990). For the regions to the north and west of 
London, the high-speed rail link is vital to spread the opportunities created by the Tunnel, 
namely improved access to continental markets. Even though the writer is of the opinion 
that the "Third Market" impact is of fundamental imponance to peripheral regional 
economies, it has thus far failed to receive the attention necessary. Chapter 8 will focus 
attention on the "double-edged" nature of improved accessibility and the "Third Market" 
impact. 
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The "Nonh": a summary 
The inadequate nature of Britain's railway network has dominated the majority of regional 
reports. In addition, BR's proposals for international services to the regions, outside the 
South East, are strongly condemned. A less stringent financial remit would allow BR to 
employ investment strategies conunonplace on the Continent; instead of waiting for an 
identified demand, BR could attempt to reproduce the success experienced by SNCF in 
terms of their TGV services. Hopes of developing a landbridge market from one of 
Britain's west coast pons seem to have faded as a result of the lack of forthcoming 
investment. More importantly, the threat of increased foreign competition in domestic 
markets will have serious repercussions on Britain's manufacturing industry. Nonetheless, 
the impact of the Tunnel on regions to the north and west of London will depend 
ultimately on the reactions of the business community to the challenges created by the 
Tunnel, even though some would argue that the North has to compete from a 
disadvantaged position. 
2.3. Conclusion 
This Literature Review has highlighted the considerable degree of uncertainty that still 
exists about the economic impact of the Tunnel, especially at the regional level. The 
Government's rather ambiguous assertion that the Tunnel will be 'good' for the UK as a 
whole (Jones 1987) does not stand up to too much scrutiny. There is an obvious case for 
national and/or regional impact studies to be carried-out. allowing each region to maximise 
the advantages offered by the Tunnel and minimise any adverse effects. The hypothesis 
of the present thesis states that the Tunnel could bring about a narrowing of the North-
South divide. But it is also recognised that this opportunity to revitalise the economic 
fortunes of the more peripheral UK regions will be missed as a result of the Government's 
policy of inaction. A considerable amount of original data will be generated to support any 
conclusions reached in the current research project. 
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Through increased efficiency and reduced operating costs, the Tunnel is expected to 
improve the competitiveness of British products in continental markets and thus, spread 
employment opportunities throughout the UK (CTG 1985b, Eurotunnel 1987, Banham 
1988). The review of the literature at the national level examined these suggested benefits 
and questioned their magnitude. However, it did not doubt the overall significance of 
improved accessibility to the Continent for British manufacturers. It is therefore important 
to model the impact of the Tunnel on regional accessibility, distinguishing between 
absolute and relative accessibility (see chapter 3). 
Most relevant publications point to the inadequate state of Britain's transport network, 
regarding the over-congested rail network in Kent and the planned level of international 
services to the more peripheral UK regions as a threat to the spreading of any benefits 
created by the Tunnel (Campaign for the North 1981, NUR 1987, NOERC 1988, CLES 
1989, KCC 1989, Pieda 1989a&b, TCPA 1990). The case for a high-speed rail link 
between London and the Tunnel portal is constantly put forward by regional interest 
groups. However, except for the Section 40 consultation process, the Government has 
avoided any form of intervention (TCPA 1990). The absence of any form of strategic 
planning adopted by the Government has led to the series of problems and delays now 
associated with the high-speed rail link. 
The Section 40 consultation process underlines the gulf that exists between perceived 
regional needs and identified commercial possibilities for BR (Knowles et. al. 1989, 
Farrington et. al. 1990). Pieda (1989a&b) correctly argues that the more peripheral UK 
regions are caught in a Catch-22 situation because decades of under-investment have 
prevented existing demand levels justifying extra services or investment. TTie policy and 
legislative environment of the Tunnel is examined in depth in chapter 4, including rail 
policy during the 1980s and eariy 1990s. 
It is feared that as a result of an inadequate supporting transport network, the Tunnel will 
lead to a further weakening of the more peripheral regional economies: 
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*..,.the positive employment effects of the Channel Tunnel are likely to be 
outweighed by the longer term disadvantages that the North is likely to 
suffer....' 
(CLES 1989. P.2) 
CLES are particularly pessinustic about the prospects of the o-aditional. stagnating or 
declining, northern industries, such as textiles and mechanical engineering. The Henley 
Centre (1988) also regards the future of these o-aditional industties as unfavourable but 
sees the Tunnel, and not an inadequate transport infrastructure, as leading to a further 
decline of these industries. The Tunnel is expected through improved accessibility to the 
Continent, and thus lower costs, to work to the detriment of the more uncompetitive 
o-aditional industries, as European imports increase. Uncompetitive industries in the UK 
and on the Continent are likely to face more intense competition as a result of the SEM, 
more so than the Tunnel, with the removal of 'al l ' artificial barriers to trade, including 
State subsidies. Vickerman and Flowerdew (1990) believe that the Tunnel is regionally 
'neutral', improving accessibility for all UK regions. However, an inadequate supporting 
o-ansport network could prevent the more peripheral UK regions from benefitting from 
improved accessibility to the Continent; while the South East's proximity to the major 
European markets will be further enhanced by the Tunnel (NOERC 1988. CLES 1989). 
The over-congested transport systems in the South East poses as much of a threat to 
peripheral UK manufacturers as companies within the South East. Regional interest groups 
therefore call for the Tunnel to be incorporated in an integrated infrastructure-led growth 
plan for the regions, removing any barriers, such as across-London rail links, to economic 
development in the North (Campaign for the North 1981. NOERC 1988, CLES 1989, 
Pieda 1989a&b, TCPA 1990). 
The perceived threat from the Continent for both the "North" and "South", as a result of 
the Tunnel, also receives attention in regional consultancy reports and academic articles. 
Within the South East, the prospect of companies relocating to the near Continent has 
almost been completely ruled out (SEEDS 1989, SERPLAN 1989). However. Simmons 
(1989) presents a strong case why companies in the South East, and the UK in general, 
could be attracted to the northern region of France. The Nord-Pas de Calais Regional 
Council has ensured that the Tunnel will form only a part of the good international 
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transport links which will radiate out from the region. Considerable investment has also 
been directed at the region's industrial base, with sizeable areas of land developed into 
business paries and industrial estates. Nonetheless, the threat of companies migrating to the 
near Continent is not considered to be serious. A southwards drift of industry within the 
UK, again as a result of the Tunnel, is also seen as unlikely. The questionnaire survey 
undertaken for the current research project examined this issue in more detail (see chapters 
6 and 7). 
In addition, the continental threat encompasses increased import penetration in both local 
and "Third" markets. The Tunnel will improve accessibility between the UK and the 
Continent in both directions. Continental companies will therefore become more 
competitive in the UK as British companies expect to become more competitive on the 
Continent (Eurotunnel and BR 1988). The "double-edged" nature of improved accessibility 
is seen to work particularly against the more peripheral UK regions. However, turning the 
above argument in on itself, regions could be 'insulated' from increased foreign 
competitiveness as a consequence of inadequate transpon infrastructure and services. The 
"Far South West", in terms of transport links, is one of the most isolated regions from the 
Tunnel. Chapter 8 will explore the potential opportunities and problems created by the 
Tunnel in Devon and Cornwall. The "Third Market" impact could therefore prove to be 
a more serious concem, particularly for the more peripheral UK regions. 
However, the overall regional economic impact of the Tunnel will ultimately depend on 
the reactions of the business community. Pieda highlights the significance of companies' 
reactions for Scotiand: 
'It follows that i f Scottish firms do not take where appropriate, positive 
action, there is a high probability tiiat the economic impact of the Tunnel 
will be adverse so far as Scotland is concerned. Scotiand would stand to 
lose in terms of domestic market share and market share in 'third markets'.' 
(Pieda 1989b, P.47) 
Dourmashkin (1989) is in agreement with Pieda (1989b), that for (Scottish) industry to 
maximise any advantages from the Tunnel there would have to be a switch from road to 
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rail hauled freight. Gossop tries to focus on *how the Tunnel could "boost" the regions' 
but is aware that: 
^Without suitable action to counteract it, the Channel Tunnel will lead to a 
further widening of the gap between south and north - though with London 
rather than Watford as the dividing line.' 
(Gossop 1987, P.330) 
The short-term construction benefits of the Tunnel for the more peripheral UK regions 
have been shown to be much less than as originally suggested by the Government (CLES 
1989, Vickerman 1989a). The regional potential of the Tunnel dictates that an adequate 
supporting transpon network needs to be in place by 1993. This is now extremely unlikely. 
Gossop (1987) criticizes the Government's 'hands-off attitude to the spreading of the 
benefits created by the Tunnel, echoing calls from the TCPA (1990), and numerous other 
organisations, for a 'UK Impact Study'. 
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CHAPTER 3: ECONOMIC POTENTIAL ANALYSIS 
Economic Potential Analysis is employed for the first time by the present study to quantify 
the impact of the rail-only Tunnel on regional accessibility within the UK and on the 
Continent. The conventional understanding that the South East will be the main beneficiary 
from the Tunnel is questioned. The results of the study provide strong empirical evidence 
to support this approach. The originality of both the Model and its findings represent the 
theoretical foundations of the present thesis. 
First the main aims of the model are outlined. Then Economic Potential Analysis is 
defined and its use justified. Also the methodology supporting the earlier study by Keeble, 
Owens and Thompson (1982a) wil l be set out, although emphasis is placed on the results 
and conclusions derived from this research. The potential model employed in the present 
thesis will then be discussed and the results analyzed. The effect of the Tunnel on regional 
accessibility within the EC in general will be briefly examined. However, the analysis of 
the results will focus on the likely impact of the Tunnel on the UK regional economic 
structure; namely, the "North-South" divide. A critique of the methodology will then 
follow, outlining the specific technical problems encountered when setting-up the model. 
The conclusion will identify policy implications, suggesting any possible courses of action 
that may be necessary. 
However, before proceeding to evaluate the Potential Model, it is important to summarise 
briefly the vast field of regional economic development theory and its relevance to the 
present thesis. On the whole, regional development theory can be divided into either 
equilibrium or disequilibrium theories. Both schools of thought have far reaching 
implications for regional policy. The present Conservative administration is strongly 
influenced by neo-classical economics, favouring non-interventionist and laissez faire 
policies. As will be discussed in detail in chapter 4, the Government has adopted a 'market 
solutions' strategy for the Tunnel itself and associated regional economic impacts. 
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3.1A. Regional Development Philosophy 
It is not possible here to provide a full analytical account of regional economic 
development theory. This section will outline the two main schools of thought and discuss 
briefly their relevance to regional policy and Channel Tunnel issues. Attention focuses first 
on neo-classical equilibrium theory before concentrating on the basic "Core-Periphery" 
model, which attempts to explain the causation process of regional inequality. 
Regional equilibrium theory asserts that in the long-term regional economies will converge. 
Central to this theory is the belief that the self-correcting mechanism of the marketplace 
will result in regional economic equilibrium. However, equilibrium theory, and neo-
classical economics in general, is dependent on assumptions which depart from the real 
worid. Historical evidence also suggests that regional economies do not converge through 
the free play of market forces (Armstrong and Taylor 1985). 
Myrdal (1957) questioned equilibrium theory, believing that Multiplier effects would 
accentuate regional inequalities. Myrdal's theory of 'Cumulative Causation' shows how 
flows of capital, labour and goods, through 'backwash' or 'polarisation' effects, work to 
the disadvantage of weaker peripheral economies. Although 'Spread' effects are identified, 
which could lead to regional convergence, Myrdal concluded that the core region was 
unlikely to stimulate economic development in the periphery. Instead Myrdal believed that 
the periphery would suffer a 'vicious circle' of decline: i.e. labour migration to the core 
causes consumption to decrease in the periphery, which in turn leads to the contraction of 
existing industry and the reduced likelihood of new industrial activity locating within the 
area. 
Hirschman (1958) was more optimistic, stating that, even though divergence is initially 
inevitable, 'trickle down' (or 'spread') effects would bring about regional economic 
convergence: 
'thereby firmly establishing the movement towards equilibrium.' 
(Pinder 1983, P.27) 
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Certain regions benefitting fi-om comparative advantage will develop first but through 
external stimulation, the core region is expected to encourage growth within the periphery. 
Hirschman, however, considered regional equilibrium possible only i f there existed 
complimentarity between regions, to the extent that the core was to an important degree 
reliant on the periphery. As Pinder (1983) points out, the liberalisation of International 
trade and modem transportation systems mean that polarisation effects are likely to 
dominate. In which case, Hirschman predicted a prolonged division between a 'progressive 
and a depressed area' (Pinder 1983; after Hirschman 1958). This would seem to be 
reflected by the apparent similarity between the economic divisions experienced in the UK 
during 1930s and the present "North-South divide", with the important exception of the 
West Midlands (Armstrong and Taylor 1985). On the otherhand, the present Government 
argues that the static nature of regional imbalance signifies the failure of traditional 
regional policy to alleviate regional inequalities. 
The 1944 White Paper on Employment Policy represents the start of a concerted 
Government regional intervention. Traditional regional policy incorporated both "carrot and 
stick" measures, by means of financial incentives to encourage development in Assisted 
Areas and strict controls on the location of new manufacturing and office investment. 
Moore, Rhodes and Tyler (1986) estimate that regional policy led directly to the creation 
of 784,000 jobs in Assisted Areas between 1960 and 1981, with over 600,000 still in 
existence in 1981. However, as pointed out above, regional divisions in the UK have 
remained fairiy constant. The post-1979 Conservative Government did not consider 
traditional regional policy as cost-effective (Armstrong and Taylor 1985). Controls on the 
location of industry were withdrawn, Assisted Area status was granted only to "hard core" 
problem regions and the regional policy budget was to be cut from £700 million in 
1983/84 to £400 million by 1987. The Government's neo-classical/monetarist philosophy 
meant that the factors of demand and supply were expected to bring about regional 
economic convergence, not State intervention. A strong correlation can be drawn between 
the present Government's regional policy, and economic policy as a whole, and their 
'market solutions' strategy towards the Tunnel (see chapter 4). 
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While recognition of regional development theory is important, this research project is 
concerned with examining the specific impact of a new transportation system, namely the 
Tunnel, on the existing regional economic structure of the UK. Economic Potential 
Analysis allows the impact of the Tunnel on regional accessibility to be quantified, while 
the broad nature of regional development theory could only permit wide sweeping 
generalisations to be made with respect to the effect of the Tunnel on the "North-South 
divide". Furthermore, any attempt to apply regional development theory would be fraught 
with difficulties, since as Law (1980, P.15) states: 
'In the field of regional development theory there is no universally accepted 
model, but only a collection of ill-fitting ideas.' 
A major criticism of both Myrdal's and Hirschman's theories, and regional development 
theory in general, is that inter-regional systems are treated as a 'set of spaceless points 
separated by unspecified distances' (Richardson 1973). The Economic Potential Model 
employed in this thesis will relate inter-regional rail freight journey times to Gross 
Domestic Product values for 90 regions, within seven EC countries. 
The remaining sections of this chapter will focus entirely on Economic Potential Analysis, 
setting out the methodology supporting the Model and examining the results generated. 
First, however, the main aims of the Potential Model will be outlined. 
3.1B. Aim of the Model 
Two eariier attempts to quantify the regional economic impact of the Tunnel both 
concluded that the South East would experience significantly higher gains in economic 
potential compared to regions to the north and west of London (Clark et. al. 1969, Keeble 
et. al. 1982a). Both studies employ Economic Potential Analysis to highlight the 
divergence in relative accessibility gains between UK and continental regions. It is shown 
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that the South East records the highest increases in absolute and relative accessibility, thus 
possessing greatest potential for economic development. 
Contrary to Keeble et, al.'s (1982a) findings, it is hypothesized in the present thesis that 
the rail-only Tunnel will have a beneficial effect on the more peripheral UK regions. The 
aims of the Model are therefore twofold: firstly, to compare and contrast the conclusions 
reached by Keeble et. al. (1982a) with the findings of the current study; and secondly, to 
interpret the implications of these findings in accordance with the legislative and policy 
framework. 
Keeble el al.'s analysis (1982a) needs a critical updating for several reasons. Firstly, they 
argue that the incorporation of 'shortest road distance' as a measure of the distance factor 
(see Potential equation, P.56) was the most appropriate at the time of study. However, the 
Tunnel project, awarded to the Eurotunnel Consortium in 1986, involves the construction 
of a twin-bore rail tunnel. It is true that the Tunnel will provide a quicker and more 
reliable mode of transport for road hauliers via the high frequency Shuttle service or 
'rolling road'. But EC legislation on permitted daily driving hours will considerably reduce 
any time savings because of its requirement for rest periods. So while ferry services take 
longer they do provide the opportunity to take a legally recognised rest period. Therefore, 
any advantages gained by road hauliers as a result of the Tunnel are likely to be limited. 
Thus, the railway, not the road, wil l allow regions to benefit fi i i iy from improved relative 
accessibility to the Continent. 
Secondly, more than 75 percent of UK freight destined for European markets originates 
from outside the South East, with up to 25 percent coming from within a 40 mile radius 
of Manchester (Gossop 1987, BR 1989b, Dourmashkin 1989, Pieda 1989a&b). Therefore, 
improved links with the Continent should not only prove to be of considerable benefit to 
the South East but to the rest of the UK as well. Finally, railway economics dictates that 
rail freight, as compared to road haulage, becomes increasingly competitive over distances 
in excess of 250/300 kms (Pieda 1989a&b). The Tunnel will join the UK and continental 
railway networks, reducing the peripheral nature of some of the UK's more distant regions 
to the European market. Thus, rail freight should become relatively more attractive to 
- 6 1 -
companies in these more peripheral regions than their counterparts in the South East, 
especially in terms of exports to the near Continent. 
It is therefore hypothesized that certain peripheral UK regions will experience increases 
in relative accessibility similar to or higher than the South East. Since more freight for the 
Continent originates from outside the South East, the "North" will gain comparatively 
more. However, it is worth pointing out here that due to data limitations, it was not 
possible to reflect the pattern of UK regional trade with the Continent in the potential 
equation (see Section 3.4). Instead, regional Gross Domestic Product (GDP) values are 
incorporated into the current model. The critique (Section 3.7) will discuss the limitations 
of the data in more detail, as well as other methodological problems. 
3.2. Economic Potential 
Economic potential is a measure of the nearness or accessibility of a given volume of 
economic activity to a particular point/region and can be interpreted as the volume of 
economic activity to which a region has access, after the cost/time of covering the distance 
to that activity has been accounted for (Clark et. al. 1969, Rich 1980, Keeble et. al. 
1982a,b&c). Potential analysis is closely related to the Gravity Model, in that botii relate 
mass (the volume of economic activity or population) to distance. The gravity model is 
primarily concerned with analyzing the actual pattern of spatial flows, whereas 'the 
potential model is more concerned with the opportunity for interaction between groups, 
created by their size and location, than with interaction itself (Rich 1980). 
The concept of regional potential was first proposed by Stewart (1947) in his analysis of 
the distribution of population in the United States in 1940. Harris (1954) adapted potential 
analysis to study industrial location and regional development. Clark, Wilson and Bradley 
(1969) were the first to apply economic potential to locational issues in a European 
context, measuring the attractiveness, in terms of accessibility, of different regions to 
manufacturers, as well as the likely effect on this accessibility of an enlarged Customs 
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Union. More recent work has been carried-oul under the auspices of the 'EEC 
Centrality-Peripherality Project' (Keeble, Owens and Thompson 1982b). 
The potential model employed in the current research project calculates the impact of the 
Tunnel on the relative accessibility of UK and continental regions; thus regional proximity 
to economic activity is assessed. For example, the relative accessibility of Scotland, both 
before and after building of the Tunnel, is quantified and compared to regions such as the 
South East. Potential values can be interpreted as a measure of regional advantage for 
economic development in terms of relative accessibility in geographic space to economic 
activity. However, the potential model does suffer from problems associated with all 
macro-analytical techniques, namely the aggregation of results. Furthermore, the potential 
model does not represent any single process but instead links the volume of economic 
activity to spatial/temporal data, producing a generalised account of regional accessibility 
and the likelihood of economic development. Economic potential analysis also considers 
only demand-side factors, ignoring important supply-side considerations such as; labour 
skills, entrepreneurship, supply of capital and non-transport infrastructure. 
Nevertheless, potential analysis does relate relative accessibility to the level of economic 
activity and can accommodate changes in the transport network, thus allowing a re-
evaluation of a region's relative accessibility. Potential analysis therefore provides a useful 
theoretical framework from which to quantify the impact of the Tunnel on regional 
accessibility and a region's comparative advantage for economic development. Before 
examining the methodology of the current model and the results produced, it is first useful 
to discuss the study carried-out by Keeble et. al. (1982a) because of the comparative nature 
of the results. 
- 63 
33. Keeble, Owens and Thompson's 1982 Study -
'Economic Potential and the Channel Tunnel' 
Keeble et. al.(1982a) consider economic potential analysis to be the only technique 
available which explicitly incorporates the geographical impact of the Tunnel. In their 
study, the methodology proposed by Rich (1980) is utilised, with his standard regional 
economic potential formula applied to 1977 GDP (SOEC 1979) and road distance data for 
108 of the Eurostat Level II regions. Their analysis assumes that road distance data are the 
most appropriate measure of the distance term, since road transport dominates the freight 
haulage market both domestically and on a pan-European basis. A distance matrix based 
on shortest road distance was constructed, and after an examination of actual sea and land 
transportation costs, Keeble et. al. used the following formula to convert ferry distances 
into road kilometres: 
R = 150 + F/1.5 
where F is the ferry crossing in kilometres and R is the road distance equivalent. The 
actual sea crossing of 35kms became the weighted value of 173 (road) kms. The Tunnel 
simulation is set-up at varying degrees of efficiency, at 10 percentile intervals (0-100 
percent). Assuming a 'Replacement Efficiency' of 100 percent the Channel crossing is 
reduced to 35kms, i.e. the Channel crossing became the land equivalent. 
At the upper limit of a 100 percent replacement efficiency, the South East records an 
increase of just over 10 percent in absolute economic potential. However, in terms of 
relative potential (relative to the maximum potential value, Rheinhessen-Pfalz), the South 
East experiences a gain of just below 5 percent, while the average for British regions as 
a whole is less than 2 percent. The attainment of 100 percent replacement efficiency is 
regarded as unlikely. At an 80 percent replacement efficiency the South East is shown to 
record increases of 7.25 percent in its own potential and 3.58 percent in relative potential. 
Keeble et. al. found that their estimates were roughly in line with Clark et. al.'s (1969) 
'finding that with a Tunnel the South East would gain 3 percent on the average of the 
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highest potential group in Europe'. The conclusions drawn by the study are consistent with 
the earlier, non-quantitative, assessments of Wise (1965) and Thompson (1973). namely 
that any benefits created by the Tunnel would be confined to the south east comer of 
England. Nonetheless, Keeble et al. regard the gains in regional accessibility for UK 
regions, even for the South East, to be small, with any direct benefit centred on the mass 
of individual users not the regions. 
The conclusions reached in the present study, however, conflict sharply with these earlier 
findings. It is shown that certain peripheral UK regions could experience fairly uniform 
increases in relative accessibility as compared with the South East. The Tunnel could 
therefore lead to a narrowing of the so-called "North-South" divide, as companies exploit 
the opportunities created by the Tunnel in terms of rail freight. Improvements to the rail 
network and the introduction of newer and faster locomotives are likely to be significant, 
further increasing the advantages offered by the Tunnel. However, before analyzing the 
results and interpreting the main findings, it is first important to outline the methodology 
supporting the current model. 
3.4. Methodology 
This section will highlight the technical and methodological problems encountered during 
the setting-up of the model and which are commonly associated with potential analysis. 
Determined by the main objectives of the model, several subjective decisions have i6 be 
made. The component structure of the model will be discussed in detail but it is first 
necessary to set-out the standard formula for regional economic potential analysis, as given 
by Rich (1980): 
n -a 
Pi = i M j / Dij 
j = l 
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where Pi is the economic poiendal for region i ; M j is the measure of the volume of 
economic activity in region j ; D i j is the measure of the Journey disiance/iime or transpon 
cost between region i and region j ; and -a is the distance exponent. The potential value 
for region i is calculated by summing for all n regions and is expressed in units of 
economic activity per unit of distance/time or transport cost. The potential value of region 
i is the summation of the potential exerted on it by all regions n, including region i's self 
or own potential: 
PI = M l / D l l + M2/D12 + M3/D13 + M4/D14 + M5/DI5 + M6/D16 
Potential values are then made relative to the region with the highest potential value and 
suitable contour intervals chosen so that isolines of equal potential can be drawn. The 
contour maps will be used to show how the Tunnel affects regional accessibility in the EC 
Before it is possible to elaborate on the characteristics of the component pans of the 
model, the so-called "Universe" has to be defined. The Universe is the area over which 
potential values are to be calculated and has to be divided into regions, each with an 
identified node. The mass M j term or the unit of economic activity has to be measured, 
usually regional GDP values are employed in economic potential analysis. The distance 
Dij term measures the distance between each of the nodes and can represent either journey 
distance/time or transport cost. A suitable distance exponent -a has to be chosen, 
depending on the particular requirements of the research project, to relate the importance 
of distance to the amount of interaction between regions. 
3.4.1. The Scope of the Model or 'Universe' 
The earlier work by Keeble et. al. (1982a) shows that only countries within close proximity 
to the Tunnel could experience gains in relative accessibility, especially the UK and 
France. For this reason it was decided that the area of study would be restricted to only 
seven of the 12 EC countries: the UK, Eire, France, Belgium, Luxembourg, the 
Netherlands and (West) GenfTiany'. The Tunnel is unlikely to have any significant 
beneficial effects on the relative accessibility of the remaining countries of the EC; namely, 
Denmark, Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain. However, single representative nodes are 
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Figure 3.1 Inter-nodal rail network 
node node 
1 Scotland 45 West Vlaanderen 
2 North 46 Oost Vlaanderen 
3 Yorkshire & Humberside 47 Hainaut 
4 North West 48 Namur 
5 East Midlands 49 Liege 
6 West Midlands 50 Brabant 
7 Wales 51 Antwerpen 
8 South West 52 Limburg 
9 East Anglia 53 Luxembourg 
10 South East 54 Luxembourg (Grand Du) 
11 Northem Ireland 55 Rheinhessen Pfiaz 
12 Eire 56 Karlsmhe 
13 Basse Normandie 57 Saarland 
14 Haute Normandie 58 Trier 
15 Nord-pas de Calais 59 Koblenz 
16 Picardie 60 Koln 
17 Champagne Ardenne 61 Dusseldorf 
18 lie de France 62 Munster 
19 Bretagne 63 Weser E m s 
20 Pays de la Loire 64 Bremen 
21 Centre 65 Schteswig Holstein 
22 Poitou Charentes 66 Hamburg 
23 Limousin 67 Luneberg 
24 Aquitaine 68 Braunschweig 
25 Midi Pyrenees 69 Hannover 
26 Languedoc Rousslilon 70 Del mold 
27 Provence Alpes Cote 71 Kassei 
28 Auvergne 72 Amsberg 
29 Rhone Alpes 73 Giessen 
30 Franche Comte 74 Darmstadt 
31 Bourgogne 75 Untertranken 
32 Lorraine 76 Oberfranken 
33 Alsace 77 Mitteltranken 
34 Groningen 78 Oberpfalz 
35 Friestand 79 Neiderbayern 
36 Drenthe 80 Oberbayern 
37 Overijssel 81 Schwaben 
38 Gelderland 82 Stungart 
39 Utrecht 83 Tubingen 
40 Noord Holland 84 Frieburg 
41 Zuid Holland 85 West Berlin 
42 Zeeland 86 Lombardie 
43 Noord Brabant 88 Hovedstadsregionen 
44 Limburg 
Data was available for the following nodes but excluded from the map. Inclusion of these nodes 
was deemed to adversely affect accuracy due to their isolated occurence. 
87 Castilla-Leon 
89 Sterea Ellada 
90 Usboa e Vale do Te| 
N 
0 kilometres 300 
miles 200 
Figure 3.1 Inter-nodal rail network 
incorporated into the model for these five member states. The results of the present model 
show that only UK and near continental regions experience any significant increase in 
relative accessibility as a result of the Tunnel. The vast majority of continental regions, 
including all 30 regions of (West) Germany, record negative changes in relative 
accessibility. The results therefore support the decision to narrow the scope of the present 
model. The universe was divided into Eurostat level 11 regions. For each of the 90 regions 
the regional capital or the major industrial city was chosen as the nodal point of that region 
(see Figure 3.1). The selection of a regional node reflects the dominance of either the 
regional capital or the major industrial city within the respective region. 
3.4.2. The Mass Mi Term 
Eurostat's GDP values for level II regions are used as a measure of economic activity (i.e. 
the mass term) and are expressed in million ECUs (mil ECU). The data refer to the year 
1988 and were the most up to-date at the time of analysis. GDP values in mil ECUs for 
Eurostat level 11 regions are widely regarded as the best available measure of the volume 
of economic activity. However, there are particular problems associated with Eurostat level 
II data; as Keeble et. al. state: 
'Eurostat's regional classification at this level is relatively coarse and 
uneven....' 
(Keeble et. al. 1982a, P.lOl). 
This is primarily a result of the compilation of disparate national statistics. The UK is 
divided into Standard Economic Planning Regions, which are generally larger than those 
favoured in other EC countries. This problem is especially highlighted by comparison of 
the size differences between Scotland and West Beriin, both being level I I regions. 
However, Eurostat level III regional data are still in its infancy, being too inconsistent and 
inaccurate (Keeble et. al. 1982a). 
Data inconsistencies for Eurostat level II regions also prevent the use of a more narrowly 
defined mass term. A strong case could be advanced for the use of regional industrial 
output values/exports, instead of regional GDP values, to measure the volume of economic 
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activity. The Tunnel will make national railway companies more competitive especially in 
terms of the carriage of unitised freight to and from the Continent, therefore regional 
industrial output/exports could be a more precise measure of the potential economic 
advantages created by improved accessibility. 
The spatial coverage of the mass term was restricted to only seven EC countries. However, 
the extent of trade between all 12 member states could justify the inclusion of all EC 
regions. This argument could also be applied to non-EC European countries, especially 
members of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA). However the model's 
application in this instance is concerned with only the impact of the Tunnel on the relative 
accessibility of regions. It is therefore feasible to restrict the area of study according to 
geographical and not economic criteria. 
3.4.3. The Distance Dii Term 
The distance term is the summation of the 'shortest' rail distances (or rail plus ferry) 
between each of the 90 regional nodes (see Figure 3.1). It is important to qualify the term 
'shortest' rail distance since due to the operating practices of national railway companies 
and the formalities encountered at border crossings the shortest distance haul is not always 
possible. Certain railway lines are restricted for passenger use only; for example, freight 
trains are prohibited from using the French high-speed TGV routes. The shortest distance 
may involve the crossing of several borders, where locomotive changes are necessary and 
timetabling formalities overcome. 
It would be impractical for the purposes of the current research project to attempt to 
simulate realistically the operational practices of each of the national railway companies. 
However, rail distances (and therefore times) cannot be so far removed from reality as to 
jeopardise the usefulness of the data. The project is concerned with relative distances (and 
times), not absolute values, thus any errors in the procedure will affect most, i f not all, 
regions and approximate relative values obtained. A distance matrix was compiled based 
on Thomas Cook's 'European Timetable' (1990) and 'Rail Map Of Europe' (1989-1990). 
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As manufacturers are primarily concerned with the time needed to transport their freight, 
the distance matrix was converted into journey times. Journey time, not journey distance, 
is a more precise measure of true accessibility. Following discussions with BR (personal 
interview: Jenkins 1990). three simulations were set-up based on the average continental 
and UK freight travel speeds (30 and 40mph respectively) and Railfreight Distribution's 
currendy limited high-value freight service of 75mph. More importandy, BR plans (1989b) 
for all future international rail freight services to operate at 75mph. Faster freight 
locomotives, attaining speeds of up to lOOmph, have also been introduced on selected 
services in France and Germany. The results for 'Simulation 3' are therefore based on a 
'realistic' post-Tunnel average running speed of 75mph. 
The base model is a simulation of the European railway network prior to the opening of 
the Tunnel. Tlius, ferry times have to be incorporated into total journey times as well as 
the time required for the transhipment of rail freight containers at the ports. The choice of 
ferry route depends on the overall joumey time, with the quickest being chosen. Six hours 
are allocated for the transhipment of container units (personal interview: Jenkins 1990). A 
further half an hour is added on to the total joumey time to take account of shunting and 
timetabling. The above simulation assumes 100 percent efficiency, with no delays. Thus, 
it was necessary to incorporate the possibility, or rather the likelihood, of delays. As a 
direct consequence of the frequency of daily ferry services for load-on/load-off (LoLo) 
freight, usually fewer than three sailings per day, and the complexities of national railway 
timetables and freight handling, any delay would normally involve up to a 12 or 24 hour 
wait. After the six hours already required for transhipment, a further six or 18 hours have 
to be added on to the total joumey time. An additional two hours also has to be included 
in the total joumey time for each border crossing as a result of the existing operational 
difficulties and bureaucracy encountered at national frontiers. As pointed out earlier, the 
model is primarily concerned with relative time differences, i.e. relative accessibility, so 
it is necessary only to incorporate time factors that are likely to affect the relative joumey 
times between regions. 
The alternative model is a simulation of the post-Tunnel European railway network, with 
all freight diverted through the Tunnel. The fixed link will considerably reduce the 
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non-transit time requirements of present rail freight operations, the most important of 
which being the time allocated for transhipment, as well as the ferry crossing time. 
However, the Tunnel has also led to a new era of co-operation between national railway 
companies, with plans to implement co-ordinated passenger and freight services. The 
creation of the Single Market by 1 January 1993 also removes much of the present 
bureaucracy. Increased co-operation and reduced bureaucracy will therefore reduce time 
wasted at border crossings by up to 50 percent, so only one hour is added on to the total 
journey time for each border crossing. In addition, only two hours have to be allocated at 
the Channel Tunnel Freight Interchange (CTFI). BR has stated that only two hours will be 
needed to organise their freight operations at the CTFI. A further half an hour is also 
allowed for locomotive changes at either end of the Tunnel. 
It would have been impracticable for the purposes of the present research project to 
attempt to incorporate the frequency of proposed international freight services to-and-from 
all 90 regions and within all seven EC countries. BR (1989) is confident that its planned 
level of service will meet the needs of all regional manufacturers. I f BR is to be believed, 
service frequency should not seriously influence the "accessibility" of a region, at least 
relative to other regions. The possibility of missed rail freight services from regional 
terminals was also not incorporated into the potential model because, while this would 
significantly affect the relative accessibility of individual companies, the impact on a 
region as a whole would be negligible. International rail freight services will run once-
daily, thus companies are likely to ensure that such an eventuality would not occur in order 
to avoid a 24 hour delay, 
3.4.4. The Distance Exponent 
The distance exponent is an expression of the importance of distance to the volume of 
economic activity. Where distance is regarded to be a major impediment to trade, or any 
form of contact, the potential model would have to incorporate a high value for the 
distance exponent. Low values, on the otherhand, indicate that trade is little constrained 
r 
by distance. Empirical research has shown that distance exponents have tended to fall as 
transportation systems have improved (Rich 1980, Keeble et. al. 1982a). 
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However, at this juncture it is important to stress that there is no universally accepted 
exponent, although values betvi^ een 1.0 and 2.5 are commonly used. Therefore, the 
selection of a suitable distance exponent does encounter panicular problems. One could 
justify the choice of an arbitrary value or duplicate a value employed in earlier studies. 
However, Rich argues that: 
*A more satisfactory method is to examine suitable interaction data, to f i t 
a gravity model to them using a regression method described by Taylor 
(1975) and so derive an exponent empirically.* 
(Rich 1980, P.20). 
Keeble et. al. (1982a) decide that without any clear justification for one particular distance 
exponent value, the most logical basis for potential analysis is unity. 
As a result of the financial and manpower limitations of this research project, it was 
impossible to collate the necessary data to set-up a gravity model and calculate the distance 
exponent. No previous research could be drawn on and so sensitivity testing was employed 
between values of 0.5 and 1.7, It immediately became obvious that values closer to unity 
were more realistic, in terms of their impact on the results, and so a distance exponent of 
1.0 was employed in the potential model. 
3.4.5. Self Potential 
In addition to the methodological problem posed by the distance exponent, is the concept 
of Self Potential. Self potential refers to the contribution to the potential of region i of its 
own mass value. To incorporate region i's self potential into the potential model, the 
intra-regional transport time would have to calculated. Earlier models incorporated a fixed 
or variable value but Rich (1975) proposed the formula: 
Dii = 1/2 / area of region  
V n 
Calculation of region i's own potential would then be based on a distance value that is 
one-half of the radius of a circle the same area of region i . 
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Keeble ei. al. (1982a) employ the above formula but find with regard to the small highly 
urbanised regions, such as Hamburg and Bremen, that a constant term of 0,333 is more 
appropriate. Sensitivity testing was again used to decide on the most appropriate constant 
term. The difference in absolute and relative potential values is minimal for the majority 
of the regions but the lower constant term does enhance the values for the small highly 
urbanised regions. Therefore, Rich's amended formula is incorporated into the potential 
model. 
A critique of the methodology is undertaken after the analysis of the results. The critique 
addresses the limitations of the potential model but stresses the strong contribution which 
the present study makes to the theoretical debate on the regional economic impact of the 
Tunnel. However, before the results can be examined in terms of the impact of the Tunnel 
on the relative accessibility of UK regions, it is useful to first discuss the general impact 
of the Tunnel on regional accessibility in the EC. 
3,5. Regional Accessibility within the EC 
Keeble et. al. (1982b&c) show that a 'wide disparity in regional accessibility values* exists 
within the EC. with higher values being associated with the more cenu^l regions. 
Therefore, it is argued that: 
'This marked disparity in relative regional accessibility, as measured 
objectively by the potential index, indicates that i f accessibility is important 
for the location and growth of economic activity, the peripheral regions of 
the Community are at a considerable disadvantage compared with central 
regions.' 
(Keeble et. al. 1982b. P.44) 
Even though a wide disparity in relative potential values is still quite evident from the 
current results, the potential surfaces produce a much more complicated pattern (see 
Figures 3.2-3.5). Peripheral locations continue to be disadvantaged by lower levels of 
regional accessibility but high levels of regional accessibility are restricted to only a few 
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localised regions; namely lie de France (France), the South East (UK), Karisruhc and 
Rheinhessen-Pfalz (Germany), and Koln and Dusseldorf (Germany). Thus, many central 
EC regions are shown to have very low levels of regional accessibility, commonly 
associated with the peripheral regions. This would seem to reflect the influence of frontier 
zones on regional accessibility and economic performance. 
The most striking feature of the contour maps is the donninance of these several key 
regions, widely perceived as the commercial and industrial centres of the Community. This 
could be explained by agglomeration tendencies of modem commercial and industrial 
enterprises, as suggested by Vickerman (1989a), coinciding with the advantages of regional 
accessibility, to create a Community of several highly industrialised regions. Keeble et. al. 
(1982b) also identify these dominant regions but with a concentric pattern spreading out 
from them, highlighting the fall off in regional accessibility as distance progressively 
increases away from the core. The distance term employed by Keeble et. al. measures pure 
road distance, in kms, and the universe encompasses all the EC member states, as well as 
countries belonging to the EFTA. Thus, the most accessible region is shown by Keeble et. 
al. to be Rheinhessen Pfalz, one of the most central European regions in terms of road 
distance. However, the present model incorporates only seven member states of the 
Community and a distance term which measures shortest rail distance in hrs/mins. Border 
crossing formalities and certain operational practices of national railway companies are also 
incorporated into the model. Since the shortest route in kilometres was not always possible, 
the potential map of the EC is significantly changed. No concentric panem spreading out 
from the core is apparent, instead a much more complicated paitem focuses on several 
regional cores. 
However, one has to be careful when interpreting these results, paniculariy if the aim is 
to assess the importance of location for economic development within the EC. The present 
potential model was set-up with the specific aim of studying the impact of the Tunnel on 
the relative accessibility of UK regions vis-a-vis the Continent. Keeble et. al.'s potential 
model, on the oiherhand, was set-up to look at the effect of location within the EC on the 
level of economic activity, and was then later adapted to study the importance of the 
Tunnel to regional accessibility. It should be noted that only 25 percent of container freight 
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is transponed by rail throughout the Continent, the corresponding figure being much 
smaller in the UK. As argued by Keeble C L al. (1982a), road transport dominates the 
haulage of both domestic and European freight. Thus, pure road distance represents a more 
appropriate basis for Keeble ei, al.'s wider study of accessibility/peripherality in die EC 
but not when the model is adapted to study the impact of the Tunnel. This argument 
justifies the use of rail in the current model, since rail journey times are a good basis on 
which to study the impact of the Tunnel on UK regional accessibility but not on 
accessibility/peripherality in the EC. The limited effect of the Tunnel on the contour maps 
would seem to support this argument Potential models are constructed with specific goals 
in mind. Their interpretation must therefore recognise this. Analysis of the results will 
concentrate on the percentage changes in own and relative potential values, highlighting 
the importance of the Tunnel to regional accessibility. 
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Figure 3.2 Relative Potential Values - Ferry 30 mph no delays, 
All values relative to maxinnum Me de France. 
node value node value 
1 Scotland 11.653 45 West Vlaanderen 8.096 
2 North 7.570 46 Cost Vlaanderen 10.619 
3 Yorkshire & Humberside 17.002 47 Hainaut 7.450 
4 North West 23.980 48 Namur 2.713 
5 East Midlands 15.647 49 Lieqe 8,197 
6 West Midlands 20.047 50 Brabant 22.594 
7 Wales 8.607 51 Antwerpen 16.433 
8 South West 17.254 52 Limburg 5.432 
9 East Anglia 6.662 53 Luxembourg 1.171 
10 South East 83.547 54 Luxembourg (Grand Du) 3.514 
11 Northern Ireland 2.797 55 Rheinhessen Pflaz 44.303 
12 Eire 6.124 56 Karlsruhe 64.403 
13 Basse Normandie 5.289 57 Saarland - 8.670 
14 Haute Normandie 10.447 58 Trier 3.477 
15 Nord-pas de Calais 21.729 59 Koblenz 11.566 
16 Picardie 9.980 60 Koln 43.264 
17 Champagne Ardenne 7.992 61 Dusseldorf 60.813 
18 He de France 100.000 62 Munster 20.626 
19 Bretagne 10.318 63 Weser Ems 17.137 
20 Pays de la Loire 11.626 64 Bremen 7.194 
21 Centre 11.933 65 Schleswig Holstein 12.763 
22 Poitou Charentes 6.273 66 Hamburg 18.349 
23 Limousin 2.551 67 Luneberg 7.066 
24 Aquitaine 9.572 68 Braunschweig 12.534 
25 Midi Pyrenees 6.561 69 Hannover 18.061 
26 Languedoc Roussillon 5.944 70 Detmold 15.410 
27 Provence Alpes Cote 13.293 71 Kassel 8.857 
28 Auvergne 4.856 72 Amsberg 35.773 
29 Rhone Alpes 24.667 73 Giessen 7.606 
30 Franche Comte 5.128 74 Darmstadt 45.331 
31 Bourgogne 8.002 75 Unterlranken 8.497 
32 Lorraine 12.682 76 Obertranken 5.935 
33 Alsace 10.565 77 Mittelfranken 14.324 
34 Groningen 7.389 78 Oberpfalz 6.272 
35 Friesland 3.177 79 Neiderbayem 5.988 
36 Drenthe 3.120 80 Oberbayern 30.090 
37 Overijssel 5.734 81 Schwaben 10.797 
38 Gelderland 12.102 82 Stungart 36.637 
39 Utrecht 8.505 83 Tubingen 11.168 
40 Noord Holland 21.296 84 Frieburg 11.994 
41 Zuid Holland 26.681 85 West Berlin 10.741 
42 Zeeland 2.171 86 Lombardie 32.967 
43 Noord Brabant 15.661 88 Hovedstadsregionen 8.029 
44 Limburg 7.176 
Data was available for the following nodes but excluded from the map. Inclusion of these nodes 
was deemed to adversely affect accuracy due to their isolated occurence. 
87 Castilla-Leon 2.435 
89 Sterea Ellada 0.289 
90 Lisboa e Vale do Tej 1.675 
Simulation 
0 kitometres 300 
miles 200 
Figure 3.2 Relative Potential Values - Ferry 30 mph no delays. 
All values relative to maxinnum lie de France. 
Figure 3.3 Relative Potential Values - Tunnel 30 mph. All values 
relative to maximum lie de France. 
node 
1 Scotland 
2 North 
3 Yorkshire & Humberside 
4 North West 
5 East Midlands 
6 West Midlands 
7 Wales 
8 South West 
9 East Anglia 
10 South East 
11 Northern Ireland 
12 Eire 
13 Basse Normandie 
14 Haute Normandie 
15 Ncrd-pas de Calais 
16 Picardie 
17 Champagne Ardenne 
lie de France 18 
19 Bretagne 
20 Pays de la Loire 
21 Centre 
22 Poitou Charentes 
23 Limousin 
24 Aquitaine 
25 Midi Pyrenees 
26 Languedoc Roussillon 
27 Provence Alpes Cote 
28 Auvergne 
29 Rhone Alpes 
30 Franche Comte 
31 Bourgogne 
32 Lorraine 
33 Alsace 
34 Groningen 
35 Friesland 
36 Drenthe 
37 Overijssel 
38 Gelderland 
39 Utrecht 
40 Noord Holland 
41 Zuid Holland 
42 Zeeland 
43 Noord Brabant 
44 Umburg 
value node 
1^826 45 West Vtaanderen 
8.513 46 Oost Vlaanderen 
18.860 47 Hainaut 
26.914 43 Namur 
17.313 49 Lieae 
22.752 50 Brabant 
9.633 51 Antwerpen 
19.617 52 Limburg 
7.263 53 Luxembourg 
103.615 54 Luxembourg (Grand Du) 
3.525 55 Rheinhessen Pfiaz 
8.605 56 Karismhe 
5.139 57 Saarland 
10.323 58 Trier 
23.516 59 Koblenz 
10.228 60 Koln 
8.172 61 Dusseldort 
100.000 62 Munster 
9.842 63 Weser Ems 
11.178 64 Bremen 
11.611 65 Schleswig Holstein 
6.081 66 Hamburg 
2.467 67 Lunebera 
9.208 68 Braunschweig 
6.278 69 Hannover 
5.695 70 Detmold 
12.743 71 Kassel 
4.695 72 Amsberg 
23.872 73 Giessen 
4.969 74 Darmstadt 
7.829 75 Untertranken 
1^889 76 Oberlranken 
10.848 77 Mittelfranken 
7.229 78 Oberpfalz 
3.121 79 Neiderbayem 
3.053 80 Oberbayern 
5.748 81 Schwaben 
12.194 82 Stuttgart 
8.426 83 Tubingen 
21.085 84 Frieburg 
26.837 85 West Berlin 
2.218 86 Lombardie 
15.815 88 Hovedstadsregionen 
7.690 
value 
8.173 
10.736 
7.641 
2.736 
8.393 
22.696 
16.649 
5.490 
1.174 
3.416 
41.496 
60.314 
8.516 
3.405 
11.273 
42.941 
60.169 
20.051 
16.571 
6.963 
12.182 
17.535 
6.758 
11.959 
17.236 
14.856 
8.466 
34.911 
7.325 
43.426 
8.092 
5.633 
13.557 
5.929 
5.665 
28.559 
10.255 
34.982 
10.689 
11.711 
10.005 
33.495 
7.220 
was deemed to adversely affect accuracy due to their isolated occurence. 
87 Castilla-Leon 2.367 
89 Sterea Ellada 0.288 
90 Lisboa e Vale do Tej 1.665 
Simulation 1 
I 
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'0 
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Figure 3.3 Relative Potential Values - Tunnel 30 mph. All values 
relative to maximum Me de France. 
Figure 3.4 Relative Potential Values - Ferry 75 mph no delays. 
All values relative to maximunn lie de France. 
node value node value 
1 Scotland 9.552 45 West Vlaanderen 7.902 
2 North 6.263 46 Oost Vlaanderen 10.451 
3 Yorkshire & Humberside 14.685 47 Hainaut 7.216 
4 North West 21.627 48 Namur 2.656 
5 East Midlands 13.947 49 Uege 7.859 
6 West Midlands 17.906 50 Brabant 22.412 
7 Wales 7.491 51 Antwerpen 15.992 
8 South West 15.115 52 Umburg 5.271 
9 East Anglia 5.143 53 Luxembourg 1.144 
10 South East 67.036 54 Luxembourg (Grand Du) 3.704 
11 Northern Ireland 2.139 55 Rheinhessen Pflaz 49.803 
12 Eire 4.436 56 Karisnjhe 72.413 
13 Basse Normandie 5.370 57 Saarland 8.977 
14 Haute Normandie 10,434 58 Trier 3.610 
15 Nord-pas de Calais 19.710 59 Koblenz 12.004 
16 Picardie 9.834 60 Koln 43.847 
17 Champagne Ardenne 7.795 61 Dusseldort 61.524 
18 lie de France 100.000 62 Munster 21.359 
19 Bretagne 10.720 63 Weser Ems 17.862 
20 Pays de la Loire 12.149 64 Bremen 7.412 
21 Centre 12.483 65 Schleswig Holstein 13.463 
22 Poitou Charentes 6.586 66 Hamburg 19.098 
23 Limousin 2.679 67 Luneberg 7.471 
24 Aquitaine 10.148 68 Braunschweig 13.345 
25 Midi F^renees 6.985 69 Hannover 19.241 
26 Languedoc Roussillon 6.317 70 Detmold 16.150 
27 Provence Alpes Cote 14.090 71 Kassel 9.409 
28 Auvergne 5.101 72 Arnsberg 36.879 
29 Rhone Alpes 25.712 73 Giessen 8.051 
30 Franche Comte 5.237 74 Darmstadt 48.468 
31 Bourgogne 8.189 75 Unterfranken 9.167 
32 Lorraine 12.130 76 Oberfranken 6.427 
33 Alsace 9.866 77 Mittelfranken 15.635 
34 Groningen 7.399 78 Oberpfatz 6.863 
35 Friesland 3.141 79 Neiderbayern 6.538 
36 Drenthe 3.120 80 Oberbayem 32.761 
37 Overijssel 5.414 81 Schwaben 11.733 
38 Gelderland 11.627 82 Stuttgart 39.217 
39 Utrecht 8.360 83 Tubingen 11.968 
40 Noord Holland 20.862 84 Frieburg 12.440 
41 Zuld Holland 25.500 85 West Berlin 11.127 
42 Zeeland 2.024 86 Lombardie 30.090 
43 Noord Brabant 14.869 88 Hovedstadsregionen 6.973 
44 Umburg 6.311 
Data was available for the following nodes but excluded from the map. Inclusion of these nodes 
was deemed to adversely affect accuracy due to their isolated occurence. 
87 Castilla-Leon 2.405 
89 Sterea Ellada 0.285 
90 Usboa e Vale do Tej 1.618 
N 
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Figure 3,4 Relative Potential Values - Ferry 75 mph no delays. 
All values relative to nnaximum lie de France. 
Figure 3.5 Relative Potential Values - Tunnel 75 mph. All values 
relative to maximum lie de France. 
node value node value 
1 Scotland 12.481 45 West Vlaanderen 8.012 
2 North 8.077 46 Oost Vlaanderen 10.544 
3 Yorkshire & Humberside 18.192 47 Hainaut 7.419 
4 North West 26.027 46 Namur 2.692 
5 East Midlands 16.335 49 Liege 8.080 
6 West Midlands 21.209 50 Brabant 22.469 
7 Wales 8.972 51 Antwerpen 16.261 
8 South West 18.024 52 Limburg 5,371 
9 East Anglia 6.451 53 Luxembourg 1.162 
10 South East 87.720 54 Luxembourg (Grand Du) 3.529 
11 Northern Ireland 3.396 55 Rheinhessen Pfiaz 45.071 
12 Eire 8.259 56 Karlsnjhe 65.522 
13 Basse Normandie 5.253 57 Saarland 8.714 
14 Haute Normandie 10.357 58 Trier 3.499 
15 Nord-pas de Calais 21.282 59 Kobtenz 11.598 
16 Picardie 9.973 60 Koln 43.138 
17 Champagne Ardenne 7.969 61 Dusseldorl 60.448 
18 lie de France 100.000 62 Munster 20.571 
19 Bretagne 10.256 63 Weser Ems 17.110 
20 Pays de la Loire 11.656 64 Bremen 7.128 
21 Centre 12.048 65 Schleswtg Holstein 12.828 
22 Poitou Charentes 6.333 66 Hamburg 18.196 
23 Limousin 2.570 67 Luneberg 7.110 
24 Aquitaine 9.678 68 Braunschweig 12.580 
25 Midi Pyrenees 6.620 69 Hannover 18.121 
26 Languedoc Roussillon 5.997 70 Detmold 15.424 
27 Provence Atpes Cote 13.405 71 Kassel 8.891 
28 Auvergne 4.896 72 Amsberg 35.684 
29 Rhone Alpes 24.822 73 Giessen 7.651 
30 Franche Comte 5.105 74 Darmstadt 45.693 
31 Bourgogne 8.027 75 Unterfranken 8.580 
32 Lorraine 12.524 76 Oberfranken 5.993 
33 Alsace 10.348 77 Mittelfranken 14.484 
34 Groningen 7.302 78 Oberpfalz 6.347 
35 Friesland 3.135 79 Neiderbayem 6.058 
36 Drenthe 3.083 80 Oberbayern 30.491 
37 Overijssel 5.584 81 Schwaben 10.927 
38 Gelderland 11.912 82 Stuttgart 36.905 
39 Utrecht 8.361 83 Tubingen 11.276 
40 Noord Holland 20.964 84 Frieburg 12.042 
41 Zuid Holland 26.127 85 West Berlin 10.365 
42 Zee land 2.129 86 Lombardie 32.266 
43 Noord Brabant 15.348 88 Hovedstadsregionen 7.220 
44 Limburg 6.958 
Data was available for the following nodes but excluded from the map. Inclusion of these nodes 
was deemed to adversely affect accuracy due to their isolated occurence. 
87 Castilla-Leon 2.435 
89 Sterea Eltada 0.289 
90 Usboa e Vale do Tej 1.675 
Simulation 3 
kilometres 300 
miles 200 
Figure 3.5 Relative Potential Values - Tunnel 75 nnph. All values 
relative to maxinnum He de France. 
3.6. Analysis of the Results 
The results will be examined individually according to speed (30, 40 or 75mph) and the 
delay factor (no delay, six or 18 hours delay). To avoid repetition, the results for 
Simulations 2 and 3 (40 & 75mph, respectively) will only highlight the main findings. 
Emphasis will also be placed on the *no delay' simulations since the incorporation of either 
a six or an 18 hour delay has a limited effect on the relative accessibility of the regions. 
The 'no delay' simulations compare an efficient pre-Tunnel rail-ferry service with the 
post-Tunnel service. Thus, any gains in relative accessibility as a result of the Tunnel 
prove to be more significant. However, it would be unrealistic to assume that the present 
rail-ferry freight service does not engender delays. As one would expect, the general level 
of accessibility for all UK regions declines as delays are incorporated into the model. 
Tables with absolute and relative potential values for all 90 regions, as well as their 
percentage changes, are presented in Appendix 2. 
It was hypothesized that the more peripheral UK regions could experience gains in relative 
accessibility, as a result of the Tunnel, similar to or even higher than that of the South 
East. Nevertheless, the initial results for Simulation 1 (30mph) and Simulation 2 (40mph), 
when taken separately, show that the South East records higher increases in own and 
relative potential values compared to the rest of Britain. It would seem that the results 
further support the earlier findings of Keeble et. al. (1982a), that the South East wil l be 
the major recipient of any benefits created by the Tunnel, and thus make it impossible to 
accept the hypothesis. However, Simulation 3 (75mph) shows that fairly uniform increases 
in relative accessibility are realised by certain peripheral UK regions as compared with the 
South East; namely, Scotland, the North and East Anglia. A gradual convergence in the 
percentage increases in the level of relative accessibility for all UK regions, through 
Simulation 1 to Simulation 3, can also be identified. Furthermore, the increases in relative 
potential values for N.Ireland and Eire, which are almost consistently higher than the 
respective values for the South East, also tend to support the basic hypothesis. 
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However, before any further analysis of the results, it is first appropriate to determine the 
significance of the apparent differences in the results for Simulations 1 to 3. The non-
parametric Mann-Whitney statistical test was employed to show whether or not the results 
for each of the simulations are significantly different, at a rejection level of a = 0.05. The 
increases in own and relative potential values for Simulations 1 to 3 (no delay scenario) 
are contrasted against each other: 
Level of Significance 
'no delay Increase in own Increase in relative 
scenario' potential potential 
Sim. 1 Vs 2 0.4025 0.6236 
Sim. 1 Vs 3 0.0011 0.0051 
Sim. 2 Vs 3 0.0029 0.0024 
As stated above, analysis of the results will focus on the 'no delay' scenario, thus a 
statistical test of the two delay scenarios is not needed. It can be seen that the respective 
increases in the relative potential values for Simulations 1 and 2 are not significantly 
different at a = 0.05. However, the differences between the results for Simulations 1 or 
2 and Simulation 3, in terms of both own and relative potential values, prove to be highly 
significant. It is therefore possible to be confident in the following comparative analysis 
of the results, since attention is focused primarily on Simulations 1 and 3. Nonetheless, it 
is important to emphasize that the simulation speeds (30, 40 & 75mph) were not selected 
at random but are based on the outcome of discussions with BR (personal interview: 
Jenkins 1990). Thus, the results for each of the simulations are important individually but 
particularly for Simulation 3, which is representative of the likely running speed of post-
Tunnel international fi-eight trains. 
3.6.1. Simulation 1 
Simulation 1 refers to the lower speed of 30 mph. The 'no delay' scenario will be 
discussed first, before analysis of the effect of a delay factor of either 6 or 18 hours on the 
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potential values. When a delay factor is incorporated the English Channel becomes an even 
greater barrier to trade, thus reducing own and relative potential values. TTie results for 
Simulation 1 show that the impact of the Tunnel on regional accessibility outside the South 
East is quite uniform (see Table 3.1). But the increase in the relative potentiaJ for the 
South East more than doubles that of most of the UK regions. The South West records the 
largest increase outside the South East, 13.7 percent, in its relative potential value, whilst 
the lowest increase is that for East Anglia, 9.0 percent 
LEVEL I I 
REGIONS: 
UK AND EIRE 
INCREASE IN OWN 
POTENTIAL PERCENT INCREASES RELATIVE TO 
I L E DE FRANCE MIL 
ECUs/Hr PERCENT 
SCOTLAND 37850 19.6 10.0 
NORTH 27850 22.2 12.5 
YORK & HUMS. 57861 20.6 10.9 
NORTH WEST 87251 22.0 12.2 
EAST MIDLANDS 52474 20.3 10.6 
WEST MIDLANDS 74226 22.4 12 .6 
WALES 30840 21.7 11.9 
SOUTH WEST 67322 23.6 13 .7 
EAST ANGLIA 20395 18.5 9.0 
SOUTH EAST 480983 34.8 24 .0 
N. IRELAND 17118 37.0 26.0 
EIRE 53418 52.8 40.5 
Table 3.1: Absolute and relative potential values for the UK and Eire 
Simulation 1 (no delay). 
(Note: De de France is the maximum) 
Increases in relative potential values, however, had a rather limited impact on the rank 
order of regions in terms of their total relative potential values (see Table 3.2). N.Ireland 
and Eire are the only two regions which record higher percentage increases than the South 
82 
East (also repeated in Simulations 2 and 3). In terms of relative accessibility to the 
Continent as compared to mainland Britain, both Eire and Northern Ireland face the 
additional "disadvantage" of the Irish Sea. The Tunnel, by removing the barrier of the 
English Channel, has a considerable effect on the relative accessibility of Eire and 
Northern Ireland, and tends to support Pieda's (1989b) concept of an 'Irish Landbridge', 
as discussed in the Literature Review (chapter 2). 
LEVEL I I 
REGIONS: 
UK AND EIRE 
PRE-TUNNEL SCENARIO POST-TUNNEL 
SCENARIO 
PERCENT RANK PERCENT RANK 
SCOTLAND 11.65 7 12.83 7 
NORTH 7.57 9 8.51 10 
YORK & HUMB. 17 .00 5 18.86 5 
NORTH WEST 23.98 2 26.91 2 
E. MIDLANDS 15.65 6 17.31 6 
W. MIDLANDS 20.05 3 22 .57 3 
WALES 8.61 8 9.63 8 
SOUTH WEST 17 .25 4 19.62 4 
E. ANGLIA 6.66 10 7.62 11 
SOUTH EAST 83 .55 1 103.61 1 
N. IRELAND 2.80 12 3.52 12 
EIRE 6.12 11 8.60 9 
Table 3.2: Relative potential values for the UK and Eire - Simulation 1 
(no delay): pre- and post-Tunnel. 
These results, therefore, only produce further theoretical evidence to support the general 
belief that the Tunnel will help only to enhance the South East's dominance over the 
British economy to the detriment of the more peripheral regions. The great disparity 
between the relative potential values for the UK, with the South East recording a value of 
83.5 percent in the pre-Tunnel scenario and Northern Ireland only 2.8 percent, highlights 
the division in the British economy. Northern Ireland is further peripheralised by the Irish 
Sea but the Noah West, with the second highest relative potential value for the UK, still 
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only records 24.0 percent, more than three times less than the respective value for the 
South East. The relative potential value for the South East in the post-Tunnel scenario is 
103.6 percent. The respective values for the North West and Northern Ireland are 26.9 and 
3.5 percent. The increase in the absolute potential value for the South East is therefore 28 
times greater than that for Northern Ireland, 480983 and 17118 mil ECU*s per hour 
respectively. The increase in absolute potential for the South East is also more than five 
times that for the North West 
However, one has to be cautious when interpreting these results. TTie wide disparity in own 
and relative potential values within the UK is exaggerated by the reliance on shortest rail 
journey time for the distance term. The vast majority of domestic British/Irish trade is 
transported by road, reflecting road transport as the more accessible mode of transpon for 
domestic container freight. Thus, the use of shortest rail journey time in the present study 
acts only to further peripheralise regions to the north and west of London. The potential 
model is designed to quantify the impact of the Tunnel on the relative accessibility of the 
UK regions vis-a-vis the Contineni. Analysis of the results should therefore be confined 
to that specific aim. The results can only provide a very general measure of regional 
economic performance/standing. Nonetheless, the disparity in own and relative potential 
values within the UK and the EC, as a whole, is consistent throughout each of the 
simulations, and thus one can have confidence in interpreting percentage changes in own 
and relative accessibility. 
In terms of the Contineni, the Tunnel has a limited influence on the relative accessibility 
of most regions. Only Nord-Pas de Calais (France) and Limburg (Netherlands) record 
percentage increases in relative potential greater than five percent, 8.2 and 7.2 percent 
respectively. A further 19 continental regions experience positive increases in relative 
potential, between 2.7 percent for Alsace (France) and 0.2 percent for Overijssel 
(Netherlands), see Appendix 2 - Simulation 1 (no delay). Reduced time wasted at border 
crossings accounts for the majority of these increases, especially since frontier regions 
predominate. The percentage increase in the relative potential value for Limburg can also 
be explained by improved efficiency at national frontiers. 
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Therefore, northern France, and to a lesser extent Belgium, are the only regions to benefit 
from improved regional accessibility directly as a result of the Tunnel. However, even this 
has to be qualified. Referring to Appendix 2, it can be seen that the percentage increases 
in relative potential for all 11 Belgian regions are minimal compared to their UK 
counterparts and that the frontier regions record higher gains. Nord-Pas de Calais is the 
only continental region that experiences a significant increase in regional accessibility, 
which can be attributed primarily to the Tunnel. Continental regions adjacent to the Tunnel 
do not benefit from the considerable increases in relative accessibility associated with the 
UK because only a small percentage of their overall economic potential will be affected 
by improvements in cross-Channel links. 
The incoiporanon of delays into the model, while reducing overall own and relative 
potential values, has a limited effect on the rank order of regions. The results for 
Simulation 1 show that the South East's own potential value fell from 1381648, no delay, 
to 1184065, six hours delay, to 975305 mil ECU' per hour, 18 hours delay. This represents 
a 29.5 percent reduction in the South East's own potential, other UK regions record similar 
but smaller reductions. As explained previously, the delay scenarios represent a more 
realistic account of die pre-Tunnel cross-Channel transport system, and are included in the 
"ferry" simulations. As one would expect the percentage increases in relative potential 
values become even greater as the delay factor is increased (see Tables 3.3 and 3.4). The 
percentage increases in relative potential values for the South East for the two delay 
scenarios (six and 18 hrs delay) are 42.5 percent and 70.0 percent respectively. These large 
increases in regional accessibility are not unique to the South East, since they are also 
recorded for the rest of the UK and Eire. However, an increased delay factor reduces the 
percentage increase in relative potential for Northern Ireland relative to other UK regions. 
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LEVEL I I 
REGIONS: 
UK AND EIRE 
INCREASE IN OWN 
POTENTIAL PERCENT INCREASES 
RELATIVE TO 
I L E DE FRANCE MIL 
ECUs/Hr PERCENT 
SCOTLAND 55618 31.8 19 .4 
NORTH 39982 35.4 22.6 
YORK & HUMB. 81983 31.9 19.5 
NORTH WEST 121636 33.6 21.0 
EAST MIDLANDS 77809 33.3 20.8 
WEST MIDLANDS 106345 35.5 22 .8 
WALES 45847 36.0 23.2 
SOUTH WEST 97444 38.2 25.2 
EAST ANGLIA 36709 39.1 26.0 
SOUTH EAST 678566 57.3 42 .5 
N. IRELAND 21247 50.4 36.3 
EIRE 63140 69.0 53.0 
Table 3.3: Absolute and relative potential values for the UK and Eire -
Simulation 1 (6hrs delay). 
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LEVEL I I 
REGIONS: 
UK AND EIRE 
INCREASE IN OWN 
POTENTIAL PERCENT INCREASES 
RELATIVE TO 
I L E DE FRANCE MIL 
ECUs/Hr PERCENT 
SCOTLAND 79067 52.2 35.5 
NORTH 55307 56.6 39.5 
YORK & HUMB. 111419 49.0 32 .7 
NORTH WEST 162877 50.7 34.3 
EAST MIDLANDS 107012 52.4 35.7 
WEST MIDLANDS 143303 54.6 37 .7 
WALES 63440 57.8 40.6 
SOUTH WEST 132118 59.9 42 .4 
EAST ANGLIA 54614 71.9 53 .1 
SOUTH EAST 887326 91.0 70.1 
N. IRELAND 26758 73.1 54.1 
EIRE 75597 95.6 74 .2 
Table 3.4: Absolute and relative potential values for the UK and Eire 
Simulation 1 (IShrs delay). 
The incorporation of a delay factor into the model is shown in Table 3.5 to have a limited 
impact on the rank order of a region's relative potential value. The inclusion of a six hour 
delay only causes the rank orders of the South West and Yorkshire and Humberside to 
change. An 18 hour delay factor also left the majority of regions unaffected. Although 
there is an apparent reduction in the relative potential values for all UK regions as well 
as Eire, this reduction is universal. Thus, the rank order of most regions remains constant 
throughout the three delay scenarios. 
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LEVEL I I 
REGIONS: 
UK AND EIRE 
NO DELAY 6Hrs DELAY 18Hrs DELAY 
% RANK % RANK % RANK 
SCOTLAND 11.65 7 10.74 7 9.46 7 
NORTH 7.57 9 6.94 9 6.10 9 
YORK & HUMB 17 .00 5 15.78 4 14 .22 4 
NORTH WEST 23.98 2 22.24 2 20.05 2 
E. MIDLANDS 15.65 6 14.33 6 12 .75 6 
W. MIDLANDS 20.05 3 18.38 3 16.39 3 
WALES 8.61 8 7.82 8 6.85 8 
SOUTH WEST 17 .25 4 15.67 5 13 .77 5 
E. ANGLIA 6.66 10 5.56 10 4 .74 11 
SOUTH EAST 83 .55 1 72 .70 1 60.92 1 
N. IRELAND 2.80 12 2 .59 12 2.29 12 
EIRE 6.12 11 5.62 11 4.94 10 
Table 3.5: Relative potential values (and rank orders) for the UK and Eire 
Simulation 1. 
However, the effect of delays on the percentage increases in relative potential values for 
the UK and Eire can be clearly seen from Table 3.6. East Anglia records the lowest 
increase in relative potential in the *no delay* scenario but the fourth highest in both the 
six and 18 hour delay scenarios. East Anglia already benefits from proximity to 
Flexistowe, thus the incorporation of delays strengthens the position of the Tunnel 
compared with the ferries, allowing the region to also benefit from the Tunnel. Even so, 
the uniformity of the percentage increases for most of the UK regions outside the South 
East, prevents any noticeable impact on the general level of relative potential values. It is 
also worth pointing out that the six and 18 hour delay scenarios have a much more limited 
impact (positive or negative) on the general level of relative potential values, and their 
percenuge changes, for continental regions. 
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LEVEL I I 
REGIONS: 
UK AND EIRE 
NO DELAY 6Hrs DELAY IBHrs DELAY 
%age 
CHANGE 
RANK %age 
CHANGE 
RANK %age 
CHANGE 
RANK 
SCOTLAND 10.07 11 19 .40 12 35.54 10 
NORTH 12 .46 6 22.63 8 39.47 7 
YORK & HUMB. 10.93 9 19.50 11 32.66 12 
NORTH WEST 12 .24 7 21.02 9 34.26 11 
E. MIDLANDS 10.65 10 20.80 10 35.73 9 
W. MIDLANDS 12 .60 5 22 .77 7 37.69 8 
WALES 11.92 8 23.22 6 40.55 6 
SOUTH WEST 13.70 4 25.19 5 42 .41 5 
E. ANGLIA 9.02 12 26.03 4 53.10 4 
SOUTH EAST 24 .02 3 42.52 2 70.09 2 
N. IRELAND 26.03 2 36.31 3 54.13 3 
EIRE 40 .51 1 53.06 1 74.15 1 
Table 3.6: Percentage changes in relative potential values (and rank orders) for 
the UK and Eire - Simulation 1. 
(Note: The rank order of a region reflects the magnitude of the percentage increase in the 
relative potential value.) 
Therefore, based on the results for Simulation 1, it is shown that UK regions gain 
considerably more, as a result of the Tunnel in terms of increasing relative accessibility, 
than continental regions. The South East experiences an increase in relative accessibility 
more than double the increases recorded by other British regions. Hence, it is not possible 
to accept the hypothesis. However, the results for Simulations 2 and 3 show a gradual 
convergence in percentage increases in relative accessibility, which tends to support the 
basic assumptions of the hypothesis of the present thesis. The discussion of the results for 
Simulations 2 and 3 will concentrate on the changes in relative potential values in the *no 
delay' scenario. As shown above, a six or 18 hour delay factor has little effect on the rank 
order of regions. It will also become apparent that the same conclusion can only be drawn 
for simulations 2 and 3. However, the influence of speed (30, 40 or 75 mph) is quite 
considerable and needs to be discussed fully. 
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3.6.2. Simulations 2 and 3 
Simulations 2 and 3 refer to the average freight train speed of 40 and 75mph. As with 
Simulation 1, the analysis will be primarily concerned with the effect of the Tunnel on UK 
regional accessibility. The results for Simulation 2, taken in isolation, also add further 
theoretical evidence to the general belief that the South East is likely to achieve a greater 
increase in accessibility vis-a-vis the Continent Even though the South East again benefits 
more from the Tunnel, the actual increase in its relative potential value compared to the 
rest of Britain is reduced considerably (see Table 3.7). The South East records an increase 
of 17.7 percent in its relative potential value; while Scotland, the North and the North 
West achieve respective values of 12.9, 13.8 and 11.5 percent. 
LEVEL I I 
REGIONS: 
UK AND EIRE 
INCREASE IN OWN 
POTENTIAL PERCENT INCREASES RELATIVE TO 
I L E DE FRANCE MIL 
ECUs/Hr PERCENT 
SCOTLAND 53605 23.1 12.9 
NORTH 36236 24.1 13 .8 
YORK & HUMB. 76232 22.4 12 .2 
NORTH WEST 105841 21.6 11.5 
EAST MIDLANDS 59039 18.6 8.7 
WEST MIDLANDS 82559 20.2 10.2 
WALES 34460 19.8 9.8 
SOUTH WEST 71210 20.4 10.4 
EAST ANGLIA 23327 18.0 8.2 
SOUTH EAST 465811 28.4 17 .7 
N. IRELAND 23036 41.9 30.1 
EIRE 71309 60.3 46.9 
Table 3.7: Absolute and relative potential values for the UK and Eire 
Simulation 2 (no delay). 
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However, the South East still manages to more than double the percentage increases in 
relative potential compared with East Anglia, the East Midlands and Wales; 8.2, 8.7 and 
9.8 percent respectively. It is again not possible to accept the hypothesis of the present 
study but the convergent trend in the percentage increases in relative potential values for 
all UK regions does allow some optimism for the more peripheral UK regions. However, 
one has to be careful when interpreting the results for Simulation 2, as compared to 
Simulation 1, since it was shown that the respective results were not significantly different. 
Referring back to Simulation 1, the results show that the proximity of each of the 12 UK 
regions to the Continent has limited importance to their overall regional accessibility. The 
distance between any two UK regions forms only a small part of the average total journey 
distance. Furthermore, the journey times of existing ferry services for freight exports also 
have the effect of reducing the importance of intra-UK distances, especially when delays 
are incorporated into the model. Therefore, when simulation speeds are increased from 30 
to 40 to 75mph, the region, outside the South East, which experiences a relatively higher 
increase in regional accessibility became progressively further north. The region which 
records the highest increase in regional accessibility, outside the South East, is the South 
West at 30mph, the North at 40mph and ScoUand at 75mph. It could be argued that the 
more distant regions would be expected to experience greater increases in relative 
accessibility as speed increases but this is only apparent in the UK and not for continental 
regions. In fact, a significant proportion of the more distant continental regions record 
reductions in relative accessibility as the Simulation's speeds are increased from 30 to 
75mph. 
The wide disparity in own and relative potential values between UK regions is still very 
evident (see Appendix 2). The South East's relative potential values in the pre-and 
post-Tunnel scenarios were 77.6 and 91.3 percent respectively, while Northern Ireland still 
only records 2.6 and 3.4 percent. Simulation 3 produces similar results but the relative 
potential values for UK regions and Eire are approximately 15-20 percent lower than 
respective values for Simulation 1. Therefore, as the simulation speed is increased the 
general level of relative accessibility of the UK regions and Eire, as compared to Le de 
France, declines. TTie effect of increased speed on the Continent differs between regions 
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but the majority also experience a fall in their general level of relative accessibility. 
Therefore, as speed is increased, De de France becomes more central in terms of rail 
freight journey times, and thus benefits relatively more. 
Focusing attention on the Continent, 23 regions experience increases in relative 
accessibility but again only Nord-Pas de Calais (France) and Limburg (Netherlands) record 
increases greater than five percent (see Appendix 2 - Simulation 2). As the speed is 
increased from 30 to 40mph, Simulation 1 to Simulation 2, a further two more continental 
regions experience a positive change in relative accessibility, while the others record higher 
increases. When the speed component is again increased from 40 to 75mph, Simulation 2 
to Simulation 3, 27 continental regions record positive changes in their relative 
accessibility. Thus, for Simulation 3 a further four more regions experience increases in 
relative accessibility, while the existing regions again recorded higher increases. 
Furthermore, Lombardie G^aly) records an increase in relative accessibility greater than 
five percent. As would be expected, most of the continental regions recording increases in 
relative potential values for both Simulations 2 and 3 are located in France, particularly 
northern France, Belgium and the Netherlands. 
However, as stated in the previous section, improved cross-Channel transportation links 
have a limited effect on the level of regional accessibility on the Continent. The frontier 
region of Limburg benefits from improved efficiency at border crossings, recording the 
highest increase in relative potential on the Continent at the higher speeds of 40 and 
75mph (8.6 and 10.5 percent respectively). As the average speed of freight trains is 
increased the reduction in the time wasted at each border crossing, from two to one hour, 
becomes more significant. The same argument can also be applied to the frontier region 
of Lombardie. Increases in relative potential of 7.6 percent in Simulation 2 and 8.0 percent 
in Simulation 3 for Nord-Pas de Calais, on the otherhand, are primarily as a result of the 
Tunnel. The increases in relative potential for Nord-Pas de Calais remain fairly constant; 
8.2, 7.7 and 8.0 percent for Simulations 1 to 3, thus ruling out the influence of increased 
efficiency at border crossings. 
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The incorporation of a six or an 18 hour delay factor in both Simulations 2 and 3 produces 
similar results as for Simulation 1. As shown earlier, own and relative potential values for 
the UK and Eire decline as the delay factor is increased. It is quite evident from Tables 
3.8 and 3.10, that a consistent downward trend in relative potential values is recorded for 
Simulations 2 and 3, as was the case with Simulation 1. Nonetheless the rank order of 
these regions remain fairly static. Analysis of the results for Simulation 2 shows that when 
a six hour delay is incorporated into the model only the rank positions of the South West 
and Yorkshire and Humberside alter. In addition, the rank position of East Anglia fell 
below dial of Eire when an 18 hour delay is included. The delay scenarios for Simulation 
3 has even less of an impact on the rank order of the regions. 
LEVEL I I 
REGIONS: 
UK AND EIRE 
NO DELAY 6Hrs DELAY 18Hrs DELAY 
% RANK % RANK % RANK 
SCOTLAND 10.95 7 10.02 7 8.77 7 
NORTH 7 .11 9 6.48 9 5.69 9 
YORK & HUMB. 16.09 5 14.94 4 13 .52 4 
NORTH WEST 23 .14 2 21.34 2 19 .21 2 
E. MIDLANDS 15.03 6 13 .71 6 12 .22 6 
W. MIDLANDS 19.28 3 17.60 3 15.71 3 
WALES 8.22 8 7 .42 8 6.50 8 
SOUTH WEST 16.49 4 14.91 5 13.13 5 
E. ANGLIA 6.12 10 5.27 10 4.34 11 
SOUTH EAST 77.63 1 67.34 1 56.67 1 
N. IRELAND 2.60 12 2 .37 12 2 .07 12 • 
EIRE 5.59 11 5.08 11 4 .41 10 
Table 3.8: Relative potential values (and rank orders) for the UK and Eire -
Simulation 2. 
The first two simulations show the South East recording much greater increases in relative 
potential compared to the rest of the UK. Simulation 3 incorporates an average running 
speed of 75mph, which at present BR confines to high value freight. However, BR plan 
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to introduce newer and faster locomotives, with a running speed of at least 75mph, for 
international freight trains. With reference to Table 3.9, it can be seen that the South East 
no longer records a significantly greater increase in relative potential compared to the rest 
of Britain. Scotland, the North and East Anglia record increases in relative potential within 
five percentage points of that for the South East. More specifically, the increase in relative 
potential for Scotland, 30.66 percent, was less than 0.2 percent below the respective value 
for the South East, 30.85 percent. 
LEVEL I I 
REGIONS: 
UK AND EIRE 
INCREASE IN OWN 
POTENTIAL PERCENT INCREASES 
RELATIVE TO 
I L E DE FRANCE MIL 
ECUs/Hr PERCENT 
SCOTLAND 165264 48.6 30.7 
NORTH 104065 46.6 29.0 
YORK & HUMB. 213745 40.8 23.9 
NORTH WEST 283814 36.8 20.3 
EAST MIDLANDS 164806 33.1 17.1 
WEST MIDLANDS 221199 34.7 18.4 
WALES 96571 36.2 19.8 
SOUTH WEST 191614 35.6 19.2 
EAST ANGLIA 78121 42.6 25.4 
SOUTH EAST 1165189 48.8 30.9 
N. IRELAND 61381 80.5 58.8 
EIRE 176555 111.7 86.2 
Table 3.9: Absolute and relative potential values for the UK and Eire 
Simulation 3 (no delay). 
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LEVEL I I 
REGIONS: 
UK AND EIRE 
NO DELAY 6Hrs DELAY 18Hrs DELAY 
% RANK % RANK % RANK 
SCOTLAND 9.55 7 8.65 7 7.59 7 
NORTH 6.26 9 5.70 9 5.06. 9 
YORK & HUMB. 14.68 5 13 .73 4 12.64 4 
NORTH WEST 21.63 2 19 .88 2 18.07 2 
E. MIDLANDS 13.95 6 12 .74 6 11.53 6 
W. MIDLANDS 17.91 3 16.38 3 14.85 3 
WALES 7 .49 8 6.75 8 6.00 8 
SOUTH WEST 15.11 4 13.69 5 12 .25 5 
E. ANGLIA 5.14 10 4 .42 10 3.71 10 
SOUTH EAST 67 .04 1 58.56 1 50.51 1 
N. IRELAND 2.14 12 1.91 12 1.65 12 
EIRE 4 .44 11 3.95 11 3.39 10 
Table 3.10: Relative potential values (and rank orders) for the UK and Eire 
Simulation 3. 
The results for Simulation 3 therefore support the original hypothesis that the more 
peripheral UK regions would experience gains in relative accessibility similar to that of 
the South East. It can be seen that the overall findings of the present study conflict with 
those of the earlier study by Keeble et. aJ. (1982a); even though the results for Simulations 
1 and 2 when analyzed individually tend to support Keeble et. al/s main proposition, 
namely that the South East would experience the greatest gains in relative accessibility. A 
convergent trend in percentage increases in relative potential values for the UK regions 
culminates in fairly uniform increases being recorded by the South East, Scotland, the 
North and East Anglia. These findings have important implications for the "North" since 
the earlier findings of Clark et. al. (1969) and Keeble et. al. (1982a) show that the Tunnel 
would further peripheralise regions to the north and west of London. Eurotunnel (1987) 
has stated that the opportunities created by the Tunnel do not have to be confined to the 
South East but recognise that action is needed to prevent this from happening. The high-
speed rail link is considered to be very important in enhancing the regional distribution of 
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benefits created by the Tunnel. The results for Simulation 3 show that rail freight speed 
is critical. Faster locomotives and improved rail infrastructure are therefore of prime 
importance to the regions. 
It can be seen that the hypothesis of the present thesis holds true in certain circumstances. 
However, it is necessary to point out here that the rather limited nature of the data 
employed in the model has prevented the hypothesis being fully supported in all 
circumstances. This issue and other methodological problems are discussed in the critique 
below. 
3.7. Critique 
Economic potential analysis provides a very useful tool for assessing the impact of a new 
transportation system, or an improvement to the existing network, on the general level of 
regional accessibility, and thus a region's comparative advantage for economic 
development. However, as with most macro-analytical techniques, there are numerous 
difficulties associated with the setting-up and interpretation of potential models. This 
section will outline the methodological and interpretive problems encountered during this 
study. 
The lack of consistent and accurate data sets at the European regional level prevented the 
hypothesis being tested as had been originally envisaged. The hypothesis was set-up to test 
whether or not the more peripheral UK regions would benefit proportionately more than 
the South East from the Tunnel. It is assumed that since more than 75 percent of UK 
freight originates from outside the South East and that rail freight, as compared to road 
haulage, becomes more competitive over longer distances (>250/300 kms), the more 
peripheral UK regions would experience greater increases in relative potential. However, 
reliance on Eurostat level I I GDP data (Eurostat 1989) reflects the dominance of the South 
East's economy and not the regional distribution of UK freight imports/exports. I f regional 
industrial output or regional exports were incorporated into the model, the dominance of 
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the South East would not have been as apparent. More "narrow" data sets are available but 
regional inconsistencies in the compilation of such data sets made their use impracticable. 
Certain difficulties are also encountered with the compilation of the distance term. 
European national railway companies do not possess relevant maps or distance matrices 
of the European freight railway network (personal interview: Jenkins 1990). Therefore, the 
distance term is based on the Thomas Cook 'European Timetable' (1990) and 'Rail Map 
of Europe' (1989-1990). The distance matrix for the 90 regions was personally compiled 
based on the above two references. A stringent checking procedure was undertaken to 
minimise human error. The obvious disadvantage associated with the reliance on Thomas 
Cook data is that it is based on the passenger network. However, most of the European 
railway network is dual purpose with only a few high-speed lines being restricted for 
passenger use. High-speed lines, such as the TGV lines in France, are not incorporated 
into the distance matrix. 
More specific problems associated with the potential model revolve around several 
subjective assumptions. Firstly, the choice of each regional node is important to the 
respective regions general level of relative accessibility. The regional capital or major 
industrial town/city was the criterion on which the decision was made. Nonetheless, as can 
be seen from the results for the UK and Eire for all three simulations, the distance between 
London and the other regional nodes is important. If, for example, Plymouth or Penzance 
was chosen as the regional node for the South West instead of Bristol, the South West 
would have recorded lower levels of relative accessibility. Secondly, the choice of 
route/port is also important to the overall results, the choice being dependent on the 
shortest journey time. Manpower and time limitations prevented more accurate criteria 
being employed. Finally, the post-Tunnel scenario involves all freight going through the 
Tunnel since great time savings were made on most, i f not all, journeys (especially when 
the delay factor is increased). Obviously more factors, such as cost and reliability, will be 
important in the choice of route/mode after the Tunnel comes into service. 
However, these problems do not affect the overall usefulness of Economic Potential 
Analysis or the important theoretical contribution the current model makes to academic 
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involvement in the study of the regional economic impact of the Tunnel. I f a more narrow 
data set was employed, the results may have allowed the hypothesis to be fully accepted. 
Nonetheless, the results do show that certain peripheral UK regions could experience fairly 
uniform increases in relative accessibility compared with the South East. The Conclusion 
will highlight any policy implications based on the new findings of the current model. 
3.8. Conclusion 
The findings of the present study represent important empirical evidence which for the first 
time challenge the general assumption that the South East will benefit the most from the 
Tunnel. Incorporating the proposed average running speed of international freight trains 
(75mph), the model shows that cenain peripheral regions could record increases in relative 
accessibility of the same magnitude as the South East. However, as pointed out in the 
critique, the use of regional GDP values for the mass M j term prevented the hypothesis 
being fully tested. 
Intra-UK distances are shown to be relatively insignificant compared to pan-European 
distances. The English Channel, at present, forms a significant barrier between the UK and 
the Continent, especially in terms of the more realistic delay scenarios. This has the effect 
of emphasizing the importance of the mass term for UK regions in the Economic Potential 
equation. The consequence of relegating the importance of the distance term, the shortest 
rail or rail-ferry distance (in hours), is that the dominance of the South East's economy 
over the rest of the UK is clearly shown and that any improvement in relative accessibility 
will have a proportionately greater impact on the South East. The results for Simulation 
3 can therefore be considered to be even more significant and thus, enhancing the potential 
of the Tunnel to redress the economic imbalance between "North" and "South". 
Since it is unrealistic to assume that the 'no delay' scenario is representative of the real 
worid, a delay factor is incorporated into the model. However, the effect of either a six or 
18 hour delay on the results is shown to be rather limited in terms of increases in relative 
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potential. The influence of speed, on the other hand, seems to be paramount to the results. 
As stated above, post-Tunnel intemational freight services wil l run at 75mph and new 
locomotives that make possible freight train speeds in excess of 90mph have already been 
introduced on selected routes in France and Germany (Haydock 1988, Freeman Allen 
1990). 
This argument can also be extended to the upgrading of railway lines and, more 
specifically, to the construction of the high-speed railway line between London and the 
Tunnel portal. The results have shown that improvements to the national railway network 
will help prevent the South East reaping all the benefits. The freight dimension of the 
proposed Ove Arup east of London route would seem to be more attractive to regions 
north and west of London but the effective postponement of the rail link until well into 
the next century will be of some concern to regional interest groups. These findings could 
even support the call of the National Union of Railwaymen (1987) for the construction of 
a high-speed corridor running down the spine of Britain. Nonetheless, BR (1989b) expects 
its proposed international services to be competitive, particulariy with the new electric 
75mph locomotives. Haydock believes that it will not be long until the UK joins the 
"lOOmph club" and optimistically poses the question: 
'Why not Glasgow-Brussels or London-Lyon overnight in a freight TGV 
network?' 
(Haydock 1988, P.411) 
Keeble et. al. (1982a) conclude that any benefits created by the Tunnel would be confined 
to the south east corner of England but that these benefits, even for the South East, would 
be small. Keeble et. al. did not foresee any significant increases in accessibility for 'firms 
throughout lowland England and the depressed North and West to European-wide 
economic activity'. They therefore argue that the apparently poor public return from the 
Tunnel justified the Government's desire that the project be funded privately. 
Regional interest groups are greatly concerned that the opportunities created by the Tunnel 
to redress the imbalance between north and south will be missed. The postponement of the 
high-speed rail link between London and Cheriton is primarily the consequence of the 
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Government's refusal to commit public funds. Section 42(3) of the 1987 Channel Tunnel 
Act, prohibits the use of public money in connection with Tunnel or related projects. 
Furthermore, the strict commercial remit imposed on BR (8% internal rate of return) 
effectively limits any proposed investment in international passenger or freight services via 
the Tunnel. The results of die present study show that the South East does not have to be 
the main or only beneficiary from the potential opportunities created by the Tunnel. The 
Tunnel could offer businesses throughout the UK a quicker and more reliable service to 
the Continent for their exports. But BR (and the British Government) have to make the 
necessary investments to encourage furns to switch from road to rail, thus capitalising on 
the potential accessibility gains that are, on the whole, restricted to the latter. The 
economic, social and environmental benefits that could be achieved are enormous but the 
Government and BR need to take action immediately i f these benefits are to be fully 
realised. 
The remaining chapters of the present thesis examine the likelihood of the regions taking 
advantage of the opponuniiies created by the Tunnel. The following chapter critically 
reviews the policy and legislative environment within which the Tunnel is being developed 
as well as its related infrastructure, including the high-speed rail link, both within the UK 
and France. British Government policy has significantiy limited the provision of supporting 
transport infrastructure. The delays associated with the International Passenger Station 
(IPS) at Ashford and Uie rail link are the result of the British Government's 'market 
solutions' approach to the Tunnel. However i f the regions are to benefit from the Tunnel, 
companies will have to either change their location or switch their distribution practices 
in favour of rail freight or both. In order to see i f they are likely to do so a questionnaire 
survey was undertaken, the results of which are analyzed in chapters 5 and 6. Case studies 
of the East Kent and the "Far South West" (chapters 7 & 8) will dien examine these broad 
issues at a more local and regional level. 
Notes 
1. The potential model was staned prior to die 1990 reunification of Germany and no 
consistent data consistent data were available for the then East Germany. 
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C H A P T E R 4: T H E L E G I S L A T I V E AND P O L I C Y F R A M E W O R K 
Any examination of the regional economic implications of the Tunnel must be grounded 
in an understanding of the existing (and future) legislative and policy framework. As 
outlined in the Literature Review (chapter 2), the Government has been strongly criticised 
by regional interest groups for neglecting to invest in the supporting transport network. It 
is considered that as result of Government inaction, the Tunnel is likely to lead to a further 
widening of the "North-South" divide. The results of the Economic Potential Model 
(chapter 3) show that certain peripheral regions could experience increases in relative 
accessibility of the same magnitude as the South East. These findings contradict the 
general assumption that the South East will be the main beneficiary from the Tunnel. 
However, these results need to be tested in the "real" worid. 
4.1. Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is to determine whether Government policy will effectively limit 
the regional spread of benefits created by the Tunnel. It is argued that the lack of a 
national transport strategy as well as the post-1979 policies of privatisation and 
deregulation, have significantly influenced Government thinking towards the Tunnel and 
related infrastructure. The motives behind the Government's support for the Tunnel are set 
out and their 'market solutions' approach towards the supporting transport network 
questioned. The British Government's policy on the Tunnel and related transport 
infrastructure needs also to be contrasted with the interventionist strategies adopted in 
France, In addition, comparisons will be drawn with the European Commission's proposed 
pan-European high-speed rail network. 
Attention will focus first on specific Tunnel policy in the UK. The Government's 
enthusiasm for a fixed Channel link, underlined with a guarantee against cancellation on 
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political grounds, generated considerable private sector interest. However, local government 
was effectively peripheralised from the decision-making process. The passage of the 
Channel Tunnel Bill through Parliament also produced limited public consultation. The 
Government therefore successfully sidelined the regional economic implications of the 
Tunnel from political debate. The 1987 Channel Tunnel Act has been widely criticised for 
failing to recognise the need for an efficient supporting transport network, to allow the 
regions to maximise the opportunities created by the Tunnel and minimise the adverse 
effects. Thus, the main components of the 1987 Act are analyzed, particularly Sections 40 
and 42. The Section 40 amendment represents the only Government sanctioned series of 
pan-regional consultations. 
After establishing the Government's primary objectives in supporting the Tunnel, the wider 
policy environment, including the Government's handling of the high-speed rail link and 
railway policy in general, will be examined. The Government's policy on the rail link has 
resulted in an indefinite postponement of the project. The confusion over the rail link will 
be used to highlight the "failure" of Government policy. In addition. State fuiancing of the 
railways during the 1980s and early 1990s could be seen to conflict with the Government's 
commitment to the Tunnel. Intemational passenger and freight services could also be 
seriously undermined by the uncertainty generated by the proposed denationalization of the 
railways. 
Finally, international comparisons with France, and to a lesser extent Belgium, will provide 
a broader perspective in which to assess British policies toward the Tunnel. The relatively 
"grandiose" plans of SNCF will be contrasted against BR's more conservative proposals. 
The relationship of SNCF with the national Government and the role of the Nord-Pas de 
Calais Regional Council will be highlighted. Finally, the British Government's policy on 
the rail link also has to be set against the European Commission's policy objectives for a 
pan-European high-speed rail network. 
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4.2. The Tunnel and Government Policy 
The British policy response towards the Tunnel and supporting transport infrastructure has 
been concerned with establishing the necessary regulatory structures needed during the 
construction and operation of the Tunnel. The Government has been strongly criticised for 
the lack of long-term planning, particularly in terms of the regional economic implications 
of Uie Tunnel (Gossop 1987, Harmen 1989, Simmons 1989, Holliday et. al. 1991). The 
regional economic impact of the Tunnel has been left predominantly for market forces to 
determine. No Government strategy has attempted to enhance the economic benefits of the 
Tunnel or to ameliorate any adverse effects. Calls for a regional development plan to 
promote a fairer distribution of benefits to regions outside the South East have invited littie 
response (Campaign for the North 1981. NOERC 1988, CLES 1989, Pieda 1989a&b, 
TCPA 1990). The Govemmeni's view that the Tunnel will be good for the UK as a whole 
has validated their non-interventionist policies. 
The position taken by the Government in support of the Tunnel will be set against the 
policy "vacuum" on the regional economic implications of improved accessibility to the 
Continent. Discussion of the British policy response towards the Tunnel will initially focus 
on the "pre-selection" stage; between 1979 and January 1986 several schemes emerged and 
by the deadline for 'Invitations' four rival projects were being promoted. This period is 
marked by intense political lobbying and by early Govemment support. However, the lack 
of local govemment involvement during this developmental stage is all too evident. 
The "Parliamentary" stage (from the concession award to Eurotunnel and up to the 1987 
Channel Tunnel Act receiving royal assent) will then be critically reviewed. The 
Government's decision to proceed with a Hybrid Bil l , although not uncommon, proved to 
be highly contentious since the opportunity for public discussion was effectively limited. 
The desire to avoid unnecessary delays, vital as it was to the success of the project, has 
to be weighed-up against the apparent neglect of economic issues. Finally, based on the 
implications of the 1987 Act, the Government's policy on the long-term regional economic 
impact of the Tunnel will be examined. Investment in necessary supporting transport 
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infrastructure has been hindered by the strict financial parameters placed on "Public" 
involvement through Section 42 of the Act. The significance of the House of Lords' 
Section 40 amendment to the 1987 Act will also be analyzed. The Section 40 consultations 
identified regional aspirations for the provision of international services and infrastructure. 
4.2.1. The Pre-Selection Stage: the politics of rival schemes 
The genesis of the present Tunnel project goes back to the BR and SNCF joint proposal 
for a single rail tunnel in 1979. By September 1981, the British Prime Minister and the 
President of France met at the London Summit to confirm both Governments' commitment 
to work towards an agreement on a proposed cross-Channel fixed link. Proponents of a 
fixed link initially believed that Government support would not be forthcoming: 
'The new Prime Minister (Margaret Thatcher) was known to dislike 
railways, took an abrasive line with the rest of the European Community 
and was eager to cut public spending; her support appeared unlikely.' 
(Comfort 1987, P.47) 
Nonetheless, the Prime Minister proved to be a strong advocate of a fixed link. Nicholas 
Ridley, the former Secretary of State for Transport, hinted that the possible reason for 
Thatcher's unwavering support was her desire to build 'monuments', as permanent 
reminders of her Premiership (Jones 1987). The Government's enthusiasm for a fixed link 
seems surprising following the sceptical Caimcross Report, November 1981, which 
concluded that there was 'no overwhelming case for a fixed link'. Existing capacity in the 
cross-Channel port and ferry industry was regarded as sufficient to cope with the 
increasing demand. However, the Government considered the introduction of a new mode 
of transport into the cross-Channel ferry industry likely to lead to increased competition, 
resulting in reduced tariff rates and improved quality. 
The Govemment's support for a fixed link did not extend to the public financing of the 
project or even financial guarantees to private developers. It was made clear from the 
out-set that the Government favoured a privately financed scheme. In 1980, the Transport 
Secretary, Norman Fowler, emphasized this expectation, niling-out any form of State 
financial help. According to Bonavia (1987), the cancellation of the 1970s scheme showed 
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that 'Government's are not particulariy good managers of major projects'. Escalating costs 
led the newly elected Labour Government to abandon unilaterally the project (Gibb 1986a). 
The favourable escape clauses for the private concessionaires did not lead to any serious 
protests against the decision to cancel the project. The Government's refusal to underwrite 
the present Tunnel project can be seen, in part at least, as an attempt to avoid a similar 
situation recurring. 
Several schemes emerged by the eariy 1980s, notably Eurorail and the CTG's twin-bore 
rail-tunnel proposal. But as a result of the Falklands War and the 1983 General Election 
much of the initial momentum was lost. It was not until 14 November 1984, that the 
Transport Secretary Nicholas Ridley and his counterparts in France, the Transport Minister 
Jean Auroux and the Planning Minister Paul Quiles, formally agreed on the need for 
private financing with Government guarantees against the cancellation of the project on 
political grounds. Margaret Thatcher and Francois Mitterrand endorsed the agreement on 
29 November 1984. Between 30 November and 28 February 1985, the required 
specifications for any fixed link proposal were drafted. Finally, on 2 April 1985 the 
Official 'Invitations to Promoters' was published, outlining the specifications such as; the 
political guarantee, the French statutory procedures, the necessary road and rail 
improvements, and the environmental assessments. 
Opposition to a proposed fixed link had previously been fragmented and unorganised but 
in April 1985 Flexilink was formed to co-ordinate the fight against a permanent link (Jones 
1987)). Flexilink was a consortium representing predominantly port and ferry interests; the 
former Seaiink British Ferries, European Ferries and the Dover Harbour Board. During 
September 1985, Flexilink launched a £400,000 poster campaign - 'For Cross-Channel 
Choice' - warning against the adverse consequences of a fixed link (Comfort 1987). This 
opposition failed to deter the Government. Thus, on 20 January 1986, Eurotunnel won the 
concession to build the Tunnel. 
Local government involvement in the UK, even in Kent, had so far been non-existent. Kent 
County Council (KCC) did not become active participants until after 1985. The policy 
stance taken by KCC was not positively in favour or actively against a fixed link. Between 
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2 April and 31 October 1985, French officials from the Transport Ministry set-up meetings 
with senior planning officials in Kent. The British Government by this time had made no 
contact with any of the local authorities in Kent and acdveiy avoided such consultadon. 
Kent had to react to a policy decision taken by central Government The problem facing 
the Govemment was that Kent had nothing really to gain from a fixed link (Comfort 
1987). The environmental damage that any of the schemes would entail and the 
rationalisation of the port and ferry industry, the main employer in a 'depressed' East Kent, 
would always arouse opposition in the region. The Govemment was therefore keen to 
peripheralise local govemment involvement It is argued in the 'Kent Impact Study: 1991 
Review' (CTJCC 1991a) that local authorities in Kent are still marginalised, with their 
'purse strings' tightiy controlled by central Govemment (see chapter 7). 
In France, the decision to award the concession to Eurotunnel was made in close 
consultation with the Nord-Pas de Calais Regional Council (HoUiday et. al. 1991). By 20 
January 1986. the Regional Council had prepared a list of regional requirements, with at 
least 75 percent already agreed to (Conseil Regional Nord-Pas de Calais 1986). Holliday 
et. al. (1991) argue that the high degree of British centralism was at the expense of 
coherent decision-making. Whereas in France, 'decisive State economic intervention 
favours rational planning and naked assertion of political w i l l ' (Holliday et al. 1991). 
Whilst concurring with this argument, it is worth wondering how the French system would 
have worked in the UK and vice versa. It is important not to lose sight of the overriding 
aims of the British and French Governments. In Britain, the Tunnel is seen as an end in 
itself and thus, all effon focused on limiting opposition wherever possible and passing the 
necessary legislation to allow construction to proceed. In France, economic issues hiave 
always been at the forefront, primarily as a result of the depressed nature of the Nord-Pas 
de Calais regional economy. The governmental systems of the two countries are different 
but, more importandy, the objectives also significantiy diverge in the UK and France. 
If a more consultative approach had been undertaken by the British Govemment, the 
Tunnel might have still been in the planning stage. A public enquiry, commonly associated 
with major transport infrastructure projects, would have engendered serious delays, 
possibly culminating in the cancellation of the Tunnel. However, when the Tunnel opens 
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in 1993. the lack of long-term regional planning is likely to limit tiie opportunities 
available to Britain. Economic Potential Analysis employed in chapter 3 shows that 
benefits created by the Tunnel could be distributed more evenly than had previously been 
believed but that improvements to the rail network, including the rail link, are critical, 
Govemment policy, developed in the pre-selection stage, has continued to limit the ability 
of the regions to maximise the benefits created by the Tunnel. Following the Concession 
award to EimDtunnel, the Govemment continued to restrict consultation since the Channel 
Tunnel Bill was to be presented before Parliament in the form of a Hybrid. 
4.2.2. The Parliamentary Stage: a Hybrid Bill 
The Govemment made clear in the 1986 White Paper - 'The Channel Fixed Link* - that 
it did not expect the Parliamentary process to take much longer than 18 months, with the 
Channel Tunnel Bill receiving royal assent during the summer of 1987. There was concern 
amongst the Labour opposition that the Government was planning to proceed with 'undue 
haste' (Comfort 1987). The signing of the Anglo-French Treaty on 12 Febnjary 1986 by 
Margaret Thatcher and Francois Mitterrand started the British Government's effort to gain 
rapid Parliamentary approval. The Concession agreement between the two Governments 
and Eurotunnel was signed on 14 March 1986. granting initially, at least, Eurotunnel the 
right to operate the Tunnel for 55 years. 
The Secretary of State for Transport at the time, Nicholas Ridley, indicated in the official 
'Invitations to Promoters' (published in 1985), that the Govemment would deal with the 
Tunnel by way of a Hybrid Bill and not through a public enquiry. A Hybrid Bill is a 
special type of measure used when a matter of public policy direcUy affects private 
interests. An aspect of the Bill is that it may be considered by a Select Committee of each 
House immediately after its Second Reading. Such a committee is bound to hear petitions 
from anyone directly affected by the provisions of the Bil l . The Government's view was 
that the Bill combined the need for Parliament to determine whether the Tunnel would be 
allowed to proceed with the right of private citizens to have their say (Comfort 1987). 
Thus: 
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'A period of extensive consultation will now follow the decision of 
principle.' 
(Department of Transport 1986, P. 11) 
However, petitions could only be heard about the details of the scheme, not on the 
principle of whether the Tunnel should be built or not. Arguments against the Tunnel 
would not be heard unless directly related to the effect on the individual. Therefore, 
consultation was stricdy limited to the particulars of the Tunnel project, not the cases for 
and against a fixed Channel link. 
The Channel Tunnel Joint Consultative Committee (CTJCC) for Kent was set-up under the 
1986 White Paper. The CTJCC was chaired by a Government Minister and became the 
central institutional device in the months after the selection of the Eurotunnel project. 
However, the CTJCC was only a consultative forum. Agreements did not commit 
Government departments and the CTJCC had no executive powers of its own to enforce 
recommendations. A proposal for an East Kent Development Agency was completely 
undermined by the refusal by Shepway District Council and Ashford Borough Council to 
co-operate. A more elaborate East Kent Development Corporation with direct powers from 
central Government was also suggested but never taken seriously. The CTJCC (1991a) still 
advocates the need for an East Kent Development Agency but again no advance has been 
made. Holliday et. al. (1991) believe that 'economic issues never really got a hearing' by 
the CTJCC, even though one of their main tasks was to commission a more detailed study 
of the potential impact on Kent. The conclusions reached by the CTJCC and the 'Strategy' 
implemented, based on the Kent Impact Study (KIS - 1987) and the '1991 Review', will 
be discussed in more detail in chapter 7. 
The Govemment's general policy towards the Tunnel was one of "dispersion"; that being 
to spread the construction benefits throughout Britain. In January 1987, a monthly 
'Channel Fixed Link Newsletter' was published by the Department of Trade and Industry, 
informing companies of construction orders. However, the placing of construction orders 
was purely based on commercial decisions by Eurotunnel and TML. Nonetheless, by the 
end of 1989, nearly 80 percent of TML subcontracts by value were retained by British 
firms throughout the UK (Vickennan 1990). 
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'Thus, a dispersal strategy has accorded well with the preferred operations 
of British policy makers, which are to operate at arm's length from the 
commercial decisions of companies such as Eurotunnel and TML wherever 
possible.' 
(Holliday et. al. 1991, P.120) 
Other than ihe CTJCC, the Select Committees in both the House of Commons and the 
House of Lords provided the only other official platform for "consultation". The first 
public session of the Common's Select Committee commenced on 24 June 1986 and by 
the publication of the Official Report on the 22 November, 4,852 petitions had been 
lodged. The Select Committee agreed with the Govemment's definition of their remit and 
thus, since the principle of building the Tunnel had been approved, the Committee would 
only hear petitions concerning the affects of the Tunnel on private interests. Consultation 
on the principle of the Tunnel and related works was not allowed to proceed. The Select 
Committee approved 70 amendments to the Channel Tunnel Bill but most were of minor 
significance. However, ferry operators were successful in gaining an undertaking that no 
Government subsidy could be paid to Eurotunnel (Section 2 of the 1987 Channel Tunnel 
Act). 
After an unopposed Second Reading in the House of Lords, the Lords' Select Committee 
began their sitting on 2 March 1987: 
'The practice of the House with regard to a Hybrid Bill is for a Select 
Committee to accept the general policy of the Bill and to inquire into the 
interests of Petitioners who are directiy and injuriously affected by its 
provisions. Both elements of the practice gave rise to argument before the 
Committee.' 
(House of Lords 1987, P.3) 
The Conrmiittee did not endorse the Minister of Transport's definition of the principles of 
the Bill and widened their remit to hear evidence on the siting of the international 
passenger station at Waterioo and the improvement of the A20 trunk road between 
Folkestone and Dover. More significantiy, the Committee also decided to hear petitions 
lodged by local authorities and associations from Greater Manchester, Bradford, Yorkshire 
and Humberside and Glasgow concerning the wider implications of the Bil l . The 
Committee heard the case presented by these regions despite the Govemment's legitimate 
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right to challenge the locus standi (their right to be heard) of these petitioners. Lord 
Ampthill, the Committee's Chairman, had made it evidently clear from the opening that 
the Government would not have it all its own way. The above regions were therefore 
successful in starting consultation, albeit limited, on the regional implications of the 
Tunnel. The Committee concluded that: 
The key to spreading the benefits which could flow from the project 
mostly lie in the hands of British Rail, at present totally dependent on 
Government for its resources. The restraints....could possibly inhibit the 
capacity of British Rail to invest in the infrastructure to exploit the 
potential.' 
(House of Lords 1987, P.4) 
The Committee accepted that these issues were not within its remit but hoped that they 
would receive further consideration. The Government agreed to a 'modest' amendment 
ensuring that BR would adequately serve regions to the north and west of London with 
international passenger and freight trains. The Section 40 consultation process was the 
means by which BR could attempt to address the needs of all UK regions (BR 1989c, 
Knowles et. al. 1989). However, as will be shown later on, the usefulness of the Section 
40 regional consultations was limited. 
The Channel Tunnel Bill received royal assent shortly after the 11 June 1987 General 
Election. During the Pariiamentary stage, the Government was effective in limiting 
consultation and thus, serious opposition to the Bill . The Government's overriding aim to 
avoid delays and to allow construction to start as soon as possible has left much 
uncertainty over the wider regional economic implications of the Tunnel. The KIS (1987) 
represents the only official consultative report on the potential impact of the Tunnel. The 
initial recommendations of the CTJCC, however, proved to be not much more than hopeful 
aspirations. Trusting the market to determine the wider impact of the Tunnel could be seen 
as an excuse by the Government for inaction or an overriding commitment to a political 
ideology. The political will shown by the Government to bring the fixed link to reality has 
not incorporated national impact studies. 
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4.2.3. The 1987 Channel Tunnel Act: implications for the UK 
The 1987 Channel Tunnel Act gives Eurotunnel the authority to build and operate the 
Tunnel. It also ratifies the Anglo-French Treaty and outlines certain particulars of the 
project, including the necessary road and rail improvements, as well as giving authority 
for compulsory purchase and setting-out the regulatory regime under which the Tunnel will 
operate. The implications of Section 42 (i.e. 'No Government grants to Railways Board 
in respect of international railway services') will be examined first (Department of 
Transport 1987). The financial restrictions imposed on BR under Section 42 and the 
Government's wider policies toward the railways, require BR to base investment decisions 
purely on commercial grounds. Attention will then focus on Section 40 of the Act (the 
'Railways Board's plan for international through services'). Under Section 40, BR is 
required to prepare a plan for international passenger and freight services to and from all 
pans of the UK. 
Section 42(3) of the 1987 Act prohibits any element of public subsidy to Tunnel-related 
operations even though the House of Lords stress that the spreading of benefits from the 
Tunnel will mostly depend on the level of international services to the regions: 
'No grants shall be made by the Secretary of State....towards expenditure 
incurred or to be incurred by the Railways Board for the purpose, 
improvement and development of international railway services.' 
(Depanment of Transport 1987. P.34) 
The Government did not want to commit public funds to expensive projects such as the 
high-speed rail link since it would conflict with their wider economic policy of reducing 
public spending. The Government was also trying to appease the real concerns of ferry 
operators and the British Ports Association that the Tunnel could be indirectly subsidised 
by BR's international services. In contrast, the French Govemmeni adopted the 'Plan 
Transmanche', a series of measures designed to ensure the maximum regional and national 
benefit (Conseil Regional Nord-Pas de Calais 1986). Regional development planning was 
apparent in France at an early stage but: 
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'Strategic vision of this kind has conspicuously not been developed by 
British institutions.' 
(Holllday el. al. 1991, P.156) 
National and regional interests did not coincide in the UK, at least to an acceptable level, 
and so there was no focus on regional development issues. The Section 40 report (Knowles 
et. al. 1989) identifies regional aspirations and commercially 'viable' services: 
'Many county councils argued that the Final Reports of the working parties 
(set-up under Section 40) reflect the constraints imposed on BR in terms of 
fijture strategy and investment, rather than opportunities presented by the 
Channel Tunnel for economic development.' 
(Farrington et. al. 1990, P.142) 
It was beyond the remit of the Section 40 regional consultations to resolve the 'mismatch' 
between aspirations and commercial opportunities. Regional consultations were undertaken 
between May 1988 and June 1989. The 13 regional forums met three times and a total of 
96 meetings were held by the 28 passenger and freight working parties. The independent 
report was submitted to BR in September 1989, and an input to BR's Business Plan, 
'International Rail Services for the UK' (BR 1989b). Unlike the French national railways, 
SNCF, BR can only base investment decisions on identified demand levels and not on the 
generative effect of new services. The Government's policy on the financing of railways 
will be examined in more detail in section 4.4.1., as will a comparative study of SNCF 
(section 4.5.2.). Even though Section 40 is regarded as a success in terms of identifying 
regional aspirations and heightening the awareness of opportunities for the regions, 
Farrington et. al. (1990, P.143) conclude that: 
'The financial conditions under which the Government requires BR to 
operate, together with the restrictions on investments imposed by Section 
42 of the Channel Tunnel Act, are constraints which will need to be eased 
in some way i f the economic development potential of the Tunnel perceived 
by the regions is to be fiilly and quickly realised after Tunnel opening.' 
Therefore, in terms of the limited scope of Section 40, the regional consultation process 
can only be regarded as a success. But the overall usefulness of Section 40 is in question. 
No strategic forward planning emerged from the regional consultations, only an awareness 
of the strict guidelines imposed on BR. 
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4.2.4. British Tunnel Philosophy: a summary 
The Government has stated that their policy on international transport is 'to increase 
consumer choice and promote efficiency by encouraging competition and innovation' 
(Department of Transport 1986). The oligopolistic structure of the cross-Channel ferry 
industry has meant that through tacit collusion tariff rates have been kept relatively high. 
The Government's support for a fixed link can therefore be seen, at least in part, as an 
attempt to promote competition in the cross-Channel transport market. The strong trade 
union contingent in the port and ferry industry could also have been the target of the 
Government's anti-union policies. The Government's support for a fixed link was crucial 
to the success of the Tunnel project A key role was played by the Prime Minister in 
advocating the need for a fixed link. It is widely considered that the 'tragedy' of the 1970s 
project and 'perhaps the real reason for its failure', was that it did not enjoy the committed 
support from such a prominent figure (HoIIiday et. al. 1991, after Monris and Hough 1986). 
However, the Government's determination to avoid unnecessary delays and restrict 
opposition limited the usual platform for consultation. The use of the Hybrid Bill instead 
of a public enquiry prevented consultation on the wider regional economic issues raised 
by the Tunnel. As with the 1985 Bus Deregulation Act. the Government avoided 
consultation and ignored calls from the opposition parties for a more open debate (Bell and 
Cloke 1990). The outcome has been that economic issues concerning the Tunnel have 
rarely been given a hearing. The Government's belief that the Tunnel would be good for 
the whole of the UK is not based on conclusions drawn from national/regional economic 
impact studies. 
The commercial operating environment of BR needs to be relaxed if, as the House of 
Lords (1987) recognise, the benefits fi-om the Tunnel are to be spread throughout the UK. 
Section 42 of the 1987 Channel Tunnel Act not only undermined the effectiveness of the 
Section 40 regional consultations but has limited BR's options to invest in international 
through services, including the high-speed rail link. Why advocate a Tunnel when, as 
independent consultants' (KCC 1989) predict, there is likely to a bottleneck on the railway 
lines approaching the Tunnel ponal as soon as or shortly after it becomes operational? 
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The next section will examine the Govemment's attitude towards the supporting transport 
infrastructure, utilising the example of the high-speed rail link. Attention will then focus 
on the proposed 'denationalization' of BR. Considerable uncertainty is likely to be 
generated at a time when the Tunnel offers the rail network unbound opportunities. The 
interventionist policies of the French Government, which are aimed at maximising the 
opportunities created by the Tunnel, will also be outlined. In addition, the European 
Commission's support for a pan-European high-speed rail network will be briefly 
discussed. The British Govemment's view on high-speed rail travel conflicts sharply with 
the Commission's 'master plan' for a European high-speed rail network. 
43. The High-Speed Rail Link 
The rail link is particulariy important in examining the legislative and policy framework 
of the Tunnel since: firstly, it is seen as an essential component of the supporting transport 
network; and secondly, it highlights the 'market solutions' strategy of the Government. The 
policy "vacuum" on supporting transport infrastructure is argued as evidence of the 
"failure" of Government policy. The prolonged history of the present rail link is also 
advanced as an argument for co-ordinated and coherent transport planning (Harmen 1989, 
Simmons 1989, Gibb and Smith 1991). The KCC (1989) report on rail services in Kent, 
concludes that capacity constraints on Network South East will be experienced as soon as 
the Tunnel opens or shortly thereafter, BR considers that a rail link is needed by 1998 (BR 
1989b). The Government, however, is of the opinion that the anticipated increase in 
domestic and international passenger and freight traffic can be accommodated on existing 
Kent main line tracks until the year 2005. The decision by the Government to postpone 
effectively the rail link until well into the next century will be shown to be based more on 
electoral factors than transport needs or the economic well-being of the UK as a whole. 
The recent history of the rail link is summarised in Figure 4.1, with the 'key dates' since 
1987 highlighted. It is first useful to discuss briefly the prolonged history of the rail link. 
It is then possible to analyze the Government's latest decision to abandon BR's New Kent 
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Main Line (NKML) in favour of Ove Arup's East London route. 'Wider considerations' 
led the Government to reject BR's proposed route for the rail link. 
4.3. L The Recent History of the Rail Link 
As is evident from Figure 4.1, the Government originally prioritised investment by the 
private sector, with BR directed to find a construction partner for the raD link project. By 
November 1989, the Eurorail Consortium of Trafalgar House and BICC was chosen. Of 
the initial four route options proposed an amended 'Route 2' was submitted by the 
Consortium to the Department of Transport in April 1990. Figure 4.2 outlines the original 
four routes taken under consideration by BR. All four options were rejected as originally 
proposed and a new route aligned close to the Route 2 conidor chosen (Figure 4.3). The 
amended Route 2 was costed at £1.7 million of which 30 percent was accounted for by 
environmental safeguards. Other options considered by BR included the RACHEL 
(Rainham to the Channel Tunnel) proposal and the TALIS (Thames Alternative link 
International System) route. Both routes were rejected on financial and technical grounds. 
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Autumn 1987 
July 1988 
August 1988 
January 1989 
March 1989 
October 1989 
November 1989 
March 1990 
April 1990 
June 1990 
November 1990/ 
April 1991 
May 1991 
October 1991 
BR chose Waterloo Station as the London terminal for Channel 
Tunnel trains. BR undertake feasibility studies on the rail link. 
BR publish four alternative routes, cosied at £1.2 billion. 
Government tell BR to look for a private sector construction panner. 
King's Cross selected as second London terminal. 
BR decides on an amended Route 2 southerly approach, costed at 
£1.7 billion. 
RACHEL route (Rainham to Channel Tunnel) and TALIS route 
(Thames alternative link international system) announced. 
Eurorail consortium of Trafalgar House and BICC chosen by BR. 
Rail link plans delayed for a year. 
Consonium asks for Govemment backing. 
Amended Route submitted to Department of Transport. 
Amended Route rejected as unacceptable. Govemment funding ruled 
out. 
BR again studies four options: its own revised route, Ove Arup*s 
easterly route. Rail Europe^s eastern link, and Newham Councifs 
proposed route. 
BR again submits its own revised Route, the *New Kent Main 
Line\the cost estimated at £3.75 billion and confirms King's Cross 
as the second London terminal. 
Ove Arup's easterly route via Stratford to King's Cross is chosen by 
the Government, costed at £4.5 billion. 
Figure 4.1: The Rail Link - Key Dates. 
(Source: Gibb and Smith 1991, P.346; after The Guardian, 10 October 1991, R24) 
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Figure 4.3 The Amended Route 2 Source: BR 1989a 
In November 1989, the BR/Eurorail consortium delayed plans for the rail link by one year. 
The estimated cost of £1.7 million reduced the commercial attractiveness of the new route, 
particularly for the private sector companies. The incorporation of environmental 
safeguards was seen as an unfair burden. The Consortium asked for financial backing from 
the Government but any form of State assistance was immediately ruled-out. The 
commercial viability of the high-speed rail link has always been in doubt, with the Eurorail 
consortium requiring a much higher annual rate of return (greater than 20 percent is not 
uncommon in the private sector) than the statutory eight percent for BR: 
'As Alastair Morton (1989) has argued, the Channel Tunnel's uniqueness 
is its value, which makes private finance viable in a way which could never 
be true of a rail link.' 
(Holliday et. al. 1991, P.158) 
Between November 1990 and April 1991, BR once more found itself reviewing four 
different options, including Ove Arup's easterly route. BR again concluded that its 
amended route was still the more attractive option, later renaming it the 'New Kent Main 
Line' (NKML). The Government disagreed and asked BR to co-operate with Ove Arup to 
prepare a more detailed feasibility study of the East London route. 
4.3.2 'Wider Considerations' Lead to a Further Delay 
The need for the rail link by no later than the late 1990s is recognised by all the interested 
parties except the British Govemment: 
'Mr Rifkind (the former Secretary of State for Transport) believes that BR's 
traffic forecasts do not justify a rail link before the year 2005.' 
(Gibb and Smith 1991,P.346) 
The Govemment considers that the capacity of Network South East is sufficient to cope 
with the increase in passenger and freight traffic for at least 10 years after the Tunnel 
opens. Traffic forecasts and capacity assessments undertaken by BR, Eurotunnel and SNCF 
all point to tiie need for the rail link before the year 2005 (KCC 1989). Thus, tiie rail link 
is essential i f an effective international passenger and freight service is to operate while 
maintaining domestic services in the South East. 
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The Government's decision to effectively postpone the rail link until 2005. or beyond, is 
based on 'wider considerations'. The Govemment is, however, confident that traffic 
forecasts do not justify the need for the rail link until this later date. The years of 
uncertainty prior to the Government's rejection of BR's N K M L does not engender 
confidence for the future: 
'In fact there is considerable concem that the recent announcement....is 
purely a delaying tactic to avoid this politically sensitive issue.' 
(Gibb and Smith 1991,P.346) 
BR is required to undertake feasibility studies, along with Ove Arup. on the newly 
favoured easteriy route. Figure 4.4 contrasts BR's preferred southern approach route to 
London with Ove Artip's proposed route via Rainham Marches and Stratford. The two 
routes diverge just north of Maidstone with the Ove Arup route continuing north through 
Chatham, boring underneath the Thames, to emerge near Rainham in Essex. The 
construction costs are estimated to be approximately £4.5 billion. £750 million more than 
the route proposed by BR which carried straight on from Detling through Swanley and 
South London, primarily underground, to Waterioo and King's Cross. The incorporation 
of more elaborate tunnelling proposals under South London in order to reduce the impact 
on the environment and residential properties, increased the cost of BR's original route 
from £1.7 billion to £3.75 billion. The doubling of costs for the NKML. not surprisingly, 
meant that BR encountered severe difficulties in trying to attract commercial backers. The 
more costly option of the Ove Arup East London route was still preferred by the 
Govemment. Furthermore, it was suggested that State financial suppon could be 
forthcoming. 
Malcolm Rifkind stressed that the Govemment had an obligation to take into account the 
impact of the rail link on the environment and residential properties, on the long-term 
requirements for rail freight and on the development opporainities for the East Thames 
Corridor. The Ove Arup route minimises the impact of the rail link on residential 
properties. Figure 4.5 summarises the environmental impact of both the N K M L and the 
Ove Arup proposal. 
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Figure 4.5: The Routes Compared: BR's NKML southern approach route 
versus Ove Arup's East London route. 
(Source: The Daily Telegraph, P.4; after the Department of Transpon 1991) 
121 
A report by the Consultants Environmental Resources highlights the difficulty in appraising 
the impact of the rival routes: 'How do you measure ancient woodland against an 
internationally important wetland?' (The Times 1991). The Government's assertion that the 
Ove Amp East London route involves only 'a fraction of the environmental impact' is 
really a reflection of the impact on residential properties. 
The freight dimension of the Ove Amp route is also considered favourably by the 
Govemment. The BR route failed to encompass any real proposals for rail freight beyond 
the routing of freight around West London's already congested tracks. However, the 
"sketchy" nature of Ove Amp's freight plans do create some confusion. The scheme as 
initially proposed is only two-tracked with no dedicated freight lines, freight trains would 
have to be diverted on to loops so as not to interfere with passenger trains. There is an 
option to build a further two tracks for freight but cost would make this option unlikely. 
The Govemment believes thai the rail link via Stratford will act as a catalyst for economic 
development in the 'East Thames corridor*, along with other improvements to the transport 
network, by attracting new investment away from the "over-heating" M4 corridor. 
Consultants employed by BR could only identify a development gain from the rail link of 
£100 million. The TCPA. however, regard the decision as making 'good planning sense' 
and the labour-controlled Borough of Newham considers that 'the imaginative development 
of East London will release sites and tap the large pool of unemployed and the skills of 
local people' (Grigsby 1991). Whether the Govemment will utilise these transport 
initiatives, including the rail link, in a wider regional development plan is really a matter 
of "wait and see" but the past record of the Conservative Govemment is not encouraging. 
The Government's decision was greeted by the Conservative Pany as the correct political 
decision in that far fewer homes in Conservative 'marginal' seats are affected by the new 
route (Brown 1991). Figure 4.6 (see P.120) highlights the political implications of die rail 
link. The routing of the rail link to the east of London would avoid several Conservative 
seats in South London, including the former Conservative marginal Lewisham East. The 
Chairman of BR. Sir Bob Reid. expressed his disappointment that political factors should 
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have outweighed the preferred transpon solution (Hope 1991); in suppon the Times 
reported that: 
'a transport minister admitted privately that if the decision had been taken 
purely on transport grounds the southern approach would have won.' 
(Times 1991, P.5) 
However, Malcolm Rifkind believed that the Ove Arup route satisfied the Govemment's 
transpon objectives for serving the needs of both domestic and international passengers. 
BR had predicted that the NKML would carry 20 million passengers a year, as well as 
offering sufficient capacity for an extra 12 high-speed commuter trains an hour for Kent 
commuters this would have cut joumey-to-work times between Ashford and London from 
75 to 35 minutes. A comprehensive service for commuters was envisaged to Waterloo and 
King's Cross, and to other Central London stations' via a series of slip tracks connecting 
the rail link to existing Thameslink and South London track. In addition, the ability to 
move 12,000 people an hour direct to the main business centres would help to relieve 
congestion on the London Underground. BR estimated that the NKML would have 
generated £285 million per annum from domestic traffic. More imporianUy, Govemment 
subsidy could have been sanctioned, despite Section 42 of the 1987 Channel Tunnel Act, 
since benefits to domestic passengers were explicitly incorporated in the proposal. Sir Bob 
Reid insists that: 
'...the route chosen will take commuters where they don't want to go and 
add up to 20 minutes to their overall journey to work.' 
(Dynes and Webster 1991, P. 1) 
The possibility of indirect Govemment subsidy for the rail link, as hinted at by Malcolm 
Rifkind, through the improvement of domestic services could therefore be undermined by 
the limited capability of the Ove Arup route for domestic passengers. It is only possible 
to conclude that the Govemment's decision amounts to little more than indecision, 
purposely designed to postpone this politically sensitive issue. 
'Any more dithering and Britain will enter the next century with a deserved 
reputation as the off-shore islands with a branch-line mentality.' 
(Fyson, 1991,R3) 
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If matters now proceed smoothly, a finalised route may just be set before Parliament by 
1993, with a further two years needed for a Rail Link Bill to achieve royal assent. The rail 
Jink, however, was thrown into further confusion when the Department of Environment 
admitted that it was still considering the route advocated by the Rail Europe Consortium. 
Britain wil l have to wait at least 10 years for the rail link to be in place and thus, could 
be condemned to a branch line status while other European countries invest £50 billion in 
high-speed railways (Hope 1991). 
Whether there will be a rail link and what route it will take is therefore still to be 
determined. Five years of planning have failed to produce any definite proposal. The 
Government's insistence that the new route should be privately financed has now been 
moderated by hints of State financial support. Thus, it is evident that the Government's 
handling of the rail link has generated little more than confusion and delay. The need for 
a more co-ordinated approach to transport planning is apparent. A national transport plan 
is generally regarded as essential to achieve a coherent policy on transport (Gossop 1987, 
AMA 1989, Harnien 1989, Simmons, 1989, TCPA 1990). 
The Government's failure to ensure that the Tunnel will be served by an efficient 
supporting transport network is likely to restrict severely the ability of the regions to 
augment the opportunities created. The Government's proposed 'franchising' of rail 
services out to the private sector may also prevent Britain exploiting the anticipated 
benefits of the Tunnel. The following section will therefore briefly examine railway policy 
during the 1980s, and the proposals for the future financing and ownership of BR. 
4.4. Post-1979 Railway Policy: implications for international rail services 
As a result of the Government's proposed denationalization of the rail services, the 
immediate future of BR is extremely uncertain. Therefore, the renewed impetus that the 
Tunnel should bring to the rail network could be over-shadowed. Whether BR will be in 
a position to implement its plans for international through trains after the Tunnel opens in 
1993 wil l depend on when the Government introduces the necessary legislation. The 
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freedom of private companies to include the generative effect of new services on forecast 
demand levels could result in a more comprehensive international service to the regions 
but the desired commercial rate of return will be higher than the eight percent required by 
BR. Nonetheless, it is necessary to ask why the Government is so keen to implement 
privatisation plans now, when a new "Victorian Age" for the railways could just be 
dawning. 
Prior to the 9 April 1992 General Election, the Transport Secretary Malcolm Rifkind MP, 
emphasized the Government's commitment to increase competition on the railways: 
'We want a very major private sector involvement in providing railway 
services.' 
(Petre and Hariow 1992) 
What form Government plans for the privatisation of BR would take, however, were still 
unclear. Having abandoned plans to produce a rail privatisation White Paper before the 
General Election, details concerning the future organisational structure of the railways were 
later released in the Conservative Party 1992 manifesto. The Government proposes the 
franchising of rail services out to the private sector. Before it is possible to examine the 
Government's plan for rail privatisation, it is first appropriate to discuss the Government's 
attitude towards the railways during the 1980s. 
4.4.1. Financing of the Railways in the 1980s 
Adley (1988) suggests that there has been a 'long tradition of misunderstanding, and 
indeed hostility to the railways that still characterises the views of British politicians'. This 
'misunderstanding' and 'hostility' would seem to manifest itself in the separate method of 
account imposed on the Railways Board. In contrast to the railways, road investment 
assessment procedures do not encompass the full marginal cost of environmental damage. 
'Unless the comparative costs are made on comparable criteria, no 
intellectually true cost comparisons, or judgements, can be made.' 
(Adley 1988, P.8) 
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BR has 10 evaluate investment decisions based purely on commercial considerations, with 
a statutory minimum eight percent per annum required. The 'Economic Evaluation 
Comparability Study\ commissioned by the Department of Transport in 1984 ,^ 
recommends that cost-benefit analysis employed to assess road investment should be 
applied to railway investment. This recommendation has been ignored. 
Following the 1973 Joint Policy Review on the railways, which concluded that no 
unsubsidised rail network of an acceptable size could be achieved, the 1974 Railways Act 
reduced the Railways Board's debt liability and set-out the framework for the control of 
the railways. An External Finance Limit (EFL) was introduced to control the amount of 
borrowing by BR. The Secretary of State for Transport also became responsible for the 
level of passenger service beyond what is commercially viable, through the PSO Grant. 
The EFL for BR includes the PSO grant, borrowing to meet losses, capital investment and 
changes in working capital (ie. stocks, debtors and creditors). The EFL is based on BR's 
annual Corporate Plans. BR must plan to meet the EFL and may therefore have to revise 
its plans, including reduced expenditure on investment capital. 
The level of funding secured by BR fell in real tenns throughout the 1980s as the 
Govemment squeezed public spending, particularly on public transport. The Government 
attempted to hold the EFL at around £800 million during the 1980s. At the same time, 
expenditure on roads increased generally in line with inflation (expenditure for 1989-90 
on roads exceeded £3 billion - Department of Transport 1987). Public subsidisation of the 
railways in 1991-1992 accounted for £892 million, with BR attracting extra financing to 
alleviate the difficulties caused by the recession. Recent Government policy has been based 
on the concept of the 'level playing field' which regards subsidies as a distortion of the 
revenue costs of competing modes of transport However, some argue that the transport 
policy debate has been dominated by: 
'....clear misunderstandings of what a level playing field for transport should 
look like.' 
(Holliday and Vickerman 1989, P. 168) 
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The Government's market based approach to transport does not take into account modes 
which use publicly provided infrastructure, such as the private car. BR is responsible for 
its own track, and thus the ability of the railways to compete is seriously undermined as 
other modes receive "indirect" public subsidy. 
'Most other governments are fully aware of and prepared to pay for 
railways' social benefits (in all railways traffic revenue does not cover total 
costs).' 
(Transport 2000 1984, P.9.) 
The British Government disagrees, at least to some extent, with the 'social' argument for 
railway provision since rail carries only a small fraction (approximately seven percent) of 
total passenger-kms. The Government therefore believes that it would be unjustified to 
subsidise heavily new rail investment projects which would only benefit a selected 
minority. 
Throughout the 1980s the Government also aimed to reduce the PSO grant. In 1983, the 
Transport Secretary, Paul Channon, set out the Government's objective to exclude InterCity 
from the PSO grant by 1988/89, which was to fall by 26 percent between 1983 and 1986, 
from £856 million £635 million. A further reduction in the level of PSO grants was 
announced in October 1986, the target set for 1989/90 was £555 million. BR was also 
asked to make a significant reduction in the grant requirement for Network South East by 
1989/90. Network South East had to cope with a dramatic increase in passenger traffic in 
the 1980s as a result of the South East's 'Economic Miracle'. The extra burden on 
resources was passed on to passengers through higher than inflation price rises. However, 
the necessary investment to improve service quality could not be financed as station 
platforms became congested and trains packed. The Government's new Passenger Charter 
imposes minimum standards which BR has to meet but the necessary investment has still 
not been forthcoming. This situation can only get worse after the Tunnel becomes 
operational, especially with no high-speed rail link. 
BR is one of the least subsidised of Europe's railway systems; in 1987, BR received £800 
million of public support compared with £1,800 million for SNCF, and in 1988, the (West) 
German national railway company was subsidised by up to £4,500 million. The tight EFL's 
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imposed on BR have prevented long-term planning for investment decisions and has even 
led 10 investment projects being cancelled; prime examples are the Heathrow to Paddingion 
link and cross-London link. The dogmatic approach of the Conservative Government has 
also prevented BR investing in the opportunities created by the Tunnel: 
'The question of lack of investment in Channel Tunnel rail infrastructure is 
not a plea for private gain: it is part of the discussion about public transport 
facilities to serve the nation.' 
(Adiey 1988, P.6) 
Drawing from an article in the Economist (1988) 'Public Works. Private Cash', AdIey 
(1988) argues that any major infrasuoicture projects are ultimately public sector projects: 
'In shon, private finance does not in itself turn a public project into a 
private one. It's better to view all finance for public projects as public 
borrowing, regardless of the intermediaries. 
What then is a public sector project? The answer is 'any project where the 
public sector is the customer'.' 
(Adley 1988, P.10-11) 
AdIey therefore concludes that public money should be spent to enhance the opportunities 
created by the Tunnel and allow BR to suppon this 'great national asset'. 
Nevertheless, while much of Europe moves closer to a high-speed rail network that will 
take them into the twenty-first century (for example, the proposed Paris-Brussels-Koln-
Amsterdam (PBKA) network), Britain will still be dependent on a rail network of the 
nineteenth century. An urgent re-appraisal of the future of the railways is needed in the 
UK. Immediate action could take the form of the relaxation of criteria for Section 8 grants 
(1974 Railways Act) to encourage more freight on to the railways. The grants are paid to 
help with the costs of installing private rail freight facilities, usually up to 50 percent of 
the total cost. There has been a very low take-up of these grants due to the strict criteria. 
More importandy» Section 42 of the 1987 Channel Tunnel Act needs to be relaxed, or even 
repealed, and the whole question of railway finances re-examined. However, a debate on 
the 'ideological' issue of who should own the railways is certain to lake precedence. Sir 
Bob Reid's calls for substantial investment guarantees in a newly franchised rail network 
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are believed to have received a 'sympathetic hearing' from the Government (Helm 1992). 
Even so, the proposed denationalization of the railways could not have come at a more in-
opportune time, with BR trying to persuade British companies to utilise the international 
through trains for both passenger and freight traffic. 
4.4.2. Full-Scale Privatisation or 'Creeping Denationalization' 
'Reports of proposals to re-establish 'competition' on the railways are ful l 
of 'analysis' based on political dogma than reality. We are offered the 
illusion of 'recreating the era of competition between the GWR and the 
LMS, or the LMS and LNER^'.' 
(Adley 1988, P . l l ) 
Whether based on 'political dogma' or 'reality', plans for the future privatisation of BR, 
in some form or other, will be likely to be presented to Parliament in the early 1990s. The 
Prime Minister was purported to favour, as Adley suggests, the recreation of regional 
railway companies (Petre and Harlow 1992), However, following the rationalisation of the 
rail network during the Beeching era, the revival of regional railway companies in an 
attempt to encourage competition is not seen as a realistic option (Adley 1988). Plans for 
the full-scale privatisation of the rail network through the selling off of BR's five business 
divisions (InierCity, Network South East, Regional Railways (formerly Provincial), Freight 
and Parcels) were also proposed. The selling off of InterCity was seen as the first stage 
in the programme of privatisation. However, prior to the 9 April General Election, the 
Transport Secretary, Malcolm Riflcind, committed the Government to the continued 
subsidisation of BR (Petre and Hariow 1992), effectively abandoning plans for wholesale 
privatisation. 
Nonetheless, the 1992 Conservative Party manifesto proposed the 'franchising' of railway 
services as 'the best way to produce profound and lasting improvements on the railways'. 
In an attempt to reassure thousands of rail commuters, particularly in marginal seats in 
London and the South East, the Conservatives gave a commitment to maintaining and 
expanding the rail network. The Government now aims to end BR's state monopoly and 
encourage private sector companies to operate rail services. The Government also plans 
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to sell Railfreight Distribution, BR's profit-making freight division, to the private sector. 
In addition, BR's EFL for 1992/93 will be in excess of £2,000 million, enabling BR to 
meet performance targets set by the new Passenger Charter. The underlying political 
motive of this set of proposals can not be over looked. 
The gradual privatisation of BR is doubtful before the opening of the Tunnel in 1993 but 
is likely to influence strongly the running of the railways shortly thereafter. The 
Govemment is confident that there is already much interest in the private sector and so is 
drafting legislation to allow the franchising of rail services as soon as possible. The 
Govemment anticipates improvements in performance and service quality which will 
enable services to be sold outright. For commercially unattractive services, subsidies will 
continue to be provided but not through lump sum payments to BR. Instead, under the 
franchise scheme, subsidies for individual services will be linked to the meeting of 
minimum standards of quality. The existing national network of services will be 
maintained and through-ticketing required under the franchise agreements. A Rail 
Regulator will be appointed to ensure free access to private companies and to hold 
franchisees to their terms of contract. A new Railways Board will be responsible for all 
track and infrastructure, and BR will operate passenger services until they are franchised 
out to private sector companies. 
The proposed franchising of rail services and the outright sale of Railfreight Distribution 
is likely to create much confusion, at least in the initial stages when legislation is being 
drafted. The newly denationalized BR may not be able to capitalise on the opportunities 
generated by the Tunnel after it opens in 1993, The Govemment's commitment to 
expanding the rail network, signalling the end of the Beeching era of cuts, is an 
encouraging shift in rail policy. However, financial support for the railways will be 
determined even more by commercial criteria. The announcement, albeit prior to a General 
Election, to increase BR's EFL to £2 billion for 1992/93 is an improvement on past levels 
of financing but the increased investment in BR could be regarded as a short-temi 
"sweetener" to encourage private sector interest in rail services. A railway franchise 
scheme has already been introduced in Switzeriand but most private sector run services are 
130 
dependent on substantial State subsidies. This raises the question over whether the British 
Government will be prepared to properiy subsidise private sector rail services? 
Before it is possible to make any concluding remarks, it is first useful to compare and 
contrast the British Government's 'market solutions' approach with the more interventionist 
attitude apparent in France and supported by the European Commission. The French 
Government, in close collaboration with the Nord-Pas de Calais Regional Council, has 
used the opportunity presented by the Tunnel to promote economic development in the 
region, both in the short- and long-term. In addition, the Tunnel and TGV Nord represent 
only a pan of the French high-speed rail network. Unlike BR. SNCF has benefitted from 
a massive investment programme to take their rail network into the next century. The 
French Government's attitude towards high-speed rail travel is also closer to Commission 
policy, with a 30.000 km high-speed rail network planned by 2015. 
4.5. British Uncertainty Versus French Optimism 
SNCF are building a high-speed Northem Line, TGV Nord. linking Paris and the Belgian 
border with the Tunnel, via Lille. TGV Nord will connect the whole of the existing French 
high-speed Sud Est and Atlanuque systems by 1994. when the Paris Interconnexion is due 
for completion. The Belgian Government has also decided to include Belgium in the 
European high-speed rail network. The opening of a new line between the French border 
and the Belgian capital is planned for 1995. At a later stage, this link with Brussels will 
be extended towards Germany, via Liege, and the Netheriands, via Antwerp. To complete 
this new Northern European high-speed rail network, BR planned for the rail link between 
London and Cheriton to be in service by 1998. As we have seen, the British Government 
decided that such a link through Kent would be unnecessary until 2005. This 'missing link' 
highlights the conflicting strategies of the British and French (and Belgian) Governments' 
toward the Tunnel in general. 
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The polidcal environment of the Tunnel within the UK and France is regarded, albeit 
simplistically, as British dogmatism versus French pragmatism (Harmen 1989, Simmons 
1989, Holliday et al. 1991). This would seem to be more representative of the British 
Government's approach after the 1987 Act received royal assent. During the pre-selection 
and Parliamentary stages, the British Government was quite pragmatic in seeking to ensure 
the success of the Tunnel project Although public funding was ruled out early on, the 
necessary political support was forthcoming to prevent any momentum being lost 
However, following the 1987 Act, the reactive policies of the British Government contrast 
strongly with the interventionist attitude of die French Government The British 
Government also actively isolated local government from the policy-making process prior 
to the selection of the Eurotunnel project, whereas collaboration between the State and the 
regions is an integral pan of the French system of Government (Holliday et. al. 1991). 
4.5.1. French Policv-Making for the Tunnel 
'Considering only the 1980s scheme (the Tunnel), it is evident that the 
French policy community was far more extensive that was the British, 
having a developed regional dimension in Nord-Pas de Calais which simply 
had no British equivalent.' 
(Holliday et al. 1991, P.91) 
Unlike KCC, the Nord-Pas de Calais Regional Council has been actively involved in 
Tunnel policy-making since the early 1980s (Comfort 1987). Holliday et. al. (1991) argue 
that institutional differences have had a substantial impact on the policy responses within 
Britain and France. The British system of strong 'centralism' usually prevents coherent 
decision-making and implementation throughout the Government system. The French 
governmental system, however, promotes co-ordinated national and local policies through 
unbroken centre-periphery policy networks (Holliday et. al. 1991). An important element 
of the French system is that key Government officials are not excluded from holding 
positions at the regional/local level. This ensures that the regional aspirations cannot be 
ignored. Pierre Mauroy, the former Prime Minister (1981-84) and Mayor of Lille, played 
a critical role in securing the finance necessary to persuade SNCF to re-route TGV Nord 
via Lille. The current Minister for National and Regional Development and die Chief Vice 
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President of the Nord-Pas de Calais Regional Council, Michel Delebarre, (and the former 
Maritime and Transport Minister in 1988) has been influential in implementing plans for 
a modem transpon network to support the Tunnel, 
At the same time as the Anglo-French Study Group (set-up in September 1981) was 
compiling its report on a fixed link, political meetings were being conducted in Nord-Pas 
de Calais under the auspices of the Braibant Commission, through the Conut6 Economique 
et Social Regional, and via semi-public 'chambres' and 'syndicates' (Holliday et. al. 1991). 
In addition, the Regional Council established a Working Group, chaired by Daniel 
Percheron, Senator and Vice President of the Council, to prepare a political report listing 
the regional requirements of a fixed link. The Transport Ministry also set up a Working 
Group with a wider remit than the Braibant Commission, bringing together local, regional 
and national interests. By the time the two Governments had selected the Eurotunnel 
project, 20 January 1986, the Regional Council was already aware that at least 75 percent 
of its regional requirements, set-out in a dossier** submitted to President Mitterrand, would 
receive Government backing (Heddebaui 1991). Similar collaborative activity would only 
be undertaken in Kent several years later in 1987, through the CTJCC (KIS 1987). 
However, it should be recognised that the British system of centralised policy-making, 
while isolating local government, prevented any serious delays which could have resulted 
in the collapse of the project 
French policies toward the Tunnel and supporting transpon infrastructure have been 
primarily orientated to the promotion of economic development within the relatively 
depressed region of Nord-Pas de Calais. The region has suffered from structural economic 
decline, with the rationalisation of the staple industries of steel, coal and textiles. During 
the mid to late 1980s, unemployment rose to 13.3 percent with the worst-hit areas 
recording figures exceeding 20 percent (Holliday and Vickerman 1989). In contrast to 
Kent, the region of Nord-Pas de Calais welcomed the anticipated construction and long-
term economic benefits that the Tunnel project could entail. French policies were designed 
to contain the economic benefits within the region, while a strategy of regional dispersal 
was favoured in Britain. 
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On 14 March 1986, a Protocole d'accord was signed by the regional prefect and the Nord-
Pas de Calais Regional Council which set-out a joint programme (Plan Transmanche), 
financed by the State and the Regional Council, usually on a 2:1 basis. Even though the 
French Govemment does not legally have to honour such commitments. Plan Transmanche 
has been substantially realised. The work to be canied-out included: the construction of 
a coastal road from the Belgian border to Boulogne-Sur-Mer, key road links to the three 
main ports of the region; the upgrading of the existing rail network, including TGV Nord; 
and the modernisation of the region *s ports. Local training initiatives for TML 
subcontracting were also established. No serious opposition to the Tunnel emerged in 
France, By a process of extensive negotiation, mutual benefits were agreed upon. For 
example: the Calais Chamber of Commerce feared the impact of the Tunnel on the port 
and ferry industry but was satisfied by plans to modernise and improve access to the ports; 
and local communities, such as Frethun and Sangatte, were 'rewarded' with investment in 
a business centre and tourist resort, respectively. The public enquiry therefore proved to 
be a formality. Compulsory purchases also engendered little opposition as protestors were 
'bought-off (Holliday and Vickennan 1989). 
The French Govemment has a long tradition of regional economic development planning, 
thus the implementation of policies designed to enhance the opportunities created by the 
Tunnel are not uncommon. Strategic planning to promote economic development in Nord-
Pas de Calais was developed at an early stage and is not restricted to the improvement of 
the supporting transport network. The EuroLille Metropole is an attempt by the City of 
Lille, the Regional Council and the French Government to redevelop Lille itself, and to act 
as a catalyst for the region as a whole. A tourism initiative is also being sponsored along 
the entire Nord-Pas de Calais coast, the Cote d'Opale. The Nord-Pas de Calais Regional 
Council has collaborated successfully with the French Govemment to have in place a 
package of policies that they hope will put the region at the 'crossroads' of Europe 
(Delebarre 1992). The creation of the 'EuroRegion' (the charter which was signed in Lille 
on 21 June 1991) encompassing both Kent and Nord-Pas de Calais, demonstrates the 
nature of cross-frontier relations initiated by the economic and political leaders of the 
region. Co-operation between the Regional Council, the City of Lille and SNCF was also 
crucial in the routing of TGV Nord through the centre of Lille. Lille will become the route 
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focus of a high-speed rail network between Paris and London, and Paris-Brussels-
Amsterdam-Kdln (PBKA). 
4.5.2. The French (and Belgian) High-Speed Rail Network 
Plans for TGV Nord did not emerge from proposals to support the Tunnel but were 
developed earlier as part of a wider strategy for the PBKA high-speed rail network (see 
Figure 4.7). The PBKA rail network was first discussed in 1983. independently of the 
proposed fixed link schemes, and originally only planned to link Paris, Brussels and 
Cologne, However, the PBKA rail network forms only a part of SNCF's existing five year 
contract with the State (1990-94) which incorporates a massive FFr100,000 million for 
investment, with nearly half (FFr45,500 million) allocated to TGV extensions (Freeman 
Allen 1990, Railway Gazette International 1990). This investment provision is 55 percent 
greater than under the previous plan which brought into service TGV Atlaniique. Planned 
expenditure on TGV services has increased by over 250 percent, including the 
simultaneous construction of three TGV lines: Nord. Interconnexion and the extension to 
the Sud Est line from Lyon to Valence. 
TGV Sud Est was first proposed in 1969, gaining Government support in 1973 and 
following a public enquiry in 1975, construction began in 1976. A full TGV service was 
in operation by September 1983, with 27 towns in the south east of France benefitting 
from high-speed travel. SNCF initially planned to extend TGV Sud Est from Lyon to 
Marseilles but this was postponed in 1986 to finance TGV Nord. After nine years in 
service, TGV Sud Est had covered all investment expenditure and current profits now help 
finance TGV Nord, Projects have to achieve a 12/13 percent annual rate of return over a 
20 year period. SNCF finances projects meeting this criteria from its own resources and 
against Government guarantees. TGV Atlaniique did not satisfy the above criteria but 
SNCF were able to attract specific Govemment grants, 30 percent of the total cost, based 
on environmental and regional development considerations (Modem Railways 1990). 
By mid-1989, none of the civil engineering work had been carried-oui but SNCF planned 
for TGV Nond to be in service by the time of the opening of the Tunnel, originally June 
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1993 (See Figure 4.8). When the Paris-London route was finalised, the choice remained 
between passage via Lille and the construction of a station on a green-field site to the 
south of the city (Haydock 1989). The Mayor of Lille. Pierre Mauroy, found the latter 
proposal unacceptable. However, the cost of routing the line through the centre of Lille 
amounted to FFrl billion, of which SNCF (and the French Government) agreed to cover 
half of the extra cost (Migneau 1991). The Nord-Pas de Calais Regional Council and the 
City of Lille covered 33 and 17 percent of the cost respectively. 
The Regional Council also proposed further improvements to the regions rail network 
(costing FFr519 million), which would enable a more comprehensive TGV service to 
operate within the Nord. The cost evenly shared between SNCF. the Regional Council and 
the Government. Since 1984. regional councils have had the authority to negotiate with 
SNCF over regional services. The Nord-Pas de Calais Regional Council has used its 
increased powers to extend the TGV network to include most of the main cities in the 
region. SNCF agree with the Regional Council that this improved service will promote 
regional development and thus increase passenger traffic (Migneau 1991). 
The continuation of TGV Nord into Belgium and on to the Netherlands and Germany, has 
not progressed as quickly. Belgian national railways, SNCB. commissioned a thematic 
study of the high-speed train project' in 1989. It found that a high-speed rail line from the 
French border through Brussels and on to Amsterdam/Cologne would 'make a true 
contribution to the natural and human environment' (SNCB 1989). However, while the 
French-speaking half of Belgium, Wallonia. generally accept the TGV as a good thing, the 
route through Randers, the Dutch-speaking half, has encountered much opposition 
(Murgatroyd 1989). Liege, like Lille, has been active in trying to ensure that the route 
passes through the city and not further to the North, via Vise or Beek (See Figure 4.9). 
Initially, the project was to be privately funded, but SNCB is now going to finance the 
investment, leading to fears that the existing rail network will suffer. Problems have also 
emerged over which stations the TGV service should stop at in Brussels, either Nord, Midi 
or Sud. The Belgian Government delayed announcing the preferred route until the late 
summer of 1991 and so it is unlikely that a dedicated high-speed rail network will be in 
place by 1995 as originally planned. In addition, the inclusion of Zaventem, Brussels 
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Intemational Airport, in the proposed route aroused some concem over increased joumey 
times and loss of revenue. 
In a report by the national railways of Britain, France and Belgium, 'The joint 
development of a high speed train for Europe', the respective chairmen stress that: 
'....British Rail, SNCF and SNCB/NMBS intend to take full advantage of 
this unique opportunity to connect their railway network....' 
(BR et. al. 1990, P.l.) 
It would, however, seem that 'this unique opportunity', namely the Tunnel, will be served 
by a differentiated TGV service as a result of the delays in Belgium and in the UK. The 
Belgian Government is, nonetheless, committed to having in place a high-speed rail 
network by the late 1990s, with Bmssels becoming the route hub of a new European TGV 
service. High-speed trains emerging from the Tunnel on to Kent main line tracks wil l have 
to run along side Network South East trains at much reduced speeds. In contrast, TGV 
Nord will allow speeds in excess of 300 km^r (187 mph). 
4.5.3. European Commission Policy on High-Speed Rail Travel 
It is only appropriate here to summarise briefly Commission policy on the future of 
European railways, which envisages 30,000 kms of new or upgraded lines for high-speed 
traffic (see Figure 4.10). The Tunnel will merge Britain's rail network with a European 
railway system that spans not only the twelve member states of the EC but also the 
countries of Scandinavia and Eastern Europe. The EC, through the European Investment 
Bank (EIB), has also been cmcial to the success of the Tunnel project itself. The EIB 
made an initial loan of £1 billion to Eurotunnel and a further loan of £300 million. The 
Tunnel represents the ElB's largest liability, and thus 'reinforces the European dimension 
of the Channel Tunnel' (Holliday et. al. 1991). 
The Community of European Railways (CER), which encompasses the twelve EC national 
railways and those of Austria and Switzeriand, believes that: 
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\...a (European high-speed rail) network would be a major factor in 
strengthening the links that bind the Community together/ 
(Hollidayei. al. 1991, P. 163; after CER 1989, P.3) 
In 1976, the European Commission proposed the co-ordination of major investment in rail 
infrastructure throughout the Community but the downtum in rail traffic following the 
1973 'oil crisis' led to the indefinite shelving of this policy proposal (Whiielegg 1988, 
Harmen 1990). The Single Market will probably encourage increased passenger and freight 
movement within the Community and thus, the prospect of a new 'Railway Age'. The 
Transport Commissioner, Karel van Miert. at a conference on Community railway policy*" 
in November 1989, re-siaied the Commission's determination to achieve a pan-European 
high-speed rail network by 2015. The new policy proposals set the framework for joint 
international action to ensure that the railways have an equal opportunity to gain success. 
High on the agenda was the need for railways to pay for their infrastructure on the same 
basis as roads (i.e. to create a 'level playing field'). 
The European Commission has been interested in proposals for a medium-term rail 
infrastructure programme, based on current national projects, between 1995 and 2005, and 
a longer-term policy, identifying 'missing links'. It is considered that high-speed lines will 
have to be developed 'to offset air and road travel growth' (Harmen 1990). A proposed 
transport infrastructure fund has never been established because 'one or two' countries, 
including Britain, have used their veto powers. Britain has been opposed to the fund 
despite the fact that high-speed rail links to the Tunnel would immediately benefit from 
EC financial support. The CER envisages a European high-speed rail network costing 90 
billion ECUs. In December 1990, van Miert presented the Commission's 'master plan' for 
a 30,000 km network, costed at 150 billion ECUs (Commission of the European 
Community 1990). The plan focused on 15 'key links', including London to Cheriton. The 
Commission proposed that 40 percent of the total cost, 60 bilHon ECUs, should be met 
from the EC budget. Previous transport infrastructure programmes have been opposed and 
later scaled down. However, van Miert stressed the importance of a European high-speed 
rail network, warning that a qualified majority basis may be used, removing the power of 
veto, to implement the Commission's proposals. Harmen (1990) believes that European 
railway policy 'could be good news for Great Britain PLC but will the British 
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Government concur? As is now evident, the British Government's policy towards the 
Tunnel and related infrastnicture contrasts sharply with the strategies favoured on the 
Continent 
4.6. Conclusion 
'The Government requires the Channel Tunnel to be treated as an ordinary 
commercial venture. However, it has far-reaching economic and 
environmental implications which cannot be resolved solely by the market. 
Local government believes that the Government must define a national 
strategy to deal with those implications. The aim must be to develop 
infrastructure and services to ensure that the benefits and opportunities for 
employment, growth, trade, tourism, and business travel are maximised and 
any adverse effects minimised for all regions of the UK.* 
(Association of Metropolitan Authorities (AMA) 1989, P.2) 
Concern over the lack of a national strategy for the Tunnel has been consistently 
highlighted throughout this chapter. The former Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher, 
remarked on the Tunnel as 'a great national asset' but no strategy to maximise the 
economic benefits of the Tunnel has been implemented in the UK. Could the former 
Transport Secretary Nicholas Ridley be correct in suggesting that Margaret Thatcher saw 
the Tunnel only as a 'monument' to her personal glory? 
The AMA's (1989) policy statement - 'Getting the Best from the Channel Tunnel: A local 
government initiative* - outiines the conflicting policy objectives of central and local 
government. Immediate action to set-up national and regional impact studies is seen as 
necessary in order to allow regions to maximise the economic benefits from the Tunnel 
and minimise any adverse effects. Govemment policy has thus far failed to ensure the 
adequate provision of supporting transport infrastructure and services. The ideological 
insistence that the private sector should provide the necessary investment is likely to have 
serious repercussions for the regions and the UK as a whole. 
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As a result of British Government policy, it would seem that the Tunnel can now only be 
considered as a "missed opportunity". Interventionist strategies adopted by the French 
Government are also likely to exaggerate the potential "cost" of Government inaction in 
the UK. The planned level of investment in Nord-Pas de Calais's transport and economic 
infrastructure may be considered as over optimistic but the Regional Council is determined 
to create the right commercial environment for success. Fears have even been expressed 
in the UK that British companies wil l migrate to northern France in order to locate at the 
'crossroads' of Europe (SEEDS 1989). 
If the gains in relative accessibility for UK regions, as shown in chapter 3, are to be 
realised, effort must be made to ensure that these regions are not disadvantaged by the 
supporting rail network. The Government should allow the necessary investment in the 
national transport network, particulariy the railways, to maximise the opportunities created 
by the Tunnel. The revised pattern of beyond-London international passenger services and 
the location of regional freight terminals could prevent companies benefitting from the 
Tunnel. The Section 40 regional consultations, as well as regional consultancy reports, 
highlight strong criticisms of BR's (1989b) plans for international rail services. Economic 
Potential Analysis employed in chapter 3 showed that speed would be a critical in terms 
of international freight services. Therefore, inadequate rail services could prevent the 
potential of the Tunnel being realised, particulariy in the more peripheral UK regions. 
Notes 
1. These central London stations include London Bridge, Charing Cross, Blackfriars, 
St.Paul's and Farringdon and Cannon Street. 
2. Carried-out by C.Buchanan and Partners. 
3. GWR = the Great Western Railway; LMS = the London, Midland and Scottish; 
LNER = the London and North Eastern Railway; and SR = the Southern Railway. 
4. 'Elements pour un plan ed developpement de la region Nord-Pas de Calais (Conseil 
Regional Nord-Pas de Calais 1988), after the Bechtel Report '. Impacts et 
perspectives pour la region Nord-Pas de Calais. 
5. Thematic Study: the high-speed train project: Paris/London-Brussels-
Koln/Amsterdam Summary Report December 1989. 
6. Topical issues of the common transport policy for railways', November 1989. 
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CHAPTER 5: T H E QUESTIONNAIRE SURVEY 
Prior to the present study, only two published surveys have been undertaken to identify the 
general perceptions held by the British business community of the Tunnel. Eurotunnel and 
BR (1988) commissioned a survey of large business interests in all UK regions outside the 
South East (except for Northern Ireland), while the London Chamber of Commerce and 
Industry (LCCI - 1989) carried out a survey of the London business community. Since the 
scope of both studies prevented an inter-regional comparison of companies in the South 
East and the more peripheral UK regions, their findings are of limited value to the present 
study. This chapter wil l examine the results of the questionnaire survey carried-out for the 
present thesis in terms of company perceptions of the Tunnel and their likely reactions to 
i t 
5.1. Objectives of the Survey 
The aims of the survey were twofold: firstly, to provide information on the general 
perceptions held by British companies of the Tunnel and its wider regional economic 
implications; and secondly, to determine the potential demand for Tunnel services (i.e. 
BR's international through trains and Eurotunnel's Shuttle service). The questionnaire 
survey constitutes an important part of the project, not only because of the original nature 
of the data produced but also in terms of whether this data will support the findings of the 
Economic Potential Model (see chapter 3) or. as argued in chapter 4. highlight 
inadequacies in tiie supporting transport infrastructure. 
Economic Potential Analysis was employed in chapter 3 to model the impact of the Tunnel 
on the relative accessibility of UK regions to economic activity on the Continent. In 
contrast to earlier studies (Clark et al. 1969, Keeble et. al. 1982a), it was shown that 
certain peripheral UK regions, such as ScoUand, the North and East Anglia. could 
experience fairly uniform increases in relative accessibility compared with the South East. 
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Since regions outside the South East account for more than 75 percent of UK-continental 
trade (BR 1989b, Dourmashkin 1989, Pieda 1989a&b), it was argued thai the more 
peripheral UK regions could gain proportionately more than the South East from improved 
rail access to the Continent. However, there is still much uncertainty concerning the 
regional economic implications of the Tunnel. Government policy has failed to ensure the 
adequate provision of supporting transport infrastructure to serve the Tunnel (see chapter 
4). Regions to the north and west of London are likely to be further peripheralised from 
European economic activity, thus undermining the potential opportunities created by the 
Tunnel. 
In reality, the regional economic impact of the Tunnel will be determined ultimately by 
the policies implemented by British companies. Therefore a clear understanding of how 
companies are likely to react to the Tunnel is required. The questionnaire survey explores 
company perceptions of the Tunnel and the anticipated usage of its services. Before 
examining the results generated, it is important to discuss the 'Methodology and Scope of 
the Survey'; as well as the structure of the questionnaire, stating the rationale behind 
individual questions. The response rate will then be analyzed to ensure that the respondents 
are a fair representative sample of all companies surveyed. The results will be examined 
and interpreted in the light of the theoretical, legislative and policy frameworks established 
in the preceding chapters. 
5.2. The Methodology and Scope of the Survey 
The questionnaire survey was undertaken during May and June of 1991, with companies 
throughout southern England randomly selected after satisfying certain basic criteria (which 
are discussed below). Over 1,500 companies. 1,002 from the South East and 517 from the 
South West, each received an identical questionnaire (see Appendix 3). Time and financial 
restrictions made it impractical to broaden the scope of the survey by including other 
regions. After a period of two weeks a secondary letter was sent out to either encourage 
companies to reply to the questionnaire or thank them for already having done so. The 
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survey targeted approximately 1,000 companies in the South East and 500 in the South 
West to achieve a fair representative sample of both regions and obtain sufficient data for 
analysis. The size of the survey was primarily based on an assumed response rate of 20 
percent. The aim was to receive at least 300 completed questionnaires. 
The initial criterion employed required participants to be large exporting companies or 
companies with an annual turnover in excess of £20 million. Only manufacturing and 
distribution companies in the South East and the South West were targeted, the intention 
being to incorporate those companies most likely to be affected by the Tunnel. The 
"invisible" nature of service companies' exports makes them unlikely to utilise fully the 
Tunnel and the more direct route for rail/road freight to the Continent. Companies which 
satisfied the above criterion were randomly selected from Dun and Bradstreet's (1990) 
compendium of 25,000 'Key British Enterprises'. However, the criterion had to be relaxed 
for companies in the South West, where the required annual turnover was reduced to £5 
million in order to facilitate a selection of a sufficient number of companies. This did not 
detrimentally affect the analysis of the results since the purpose of establishing a criterion 
was to target companies most likely to be affected by the Tunnel in the two regions. 
Companies selected from the South West, therefore, satisfied the relaxed criterion but still 
represent the region's larger exporting companies or companies with a higher annual 
turnover. 
No attempt was made to survey a representative sample of the industrial base of either 
the South East or South West, or to analyze respondents in terms of their overall 
representativeness. The overriding objective, enforced due to time and financial limitations, 
was to survey companies most likely to be affected by the Tunnel. The inclusion of small 
and/or non-exporting companies could have proved counterproductive, jeopardising the 
significance of the sample size. Furthermore, it will be shown that the type of companies 
themselves do not significantly affect company perceptions of and/or the anticipated future 
usage of its services. The number of companies targeted within the two regions (1,000 in 
the South East and 500 in the South West) was also dictated by the need not only to obtain 
sufficient respondents at the regional level but also at the intra-regional/county level. 
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The postal survey was carried out after a pilot survey was undertaken in March, 1991. The 
questionnaire was tested at a conference held by the Royal Town Planning Institute 
concerning The Economic Impact of the Channel Tunnel on the South West', which 
attracted over 50 large companies from the region. More than 30 companies completed and 
returned the questionnaires. After examining the responses, only minimal amendments were 
made to the design of the questionnaire. The structure of certain questions was altered to 
avoid misunderstandings that became apparent with the original questionnaire. The pilot 
survey was undertaken purely to determine the effectiveness of the questionnaire. The 
completed pilot questionnaires were not therefore incorporated into the analysis of the main 
questionnaire. 
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53, The Questionnaire 
As with all questionnaires, conflict arises between the "need" for certain questions and the 
overall length of the questionnaire. So as not to deter potential respondents, effort was 
made to keep the number of questions to a minimum without detrimentally affecting the 
usefulness of the questionnaire. In addition, where possible, answers to questions were 
structured so as to reduce the lime required to complete the questionnaire. Over 75 percent 
of the questions incoiporated some form of a stmctured answer. To improve the accuracy 
of the data and reduce the chance of human error, it was necessary to code the responses 
for use in computer data bases after the questionnaires were returned. 
The structure of the questionnaire was based on four main categories (see Appendix 3): 
(1) Details about the company; 
(2) The impact of the Tunnel and related transport infrastructure on the location 
and competitiveness of the company; 
(3) Potential demand for the Tunnel, in terms of both passenger and freight 
traffic, generated by the companies; and, 
(4) Wider considerations. 
The first seven questions are included to ascertain important details about the companies 
themselves and to allow cross-sectional analysis of the results by; type of company 
(questions 2 and 3), industrial classification (question 4), length of time at present location 
(question 5), size of workforce (question 6), and importance of export markets (question 
7), Information derived from this section was used to ensure that the respondents are a fair 
representative sample. This issue will be discussed in more detail in section 5,4. 
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The second category of questions attempted to determine the importance of location lo the 
companies (questions 8 and 9) and how the Tunnel would alter iheir perceptions in terms 
of: the locauonal advantages/disadvantages of their present site (question 10); accessibility 
to domestic and European markets (question 11); vulnerability to increased competition 
from both domestic and European producers (question 12); and whether or not the Tunnel 
would encourage companies to relocate (question 13). An improved supporting transpon 
infrastructure will improve accessibility to both domestic and European markets, 
particularly with regard to Kent The questionnaire therefore recognised this potential. 
The questionnaire then focused attention on company plans for future Tunnel usage in 
terms of both business crips and the transportation of exports. The first section (questions 
14 to 16) concentrated on business trips. Companies were asked about the nature of their 
existing business trips to Europe, according to the frequency, destination and mode by 
which representatives were likely to travel. Question 15(a) then attempted to obtain 
company "estimates" of the percentage of future business trips likely to go via the Tunnel. 
The pilot survey revealed that this question created certain problems, particularly since 
companies are unlikely to be confident about any predicted future usage until nearer to the 
time of the opening of the Tunnel. However, even rough approximations were considered 
beneficial. Companies were then prompted to distinguish between BR*s international 
through trains and EurotunneKs Shuttie service. Question 16 concluded this section by 
asking the companies what factors would be important to the outcome of the previous 
question. A similar structure was employed for the second section on freight traffic 
(company exports). The anticipated level of company usage of international freight services 
will determine ultimately the long-term economic impact of the Tunnel (see chapter 3). 
The final category of questions brings together important but somewhat unrelated 
questions. First, anention is focused on whether company altitudes about using the Tunnel 
are static or whether they could be influenced by certain Government, BR and/or 
Eurotunnel strategies (question 20). This question is particularly relevant considering that 
Government policy towards the Tunnel and related transport infrastructure has been 
strongly criticised (Gossop 1987, Simmons 1989, Holliday et. al. 1991). Companies were 
then asked about the general availability of information concerning the Tunnel and the 
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services that it will offer. One would generally expect companies with a high degree of 
knowledge concerning the Tunnel to form more accurate perceptions of the TunnePs likely 
impact and estimates of anticipated future usage. Furthermore, it was also possible to 
gauge the success or failure of promotional campaigns implemented by Eurotunnel and BR. 
The penultimate question then attempted to quantify the degree to which the Tunnel and 
the Single European Market (SEM) are likely to generate new cross-Channel trade. Based 
on the knowledge held by companies of their own regional economies, the final question 
tried to establish their opinions concerning the likely overall impact of the Tunnel on the 
South East/South West. 
5.4. The Response Rate 
More than 370 questionnaires were completed and returned, representing a response rate 
of 24.5 percent. The survey was conducted in the hope that at least 300 questionnaires 
would be completed, thus providing sufficient data for analysis. Hence, the first aim of the 
survey was achieved. The response rate was affected by the number of companies that had 
either gone out of business or changed location, leaving no forwarding address. Dun and 
Bradstreet's (1990) 'Key British Enterprises' was the most up-to-date database at the time 
of study, compiled during 1989. Even so. a surprisingly large number of companies, 
approximately 86, ceased operating at the location given. Therefore, a return rate of 26.0 
percent would be a more accurate reflection of the true response rate. To ensure that the 
respondents are a fair representative sample of the total number of companies surveyed, 
it is necessary to analyze the response rate, utilising descriptive statistical techniques and 
the chisquare X* test, by region/county, industrial classification and size of workforce. 
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REGION 
PERCENTAGE 
OF COMPANIES 
SURVEYED 
PERCENTAGE OF 
RESPONDENTS 
LONDON 19.68 (299) 13.17 (49) 
BEDFORDSHIRE 2.24 (34) 2.42 (9) 
BERKSHIRE 5.46 (83) 5.65 (21) 
BUCKINGHAMSHIRE 3.03 (46) 3.23 (12) 
ESSEX 3.75 (57) 3.23 (12) 
HAMPSHIRE 4.34 (66) 6.45 (24) 
HERTFORDSHIRE 4.28 (65) 3.49 (13) 
KENT 4.08 (62) 6.45 (24) 
MIDDLESEX 7.77 (118) 7.53 (28) 
OXFORDSHIRE 2.30 (35) 1.88 (7) 
SURREY 6.12 (93) 5.11 (19) 
SUSSEX 2.90 (44) 4.03 (15) 
SOUTH EAST 65.96 (1002) 62.63 (233) 
AVON 8.23 (125) 7.26 (27) 
CORNWALL 1.51 (23) 1.88 (7) 
DEVON 4.81 (73) 6.45 (24) 
DORSET 4.87 (74) 4.84 (18) 
GLOUCESTERSHIRE 5.92 (90) 7.53 (28) 
SOMERSET 3.69 (56) 4.57 (17) 
WILTSHIRE 5.00 (76) 4.84 (18) 
SOUTH WEST 34.04 (517) 37.37 (139) 
Table 5.1: Percentage (and number) of companies surveyed and 
respondents by county/region. 
Companies in the South East accounted for 66.0 percent of the total number of companies 
surveyed and 62.6 percent of the total number of respondents. Thus, the regional location 
of companies did not influence the response rate (see Table 5.1). It can be seen that only 
London records any significant difference, with the respective percentages falling from 
19.7 to 13.2 percent. 
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However, the test does provide a more detailed account of the response rate at the 
county level (see Table 5.2): 
Region T o t a l Percent Observed Expected 
f req. f req. 
{% of 372) 
South E a s t 
London 299 19.68 49 73 .21 
Bedfordshire 34 2 .24 9 8.33 
B e r k s h i r e 83 5.46 21 20.31 
Bucks. 46 3 .03 12 11.27 
Essex 57 3 .75 12 13 .9 
Hampshire 66 4 .34 24 16.14 
H e r t f o r d s h i r e 65 4.28 13 15.92 
Kent 62 4 .08 24 15.18 
Middlesex 118 7 .77 28 28.90 
Oxfordshire 35 2.30 7 8.56 
Surrey 93 6.12 19 22 .77 
Sussex 44 2.90 15 10 .79 
South West 
Avon 125 8.23 27 30.62 
Cornwall 23 1.51 7 5.62 
Devon 73 4 .81 24 17 .89 
Dorset 74 4 .87 18 18.12 
Glouc. 90 5.92 28 22.02 
Somerset 56 3 .69 17 13 .73 
W i l t s h i r e 76 5.00 18 18.60 
1019 372 
Table 5.2: The significance of the response rate by region/county. 
It was assumed that the location of the companies would not influence the response rate. 
The null hypothesis, Hq, therefore stated that the response rate is not related to the location 
of companies. 
= I (Q - E)^ where O = the frequencies 
Z E actually observed, and 
E = the frequencies expected 
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X ' = 8.01 + 0.05 + 0.02 + 0.05 + 0.27 + 3.83 + 0.54 
+ 5.12 + 0.03 + 0.28 + 0.62 + 1.64 + 0.43 + 0.34 
+ 2.65 + 0.00 + 1.62 + 0.78 + 0.02 
X^ = 26.30 degrees of freedom (dO = n - 1 = 18 
critical value of chisquare (a = 0.05) = 28.87 
It is not possible to reject Hp at the 0.05 level (i.e. that there is more than one chance in 
20 that these observations occurred at random). This would therefore suggest that the 
location of the companies did not affect the response rate. But at the rejection level of a 
= 0.10, the critical value of chisquare is 25.99 and so it is possible to reject H^. This can 
be explained by the less than expected number of responses for London and the relatively 
larger numbers of responses for Hampshire, Kent and Devon. However, overall it has been 
shown that the location of the companies at the regional and county level did not 
significantly influence the response rate. 
Question 4 asked companies to state what industrial activities they were predominantiy 
involved in. The answers were then coded for use on computer data bases/statistical 
packages, with the first three choices included. For the purposes of analyzing the response 
rate only the first choice will be examined (see Table 5.3). The response rate was again 
unaffected by indusu-ial classification. The test was used on the seven main industrial 
categories to determine whether certain industries were more likely to respond. It was 
shown that the response rate was not influenced by the industrial classification of 
companies. Table 5.4 contrasts industrial classification at the regional level of analysis. 
Only electrical engineering in the South West experienced any noticeable change, 
accounting for 13.9 percent of the total number of companies surveyed in the South West 
and 20.1 percent of the respondents. 
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INDUSTRIAL 
CLASSIFICATION 
PERCENTAGE OF 
COMPANIES SURVEYED 
PERCENTAGE OF 
RESPONDENTS 
FOOD, DRINK 
& TOBACCO 
15.40 (234) 14.78 (55) 
COAL & PETROLEUM 1.38 (21) 0.54 (2) 
CHEMICALS & 
ALLIED INDs 
14.42 (219) 10.22 (38) 
METAL 
MANUFACTURE 
4.61 (70) 5.11 (19) 
MECHANICAL ENG. 11.72 (178) 12.63 (47) 
INSTRUMENT ENG. 2.57 (39) 4.30 (16) 
ELECTRICAL ENG. 17.18 (261) 16.67 (62) 
SHIPBUILDING & 
MARINE ENG. 
0.53 (8) 1.34 (5) 
VEHICLES 2.11 (32) 2.96 (11) 
OTHER METAL 
GOODS 
1.12 (17) 1.08 (4) 
TEXTILES 0.92 (14) 0.27 (1) 
LEATHER & FURS 0.26 (4) 0.27 (1) 
CLOTHING & 
FOOTWEAR 
2.30 (35) 1.61 (6) 
BRICKS, POTTERY, 
GLASS, CEMENT... 
4.21 (64) 5.65 (21) 
TIMBER, 
FURNITURE 
3.16 (48) 3.49 (13) 
PAPER, PRINTING, 
PUBLISHING 
9.61 (146) 9.68 (36) 
OTHER MANU. INDs 3.42 (52) 3.76 (14) 
DISTRIBUTION & 
WHOLESALING 
5.07 (77) 5.65 (21) 
Table 5.3: Percentage (and number) of companies surveyed and respondents by 
industrial classification. 
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INDUSTRIAL 
CLASSIFICATION 
PERCENTAGE OF 
COMPANIES SURVEYED 
PERCENTAGE OF 
RESPONDENTS 
SE SW SE SW 
FOOD, DRINK 
& TOBACCO 
14 .87 16.44 17 .17 11.51 
COAL & PETROLEUM 1.50 1.16 0.0 1.44 
CHEMICALS & 
ALLIED INDS 
17.86 7 .74 13 .73 4.32 
METAL 
MANUFACTURE 
4.49 4.84 5.15 5.04 
MECHANICAL ENG. 9.38 16.25 12 .88 12 .23 
INSTRUMENT ENG. 1.90 3 .87 4.29 4 .32 
ELECTRICAL ENG. 18.86 13.93 14 .16 20.86 
SHIPBUILDING & 
MARINE ENG. 
0.20 1.16 0.43 2 .88 
VEHICLES 1.90 2 .51 3 .43 2.16 
OTHER METAL 
GOODS 
0.70 1.93 1.29 0.72 
TEXTILES 0.60 1.55 0.0 0.72 
LEATHER & FURS 0.10 0.58 0.0 0.72 
CLOTHING & 
FOOTWEAR 
2 .69 1.55 0.86 2 .88 
BRICKS, POTTERY, 
GLASS, CEMENT... 
3.79 5.03 4.29 7.91 
TIMBER, 
FURNITURE 
2.40 4 .64 3 .86 2 .88 
PAPER, PRINTING, 
PUBLISHING 
10.28 8.32 10.30 8.63 
OTHER MANU. INDs 3.00 4.26 1.72 6.47 
DISTRIBUTION & 
WHOLESALING 
5.49 4.26 6.44 4.32 
Table 5.4: Percentage of companies surveyed and respondents by industrial 
classification for the South East and South West. 
Finally, Tables 5.5 and 5.7 provide a breakdown of the proponion of companies surveyed 
and respondents by size of workforce. 
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SIZE OF 
WORKFORCE 
PERCENTAGE OF 
COMPANIES 
SURVEYED 
PERCENTAGE OF 
RESPONDENTS 
0-50 6.42 (92) 10.22 (38) 
50-100 6.98 (100) 8.33 (31) 
100-500 39.32 (563) 43.28 (161) 
500-1000 17.60 (252) 16.13 (60) 
1000-5000 22.70 (325) 16.13 (60) 
5000 + 6.98 (100) 5.91 (22) 
Table 5.5: Percentage (and number) of companies surveyed and 
respondents by size of workforce. 
The test does show that the size of companies, in terms of workforce, did to some 
degree influence the response rate (see Table 5.6): 
S i z e of T o t a l Percent Observed Expected 
Workforce f r e q . f r e q . 
0-50 92 6 .42 38 23 .88 
50-100 100 6 .98 31 25 .97 
100-500 563 39 .32 161 146 .27 
500-1000 252 17 .60 60 65 .47 
1000-5000 325 22 .70 60 84 .44 
5000 + 100 6 .98 22 25 .97 
1432 372 
Table 5.6: The significance of the response rate by size of 
workforce. 
X ' = 8.35 + 0.97 + 1.48 + 0.46 + 7.07 + 0.61 
X ' = 18.94 df = 6 - 1 = 5 
the critical value of chisquare (a = 0.05) = 11.07 
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It is therefore possible to reject and accept H,, and conclude thai the response rate was 
influenced by the size of companies. It can be seen from Table 5.6 that companies 
employing less than 50 people are significandy over-represented in the response rate and 
companies employing between 1000-5000 people are under-represented. However, this 
could be explained by the time lag between the compilation of the Dun and Bradstreet's 
(1990) company database and the present questionnaire survey, a two year period of 
recession resulting in numerous company rationalisations. South East England is generally 
perceived as being the hardest hit by the downturn in the economic cycle; this is likely to 
have resulted in a greater number of company rationalisations in this region as compared 
to the South West. This would result in a larger number of companies in the South East 
employing fewer than 100 people, between the compilation of the data base and the time 
of the survey. 
SIZE OF 
WORKFORCE 
PERCENTAGE OF 
COMPANIES SURVEYED 
PERCENTAGE OF 
RESPONDENTS 
SE SW SE SW 
0-50 5.13 8.74 12.02 7.14 
50-100 4.91 10.68 8.58 7.86 
100-500 30.86 54.37 33.91 58.57 
500-1000 19.96 13.40 17.17 15.00 
1000-5000 29.55 10.49 20.17 9.29 
5000 + 9.60 0.84 8.15 2.14 
Table 5.7: Percentage of companies surveyed and respondents by size 
of workforce for the South East and South West. 
In terms of respondents in the South East, Table 5.7 shows an over-representation of 
companies with a workforce of less than 100 employees and an under-representation for 
companies with a workforce greater than 1,000. The respective figures for the South West 
are fairly uniform. The test did show that the response rate for companies from only 
the South East were significantly affected by size of workforce. 
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On the whole, i i is possible lo conclude thai the companies which responded to the 
questionnaire are a fair representative sample of the total population. Analysis of the 
response rate failed to identify any major differences between the respondents and the total 
number of companies surveyed. Only the sire of company workforces in the South East 
seemed to influence the response rate but this can be explained, at least in part, by the 
present recession. 
5.5. Analysis of the Results 
Attention will focus on an analysis of the overall results. Descriptive statistical techniques, 
cross-tabulations and the chisquare test are utilised in order to interpret the findings in 
accordance with the theoretical and legislative framework established in the two preceding 
chapters. The X" test was employed to test the significance level of any associations found 
to be relevant. The following chapter will examine the results at the regional, sub-regional 
and county level, identifying any apparent similarity/dissimilarity. 
Analysis of the results will highlight the general hopes and fears of the business 
community engendered by the Tunnel. The impact of the Tunnel on "location", and thus 
the ability of companies to compete, will have important repercussions on the overall 
performance of the UK economy. However, the success (and significance) of the Tunnel 
will depend on the level of demand for its services. The perceptions of companies at 
present anticipating to use the Tunnel will be contrasted with all respondents in general, 
in order to identify any differences of opinion. 
However, it is first important to examine the "type" of companies which have responded 
to the survey, in terms of ownership status, industrial classification, size of workforce and 
percentage of exports. This data can then be used to ascertain whether certain categories 
of companies are more or less likely to perceive the impact of the Tunnel favourably, or 
plan to use the Tunnel to a greater extent. Company perceptions of the Tunnel and related 
infrastructure will then be analyzed. Forecast usage of the Tunnel, via international through 
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trains or the Shuttle service, will be examined according to passenger and freight traffic. 
The results of the final section, 'Wider Considerations', will be discussed before making 
any concluding remarks. 
5.5.1. Company Details 
Over half of the companies which responded to the questionnaire classified themselves as 
privately owned and a further 30 percent as public limited companies (PLCs). The 
ownership status of the companies is set out in Figure 5.1. More than three quarters of the 
companies were multinational corporations (MNCs) or subsidiaries of MNCs. Over half 
the companies have other companies/branches located in die UK but the majority are also 
represented abroad; 41.4 percent within the EC, 17.5 percent in other European countries, 
and 62.1 percent worldwide. 
Categorising companies by industrial activity showed that over 60 percent are operating 
in just five industrial sectors (see Table 5.3): electrical engineering accounting for 16,7 
percent of the companies; food, drink and tobacco, 14.8 percent; mechanical engineering, 
12.6 percent; chemicals and allied industries, 10.2 percent; and paper, printing and 
publishing, 9.7 percent. It was decided that companies could list up to three industrial 
activities (Table 5.3 represents the first response only). A further 23.9 percent of 
companies listed two industrial activities and only 3.8 percent gave three. The dominance 
of the above five industrial sectors is further evident when looking at all industrial 
activities listed. 
More than three quarters of the companies have been operating at their present location 
for longer than 10 years (see Table 5.8). Only 51 companies (13.7 percent) have been at 
their present site for less than five years. This would suggest fairly stable local/regional 
economies, in terms of the turnover of manufacturing companies. The majority of 
companies will therefore have strong links with their local/regional economy and thus, 
company perceptions of and reactions to the Tunnel could have profound implications for 
the local community and the region as a whole. Companies have also generally become 
larger in terms of the size of their workforce (see Figure 5.2). More than 50 percent of 
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Figure 5 .1 : Ownership Status of Companies. 
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Figure 5.2: Size of Company Wortdorce. 
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companies had an initial workforce of less than 50 people, only 8.1 percent employed over 
1,000. Workforces of less than 50 people now account for 10.2 percent of the companies 
and nearly one quarter employ more than 1,000 people. Over 40 percent of companies can 
be classed as "medium" sized companies, employing between 100-500 people, and 38.2 
percent as "large" companies, employing more than 500 people. 
NUMBER 
OF YEARS 
PERCENTAGE OF 
COMPANIES 
0 - 5 13.71 (51) 
5 - 1 0 10.22 (38) 
10 - 20 25.54 (95) 
20 - 50 31.45 (117) 
50 + 18.82 (70) 
Table 5.8: The number of years 
companies have been 
operating at their present 
location. 
Finally, the percentage of company sales that are dependent on exports, as well as their 
designated market areas, will determine the likely attraction of the Tunnel. The majority 
of companies, 55.1 percent, export less than 20 percent of their goods (see Table 5.9). 
PERCENTAGE 
OF EXPORTS 
PERCENTAGE OF 
COMPANIES 
0 - 2 0 55.11 (205) 
20 - 40 11.29 (42) 
40 - 60 16.40 (61) 
60 - 80 7.53 (28) 
80 - 100 8.60 (32) 
Table 5.9: Percentage of company sales 
dependent on exports. 
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Of those companies, 35.6 percent are non-exponers and at least a funher 23.7 percent 
export less than five percent of their goods. However, approximately one third of 
companies are dependent on exports for at least 40 percent of their sales. Ownership status 
did not significantiy affect company attitudes towards expon sales but fewer than half of 
MNCs or subsidiaries of MNCs export less than 20 percent of their goods compared to 
77.4 percent of non-MNCs. 
In terms of market orientation, over two thirds of companies export to some degree to 
other EC member state countries (see Figure 5.3). However, 68 percent of those companies 
export less than 20 percent of their goods. Nevertheless, BR and, to a lesser extent, 
Eurotunnel would consider most EC countries to be within their catchment area, and thus 
would expect some of these exports to go via the Tunnel. Exports to other European 
countries and lo the rest of the world are much less likely to be attracted by direct rail/road 
haulage. At present company exports to Germany and eastern Europe are more likely to 
go via North Sea ferry routes, instead of short-sea cross-Channel routes. Approximately 
one third of companies also export to non-EC European countries, of which 95.0 percent 
export less than 20 percent of their goods; and a further 58.3 percent export to the 'rest 
of the worid', of which, 63.6 percent export less than 20 percent of their goods. The 
Tunnel is much less likely to influence the existing distribution practices of companies 
exporting outside of the EC. 
The following sections will utilise the above information to obtain a better understanding 
of how companies are likely to perceive the potential impact of the Tunnel, as well as their 
anticipated usage of BR's international through trains and Eurotunnel's Shultie service. 
5.5.2. The Perceived Impact of the Tunnel 
The perceived impact of the Tunnel on company location will be examined first. Analysis 
of the results will then focus on the effect of the Tunnel on the competitiveness of British 
companies in both the home and continental marketplace. It is then possible to contrast tiie 
results of the current survey with the comparative findings of the London Chamber of 
Commerce and Industry (LCCI - 1989), Eurotunnel and BR (1988) reports. The possibility 
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of company relocations will then be examined before summarising general perceptions of 
the Tunnel. 
Impact on company location 
Companies were asked to state why they located at their present site? more than one reply 
was allowed. The responses are listed below: 
Rent/Rates 21.8% (81) 
Proximity to markets 23.4% (87) 
Proximity to supplies 12.1% (45) 
Good transpon links 37.4% (139) 
Labour force 35.5% (132) 
Room for expansion 28.0% (104) 
Other 34.7% (129) 
More than one third of the companies stated that good u-ansport links and labour force 
requirements were factors in their decision. A large proportion of the companies which 
listed *other* located at their site as a result of historical reasons or to *suit the 
convenience of the managing directors'. 
Over 55 percent of companies considered location to be an important component of their 
business strategy, 18.8 percent as very important and only 11.3 percent regarded the 
location of their company as unimportant. Of those companies which believed location to 
be significant, accessibility (55), contact with customers (50), workforce considerations 
(23), high transpon costs (8), and quick delivery (7), were cited as being important 
considerations. 
Focusing attention on how companies perceive the potential impact of the Tunnel and 
related transpon developments on their location, 80 percent stated that the Tunnel would 
have no effect and only 11.6 percent could foresee some kind of impact. The Tunnel 
represents a significant addition to the UK's transpon infrastructure but the vast majority 
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of companies do not regard it as important to their operations. Nearly 15 percent of PLCs 
considered that the Tunnel would have some influence on their location compared lo 8.9 
percent of privately owned companies. Whether companies are yet to understand fully the 
implications of the Tunnel has therefore to be questioned. The test showed that 
ownership status did not influence the perceptions of companies. The Economic Potential 
Model employed in chapter 3 quantified the impact of the Tunnel on regional accessibility, 
showing for all scenarios significant increases in relative accessibility for the South East 
and the more peripheral UK regions. Nonetheless, the vast majority of the companies in 
both the South East and South West do not expect the Tunnel to affect the locational 
advantages/disadvantages of their current operations. 
Of those companies which consider the Tunnel to be important to their location, the main 
reasons cited are: 
Increased accessibility (34) 
A reduction in transport costs (27) 
A reliable year round cross-Channel service (11) 
Just an alternative mode of transport (4) 
However, some companies did point out that the Tunnel would only improve their location, 
and thus increase their accessibility, i f road and rail links to the Tunnel are improved. The 
main reasons given why the Tunnel would not affect the locational characteristics of 
companies are: 
Present transport links adequate (24) 
UK markets only (23) 
Specialised market (13) 
The Tunnel is irrelevant to our company (11) 
Only use air freight (9) 
Have European subsidiaries (9) 
Too distant - South West companies only (8). 
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Only 15 companies which regard *good transport links* as a factor in their decision to 
locate at their present site believe the Tunnel would change the locational characteristics 
of the company. Thus, the linking of Britain to mainland Europe by the Tunnel is not seen 
by companies to be of any great locaiional significance. Furthermore, one would expect 
a larger percentage of companies which regard location as an important component of their 
business strategy to believe that the Tunnel will alter their locational 
advantages/disadvantages (see Table 5.10). 
'LOCATION' 
CHANGE LOCATIONAL 
DISADVANTAGES OF 
ADVANTAGES/ 
THE COMPANY 
YES NO DON'T KNOW 
VERY IMPORTANT 14 .29 81.43 4.29 
QUITE IMPORTANT 13.97 75.74 10.29 
NOT TOO IMPORTANT 9.68 83 .06 7.26 
UNIMPORTANT 4.76 88.10 4.76 
Table 5.10: Importance of location and the impact of the Tunnel. 
As the importance of Mocation* diminishes, progressively fewer companies believe the 
Tunnel will affect their location. However, on the whole, the importance of location in 
overall company business strategy does not influence the perception of companies. 
Impact on company competitiveness: increased accessibility to markets 
A significantly larger proponion of companies. 28.5 percent, do consider that the Tunnel 
and related transpon developments will improve their accessibility to both UK and 
European markets, with a funher 10 percent uncertain. The reasons given are set out 
below: 
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Will improve accessibility: 
Will not improve accessibility 
reduced time of transit (42) 
reduced cost (7) 
if road/rail links improved (10) 
existing transport adequate (19) 
company already accessible (12) 
specialised market (12) 
only local markets (9) 
have European subsidiaries (9) 
no 'real' change (9) 
too distant (5) 
One third of all PLCs believe that the Tunnel will make them more accessible compared 
to just over one quarter of privately owned companies. However, the test showed that 
ownership status did not affect company perceptions of increased accessibility. 
A larger proportion of companies, 35.6 percent, which consider 'proximity to markets' an 
important factor in their original locational decision believe the Tunnel wil l improve their 
accessibility to both domestic and European markets. But this is not, as one may have 
expected, significantly higher than the respective overall figure of 28.5 percent. 
Furthermore, 26.4 percent of companies which consider 'proximity to markets' not to be 
an important determinant of location, stated that their accessibility to both domestic and 
European markets would be improved by the Tunnel and related transport developments. 
Thus, proximity to markets as a factor in locational decisions is only likely to refer to local 
and/or "Third Markets". 
However, as can be seen from Table 5.11, a larger proportion of companies which regard 
location as an important component of their business strategy believe the Tunnel and 
related Tunnel developments will improve their accessibility to UK and continental 
markets. Furthermore, the percentage of companies that are uncertain as to the outcome 
generally increases as the significance of location decreases. 
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IMPROVED ACCESSIBILITY TO BOTH 
'LOCATION' UK AND EUROPEAN MARKETS 
YES NO DON'T KNOW 
VERY IMPORTANT - 30.00 61.43 7.14 
QUITE IMPORTANT 35.29 54 .41 8.82 
NOT TOO IMPORTANT 27 .42 60.48 12.10 
UNIMPORTANT 7 .14 81.00 11.90 
Table 5.11: Importance of location and company accessibility to both UK and 
continental markets. 
The test shows that the importance of location in company business strategy did affect 
the perceptions of companies as to the impact of the Tunnel on accessibility to continental 
markets (see Table 5.12): 
I n c r e a s e d a c c e s s i b i l i t y 
'Location' Yes No Don't Know 
Obs Ex Obs Ex Obs Ex 
1 21 19.8 43 42.3 5 6.9 69 
2 48 38.5 74 82.1 12 13.4 134 
3 34 35.6 75 75,9 15 12.4 124 
4 3 12.1 34 25.7 5 4.2 42 
2k 106 226 37 N=369 
Table 5.12: The significance of company location on perceptions of improved 
competitiveness on the Continent 
(1 = Very Important, 2 = Quite Important, 3 = Not Too Important and 4 = Unimportant) 
= 0.07 + 0.01 + 0.52 + 234 + 0.80 + 0.15 + 0.07 + 0.01 + 0.55 + 6.84 + Z68 + 0.15 
X ' = 14.19 df = (4-l)(3-l) = 6 
critical value of chisquare (a = 0.05) = 12.59 
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The calculated value is higher than the critical value of chisquare, at a rejection level 
of a = 0.05. Therefore, it is possible to reject Ho, but companies which consider location 
to be unimportant in their overall business strategy account for most of the calculated X^ 
value. Thus, companies which regard 'location* to be unimportant generally do not expect 
the Tunnel and related transport developments to increase their accessibility to domestic 
and European maricets. 
However, less than 30 percent of the companies anticipate improved accessibility as a 
result of the Tunnel. Significant increases in relative accessibility are recorded, in chapter 
3, for all UK regions vis-a-vis the Continent. Nonetheless, the vast majority of companies, 
over 70 percent, do not foresee any such improvements. Company perceptions may have 
been influenced by the lack of transport infrastructure/services supporting the Tunnel, as 
advanced in chapter A. But this study, is primarily concerned with the regional economic 
implications of the Tunnel, thus the relative perceptions of companies in the South East 
and South West are of more importance. Chapter 6 will examine whether companies in the 
South East or South West are more or less likely to anticipate improved accessibility as 
a result of the Tunnel. I f it is shown that companies in the South East are more likely to 
expect to benefit from increased accessibility to domestic and continental markets, this 
could conflict with the findings of the Economic Potential Model. 
Impact on company competitiveness: vulnerability to increased competition 
In terms of the home market, companies tend to be more optimistic. Nearly two thirds of 
companies believe that the Tunnel and related transport infrastructure will not encourage 
more intense competition from domestic and/or European producers. Only 22.9 percent 
expect the Tunnel to increase their exposure to increased competition, 11.3 percent are sull 
undecided. The reasons given are set out below: 
Will increase competition: 
reduced time of transit (42) 
reduced cost (9) 
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Will not increase competition: 
already competitive market (40) 
specialise market (18) 
double-edged (7) 
irrelevant (5) 
no 'rear change (5) 
The percentage of companies that regarded 'proximity to markets* to be important in their 
original locational decision and can foresee more competition as a result of the Tunnel is 
more than 50 percent higher than the overall figure (36.8 and 22.9 percent respectively). 
Of the companies which believed 'good transport links' to be important, nearly one third 
expect increased competition. Therefore, companies which prioritise contact with customers 
and overall accessibility are more likely to perceive increased competition resulting from 
the Tunnel. However, this does not directly imply that these companies are more aware of 
the potential consequences of the Tunnel and related transport developments. 
'LOCATION' 
INCREASED COMPETITION IN BOTH 
UK AND EUROPEAN MARKETS 
YES NO DON'T KNOW 
VERY IMPORTANT 22 .86 60.00 15.71 
QUITE IMPORTANT 27 .21 58.09 13 .24 
NOT TOO IMPORTANT 21.77 69.35 8.87 
UNIMPORTANT 11 .90 83 .33 4.76 
Table 5.13: Importance of location and company vulnerability to increased 
competition. 
Table 5.13 somewhat contradicts the above assumption since nearly as many companies 
which regard location as 'not too important' compared to those which consider it to be 
'very important' also foresee increased competition resulting from the Tunnel. The 
importance of location as a component of company business strategy does not influence 
significantly their perceptions of increased vulnerability to more intense competition. 
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Nonetheless, feelings of vulnerability to increased competition reduce as the percentage of 
exports increase (see Table 5.14). Companies which export less than 40 percent of their 
goods feel more vulnerable than the overall figure. The test showed that while the null 
hypothesis (HQ = exports are not related to company perceptions of vulnerability to 
increased competition) cannot be rejected at a = 0.05, the alternative hypothesis, H,, can 
be accepted i f the rejection level is relaxed to a = 0.10. 
EXPORTS AS 
PERCENTAGE OF 
COMPANY SALES 
INCREASED COMPETITION IN BOTH 
UK AND EUROPEAN MARKETS 
YES NO DON'T KNOW 
0 - 2 0 28.29 55.61 15.61 
20 - 40 26.19 64 .43 4.76 
40 - 60 18.03 77.05 4.92 
60 - 80 7 .14 85.71 7 .14 
80 - 100 9.38 81.12 9.38 
Table 5.14: Exports as a percentage of total sales and company 
vulnerability to increased competition. 
It is evident from Table 5.14, that a fairly positive relationship exists between company 
exports and feelings of vulnerability, i.e. more companies anticipate no increase in 
competition as exports rise in respect to total sales. 
Tunnel usage and company perceptions 
By isolating companies which currently expect to use the Tunnel for either business trips 
and/or freight exports, it is possible to contrast their feelings as regards to the effect of the 
Tunnel on their ability to compete at home and abroad, with all respondents in general (as 
discussed above). In terms of ownership status, industrial classification, size of workforce 
and percentage of exports, companies which at present plan to use the Tunnel do not 
significantly differ from all respondents in general. Therefore, any differences in 
perceptions of the Tunnel are not likely to be the result of the type of companies 
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themselves but more likely a result of their anticipated usage of the Tunnel. Table 5.15 
summarises perceptions of companies currently planning to use the Tunnel. 
w i l l t h e Tunnel ( p e r c e n t a g e ) 
a f f e c t : Yes No Don't Know 
L o c a t i o n a l 
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s 15.38 76.15 8.46 
A c c e s s i b i l i t y t o 
markets 43,08 46.92 10.00 
V u l n e r a b i l i t y t o 
i n c r e a s e d c o m p e t i t i o n 29.23 62.31 8.46 
Table 5.15: Perceptions of companies currently anticipating using the 
Tunnel. 
A significantly larger percentage of companies planning to use the Tunnel believe that the 
Tunnel and related transpon developments will increase their accessibility to both UK and 
continental markets, 43.1 percent compared to 28.5 percent for all respondents. Only a 
slightly larger proponion of companies planning to use the Tunnel expect the Tunnel to 
either affect their location and/or their vulnerability to increased competition. In fact, fewer 
companies planning to use the Tunnel (62.3%) anticipate no increase in competition. 
It is therefore quite apparent that companies are fairly optimistic about the potential impact 
of the Tunnel on their own level of competitiveness at home and abroad. However, surveys 
carried-out prior to the present research project (Eurotunnel and BR 1988, LCCI 1989), 
repon a considerably higher degree of optimism among UK companies. 
Comparison of results with the LCCI (1989), Eurotunnel and BR (1988) surveys 
Reports commissioned by the LCCI (1989), Eurotunnel and BR (1988) both looked at the 
likely effect of the Tunnel on the ability of British producers to compete effectively in both 
the domestic and European markets. The LCCI survey targeted production and service 
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companies in London but attention will be primarily focused on the results for 
manufacturing companies. It was shown that 33.7 percent of companies in the production 
sector anticipated a positive effect on the level of exports/foreign business, with only 1.2 
percent predicting a negative effect. In addition, 36.1 percent anticipated a positive effect 
on European competitiveness. The respective figures for the level of domestic business and 
UK competitiveness were 12.0 and 10.8 percent. Service companies were generally less 
confident about the likely effect of the Tunnel in both the UK and European marketplace. 
Furthermore, two thirds of manufacturing companies planning to use the Tunnel anticipated 
increased competitiveness in European markets, 20.6 percent could foresee a positive effect 
on UK competitiveness. All companies planning to use the Tunnel were more optimistic 
as to the outcome. Eurotunnel and BR (1988) asked companies to comment on what 
attributes of the Tunnel were likely to increase 'exporting efficiency to Western Mainland 
Europe*, the results are listed below: 
Delivery times reduced 67% 
Increased tariff competition 39% 
Greater transport choice 38% 
Service frequency increased 30% 
Service reliability 26% 
Other 1% 
The Eurotunnel and BR (1988) survey showed that 55 percent of companies considered 
that commercial performance would be improved as a result of cost savings and 45 percent 
due to faster response to market demands. Over two thirds of companies anticipated 
increased accessibility, i.e. reduced transit times, compared to only 28.5 percent of 
companies which responded to the present study. The generally higher levels of 
confidence/optimism reported in the above surveys can to a large degree be explained by 
the euphoria surrounding the Tunnel immediately after construction commenced. The 
problems associated with the Tunnel at the present time; panicularly with regard to the 
increasing debt profile of Eurotunnel, the delays associated with the opening of the Tunnel 
and the introduction of the new international passenger trains; has affected the initial level 
of optimism. The influence of the Tunnel on potential company relocations is examined 
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in the next section. It will again become evident that fewer company relocations are now 
seen as necessary to optimise the improved level of accessibility offered by the Tunnel. 
A migration of industry? 
The final question designed to determine the perceptions of companies toward the Tunnel 
and related transport infrastructure attempted to quantify potential company relocations 
which might be brought about as a result of the Tunnel. The vast majority of companies, 
98.1 percent cannot foresee any need to relocate. This apparent degree of certainty is 
reflected throughout all types of companies in both regions. As referred to in the Literature 
Review (chapter 2), there is great anxiety among regional interest groups concerning the 
likelihood of a southwards drift of industry in favour of the South East and northern 
France, i.e. the Tunnel's immediate hinterland. The results here should help to dispel such 
fears, providing more hope of a fairer distribution of benefits created by the Tunnel 
throughout all UK regions, as assumed in the hypothesis tested in chapter 3. The LCCI 
report concludes that: 
*In neither the production nor services sector can the Channel Tunnel be 
said to be a major reason for relocation, it is cited by 20 and 14 percent of 
production and service fuTns respectively.' 
(LCCI 1989, P. 13) 
These figures are relatively high compared to the present research project's results and 
those of Eurotunnel and BR, which showed that 'only one percent of companies considered 
that the Tunnel would encourage them to relocate production elsewhere*. However, the 
Eurotunnel and BR report went on to say that many companies believed increased 
investment in transport infrastructure in their regions would be necessary i f they were to 
be able to benefit from the Tunnel: 
Increased rail investment 43% 
Need for localised customs facilities 42% 
Increased road investment 42% 
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These findings substantiate the argument advanced in chapter 4, that Government policy 
was likely to peripheralise further regions to the north and west of London, and are in line 
with the Section 40 recommendations, which recognise regional concerns of inadequate 
transport infrastructure investment. Even so, nearly all of the companies which responded 
to the present survey do not consider relocation as a result of the Tunnel as a realistic 
option. 
Company perceptions: a summary 
Companies generally seem to be more optimistic about their prospects in the home market, 
with nearly two thirds anticipating no increase in competition as a result of the Tunnel. 
Approximately 30 percent of companies perceived that the Tunnel and related transport 
developments would improve their accessibility to both UK and European markets; 10 
percent are uncertain. Company attitudes as regards the importance of location to their 
overall business strategy and/or the reasons for locating at their present site, do not 
generally influence company perceptions of the Tunnel and its implications. As expected, 
a larger proportion of companies planning to use the Tunnel can foresee the Tunnel 
affecting their company, in terms of their location, accessibility to UK and continental 
markets and vulnerability to increased competition. Thus, companies currently planning to 
use the Tunnel are much more optimistic about the effect of the Tunnel on accessibility 
to markets but more also fear increased competition. 
The present study conflicts with the two earlier surveys. It was shown that companies, on 
the whole, have become less confident about how the Tunnel will affect their ability to 
compete at home and abroad. The initial level of euphoria surrounding the Tunnel has 
receded against the mounting problems now facing Eurotunnel and BR. The third 
postponement of the opening of the Tunnel (now expected to be December 1993) is just 
one of the latest problems facing Eurotunnel. The servicing of Eurotunnel's debt portfolio 
will be severely hampered by this delay, thus further reducing any hopes for cheaper cross-
Channel transportation. 
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Nonetheless, 28.5 percent of the companies still believe that the Tunnel and related 
transport infrastructure will improve their accessibility to UK and continental markets. In 
addition, two thirds do not anticipate any increase in competition in the home market. Such 
optinusm in the home market is based on the belief that domestic markets are already too 
highly competitive or too specialised to be affected. The Single European Market (SEM) 
and the Tunnel will significantly alter existing trading relationships, with all EC countries' 
markets becoming more open and accessible to increased competition. The Tunnel will 
considerably improve the accessibility of the near Continent to all UK regions but 
especially the South East and the Midlands. The South East and the Midlands represent 
the largest markets for the more peripheral UK manufacturers. Thus, the "Third market" 
impact of the Tunnel could severely hinder the growth of the more peripheral regional 
economies, such as the South West The "Third Market" impact of the Tunnel, as discussed 
briefly in chapter 2, will be examined in more detail in chapter 8. Increased accessibility 
is a 'double-edged sword' (Pieda 1989b). I f nearly 30 percent of UK companies expect 
their accessibility to the Continent to improve, it is only reasonable to assume that a 
similar proportion of companies on the Continent, particularly the near Continent and 
Nord-Pas de Calais, will also believe their accessibility to UK markets will improve. 
Analysis of the results at the regional level (chapter 6) will highlight any differences in 
company perceptions toward the Tunnel between companies in the South East and South 
West, with regard to the impact of the Tunnel on the level of company competitiveness. 
However, a more detailed analysis of the results can only support the above finding that 
the Tunnel will not encourage company relocations in favour of the South East. Only two 
companies from London slated that they would relocate as a result of the Tunnel. With 
company perceptions toward the Tunnel examined, it is now possible to analyze current 
company plans to use the Tunnel. The long term impact of the Tunnel will depend on the 
level of demand for its services by companies in the UK and on the Continent. 
5.5.3. Potential Usage of the Tunnel 
The greatest potential benefit of the Tunnel, claimed by its proponents, is an increase in 
accessibility to the Continent. The Tunnel will improve cross-Channel road and rail links 
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for both passenger and freight traffic. But are companies likely to opt in favour of the 
Tunnel and switch from present modes of transport? To.realise any increase in accessibility 
to EC markets, companies will have to use both BR's international passenger/freight trains 
and Eurotunnel's Shuttle service. Otherwise such benefits could be restricted to the mass 
of individual users and for leisure purposes only. Eurotunnel's traffic forecasts for 1993 
and 2003 are set out in Table 5.16. Eurotunnel expect over 30 million passenger journeys 
in the Tunnel's first year of service, evenly divided between BR's international through 
trains and Eurotunnel's Shuttle service. In addition, Eurotunnel forecast that over 15 
million tonnes of freight will travel to continental destinations via the Tunnel. However, 
Eurotunnel now regard its estimated rate of cross-Channel traffic growth as conservative, 
and thus anticipate an even larger market share for both passenger and freight traffic. 
1993* 2003 
PASSENGERS: 
( m i l l i o n s ) 
15.3 21.5 
SHUTTLE 
15.4 19.8 
TRAIN 
30.7 41.3 
TOTAL 
FREIGHT: 
( g r o s s t o n n e s , 
m i l l i o n s ) 
8.1 12.2 
SHUTTLE 
7.4 11.4 
TRAIN 
15.5 23.6 
TOTAL 
Table 5.16: Estimated Tunnel trafTic. 
(Source: Eurotunnel 1988) Full year equivalent) 
As recognised by Pieda (1989a), the regional economic impact of the Tunnel will be 
determined ultimately by the reactions of companies to the challenges created by the 
Tunnel. Even though it would have been impracticable here to attempt to quantify the 
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likely demand for the Tunnel, the attraction of the Tunnel for company business trips and 
freight exports will be analyzed. By comparing the results of the current research project 
with the two earlier studies (Eurotunnel and BR 1988, LCCI 1989) and by examining the 
reasons behind company forecasts, it will be possible to identify the necessary policies that 
will have to be implemented in order to achieve the level of patronage set out in Table 
5.16. The current and future business trip market will be examined first, with the following 
secdon concentradng on the freight market 
The business t r ip market 
The current cross-Channel market and the estimated future usage of the Tunnel for 
business trips will analyzed. However, it useful to examine the earlier findings of the LCCI 
(1989), Eurotunnel and BR (1988) surveys. It will become evident that during the late 
1980s considerable optimism affected the anticipated usage of the Tunnel. 
Comparative findings 
BR. and to a lesser extent Eurotunnel, recognise company business trips to the near 
Continent as important to the success of their respective services. To achieve this BR and 
Eurotunnel will have to encourage companies to switch from air travel in favour of direct 
rail/road links. BR believes that its proposed international passenger service to cities such 
as Paris, Brussels and Cologne, will be competitive on 'city-centre to city-centre* journey 
limes and cost (BR 1989b). 
Based on the LCCI (1989) survey, more than one quaner of manufacturing and service 
companies plan to use the Tunnel for business trips, the majority of which favour the 
Shuttle service (see Table 5.17A). BR would be concerned that a larger proportion of 
companies from London prefer EurotunnePs Shuttle service for business trips. Of the 
companies that used cross-Channel services at the time of the study (see Table 5.17B). 
over half planned to use the Tunnel and a larger proportion of companies prefer the 
car/coach. More importandy. however, could be the degree of uncertainty. To ascertain the 
level of interest in the Tunnel for business trips, Eurotunnel and BR (1988) categorised 
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companies as 'very interested' or just 'interested' (see Table 5.17C). Caution must be used 
when interpreting these results since 'Interested' does not mean that companies will 
eventually use the Tunnel. 
TYPE OF SERVICE 
THROUGH THE 
TUNNEL 
% PLANNING TO 
PRODUCTION 
USE THE TUNNEL 
SERVICES 
YES DON'T KNOW YES DON'T KNOW 
ANY SERVICE 41.0 9.6 32.2 9.3 
ANY FREIGHT 
SERVICE 
34.9 15.7 18.4 14.9 
FREIGHT: RAIL 15.7 30.1 9.2 23.0 
FREIGHT: LORRY 32 .5 20.5 14.9 18.4 
ANY PASSENGER 
SERVICE 
26.5 20.5 25.3 14.9 
PASSENGERS: RAIL 19.3 26.5 23.0 19.5 
PASSENGERS: 
CAR/COACH 
24.1 22.9 16.1 21.8 
Table 5.J7A: Planned usage of the Tunnel: percentage of all respondents. 
(Source: LCCI 1989, P.8) 
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TYPE OF SERVICE 
THROUGH THE 
TUNNEL 
% PLANNING TO 
PRODUCTION 
USE THE TUNNEL 
SERVICES 
YES DON'T KNOW YES DON'T KNOW 
ANY FREIGHT 
SERVICE 
63.4 22.0 57 .7 38.5 
FREIGHT: RAIL 29.3 48.8 26.9 65.4 
FREIGHT: LORRY 58.5 29.3 50.0 42 .3 
ANY PASSENGER 
SERVICE 
52.5 25.0 67 .6 23.5 
PASSENGERS: RAIL 37.5 35.0 55.9 32.4 
PASSENGERS: 
CAR/COACH 
47.5 30.0 38.2 38.2 
Table 5.17B: Planned usage of the Tunnel: percentage of respondents currently 
using cross-Channel services. 
(Source: LCCI 1989, P.8/9.) 
PERCENTAGE 
VERY 
INTERESTED INTERESTED 
ESTABLISHMENT STAFF 19 42 
MAINLAND EUROPEAN 
CUSTOMERS 11 39 
MAINLAND EUROPEAN 
SUPPLIERS 6 25 
Table 5.17C: The level of ' in te r^ t ' expressed in the Tunnel for 
future business trips. 
(Source: Eurotunnel and BR 1988) 
The present survey was conducted during the Summer of 1991, more than two years before 
the Tunnel is due to open. Until service timetables and tariffs are published, companies 
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other (11.0%) y-Daily(10.8%) 
Annually (3.0%) 
Bi-annually (3.2%) 
Quarterly (11.8% 
^Weekly (28.2%) 
Monthly (32.0%) 
Figure 5.4: Frequency of Company Business Trips to the Continent. 
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will only be able to provide approximate estimates of their proposed future usage of the 
Tunnel. However, this argument is more relevant to the earlier reports, particularly since 
both surveys were undertaken shortly after construction commenced and the euphoria 
suiTounding the Tunnel was at its peak. Forecasts will be revised as more information on 
quality of service, journey times and tariff rates is released. 
The current cross-Channel market 
Companies were asked to categorise the frequency of business trips (see Figure 5.4). Over 
one in ten companies currently undertake business trips on a daily basis, a further 28.2 
percent every week and nearly one third once a month. Companies which stated *other\ 
10.5 percent, undertake business trips less than once a year or not at all. In terms of 
companies which undertake business trips on a daily basis, 25 percent employ over 5.000 
people and 30 percent had a workforce between 1,000 and 5,000 (see Table 5.18). 
SIZE OF 
WORKFORCE 
FREQUENCY OF BUSINESS TRIPS 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
0-50 2.50 7.62 8.40 20.05 8.33 18.18 15.38 
50-100 7.50 5.71 5.88 11.36 25.00 9.09 15.38 
100-500 22.50 34.29 53.78 52.27 66.66 54.55 38.46 
500-1000 12.50 24.76 14.29 11.36 0.00 9.09 15.38 
1000-5000 30.00 23.81 14.29 4.55 0.00 9.09 5.13 
5000 + 25.00 3.81 3.36 0.00 0.00 0.00 10.26 
Table 5.18: Frequency of business trips with respect to size of workforce. 
(1 = Daily, 2 = Weekly, 3 = Monthly, 4 = Quarteriy, 5 = Bi-Annually, 
6 = Annually and 7 = Other) 
However, 22.5 percent was also accounted for by companies with between 100 and 500 
employees. One would expect larger companies to undertake business trips on a more 
regular basis. There is a fairly positive relationship between the size of the workforce and 
frequency of business trips (see Table 5.19): 
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Frequency o f b u s i n e s s t r i p s 
S i z e >Weekly Mon t h l y Q u a r t e r l y Other 
Obs Ex Obs Ex Obs Ex Obs Ex 
0-50 9 14 .5 10 11 .9 9 4 .4 9 6 .2 37 
50-100 9 12 .1 7 10 .0 5 3 .7 10 5 .2 31 
100-500 45 63 .1 64 51 .8 23 19 .1 29 27 .0 161 
500-1000 31 23 .5 17 19 .3 5 7 .1 7 10 .0 60 
1000-5000 37 23 .1 17 19 .0 2 7 .0 3 9 .9 59 
5000+ 14 8 .6 4 7 .1 0 2 .6 4 3 .7 22 
145 119 44 62 N =370 
Table 5.19: Significance of size of workforce on the frequency of business 
trips. 
(obs = Observed Frequency and ex = Expected Frequency) 
(Expected Frequency = (Er)(Ek)/N) 
X ' = ErEk{(0 -E y/E) 
= 2.09 + 0.30 + 4.81 + 1.26 + 0.79 + 0.90 + 0.46 
+ 4.43 + 5.19 + 2.87 + 0.80 + 0.15 + 2.39 + 0.27 
+ 0.62 + 0.90 + 8.36 + 0.21 + 3.57 + 4.81 + 3.39 
+ 1.35 + 2.60 + 0,02 
X ' = 52.54 df = (6-l)(4-l) = 15 
critical value of chisquare: (a = 0.05) = 25.00 
(a = 0.001) = 37.70 
To utilise the test it was necessary to group the frequencies together, i.e.'>WeekJy' 
refers to Daily and Weekly business trips and 'Other* incorporates business trips less 
frequent than Bi-annually. The calculated X^ value proves to significant at a = 0.001, or 
in other words there is less than one chance in 100 that the observations occurred 
randomly. As the size of company workforces decrease so does the regularity of business 
trips. When business trips become less frequent than quarterly, more than three quarters 
of the companies employed less than 500 people (see Table 5.18). 
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It can also be seen from Table 5.20 that companies which undertake regular business trips 
to the Continent export proportionately more of their goods: = 46.22; df = 12, thus the 
critical value of chisquare, a = 0.05. = 21.03. Nearly three quaners of companies with 
representatives travelling daily to Europe export more than 20 percent of their goods. As 
the frequency of business trips decline so does the percentage of company sales dependent 
on exports. Companies exporting less than 20 percent of their goods undertake significantly 
fewer business trips. 
% OF 
EXPORTS 
FREQUENCY OF BUSINESS TRIPS 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
0 - 2 0 32.50 39.05 57.14 70.45 75.00 81.82 8.46 
20 - 40 20.00 13.33 9.24 11.36 8.33 0.00 7.69 
40 - 60 15.00 26.66 18.49 2.27 8.33 9.10 5.13 
60 - 80 10.00 11.43 7.56 4.55 0.00 0.00 2.56 
80 - 100 17.50 9.52 6.72 11.36 8.33 9.10 0.00 
DON'T KNOW 5.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Table 5.20: Frequency of business trips with respect to company exports. 
(l=Daily, 2=WeekIy, 3=Monthly. 4=Quaneriy, 5=Bi-annually, 6=Annually, and 7=0ther) 
The frequency of business trips is important in determining potential demand but the 
destination of business trips will be paramount to the overall attraction of the Tunnel. 
Figure 5.5 shows the destination of current business trips between 'France, Germany and 
the Low countries*, *rest of E C and the 'rest of continental Europe*. The Tunnel 
catchment area would encompass most of France, Germany and the Low countries, thus 
the 82.3 percent of companies which currenUy undertake business crips to this region are 
of particular interest to BR and Eurotunnel. 
However, BR also plan to offer competitive over-night international train services to the 
more distant European cities from most British cities, departing 'UK* late evening and 
arriving 'European' early morning (BR 1989b). Therefore, business trips to other EC 
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countries (32.5%) and even other European countries (20.2%) can be considered part of 
the TunneFs wider hinterland. 
The firequency of business trips to the near Continent is not dissimilar to the overall 
frequency to all continental destinations, i.e. the frequency of business trips is not affected 
by destination. Hence, nearly three quarters of business trips to Trance, Germany and the 
Low countries' are more regular than monthly. In addition, of the 32.5 percent of business 
trips to the 'rest of the EC, over 82 percent are again more frequent than monthly. 
Therefore, a potentially huge market exists which BR and Eurotunnel wil l be determined 
to attract. 
However, both BR and Eurotunnel will have to adopt aggressive advertising campaigns 
since over 90 percent of companies currently favour air travel for business trips. Only 11 
companies said that they at present use rail/ferry for business trips to the Continent but 
more encouragingly for Eurotunnel, 27.4 percent also use road/ferry. It would seem that 
as the distance of business trips increase a progressively larger proportion of companies 
go by aeroplane and fewer go by road/ferry: 
A i r Road 
France, Germany and the Low countries 95.8% 47.2% 
rest of the EC 96.7% 29.8% 
rest of Continental Europe 98.7% 29.3% 
Quality of service will be important to the overall attraction of the Tunnel but reliability 
could be singularly paramount to the success of the Tunnel, particularly with regards to 
the frequent business trip market. Nearly one in ten companies undertake business trips on 
a daily basis to the near Continent. A further 25.3 percent of business trips to the near 
Continent are more regular than once a week. These companies will be strongly targeted 
by BR and Eurotunnel but frequent business trips in the Tunnel's catchment area will 
require a highly reliable service. However, the *Open Skies' policy adopted by the EC 
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member states could seriously undermine the attraction of BR's international through trains 
and Eurotunnel's Shuttle service. Deregulation of air services within the EC after 1 January 
1993, will lead to immediate price reductions and increased choice, with more carriers 
allowed to operate on previously restricted routes (Graham 1992). The late introduction of 
the new international passenger trains and the huge debt burden faced by Eurotunnel will 
further improve the competitive position of the airline industry. Company estimates of the 
future usage of the Tunnel for business trips to the Continent, discussed below, were made 
prior to the announcement of the 'Open Skies' policy. It is therefore reasonable to assume 
that companies are now less likely to be attracted by services operating through the 
Tunnel. 
The estimated future usage of the Tunnel 
The estimated future usage of the Tunnel is set out in Table 5.21. It is quite evident that 
the vast majority of companies (84.4%) only plan to use the Tunnel for less than 20 
percent of business trips, of which 83.8 percent do not plan to use the Tunnel. Therefore, 
approximately 25 percent of companies plan to use the Tunnel for at least some of their 
business trips to continental Europe, 5,1 percent are undecided but only 2.2 percent plan 
for more than 60 percent of future business trips to go via the Tunnel. 
% OF 
BUSINESS 
TRIPS 
V I A THE 
TUNNEL 
V I A THE TUNNEL 
BY BR BY SHUTTLE 
0 - 2 0 84.41 78.23 75.54 
20 - 40 5.38 0.54 1.88 
40 - 60 2.96 8.33 8.06 
60 - 80 1.08 1.88 0.54 
80 - 100 1.08 3.76 6.72 
DON'T KNOW 5. 1 1 7.26 7.26 
Table 5.21: Estimated usage of the Tunnel for future business 
trips: percentage of all respondents. 
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Planned usage of the Tunnel was divided between BR's international through trains and 
Eurotunnel's Shuttle service. One can ascertain from Table 5.21 that slightly more 
companies believe that they will use the Shuttle service in preference over international 
through trains. Table 5.22 outlines the percentage of future business trips which might go 
via the Tunnel for planned Tunnel users. It is therefore possible to obtain a better 
understanding of what proportion of business trips undertaken by planned Tunnel users are 
likely to go via the Tunnel, as well as the relative attractiveness of international through 
trains compared to the Shuttle service. Less than 9 percent of planned Tunnel users believe 
more than 60 percent of their future business trips will go by the Tunnel. 
% OF 
BUSINESS 
TRIPS 
VIA THE 
TUNNEL 
VIA THE TUNNEL 
BY BR BY SHUTTLE 
0 - 2 0 56.66 (51) 31.11 (28) 20.00 (18) 
20 - 40 22.22 (20) 2.22 (2) 7.77 (7) 
40 - 60 12.22 (11) 34.44 (31) 33.33 (30) 
60 - 80 4.44 (4) 7.77 (7) 2.22 (2) 
80 - 100 4.44 (4) 15.55 (14) 27.77 (25) 
DON'T KNOW - 8.88 (8) 8.88 (8) 
Table 5.22: Estimated usage of the Tunnel for future business trips: 
percentage (and number) of companies planning to use 
the Tunnel. 
Companies plan to use Eurotunnel's Shuttle service for a larger proportion of their business 
trips, compared to the alternative international through trains. One would expect the Shuttle 
service to be more attractive since over 40 percent of companies planning to use the 
Tunnel currently prefer to use road/ferry for business trips. 
Factors likely to influence planned Tunnel usage 
However, current estimates of the future usage of the Tunnel will not remain static. 
Companies are likely to revise continually their plans closer to the time of the opening of 
the Tunnel and after experiencing the services offered. Therefore, it is necessary to 
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determine what factors are considered important by companies in evaluating what 
percentage of future business trips are likely to go via the Tunnel. The responses are listed 
below: 
Cost 42.7% 
Joumey Time 82.5% 
Reliability 35.8% 
Comfort 14.5% 
Other 10.8% 
Over 80 percent of companies regarded joumey time to be the main consideration in using 
the Tunnel and its services. In comparison, only 42.7 percent of companies believed cost 
to be important. Thus, BR will have to concentrate on offering competitive joumey times 
to the main European cities. The importance of the above factors will vary according to 
how companies currently undertake business trips to the Continent: 
By Aeroplane By Rail By Road 
Cost 43.5% 54.6% 61.8% 
Joumey Time 86.8% 54.6% 81.4% 
Reliability 38.2% 27.3% 48.0% 
Comfort 15.9% 9.1% 21.6% 
It can be seen that a larger proportion of companies which ciurently undertake business 
trips by road/ferry, consider cost, reliability and comfort as important relative to the other 
modes of transport but still regard joumey time as the principal factor. Fewer companies 
which travel by rail/ferry believe joumey time, reliability and general comfort to be 
important compared to the respective overall figures. The proposed joumey times for future 
international through trains are considered to be extremely competitive by BR but 
companies presently using cross-Channel rail/ferry services are less likely to regard joumey 
times as important. Nonetheless, intemational through services will become more attractive 
to companies currently favouring air travel or road/ferry, at least in terms of joumey time. 
Not surprisingly, companies which undertake business trips by aeroplane consider joumey 
time to be paramount in their decision, nearly twice as important as their next 
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consideration, i.e. cost. However, the 'Open Skies* policy adopted by the European 
Commission will allow more direct air services, as well as an increased choice of 
operators, between UK and continental cities (Graham 1992). The ability of international 
through trains to compete on journey times could therefore be undermined. Furthermore, 
the mounting problems faced by Eurotunnel will affect their ability to offer competitive 
tariff rates. Thus, companies preferring road/ferry are likely to remain loyal to their 
existing ferry services. 
However, the regional economic impact of the Tunnel is more likely to be influenced by 
the proportion of companies anticipating sending future freight exports via international 
through trains or the Shuttle service. The Economic Potential Model employed in chapter 
3, incorporates rail freight journey times to quantify the impact of the Tunnel on regional 
accessibility. As a result of increased accessibility and reduced operating costs, the Tunnel 
is expected to lead to significant cost savings for British industry. British companies will 
have to send freight exports via the Tunnel i f these benefits are to be realised. The next 
section will examine the current cross-channel freight market and the estimated future 
usage of the Tunnel. 
The freight market 
Analysis of current and future cross-Channel freight traffic will be structured according to 
the format adopted in the preceding section. Thus, to obtain a more comprehensive 
understanding of the results of the present research project, it is first useful to examine the 
findings of the two earlier surveys. 
Comparative findings 
The LCCI (1989) report showed that 34.9 percent of all respondents in the production 
sector planned to send at least some of their exports via the Tunnel, 32.5 percent favoured 
the Shuttle service and only 15.7 percent believed that they would utilise direct rail 
haulage to the Continent (see Tables 5.17A&B). More significantly, nearly two thirds of 
companies using cross-Channel services for freight at the time of the survey planned to use 
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the Tunnel. Again, a larger proponion of companies preferred the Shuttle service, 58.5 
percent, over rail freight, 29.3 percent. Table 5.23 sets out Eurotunnel and BR*s (1988) 
estimates of the Mevel of interest* in the Tunnel for freight exports. 
MODE OF PERCENT 
TRANSPORT INTERESTED 
THROUGH RAIL FREIGHT 5 
BOTH RAIL & ROAD SERVICES 34 
RORO SHUTTLE 57 
DID NOT ANSWER 4 
Table 5.23: The level of 'interest' expressed in the 
Tunnel for future freight exports. 
(Source: Eurotunnel and BR 1988) 
Both repons highlight the preference for the Shuttle service over rail freight but they 
diverge on the extent of this preference. According to Eurotunnel and BR. only five 
percent of companies are interested in rail freight for the transportation of exports to the 
Continent This figure is less than the current percentage of exports to the Continent that 
go via rail/ferry. More than 40 percent of the respondents to the Eurotunnel and BR (1988) 
report did not export to Europe, thus one has to be careful when interpreting these results. 
The current cross-Channel market 
Question 7 ascertained what percentage of company sales are dependent on exports and 
the market orientation of these exports (see Table 5.9 and Figure 5.3). To summarise, only 
73 companies are non-exporters or have no business interests abroad and approximately 
56 companies export less than five percent of their goods. The remaining companies expon 
to some extent, with one third exporting over 40 percent of their goods. In addition, more 
than two thirds of companies export to other EC member state countries. Exports were then 
categorised by mode of transport: 
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Aeroplane 21.5% 
Rail/Sea 17.2% 
RoRo 50.5% 
LoLo 16.9% 
Other 10.2% 
Over half of the companies at present use RoRo facilities for at least some of their exports 
and more than 20 percent use air freight. The degree to which companies export, on the 
whole, will not determine the choice of transport mode; except possibly for air freight, 
where the test showed that the frequency of companies using air freight was higher than 
the 'expected* frequency (and vice versa when exports accounted for less than 20 percent 
of company sales). 
Companies currently sending freight expons to the Continent via RoRo ferry services will 
be of particular interest to Eurotunnel, as will companies using existing rail/sea and/or 
LoLo services to BR. Rail freight services will become more competitive after the Tunnel 
opens in 1993, compared with the dominant road haulage sector. As discussed in chapter 
3, Eurotunnel's Shuttle service is not expected to offer considerable time savings as 
initially envisaged. EC legislation on permitted daily driving hours negates any advantages 
the Shuttle offers, in terms of quicker cross-Channel transit times, compared with existing 
ferry services. Thus rail freight is likely to benefit from considerable time savings (as 
opposed to the road haulage sector). The proportion of companies currently planning to use 
the Tunnel for freight exports to the Continent, via international through trains and the 
Shuttle service, is examined in the next section. However, it is important to emphasize that 
the regional economic impact of the Tunnel will be strongly determined by the number of 
companies which anticipate using international rail freight services. 
The estimated future usage of the Tunnel 
Table 5.24 shows that 61.0 percent of companies plan to use the Tunnel for less than 20 
percent of future exports, of which 89.9 percent do not plan to use the Tunnel. However, 
over 19 percent of companies do believe that they will send more than 20 percent of 
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exports via the Tunnel whilst 20 percent are undecided. But of those companies which 
currently export to the Continent, nearly one third anticipate using the Tunnel to some 
degree. 
% OF 
EXPORTS 
VIA THE 
TUNNEL 
VIA THE TUNNEL 
BY BR BY SHUTTLE 
0 - 2 0 61.02 61.29 60.22 
20 - 40 8.33 1.88 1.08 
40 - 60 7.80 9.14 9.14 
60 - 80 1.61 1.34 1.61 
80 - 100 1.34 4.03 5.65 
DON'T KNOW 19.89 22.31 22.31 
Table 5.24: Estimated usage of the Tunnel for future freight 
exports: percentage of all respondents. 
Although slightly more companies favour the Shuttle, in preference over rail freight, the 
test showed this not to be statistically significant. A more detailed breakdown of the 
likely future usage of the Tunnel is provided in Table 5.25, which incorporates companies 
planning to use the Tunnel. Over one quarter of the companies plan to use the Tunnel to 
some degree, of which 63.8 percent anticipate sending between 20-60 percent of their 
exports via the Tunnel and 11.7 percent more than 60 percent of exports. Slightly more 
companies plan to send a larger proportion of their exports by Shuttle than rail freight. 
This would again be expected since nearly two thirds of companies planning to use the 
Tunnel currently send exports by RoRo ferry, however 22.3 percent also favour rail freight. 
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% OF 
EXPORTS 
VIA THE 
TUNNEL 
VIA THE TUNNEL 
BY BR BY SHUTTLE 
0 - 2 0 24.46 (23) 25.53 (24) 21.28 (20) 
20 - 40 32.98 (31) 7.45 (7) 4.26 (4) 
40 - 60 30.85 (29) 36.17 (34) 36.17 (34) 
60 - 80 6.38 (6) 5.32 (5) 6.38 (6) 
80 - 100 5.32 (5) 15.96 (15) 22.34 (21) 
DON'T KNOW - 9.57 (9) 9.57 (9) 
Table 5.25: Estimated usage of the Tunnel for future freight exports: 
percentage (and number) of companies planning to use 
the Tunnel. 
Therefore, three quarters of companies, or, more importantly, 70 percent of companies 
which currently export to the Continent, have no intention of sending freight exports via 
the Tunnel or are undecided. Furthermore, no real distinction is made between rail freight 
or the Shuttle service. Thus, considerably fewer companies will switch their distribution 
practices in favour of the rail network. Hence, the significance of the Tunnel to the UK 
and the regions has to be placed in context. The long-term benefits of the Tunnel, as 
highlighted in the Literature Review (chapter 2), are dependent on companies exploiting 
the advantages of improved journey time and cost via direct rail freight services to the 
Continent. Since most companies do not anticipate switching from their present preferred 
mode of transport, namely road/ferry, the long-term regional economic impact of the 
Tunnel is likely to be limited. 
Factors likely to influence planned Tunnel usage 
It is evident that current plans to use the Tunnel do vary according to the business and 
freight sectors. As compared to future business trips, significantly more companies are 
unsure how the Tunnel will be incorporated into their distribution plans. Thus, it is 
important to identify which factors are considered likely to increase the anticipated usage 
of the Tunnel for freight exports, particularly since company estimates will not remain 
static. The results are listed below: 
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Cost 64.0% 
Journey Time 43.8% 
Reliability 41.4% 
Other 8.6% 
Unlike with business trips, the relative cost of rail freight and/or the Shuttle is considered 
more important than the total transit time. This would seem to go against the general trend 
of manufacturing companies adopting 'just-in-time' systems of production and delivery. 
However, the cost of transporting goods to the Continent is of much greater concern to 
companies than individual business trips. BR and Eurotunnel wi l l , therefore, have to offer 
favourable tariff rates to enable them to compete effectively. Companies wil l not make any 
final decisions until the actual tariffe are made public. Companies planning to use the 
Tunnel regard cost to be more important than all respondents in general; 50.8 percent for 
business trips and 78.5 percent for exports. 
The above factors are generally regarded to be more important by companies currently 
exporting to the Continent and vary according to the mode of transport: 
Air 
Freight 
Rail 
Freight 
RoRo Lo/Lo 
72.5% 84.4% 79.8% 77,8% 
67.5% 53.1% 54.8% 65.1% 
47.5% 45.3% 55.3% 58.7% 
Cost 
Journey Time 
Reliability 
There is a definite consensus amongst companies that cost will be the most significant 
factor in deciding whether or not to use the Tunnel for freight exports and to what extent. 
Companies currently favouring RoRo or LoLo transport facilities consider reliability to be 
more important than companies using rail freight. The reliability of future rail freight 
services via the Tunnel will be vital to the success of their operations. Between a half and 
two thirds of companies currently transporting goods to the Continent regard time of transit 
to be important. 
196 -
Anticipated Tunnel usage: a summary 
More than one quarter of companies plan to use the Tunnel for business trips and/or the 
transportation of exports. These figiuies are more conservative than earlier findings but, as 
explained previously, the optimism generated by the Tunnel in the late 1980s has now 
given way to more realistic forecasts. Despite the Tunnel representing an important 
addition to the UK*s transport infrastructure, more than 70 percent of companies have no 
plans to use the Tunnel or are undecided. However, as more finalised information becomes 
available, companies wil l revise their estimated future usage of the Tunnel. I t is therefore 
dependent on BR and Eurotunnel to implement the necessary policies to increase demand. 
One cannot place too much confidence in traffic forecasts or current company plans for 
the future use of the Tunnel since the post-Tunnel cross-Channel transport market wil l be 
extremely dynamic, and thus subject to volatile changes. Ferry operators have repeatedly 
stated that they will be in a position to compete effectively with the Tunnel as soon as it 
opens, now not until December 1993. P&O and Sealink are likely to re-apply to the 
Monopolies and Mergers Commission (MMC), shortly after the Tunnel opens, to allow the 
proposed merger of ferry services at Dover. The CTJCC considers that such a merger is 
vital to the long-term survival of the pon and ferry in East Kent (see chapter 7). It is 
therefore expected that the MMC will finally pemrut the merger of the P&O and Sealink 
ferry fleets. The pooling of services and tariff collusion will result in more cost effective 
services and improved service quality. Thus, companies are likely to be constantly 
reviewing their distribution practices and, to a lesser extent, how they undertake business 
trips. 
However, the recent difficulties encountered by both Eurotunnel and BR, in terms of the 
delayed opening of the Tunnel and the late introduction of intemational passenger trains, 
can only weaken their competitive posiuons. The postponement of the high-speed rail link, 
as discussed in chapter 4, casts a further shadow over the Tunnel project. KCC (1989), and 
most other commentators, predict capacity constraints as soon as the Tunnel opens. If 
Simmons (1989) is correct, capacity constraints on Kent main line tracks will lead to either 
a reduction in the level of domestic passenger services or slower international trains 
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operating alongside commuter services. The latter option will again reduce the 
attractiveness of international passengers trains for business trips to the Continent, 
especially in the light of the EC*s 'Open Skies* policy for air services. The Crovemment 
has also created further uncertainty through its planned denationalization of the railways 
and the complete sell-off of BR's freight sector (see chapter 4). It is therefore evident that 
companies will not be able to make any definite predictions of future usage of the Tunnel 
until service timetables and tariff rates are published. Nonetheless, certain strategies 
adopted by either the Government, BR and Eurotunnel could encourage companies to 
revise, positively or negatively, their planned usage of the Tunnel. The next section, 
'Wider Considerations', wil l determine whether any strategies are considered necessary to 
increase the anticipated usage of the Tunnel. In addition, more general impressions of 
companies toward the Tunnel will be elaborated upon. 
5.5.4. Wider considerations 
To conclude the analysis of the results, attention will now focus on more general 
considerations. As referred to above, present plans to use the Tunnel are unlikely to remain 
static. Certain strategies/policies may also influence companies to increase their planned 
usage of the Tunnel. Thus, question 20 attempted to determine what Government and/or 
BR strategies would be needed to encourage companies to revise upwards their current 
estimated usage of the Tunnel, for both passenger and freight traffic. 
The results show that BR will have to improve its overall image i f more companies are 
going to be encouraged to rethink their planned usage of the Tunnel for passenger and 
freight traffic. More than one quarter of the companies believe that a better overall train 
service, including more and faster trains, would increase their planned usage of the Tunnel. 
The cost of train journeys via the Tunnel, for passenger and freight traffic, relative to other 
modes of transport, is regarded as important by 23.4 percent of companies. This could be 
to some extent premature but it does mean that BR will have to offer a competitive pricing 
policy. Only 15.3 percent considered that BR would have to increase its general level of 
reliability; somewhat contradicting the general perception of BR, particulariy with regard 
to rail freight. 
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Eariier results showed that more than one third of companies would consider reliability 
important in their plans to use the Tunnel for business trips; the respective figure for 
freight exports is 41.4 percent. Of those companies which stated that either a better service, 
improved reliability or competitive prices would encourage them to increase their usage 
of the Tunnel: 85.6, 87.7 and 83.9 percent respectively, anticipate less than 20 percent of 
future business trips going via the Tunnel; the respective figures for exports are 64.4, 61.4 
and 57.5 percent. Therefore, the vast majority of companies that at present plan not to use 
the Tunnel or use it for less than 20 percent of business trips and/or exports, are prepared 
to revise their plans i f BR adopt certain strategies. Furthermore, neariy 30 percent of 
companies currently planning to use the Tunnel would increase their usage of the Tunnel 
if costs were competitive and 36.2 percent would require faster and more frequent trains. 
Again rather surprisingly, only 9.1 percent of companies (16.9 percent for companies 
planning to use the Tunnel) stated that increased investment in Tunnel related transport 
infrastructure would be necessary to increase their usage of the Tunnel, of which 
approximately 70 percent did not plan to use the Tunnel for future business trips and over 
half had no plans to send exports via the Tunnel. The questionnaire survey was carried out 
prior to the Government's decision, 9 October 1991, to abandon BR's proposed route for 
the high-speed rail link in favour of the 'sketchy' Ove Arup East London route, effectively 
delaying the rail link until well into the next century (see chapter 4). This decision, after 
months of certainty that the Government would give the go ahead for BR's proposed route, 
and the increased publicity, could have altered the above finding. A further 13.2 percent 
of companies believe that accessibility to the Tunnel by road and rail needs to be 
improved. Again the majority of those companies had no plans to use the Tunnel, three 
quarters for business trips and neariy 60 percent for exports. One would expect to associate 
this response with companies more isolated from the Tunnel, namely companies from the 
"Far South West". Over one third of companies stated other reasons, of which the majority 
considered that no strategies would encourage them to revise their planned use of the 
Tunnel. 
The accuracy of the responses to the questions would to a large degree depend on the 
general level of knowledge concerning the Tunnel and its services. Less than one third of 
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companies believe that information about the Tunnel has been easily accessible and 13.7 
percent are uncertain as to whether any information has been fonhcoming. The type or size 
of the company did not affect the amount of information available. It would therefore seem 
that BR and Eurotunnel will have to adopt a more aggressive advertising campaign, 
targeting potential users. Companies currently anticipating using the Tunnel do not seem 
to be more informed about the Tunnel and its services, over half do not believe that 
information was easily available and a further 13.9 percent are unsure. 
The last two questions attempted to place the Tunnel in an overall context. In terms of 
companies becoming more 'Europeanised\ 35.22 percent regard the Single European Act 
and the Tunnel as encouraging them to look more towards the Continent. However, the 
Tunnel is considered insignificant in comparison to the SEM. The theory of transport 
economics does not support the view that companies will relocate closer to the Tunnel, to 
optimise any improvement in accessibility to the Continent. Tlie Port of Dover has been 
the main corridor for the majority of UK exports to the Continent but Kent has not 
benefitted from a migration of industry to the county or from a dynamic distribution 
industry (see chapter 7). I f BR (1989b) are to be believed all regions will be well served 
by rail to and from the Tunnel. Nonetheless, the psychological importance of the SEM and 
the Tunnel could persuade some companies that the South East, and particularly the 
*EuroRegion* of Kent, is where they should be located. However, nearly all of the 
companies which responded, as the present research highlights, do not foresee the need to 
relocate. In addition, the psychological importance of the Tunnel is negligible against the 
wider implications of the SEM. 
Companies are generally optimistic that the overall regional economic impact of the Tunnel 
wil l be beneficial. Nearly half of the companies did believe the impact will be beneficial 
on the region in which they are located. In addition, 16.4 percent anticipated the impact 
to be neutral and only 15.1 percent could foresee a damaging impact. Increased trade, 
tourism and employment are the general reasons why companies are so optimistic. 
However, some companies are concerned about the impact of the Tunnel on the 
environment and its South East bias. Companies are generally more optimistic about their 
future outlook to Europe and the overall impact of the Tunnel i f they at present plan to use 
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the Tunnel, 46.2 percent believe they will become more orientated towards Europe and 
59.2 percent expect the overall impact on their region to be beneficial. Companies in the 
South East are much more likely to believe that the Tunnel will have a beneficial impact 
on their region; approximately one third of the companies in the South West expect the 
impact to be neutral. Analysis of the data at the inter- and intra-regional levels will be 
carried out in chapter 6, but it is first appropriate to conclude this chapter according to the 
theoretical, and the legislative and policy fi-ameworks established in the preceding chapters. 
5.6. Conclusion 
The main findings of the present survey tend to be more conservative than those of the 
eariier reports by LCCl (1989), Eurotunnel and BR (1988). This can be explained by the 
mounting problems faced by Eurotunnel and BR. Construction of the Tunnel has 
continually been plagued by financial difficulties; contractual disputes between Eurotunnel 
and TML; problems meeting health and safety standards both in the Tunnel and in 
proposed future services; and the indecision associated with supporting transport 
infrastructure, particularly the high-speed rail link between London and the Tunnel portal. 
More important, however, is the decision to postpone the opening of the Tunnel, for a third 
time, until December 1993. This will effectively stop the revenue earning potential of the 
Tunnel for at least a further six months, representing a loss of revenue of more than £200 
million (Daily Telegraph 1992), and thus increasing Eurotunnel's "real" debt burden. 
Pressure to meet a tightly enforced debt repayment schedule will restrict Eurotunnel's 
ability to introduce attractive tariff rates for both passenger and freight traffic. Until 
Eurotunnel and BR are in a position to publish service timetables and tariff rates, 
companies will be unable to plan confidently their future usage of the Tunnel. Both P&O 
and Sealink expect to be in a position of strength by the summer of 1993, after a 
substantial rationalisation of the cross-Channel ferry industry (Hall 1987). The significant 
time advantages of the Tunnel over short-sea ferry crossings, particulariy for rail freight 
and passengers by road or rail, could be over-shadowed i f the present difficulties hindering 
Eurotunnel and BR prevent them competing effectively with the more cost-efficient ferry 
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operators. Companies regard cost to be the paramount consideration in any future usage 
of the Tunnel for freight exports. The planned denationalization of BR also engenders 
considerable uncertainty, possibly adversely affecting the attractiveness of intemational rail 
services (see chapter 4). 
At present, approximately one quarter of companies plan to use the Tunnel for future 
business trips, of which over half anticipate less than 20 percent of business trips going 
via the Tunnel. This is not surprising, since the present business trip market is dominated 
by air travel, with over 90 percent of companies currently using this mode of transport to 
some degree. BR and, to a lesser extent, Eurotunnel will have to adopt aggressive 
advertising campaigns, highlighting the unique advantages of direct rail (and/or road) travel 
to the Continent, namely fast city-centre to city-centre joumey times without the need to 
check-in up to two hours before departure. Joumey times are the prime concern of 
companies in their choice of u^ansport mode for business trips; 82.5 percent regard joumey 
time as important In comparison, only 42.7 percent believe cost to be important. BR is 
confident that their intemational through train services will be able to compete on joumey 
times, particularly to the near Continent and even to the more distant European cities via 
over-night sleeper services. Therefore as service timetables and tariff rates are made public 
and after the service becomes operational, companies are likely to revise their estimated 
usage of the Tunnel favourably. However, capacity constraints on Kent main line tracks 
(discussed in chapter 7) could entail international services mnning at much reduced speeds. 
Furthermore, the delayed introduction of the new intemational passenger trains will also 
limit the number of companies deciding to switch from air to rail travel, at least in the 
immediate years following the opening of the Tunnel. 
In terms of freight exports, approximately 25 percent of companies again plan to use the 
Tunnel but companies generally anticipate sending a larger proportion of their exports, as 
compared to business crips, via the Tunnel. Over three quarters of the companies planning 
to use the Tunnel expect to send more tiian 20 percent of their expons via the Tunnel. In 
addition, nearly 20 percent of companies are still undecided. Rail freight will be a position 
to offer attractive time and cost savings after the Tunnel opens but EC legislation on 
permitted daily driving hours will reduce any rime savings for road hauliers using the 
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Shuttle service. Nonetheless, companies are fairly evenly divided between their planned 
usage of rail freight or the Shuttle service. As stated in chapter 3, BR is introducing more 
powerful locomotives to increase both the load capacity and the average running speed of 
freight trains, initially 75mph. BR is actively trying to persuade companies that the general 
perceived image of an unreliable service is now out-dated. Regional freight villages are 
just one example of BR attempting to bring rail freight services to the regions and the 
companies, swap-body technology and inter-modal door-to-door services are others. The 
Tunnel represents a new era for the railway in the UK, but the complete sell-off of BR's 
rail freight sector is likely to create much uncertainty and prevent BR maximising the 
opportunities that the Tunnel offers. However, i f these estimates remain fairly constant, 70 
percent of companies currently exporting to the Continent do not plan to use the Tunnel 
and even fewer are likely to use international rail freight services. The regional economic 
impact of the Tunnel is therefore likely to be limited. 
Surprisingly, fewer than 10 percent of companies believe that increased investment in 
transport infrastructure would increase their planned usage of the Tunnel. More companies 
are concerned about the general level of service quality, particularly for BR. and the need 
for competitive tariffs. Regional interest groups argue that the spreading of the benefits 
from the Tunnel will be hindered by the lack of necessary investment in the UK's transport 
infrastructure, citing the case of the high-speed rail link as a prime example (NOERC 
1988, CLES 1989, Pieda 1989a&b). Nonetheless, companies seem to believe that it is up 
to BR and Eurotunnel to offer an attractive overall service, and thus persuade them to 
increase their planned usage of the Tunnel. This would also seem to conflict with the 
findings of the Section 40 Report (Knowles et. al. 1989), which highlights regional 
concems of inadequate supporting transport infrastructure. However, the questionnaire 
survey was carried-out prior to the announcement (on 9 October 1991) that the 
Government was to reject BR's proposed NKML. The delay now associated with the high-
speed rail link would have been likely to lead to more companies calling for increased 
investment in transport infrastructure. 
Companies are generally optimistic about the impact of the Tunnel on their overall ability 
to compete in both UK and European markets. Nearly three out of every ten companies 
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believe that the Tunnel and related transport infrastructure will increase their accessibility 
to both UK and continental markets. Nonetheless, over 60 percent of companies do not 
anticipate any such improvements in accessibility, the majority considering existing cross-
Channel transportation more than adequate for their purposes. Only 22.9 percent of 
companies anticipate increased competition resulting from the Tunnel, a sign that 
companies are more optimistic about die effect of the Tunnel on the home market. Such 
optimism could be misplaced considering continental attitudes toward the Tunnel. The 
threat posed by continental states, in terms of company relocations and increased exports, 
will be examined in the case studies of East Kent (chapter 7) and Uie "Far South West" 
(chapter 8). Concerns that the Tunnel will encourage a southward migration of industry 
were considered to be unfounded in the Literature Review (chapter 2), and are examined 
in more detail with respect to East Kent and Nord-Pas de Calais in chapter 7. Furthermore, 
the results show that companies have no plans to relocate. Chapter 8 will focus attention 
on the "double-edged" nature of improved accessibility and the "Third Market" impact of 
the Tunnel. Companies in the "Far South West", and other peripheral UK regions, are 
likely to suffer a loss of market share to increased competition from the Continent, 
particularly in the important markets of the South East and the Midlands. 
The questionnaire survey also showed that companies anticipate a positive impact on their 
regional economies. However, this will depend ultimately on the reactions of British 
industry to the new challenge of a more accessible European mainland. The vast majority 
of companies which responded to the survey do not anticipate any increase in accessibility 
(>70%) and/or currently plan to use the Tunnel (approximately 75%). One has to be 
careful when interpreting these results, but it would seem that the real significance of the 
Tunnel, as seen by companies, is limited, especially in comparison with the SEM. But this 
could be indicative of the British Government's non-interventionist attitude towards the 
Tunnel. However, the real significance of the Tunnel will depend on how companies in the 
different regions of the UK and on die Continent actually react to the potential 
opportunities created by the Tunnel. It was argued in chapter 4, that British Government 
policy could disadvantage the more peripheral regions, and the UK as a whole, relative to 
the near Continent. The contrasting strategies implemented by the French Government, and 
the Nord-Pas de Calais Regional Council, could exacerbate the potentially damaging "Third 
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Market" impact of the Tunnel. It is therefore important to examine whether regional 
location affects how companies are likely to react to the new opportunities created and 
how they perceive the potential impact of the Tunnel. 
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CHAPTER 6: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE 
OUESTIONNAIRE RESULTS 
This chapter will highlight any similarities and dissimilarities in perceptions of and 
reactions to the Tunnel for companies in the South East and South West As stated by 
Pieda (1989b). the reactions of companies to the challenges created wil l ultimately 
influence the regional economic impact of the Tunnel. It will be shown whether companies 
from the South East and South West are likely to react differently to the Tunnel and thus 
significantly affect the regional economic structure of the UK. The comparative findings 
of the survey between the two regions will have important implications for companies 
throughout the UK. The South West, but panicularly the "Far South West" (Devon and 
Cornwall), is one of the regions most isolated from the Tunnel, in terms of geographical 
distance and supporting transport infrastructure. A comparative regional analysis of the 
results will therefore greatly conu-ibute to existing research on the potential regional 
economic impact of the Tunnel. 
6.1. Regional Analysis 
Analysis of the results at the regional level will again be structured according to the design 
of the questionnaire (see Appendix 3). First the company base of the two regions must be 
examined before analyzing company perceptions of the Tunnel and any proposed future 
usage of BR*s intemational through trains and/or EurotunnePs Shuttle service. It will 
reveal whether businesses share the commonly perceived image that the Tunnel will further 
disadvantage the more peripheral UK regions. It was shown in chapter 3, that significant 
increases in relative accessibility could be experienced by all UK regions vis-a-vis the 
Continent However, the realisation of these benefits will depend on company perceptions 
of and reactions to the Tunnel. Having established the more important parameters 
influencing the decisions of companies in using the Tunnel, the regional analysis will then 
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focus on more general considerations, particularly to ascertain if companies in either of the 
two regions are more optimistic or pessimistic as regards the likely impact of the Tunnel 
on the region in which they are located. Analysis of the results will also be undertaken at 
the sub-regional county level. However, caution must be used when interpreting the results 
because of the small number of respondents involved. 
6.1.1. The Regional Company Base 
Any similarity in attitudes toward the Tunnel found amongst companies in die South East 
and the South West cannot be accounted for by common factors in their economic base. 
The results outlining the company profiles of the two regions proved to be significantly 
different, at a rejection level of at least a = 0.05. It will be shown that companies in the 
South East are less likely to be privately owned and are more likely to be a MNC or 
subsidiary of a MNC, employ larger workforces and export more of their goods as a 
proportion of their total sales. Analysis of the results in chapter 5 showed that the type of 
companies themselves did not generally influence perceptions and forecast usage of the 
Tunnel. The company profiles of the two regions will be discussed individually, with the 
results presented in Tables 6.1 to 6.3 and Figures 6.1 and 6.2. 
Fewer than half of the companies in the South East, 46.4 percent, are privately owned and 
37.3 percent are PLCs (see Figure 6.1). Companies considering themselves to be MNCs 
or subsidiaries of MNCs account for 85.8 percent; of which nearly half have branch/sister 
companies located in other EC countries, 21,9 percent in the Vest of Europe' and 70.4 
percent in the *rest of the World'. More than two thirds of the companies can be 
categorised into five industrial categories (see Table 6.1); namely, 'food, drink and 
tobacco' (17.2%), electrical engineering (14.2%), chemicals and allied industries (13.7%), 
mechanical engineering (12.9%) and 'paper, printing and publishing' (10.3%). As is 
evident from Table 6.2, over one quarter have been located at their present site for less 
than 10 years but nearly 20 percent of companies have been at their present location for 
over 50 years. Companies employing more than 1,000 people account for 28.3 percent of 
all companies in the South East, 20.6 percent also employ fewer than 100 people. 
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South West 
Other (0.0%) 
Branch Plant (6.5%) 
PLC (15.8%) 
Partnership (1.4%) 
Private (76.3%) 
Figure 6.1 (cont'd): Ownership Status of Companies in the South East and 
South West. 
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Figure 6.2: Size of Company WorWorce. 
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INDUSTRIAL 
CLASSIFICATION 
SOUTH EAST SOUTH WEST 
FOOD, DRINK 
& TOBACCO 
17.17 (40) 11.51 (16) 
COAL & PETROLEUM 
PRODUCTS 
0.0 (0) 1.44 (2) 
CHEMICALS & 
ALLIED INDs 
13.73 (32) 4.32 (6) 
METAL MANUFACTURE 5.15 (12) 5.04 (7) 
MECHANICAL ENG. 12.88 (30) 12.23 (17) 
INSTRUMENT ENG. 4.29 (10) 4.32 (6) 
ELECTRICAL ENG. 14.16 (33) 20.86 (29) 
SHIPBUILDING & 
MARINE ENG. 
0.43 (1) 2.88 (4) 
VEHICLES 3.43 (8) 2.16 (3) 
OTHER METAL GOODS 1.29 (3) 0.72 (1) 
TEXTILES 0.0 (0) 0.72 (1) 
LEATHER & FURS 0.0 (0) 0.72 (1) 
CLOTHING & 
FOOTWEAR 
0.86 (2) 2.88 (4) 
BRICKS, POTTERY, 
GLASS, CEMENT... 
4.29 (10) 7.91 (11) 
TIMBER, FURNITURE 3.86 (9) 2.88 (4) 
PAPER, PRINTING, 
PUBLISHING 
10.30 (24) 8.63 (12) 
OTHER MANU. INDs 1.72 (4) 6.47 (9) 
DISTRIBUTION & 
WHOLESALING 
6.44 (15) 4.32 (6) 
Table 6.1: Industrial classincation: percentage (and number) of 
companies in the South East and South West. 
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NUMBER OF 
YEARS 
SOUTH EAST SOUTH WEST 
0 - 5 16.74 (39) 8.63 (12) 
5 - 1 0 10.73 (25) 9.35 (13) 
10 - 20 23.61 (55) 28.78 (40) 
20 - 50 28.76 (67) 35.25 (49) 
50 + 19.74 (46) 17.99 (25) 
Table 6.2: The number of years companies have been 
operating at their pr^ent location: 
percentage (and number) of companies 
in the South East and South West. 
In terms of exports (see Table 6.3A), 11.2 percent export over 80 percent of their goods, 
the majority (53.3%) still, however, export less than 20 percent, of which 43.6 percent are 
non-exporters. Finally, it can be seen from Table 3.B, that nearly two thirds have export 
markets in other EC countries, 35.6 percent in other European countries and 60.5 percent 
outside Europe. 
PERCENTAGE 
OF EXPORTS 
SOUTH EAST SOUTH WEST 
0 - 2 0 53.22 (124) 58.99 (82) 
20 - 40 12.88 (30) 8.63 (12) 
40 - 60 15.02 (35) 18.71 (26) 
60 - 80 6.44 (15) 9.35 (13) 
80 - 100 11.16 (26) 4.32 (6) 
Table 6.3A: Exports as a proportion of total sales: 
percentage (and number) of companies 
in the South East and South West. 
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% OF 
EXPORTS 
EEC 
SE SW 
EUROPE 
SE SW 
WORLD 
SE SW 
0 - 2 0 43.35 50.36 34.33 29.50 37.77 36.69 
20 - 40 15.45 12.95 0.86 1.44 6.87 12.23 
40 - 60 6.01 3.60 0.43 0.0 9.01 4.32 
60 - 80 0.86 1.44 0.0 0.72 3.43 0.72 
80 - 100 0.86 0.72 0.0 0.0 3.43 1.44 
Table 6,3B: Destination of exports: percentage of companies in the South East 
and South West. 
In comparison, more than three quarters of companies in the South West are privately 
owned, 15.8 percent are PLCs and 6.5 percent consider themselves branch plants. Nearly 
two thirds are MNCs or subsidiaries of MNCs; of which 52.5 percent have branch/sister 
companies located in the UK, 29.5 percent in other EC countries. 10.1 percent in other 
European countries and 48.9 percent around the World. Engineering industries accounted 
for over one third of all companies in the South West; electrical engineering (20.9%). 
mechanical engineering (12.2%). and instrument engineering (4.32%); chemicals and allied 
industries only accounted for 4.3 percent of companies, compared to 13.7 percent for the 
South East. As can be seen from Table 6.2 and Figure 6.2, more than 80 percent of 
companies have been operating at their present location for longer than 10 years and the 
vast majority employ between 100 and 500 people, only 2.2 percent employ over 5000 
people. Companies in the South West also export a smaller proportion of their goods, 59.0 
percent exporting less than 20 percent of their goods, of which 34.2 are non-exponers. The 
main markets for exports from the South West are the EC and the rest of the World, 69.1 
and 55.4 percent respectively. 
It is therefore quite evident that company profiles are significantly different in the two 
regions. Companies in the South West tend to be privately owned, employ fewer people 
and export a smaller proportion of their goods, as well as more likely to be active in 
engineering industries. Nonetheless, different company profiles did not generally influence 
perceptions and forecast usage of the Tunnel (see section 5.4). The next section will 
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compare and contrast company perceptions of the Tunnel between the two regions, in 
terms of the impact of the Tunnel on their own level of competitiveness. 
6.1.2. Perceptions of "Peripheralitv" or "Insulation" 
Fears that the Tunnel will lead to an increased polarisation of economic activity within the 
South East and the further peripheralisation of regions to the north and west of London are 
not substantiated by the results. Regional interest groups are concerned that the Tunnel will 
add to the existing disadvantages of the UK's more peripheral regions, thus reducing the 
competitiveness of their industries and widening the so-called "North-South" divide. 
Feelings of peripherality for companies in the South West are generally countered by the 
belief that they will be insulated from most of the adverse effects of the Tunnel. 
Consequentiy. perceptions of the Tunnel for companies in the South East and South West 
tend to converge, albeit for very different reasons. 
The impact of the Tunnel on company locations in the South East and South West will be 
analyzed first. How companies in the two regions are likely to anticipate the effect of the 
Tunnel on their own level of competitiveness both at home and abroad will then be 
determined. Fears that companies will be forced to relocate have been shown to be 
misplaced at a national level, but how realistic is the perceived tiireat of large scale 
relocations at the regional and county level? 
The Tunnel and company location 
The reasons why companies locate at their present sites vary between the South East and 
South West, particularly with regard to 'proximity to markets' and 'good transport links' 
(see Table 6.4). Companies in the South East consider proximity to markets and good 
transport links as paramount in their decisions to locate at their present sites. More 
companies in the South West staled 'other' reasons, referring primarily to historical factors 
and/or the convenience of managing directors. Only 28.8 percent of companies in the 
South West consider good transport links as a reason for locating at their present site, thus 
explaining why companies in the South West are likely to regard themselves as relatively 
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more isolated from the Tunnel. Considerations such as rent/rates, proximity to supplies, the 
labour force and room for expansion, do not vary in importance for companies in either 
of the two regions. 
DETERMINANTS OF 
LOCATION 
PERCENTAGE 
SOUTH EAST SOUTH WEST 
RENT/RATES 22.75 20.14 
PROXIMITY TO MARKETS 28.33 15.11 
PROXIMITY TO SUPPLIES 11.59 12.95 
GOOD TRANSPORT LINKS 42.49 28.78 
LABOUR FORCE 34.76 36.69 
ROOM FOR EXPANSION 27.47 28.78 
OTHER 30.04 43.17 
Table 6.4: Factors influencing company location: percentage of 
companies in the South East and South West. 
The significance attached to the above reasons also vary within the two regions; for 
example. 71.4 percent of companies in Berkshire regarded good transport links to be 
important compared to 20.8 percent in Kent or only 5.6 percent in Dorset. In fact, no 
companies in either Cornwall or Devon believed good transport links to be a factor in their 
decision to locate at their present site. This cannot be regarded as surprising considering 
that the "Far South West" is relatively isolated from the rest of the UK in terms of both 
geographical distance and transport links. Companies in Bedfordshire were primarily 
concerned about the quality of the local labour force (77.8%) as well as good transpon 
links (66.7%). Only 8.3 percent of companies in Buckinghamshire, Essex and Kent 
regarded proximity to markets as a determinant in their locational decision. Kent's rather 
unique position with respect to proximity to both London and the Continent does not seem 
to be an attraction for companies considering locating in the county. Companies in Devon 
were primarily influenced by Historical factors or the convenience of their managing 
directors, 66.7 percent stated *oiher\ The attraction of the labour force was only cited by 
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11.8 percent of companies in Somerset, compared to 44.4 percent in Wiltshire and 55.6 
percent in Avon. 
'LOCATION' SOUTH EAST SOUTH WEST 
VERY IMPORTANT 19.74 17.27 
QUITE IMPORTANT 38.63 32.37 
NOT TOO IMPORTANT 31.76 36.69 
UNIMPORTANT 9.87 13.67 
Table 6.5: Importance of location as a component of overall 
business strategy: percentage of companies in the 
South East and South West. 
The importance of location in the overall business strategy does not vary significantly 
between companies in the two regions (see Table 6.5). More than 58 percent of companies 
in the South East regard location to be an important component of their overall business 
strategy, compared to fewer than half of the companies in the South West. The chisquare 
test shows that this is not significant: 
'Location' South E a s t South West Er 
Observed Expected Observed Expected 
Freq. Freq. Freq. Freq. 
V. imp. 46 43 .84 24 26.16 70 
Q. imp. 90 84.56 45 50.44 135 
Not too imp. 74 78.29 51 46.71 125 
Unimp. 23 26.31 19 15.69 42 
Ik 233 139 372 
Table 6.6: Significance of location for companies in the South East and 
South West. 
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X ' = 0.11 + 0.18 + 0.35 + 0.59 + 0.24 + 0.39 + 0.42 + 0.70 
= 2.98 degrees of freedom = (4-1) (2-1) = 3 
critical of value of chisquare, at a = 0.05, = 7.82 
The critical value of chisquare is higher than the calculated X^, at a rejection level of a 
= 0.05. Thus, it is not possible to reject H^, which stated that there was no significant 
difference in the importance of location between companies in the South East and South 
West. 
Companies in the South West are much less likely to anticipate the Tunnel having any 
impact on their location,- only 5.8 percent believe that the Tunnel will affect their location 
and 6.5 percent are uncertain. In contrast, 15.0 percent of companies in the South East 
expect some degree of impact on their location and a further 7.7 percent are unsure. The 
X^ test showed this difference to be significant at a rejection level of a = 0.05: X^=7.93; 
df=2, thus the critical value of chisquare = 5.99. Of the companies in the South East which 
believe that the Tunnel will affect their location, 20 stated that they anticipate improved 
accessibility, compared to only two of the respective companies in the South West. A 
further five companies in the South West consider that there would be an increase in 
accessibility i f supporting transport links are improved. 
Companies in the South East currently planning to use the Tunnel anticipate more of an 
impact than all respondents in the South East? 20.9 percent believe the Tunnel will affect 
the locational characteristics of their present site. This is not apparent for companies 
planning to use the Tunnel in the South West Companies in Cornwall do not expect any 
effect on their location but a larger proportion of companies in Devon, 12.5 percent, 
compared to any other county in the South West, do expect some impact. One would 
expect companies in the "Far South West" to feel more "insulated" from the Tunnel but 
this is not evident for companies in Devon. BR does propose to run nighttime international 
through trains to-and-from Plymouth. Plans not to continue the service into Cornwall are 
now under review. Companies in Devon are thus more likely to feel "linked" to the Tunnel 
and so perceive more of an impact. 
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It is therefore apparent that companies in the South East are significantly more likely to 
anticipate some kind of impact on their present location as a result of die Tunnel. How this 
impact will affect company competitiveness in both the home and continental marketplace 
will be analyzed in the next section. 
Regional competitiveness: increased accessibility to markets 
Tables 6.7. and 6.8 ouUine company perceptions of the Tunnel, in terms of how the Tunnel 
and related transport developments are likely to affect accessibility to UK and continental 
markets, as well as vulnerability to increased competition. Slightiy more companies in the 
South East generally believe their accessibility will improve as a result of the Tunnel. 30.5 
percent compared to 25.2 percent for companies in the South West. One in ten companies 
in both regions are undecided. Companies in both the South East and South West currenUy 
planning to use the Tunnel are significantly more likely to anticipate increased accessibility 
to the Continent, 44.2 and 40.9 percent respectively. 
Of the companies in the South East which staled thai proximity to markets was a factor 
in their decision to locate at their present site, 43.5 percent anticipate increased 
accessibility lo both UK and continental markets. The respective figure for South West 
companies is only 9.5 percent. Market orientated companies in the South East are therefore 
considerably more likely to believe that the Tunnel will improve their accessibility to both 
UK and continental markets. Companies in the South East tend to export a larger 
proportion of their total sales and so are much more likely to feel optimistic about their 
ability to compete on the Continent 
219 -
INCREASED 
ACCESSIBILITY 
SOUTH EAST SOUTH WEST 
YES 30.47 25.18 
NO 76.82 67.63 
DON'T KNOW 7.73 10.07 
Table 6.7: Improved accessibility to UK and continental 
markets: percentage of companies in the South 
East and South West 
Only 8.3 percent of companies in Essex anticipate increased accessibility resulting from 
the Tunnel compared to over 41 percent in Kent. Companies in Kent may not have 
considered proximity to markets as a reason for locating in the county but they do expect 
accessibility to markets in both the UK and the Continent to increase as a result of the 
Tunnel and related transport infrastructure. The proposed high-speed rail link will 
considerably improve their accessibility to UK markets, particularly London. However, the 
International Passenger Station at Ashford is vital if the county is to benefit from direct 
rail access lo the Continent (see chapter 7). Furthermore, current plans for rail freight (BR 
1989b), mean that company expons in Kent will have to be diverted by the Willesdon 
depot in North London. The Shuttle service is therefore likely to be of more importance 
to companies in Kent. One third of companies in Devon believe that the Tunnel and related 
transport developments will improve their accessibility to UK and continental markets; the 
respective figure for companies in Dorset is only 11.1 percent. Companies in Dorset regard 
present cross-Channel transport facilities as more than adequate but this probably reflects 
the market orientation of their exports. 
Companies in the South West (10) commented that increased accessibility to the Continent 
could only be experienced i f supporting road and rail links to the Tunnel are improved, one 
company stated that 'BR links are pathetic'. It was shown in chapter 3, that all UK regions 
would experience significant increases in relative accessibility to continental markets, and 
that certain regions, such as Scotiand, the North and East Anglia, could record an increase 
of the same magnitude as the South East. The above results substantiate these earlier 
findings. Companies in the South East and South West do not anticipate a different type 
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of an impact on their level of competitiveness. However, a number of companies in the 
South West, and none in the South East, regard the transport network as inadequate. This 
supports the conclusion reached in chapter 4 that the Government may have biased the 
potential benefits created by the Tunnel in favour of the South East, and is in-line with the 
general consensus of opinion expressed in the Literature Review (chapter 2). The lack of 
a regional freight terminal within the South West, and BR's generally conservative fi-eight 
estimates, could prevent the region maximising the advantages offered by the Tunnel. 
However, company plans to use the Tunnel will in the end determine whether regional 
gains in accessibility are realised or not. But i f international rail freight services are 
perceived as inadequate, companies are less likely to send their exports via the Tunnel. 
Regional competitiveness: vulnerability to increased competition 
Companies in both the South East and South West are optimistic about the impact of the 
Tunnel on the home market; 58.8 and 67.6 percent respectively, anticipate no increase in 
competition (see Table 6.8). Companies in Berkshire (76.2%), Buckinghamshire (83.3%) 
and Hampshire (79.2%) tend to be more confident that they will not be exposed to an 
increase in competition. No companies in Somerset expect increased competition resulting 
from the Tunnel and only 5.9 percent are unsure. One in five companies in both regions, 
however, do believe that they will become more vulnerable to increased competition. 
INCREASED 
VULNERABILITY 
SOUTH EAST SOUTH WEST 
YES 2 3 . 6 1 21 .58 
NO 58 .80 67 .63 
DON'T KNOW 11.59 10 .79 
Table 6.8: Vulnerability to increased competition: 
percentage of companies in the South East 
and South west. 
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Companies in the South East currently planning to use the Tunnel are also much more 
likely to believe that they will be vulnerable to increased competition (32.6%). This is not 
the case for similar companies in the South West (22.7%), again suggesting feelings of 
"insulation". Since companies in the South East generally anticipate more of an impact on 
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the home market, it would seem probable that the "Third Markets" of companies in the 
South West and other regional manufacturers are likely to experience increased competition 
from continental producers. Nonetheless, at least two thirds of all companies do not believe 
that they will be more vulnerable to increased competition from continental imports, as a 
result of the Tunnel. 
Of the companies which considered proximity to markets to be an important locational 
determinant, 37.9 and 33.3 percent in the South East and South West, respectively, 
anticipate increased competition resulting from the Tunnel. Companies primarily orientated 
to market considerations, are therefore more likely to fear increased imports from the 
Continent As exports increase as a proportion of total sales, one would expect feelings of 
vulnerability to increased competition to reduce but this is only apparent for companies in 
the South East (see Table 6.9). 
PERCENTAGE 
OF EXPORTS 
FEELINGS OF VULNERABILITY 
SOUTH EAST SOUTH WEST 
0 - 2 0 30 .89 24 .39 
20 - 40 26 .67 25 .00 
40 - 60 17 .14 19 .23 
60 - 80 6.60 7 .69 
80 - 100 7 .69 16 .67 
Table 6.9: The influence of exports on feelings of 
vulnerability to increased competition: 
percentage of companies in the South 
East and South West 
The reasons cited for optimism over the impact of the Tunnel on the home market do not 
vary by region; 26 companies in the South East and 14 in the South West regard their 
markets as already highly competitive, a further 8 and 10 companies, respectively, believe 
their markets to be too specialised, and 5 and 4 companies, respectively, expect no 'real' 
change. Companies in the two regions which expect increased competition as a result of 
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the Tunnel again tend to agree on the reasons why, namely that increased accessibility 
experienced by continental producers will encourage further penetration of the UK market, 
i.e. the "double-edged sword" (Pieda 1989b). 
The threat of company relocations 
Fears of a massive relocation of companies in response to improved cross-Channel 
accessibility, culniinating in a southwards drift of industry in favour of the South East, 
were not substantiated by the results in chapter 5. These fears cannot be justified at the 
regional level of analysis either. Less than one percent of companies in the South East and 
no companies in the South West foresee the need to relocate. Since the South West, but 
more particularly the "Far South West", is one of the most isolated regions in the UK from 
the Tunnel, it can therefore be surmised that fears of company relocations from other 
peripheral regions are also misplaced. Only two out of the 372 companies which responded 
to the questionnaire survey foresee the need to relocate; both are from London. This issue 
receives further attention in the case studies of East Kent and the "Far South West". 
Regional perceptions: a summary 
Although more companies in the South East expect the Tunnel, in some way, to affect the 
locational characteristics of their present site, companies in both regions are fairly evenly 
divided in their optimism over the impact of the Tunnel on their own level of 
competitiveness. But companies which attach importance to proximity of markets and/or 
export a larger proportion of total sales are considerably more likely in the South East to 
anticipate increased accessibility resulting from the Tunnel. Feelings of vulnerability to 
increased domestic and continental competition reduce, on the whole, as exports increase 
relative to total sales for companies in the South East but not for companies in the South 
West. Such companies in the South East are therefore significanUy more likely to be 
optimistic about the impact of the Tunnel on their ability to compete in both the home and 
continental marketplace. 
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On the whole, companies in the South West are as inclined to be as positive about the 
effect of the Tunnel on their level of competitiveness as companies in the South East Such 
optimism for companies in the South West has to be questioned, particularly in terms of 
the home market The 'Third Market" impact of the Tunnel, as recognised by Pieda 
(1989a&b) and CLES (1989), is likely to be damaging to regional manufacturers. The 
Tunnel wi l l relatively improve the accessibility of continental producers to markets in the 
South East and the Midlands to the detriment of the more peripheral UK regions. While 
local markets in regions such as the South West are less likely to be affected by the 
Tunnel, companies wi l l have to compete harder in their "Third Markets", namely the South 
East and the Midlands. The South East and the Midlands represent the largest domestic 
markets for UK manufacturers, thus any loss of market share will have a significant impact 
on the viability of the more peripheral UK companies and the future growth of the regional 
economies as a whole. Table 6.9 shows that feelings of vulnerability to increased 
competition from both UK and continental producers, as a result of the Tunnel, do not 
significantly reduce for companies in the South West as expons increase as a proportion 
of total sales. Since local markets are less likely to be penetrated by increased imports 
from the Continent, "Third Markets", such as the South East and the Midlands, will 
therefore remain relatively important even for companies exporting a larger proportion of 
their total sales. Chapter 8 will focus attention on the "double-edged" nature of improved 
accessibility and the "Third Market" impact. 
6.1.3. Planned Usage of the Tunnel and its Services 
It will become evident that current plans lo use the Tunnel are fairly uniform between 
companies in both the South East and South West It is appropriate therefore to examine 
the planned level of usage of the Tunnel and its services, before studying the current cross-
Channel transport market The time advantages of the Tunnel for passenger traffic, 
particularly via the Shuttie, will be predominantly restricted to the South East Companies 
in the South East, however, do not significantiy plan to utilise the Tunnel for business trips 
to a much greater extent than companies in the South West Furthermore, it was argued 
in chapter 3 how the Tunnel could benefit certain peripheral UK regions, in terms of rail 
freight, to the same extent as the South East More than 75 percent of exports to the 
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Continent originate from or are destined for regions outside the South East, nearly 25 
percent within a 40 mile radius of Manchester (Pieda 1989b). Hence, it is important that 
BR offers an attractive service for companies outside the South East to optimise the future 
attraction of rail freight. Even though BR have already decided on the location of regional 
fi-eight villages, there is still much concern that the more peripheral regions are likely to 
be discriminated against with a second class service (Pieda 1989b). This particularly true 
for the "Far South West" since the nearest freight terminal serving the region is likely to 
be Cardiff. The outcome of the Section 40 regional consultations, as discussed in chapter 
4, did little to allay the concerns of the more peripheral UK regions. Nonetheless, current 
plans to use the Tunnel for the exportation of freight to the Continent do not vary 
significantly between the two regions. 
These issues will be discussed in more detail below. Explanations will be advanced for the 
apparent similarity in company plans to use the Tunnel for the two regions. Examination 
of the potential future demand for the Tunnel and the current cross-Channel business trip 
market, will be followed by an analysis of the freight market. 
The business trip market 
First the similarity in company plans to use the Tunnel will be examined. The current 
cross-Channel business trip market and the factors influencing company decisions will then 
be analyzed to determine the basis for this similarity. 
The attraction of the Tunnel 
As one can see from Table 6.10, there is less than a two percent difference between 
companies in the South East and South West planning to use the Tunnel for more than 20 
percent of future business trips (11.2 and 9.4 percent, respectively). Table 6.11 provides 
a more detailed account of company plans to use the Tunnel, encompassing only 
companies currently planning to use the Tunnel for either business trips and/or freight 
exports. There is no apparent difference in the planned level of usage of the Tunnel but 
slightly more companies in the South East do plan to use the Tunnel to higher degree. 
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Eurotunnel's ShutUe service is also slighUy preferred over BR's international through trains 
for companies in both regions. 
% OF 
BUSINESS 
TRIPS 
SOUTH EAST SOUTH WEST 
TUNNEL BR SHUTTLE TUNNEL BR SHUTTLE 
0 - 2 0 83.26 76.82 74.25 87.05 81.29 78.42 
20 - 40 6.01 0.86 2.15 4.32 0.0 1.44 
40 - 60 2.15 9.01 9.44 4.32 7.19 5.76 
60 - 80 1.72 3.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.44 
80 - 100 1.29 3.43 7.30 0.72 4.32 5.76 
DON'T KNOW 5.58 6.87 6.87 3.60 7.19 7.19 
Table 6.10: Estimated future usage of the Tunnel for company business trips: 
percentage of all respondents in the South East and South W^t. 
% OF 
BUSINESS 
TRIPS 
SOUTH EAST SOUTH WEST 
TUNNEL BR SHUTTLE TUNNEL BR SHUTTLE 
0 - 2 0 68.60 57.16 44.19 70.45 54.55 45.45 
20 - 40 16.28 2.33 5.81 13.64 0.0 4.55 
40 - 60 5.81 24.42 25.58 13.64 22.73 18.18 
60 - 80 4.65 8.14 0.0 0.0 0.0 4.55 
80 - 100 3.49 9.30 19.77 2.27 13.64 18.18 
DON'T KNOW 1.16 4.65 4.65 0.0 9.09 9.09 . 
Table 6.11: Estimated future usage of the Tunnel for company business trips: 
percentage of companies currently planning to use the Tunnel 
in the South East and South West. 
The results, however, do vary to some extent at the county level but, as stated above, one 
has to be careful when interpreting these results, due to the relatively small number of 
companies involved. Companies in Bedfordshire, Hampshire and Oxfordshire currentiy 
have no plans to use the Tunnel whilst more than 20 percent of companies in Kent and 
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Sussex plan to use the Tunnel for more than 20 percent of future business trips. Thus, 
companies in closer proximity to the Tunnel portal plan to use the Tunnel to a greater 
extent, especially the Shuttle service. Nearly 30 percent of companies in Kent plan for 
more than 20 percent of business trips through the Tunnel to go via the Shuttle compared 
to 20.8 percent by BR*s international through trains. As stated eariier, the International 
Passenger Station at Ashford will be paramount in any decision by companies in Kent in 
using BR's international passenger trains. Companies in Hampshire seem to regard existing 
cross-Channel ferry services from Southampton and Portsmouth to be more than adequate. 
Of the companies in London planning to use the Tunnel, 27.2 percent anticipate more than 
20 percent of business trips to go by BR's international through trains and 20.4 percent by 
Shuttle. London companies will be more efficiently served by the Waterioo and King's 
Cross international passenger termini, and thus a larger proportion currently anticipate 
using this service. 
In terms of the South West, only companies in Dorset have no plans to use the Tunnel but 
28.6 percent of companies in Cornwall plan to use the Tunnel for more than 20 percent 
of future business trip; the vast majority plan to use BR*s international through trains. This 
figure is rather surprising considering that there are at present no plans for international 
passenger trains to serve Comwall, and with links to London Waterioo considered as poor. 
The current cross-Channel market 
Similarities in current company plans to use the Tunnel and its services for future business 
trips cannot be explained by the present cross-Channel business trip market. Although the 
destination of business trips from both regions is fairiy similar, there are significant 
differences in the frequency and the mode in which they are undertaken. The generation 
of business trips from companies in the South East is much more likely to be more 
frequent than once monthly (see Figure 6.3). More than three quarters of companies in the 
South East undertake business trips to the Continent more regulariy than once monthly 
compared to 58.3 percent for companies in the South West: 
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South East 
Annually (1.7%) 
Bi-annually (2.6°/< 
Quarterly (9.9%) 
Monthly (32.6%) 
Other (6.4%) 
Daily (14.2%) 
Weekly (32.2%) 
Figure 6.3: Frequency of Business Trips for Companies in the South East and 
South West. 
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South West 
Other (17.3% 
Annually (5.0%) 
Bi-annually (4.3%)— 
Quarterly (15.1% 
j-Daity (5.0%) 
fc^Weekly (22.3%) 
Monthly (30.9%) 
Figure 6.3 (cont'd): Frequency of Business Trips for Companies in the South 
East and South West. 
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Frequency South Ea s t South West Er 
Observed Expected Observed Expected 
D a i l y 33 25.01 7 14 .99 40 
Weekly 75 66.29 31 39.71 106 
Monthly 76 74.42 43 44.58 119 
Q u a r t e r l y 23 27.51 21 16.49 44 
B i - a n n u a l l y 6 7 .50 6 4.50 12 
Annually 4 6.88 7 4.12 11 
Other 15 24.39 24 14.61 39 
232 139 371 
Table 6.12: Significance of regional location on frequency of business trips. 
= 2.55 + 4.26 + 1.14 + 1.91 + 0.03 + 0.06 + 0.74 
+ 1.23 + 0.30 + 0.50 + 1.21 + 2.01 + 3.62 + 6.04 
= 25.60 degrees of freedom = (7-1) (2-1) = 6 
critical value of chisquare: a = 0.05, = 12.59 
a = O.OOL = 22.46 
The value of the calculated X^ is higher than the critical value of chisquare, at a rejection 
level of a = 0.05. Thus, it is possible to reject HQ, or in other words, there is a significant 
difference in the frequency of business trips between companies in the South East and 
South West. The real differences in frequency can be seen in the individual cell values of 
X ^ i.e. a larger proportion of companies in the South East undertake business trips more 
frequent than once weekly and companies in the South West less frequent than once per 
annum or not at all. The frequency of business trips does not vary significantly at the 
county level, except possibly for Comwall where companies undertake business trips on 
a monthly or less frequent basis. 
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Figure 6.4 outiines the destination of current business trips for companies in the South East 
and South West. It is apparent that the destination of business trips are similar for 
companies in both regions, with over 80 percent going to 'France, Germany and the Low 
counoies' and approximately one third going to the 'rest of the EC*. 
MODE OF 
TRANSPORT 
PERCENTAGE 
SOUTH EAST SOUTH WEST 
AEROPLANE 93.56 88.49 
RAIL/FERRY 2.58 3.60 
ROAD/FERRY 23.18 34.53 
OTHER 0.43 1.44 
Table 6.13A: Preferred mode of transport for 
current business trips to the 
Continent: percentage of companies 
in the South East and South West. 
The preferred modes of transport for business trips are set out in Table 6.13A. Air travel 
is the preferred mode of transport for business trips in both regions but more companies 
in the South West currently go via road/ferry (34.5%), except for companies in Wiltshire 
where the respective figure is only 5.6 percent. The destination and mode of business trips 
at the county level also remains constant Significantly more companies currently planning 
to use the Tunnel in both regions prefer road/ferry when undertaking business trips (see 
Table 6.I3B). The attraction of road/ferry for companies currently planning to use the 
Tunnel explains the slight preference for Eurotunnel's Shuttie service. More than half of 
the companies planning to use the Tunnel in the South West at present use road/ferry. 
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Figure 6.4: Destination of Business 
Trips - South East/South West. 
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MODE OF 
TRANSPORT 
PERCENTAGE 
SOUTH EAST SOUTH WEST 
AEROPLANE 94.19 93.18 
RAIL/FERRY 3.49 4.55 
ROAD/FERRY 32.56 56.82 
Table 6.13B: Preferred mode of transport for 
current business trips to the 
Continent: percentage of companies 
anticipating using the Tunnel in 
the South East and South West. 
Factors influencing company plans 
I i can be seen from Table 6.14A. that companies in the South East are more likely lo be 
influenced by journey time and reliability in their decision to use the Tunnel compared to 
companies in the South West. Companies in the South West are relatively more concerned 
with cost, even though journey time is still of paramount importance. Companies in Avon 
and Wiltshire, the more accessible counties of the South West, consider journey times to 
be the main factor in their decision to use the Tunnel for future business trips, 92.6 and 
88.9 percent respectively, compared to only 57.1 percent for companies in Cornwall. 
Companies in both regions planning to use the Tunnel attach more importance to cost and 
43.2 percent of such companies in the South West consider reliability to be important (see 
Table 6.14B). 
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FACTORS PERCENTAGE 
SOUTH EAST SOUTH WEST 
COST 40.34 47.48 
JOURNEY TIME 85.84 77.70 
RELIABILITY 39.91 28.78 
COMFORT 15.02 13.67 
OTHER 10.30 11.51 
Table 6.14A: Factors influencing the planned usage of 
the Tunnel for business trips: percentage 
of companies in the South Cast and South 
West. 
FACTORS PERCENTAGE SOUTH EAST SOUTH WEST 
COST 47.67 56.82 
JOURNEY TIME 88.37 75.00 
RELIABILITY 41.86 43.18 
COMFORT 19.77 20.45 
Table 6.14B: Factors influencing the planned usage of 
the Tunnel for business trips: percentage 
of companies anticipating using the 
Tunnel in the South East and South West. 
Therefore, as shown in chapter 5, i f companies are to use the Tunnel both BR's 
international passenger trains and EurotunnePs Shuttle service will have to be competitive 
in terms of journey time. Relatively more companies in the South West are concerned with 
cost. Plans not to run an intemational daytime service to and from the South West (BR 
1989b) will reduce the attractiveness of such a service for companies in that region. In 
addition, medium- and long-sea ferry services are likely to remain popular with companies 
in the South West (Gibb 1990). 
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Regional differences in the weight of importance attached to the above factors do not 
explain the similarity in present company plans to use the Tunnel for the South East and 
South West. The forecast usage of the Tunnel does not appear to be related to the present 
cross-Channel business trip market or strongly influenced by the above factors. The 
destination of business trips is however of paramount importance. The near Continent 
represents the main destination of business trips for companies from both the South East 
and South West. The destination of business trips will,on the whole, determine the 
attraction of the Tunnel and its services. The marginal preference for Eurotunnel's Shuttle 
service over BR's international through trains is a reflection of the main destination of 
business trips, namely Trance, Germany and the Low countries', and the current 
dominance of road haulage. The wider catchment area of BR*s international through trains 
cannot be exploited by the majority of companies which undertake business trips to the 
near Continent, even though BR*s principal services will be to Paris, Brussels and Cologne. 
However company plans to send freight by the Tunnel, particularly via rail freight, will 
determine the regional economic impact of the Tunnel. The next section will therefore 
focus attention on the freight market, with more general considerations discussed before 
making concluding remarks. 
The freight market 
Analysis of company plans to use the Tunnel for freight exports is undertaken according 
to the structure adopted in the preceding section. Thus, the level of anticipated Tunnel 
usage for freight exports is examined first. The current cross-Channel freight market and 
the factors which are likely to influence company plans will then be analyzed. 
The attraction of the Tunnel 
The anticipated level of demand for the Tunnel and its services for the exportation of 
freight is outlined in Tables 6.15 (all respondents) and 6.16 (companies currently planning 
to use the Tunnel). Table 6.16 provides a more detailed account of the likely demand for 
rail freight and the Shuttle service. It can be seen that current plans to use the Tunnel do 
not differ significantly by region. However, neariy one quarter of companies in the South 
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East remain undecided (see Table 6.15). Of the companies planning to use the Tunnel for 
the transportation of over 20 percent of their exports, 19.3 and 18.7 percent are from the 
South East and South West, respectively. Companies currently planning to use the Tunnel 
in the two regions do vary in their expected usage of the Tunnel. Companies in the South 
West planning to use the Tunnel do not differentiate between rail freight or the Shuttle 
service (see Table 6.16). while their counterparts in the South East generally prefer the 
Shuttle service. This would tend to support the earlier assumption that the benefits of the 
Shuttle service are predominately restricted to the South East. Nonetheless, there is. at 
present, no significant difference in the planned usage of the Tunnel for companies in 
either the South East or South West. The planned level of usage of the Tunnel also does 
not vary considerably within the two regions but companies in Kent are again more likely 
to use the Shuttle service. 
% OF 
EXPORTS 
SOUTH EAST SOUTH WEST 
TUNNEL BR SHUTTLE TUNNEL BR SHUTTLE 
0 - 2 0 58.37 58.80 57.08 66.19 66.19 66.19 
20 - 40 8.58 2.58 1.72 7.91 0.72 0.0 
40 - 60 7.30 8.15 8.15 8.63 10.79 10.79 
60 - 80 1.72 2.15 2.15 1.44 0.0 0.72 
80 - 100 1.72 3.43 6.01 0.72 5.04 5.04 
DON'T KNOW 22.32 24.89 24.89 15.11 17.27 17.27 
Table 6.15: Estimated future usage of the Tunnel for company exports: 
percentage of companies in the South East and South West. 
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% OF 
EXPORTS 
SOUTH EAST SOUTH WEST 
TUNNEL BR SHUTTLE TUNNEL BR SHUTTLE 
0 - 2 0 36.05 37.21 32.56 29.55 29.55 29.55 
20 - 40 23.26 6.98 4.65 25.00 2.27 0.0 
40 - 60 19.77 22.09 22.09 27.27 34.09 34.09 
60 - 80 4.65 5.81 5.81 4.55 0.0 2.27 
80 - 100 4.65 9.30 16.28 2.27 15.91 15.91 
DON'T KNOW 11.62 18.61 18.61 11.36 18.18 18.18 
Table 6.16: Estimated future usage of the Tunnel and its services: percentage of 
companies anticipating using the Tunnel in the South East and 
South West. 
As highlighted in chapter 5. the regional economic impact of the Tunnel is likely to be 
limited. The long-term impact of the Tunnel depends ultimately on companies exploiting 
the advantages of improved journey times and cost, leading to significant savings for 
British industry. As explained in chapter 3, these advantages are predominately restricted 
to the rail network. Only 19 percent of companies in the South East and South West 
anticipate sending more than 20 percent of their exports via the Tunnel. Thus, the vast 
majority of companies do not plan to use the Tunnel, and only 3.4 and 2.2 percent of 
companies in the South East and South West, respectively, plan to send more than 60 
percent of their goods through the Tunnel. Considerably fewer companies expect to use 
BR's international rail freight services. Hence, the results show that the impact of the 
Tunnel will be limited but, more imponantly, since company plans are similar in the two 
regions, it is unlikely that the Tunnel will adversely affect the regional economic structure 
of the UK. Company plans to use the Tunnel for freight exports suggest the Tunnel will 
not detrimentally affect the more peripheral regions, such as the "Far South West". 
However, it is now necessary to determine why the anticipated usage of the Tunnel is 
similar for companies in the South East and South West. The current cross-Channel freight 
market will be examined next, before identifying the factors likely to influence company 
decisions. 
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The current cross-Channel market 
The preferred modes of transport for existing exports to the Continent are set out in Table 
6.17A. 'Other' refers to postal service, couriers and Hoverspeed» etc. It can be seen that 
relatively more companies in the South East at present send exports to the Continent via 
rail freight but that, on the whole, company preferences between the two regions for 
current modes of cross-Channel transport do not diverge significandy. Companies planning 
to use the Tunnel are more likely to send exports to the Continent by RoRo and LoLo 
ferry services, especially companies in the South West (see Table 6.17B). The existing 
preference of companies planning to use the Tunnel for RoRo ferry services explains the 
current attraction of the Shuttle service. The Shuttle service will offer road hauliers more 
flexibility, with Shuttle trains running up to every 15 minutes and total transit limes less 
than half an hour. 
MODE OF 
TRANSPORT 
PERCENTAGE 
SOUTH EAST SOUTH WEST 
AEROPLANE 20.60 23.02 
RAIL FREIGHT 19.31 13.67 
RoRo FERRY 51.93 48.92 
LoLo FERRY 17.60 16.55 
OTHER 7.73 14.39 
Table 6.17A: Preferred mode of transport for current 
freight exports to the Continent: 
percentage of companies in the South 
East and South West. 
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MODE OF 
TRANSPORT 
PERCENTAGE 
SOUTH EAST SOUTH WEST 
AEROPLANE 20.93 22.73 
RAIL FREIGHT 25.58 15.91 
RoRo FERRY 63.95 70.45 
LoLo FERRY 15.12 25.00 
Table 6.17B: Preferred mode of transport for current 
freight exports to the Continent: 
percentage of companies anticipating 
using the Tunnel in the South East 
and South West 
Therefore, the existing pattern of cross-Channel transportation accounts to some extent for 
the anticipated preference, albeit slight, for the Shuttle service over rail freight However, 
the current use of certain modes of transport for the exponation of freight cannot 
completely explain the similarity in the anticipated overall use of the Tunnel for companies 
in the South East and South West. 
Factors influencing company plans 
Companies in both regions seem to attach the same weight of importance to potential 
factors influencing the future usage of the Tunnel for freight exports, except for cost (see 
Table 6.18A). Companies stating 'other' primarily leave all distribution and transportation 
considerations to their couriers. Over two thirds of companies in the South East generally 
regard cost to be an important determinate of any future usage of the Tunnel, compared 
to 58.3 percent of companies in the South West. 
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FACTORS PERCENTAGE 
SOUTH EAST SOUTH WEST 
COST 67.81 58.27 
JOURNEY TIME 42.92 46.04 
RELIABILITY 45.06 35.97 
OTHER 7.30 10.79 
Table 6.18A: Factors influencing the planned usage of 
the Tunnel for freight exports: 
percentage of companies in the South 
East and South West 
As is evident from Table 6.183. the importance attached to cost rises significantly for 
companies planning to use the Tunnel in both regions. Companies planning to use the 
Tunnel in the South West also attach much more importance on reliability. The degree of 
importance attached to cost may differ but the vast majority of companies in both regions 
believe it to be the paramount consideration. The overall attraction of the Tunnel will 
therefore be dependent on the level of tariffs introduced by both RailFreight Distribution 
and Eurotunnel. Thus, the 'cost' factor could explain to a certain extent the similarity in 
the planned usage of the Tunnel by companies in both regions. Until the tariff rates for 
both services through the Tunnel are made public, companies in the two regions will only 
then be in a position to provide accurate forecasts of the future usage of the Tunnel. 
FACTORS PERCENTAGE SOUTH EAST SOUTH WEST 
COST 81.40 72.73 -
JOURNEY TIME 45.35 50.00 
RELIABILITY 55.81 54.55 
OTHER 11.36 6.98 
Table 6.18B: Factors influencing the planned usage 
of the Tunnel for freight exports: 
percentage of companies anticipating 
using the Tunnel in the South East 
and South West. 
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As shown earlier, a larger proportion of companies in the South East export (see Table 
6.3A). Over 11 percent of companies in the South East export more than 80 percent of 
their goods compared to only 4.3 percent of companies in the South West Approximately 
two thirds of all companies export to other EC countries. The extent and the market 
orientation of company exports was shown not to affect anticipated Tunnel usage. It would 
seem that existing company preferences for RoRo ferry services, and the level of 
importance attached to cost, will ultimately influence the planned usage of the Tunnel and 
its services. The regional location of companies therefore does not affect the anticipated 
level of Tunnel usage for freight exports. 
Plans to use the Tunnel for future business trips for both regions are likely to be influenced 
more by destination and journey time. However, the future demand for the Tunnel for 
freight exports will be more responsive to the cost of either BR's international through 
trains and/or EurorunnePs Shuttle service. Company plans to use the Tunnel for both 
business trips and freight exports will not remain static; certain policies could persuade 
companies in either region to revise their estimated usage of the Tunnel. It is therefore 
important lo determine what strategies, adopted by the Government, BR and/or Eurotunnel, 
are likely to influence current plans to use the Tunnel, as well as highlight any regional 
differences and/or similarities. The availability of information and the psychological 
importance of the SEM and the Tunnel, will also be examined to identify any regional 
bias. Finally, it is important to analyze the perceived overall impact of the Tunnel on the 
companies* respective regions. 
6.1.4. A South East Bias? 
Comparative analysis of the results between the South East and South West has so far 
shown no significant differences in company perceptions of the Tunnel or future plans to 
use its services. Companies in the South East, however, are more likely to believe that the 
Tunnel will have a beneficial impact on their region. It has been suggested in this chapter 
that feelings of peripherality for companies in the South West are generally countered by 
the belief that they will be insulated from most of the adverse effects of the Tunnel. This 
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assumption is supported by the percentage of companies anticipating an overall neutral 
impact on their respective region. 
Current company plans to use the Tunnel will continually be revised as more information 
becomes available, particularly with regard to cost. Certain strategies adopted by either the 
Government, BR and/or Eurotunnel could encoiu^ge companies to revise their estimated 
usage of the Tunnel. 
'STRATEGIES' PERCENTAGE SOUTH EAST SOUTH WEST 
INCREASED INVESTMENT 11.16 5.76 
SERVICE QUALITY 26.61 30.94 
INCREASED RELIABILITY 16.31 13.67 
COMPETITIVE PRICES 21.46 27.34 
INCREASED ACCESSIBILITY 13.30 12.95 
OTHER 43.17 33.91 
Table 6.19: Strategies perceived necessary to increase the anticipated 
usage of the Tunnel: percentage of companies in the 
South East and South West. 
Except for the level of transport infrastructure investment, companies in both regions 
generally agree on the need for certain strategies (see Table 6.19). 'Other' incorporates a 
wide variety of responses but most refer to 'none\ i.e. that no initiative by either the 
Government, BR or Eurotunnel would encourage companies to use the Tunnel to a higher 
degree. 
Compared to the South West, twice as many companies in the South East regard increased 
investment in supporting u-ansport infrastructure as necessary. The on-going public debate 
within the South East over the high-speed rail link could account for this difference. The 
results reveal no bias in the perceived need for increased accessibility, by road or rail, to 
Tunnel services. One would tend to expect a larger proportion of companies in the South 
West to demand improved access to Tunnel services but this proved not to be the case. 
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One quarter of companies in Devon do, however, believe that accessibility to Tunnel 
services should be improved. Only 4.8 percent of companies in Berkshire consider there 
to be a need for improved accessibility to Tunnel services; the respective percentages for 
companies in Hampshire, Essex and Surrey are 29.2, 25.0 and 21.1 percent. As a result of 
delays associated with the high-speed rail link and the Intemational Passenger Station at 
Ashford, 12.5 percent of companies in Kent also believe there is a need for improved 
access to Tunnel services. BR*s intemational rail freight proposals also fail to serve the 
needs of companies in Kent. Companies in Berkshire are much more positive about their 
ability to utilise Tunnel services than companies in the Tunnel's immediate hinterland, 
namely Kent and Surrey. 
More than one quarter of companies from both regions would like to see BR improve 
overall service quality, with more and faster trains. Contradicting earlier findings, slightly 
more companies in the South West stated that competitive prices for BR and Eurotunnel 
services would encourage them to revise favourably their planned usage of the Tunnel. 
More companies in the South East stress the importance of reliability in any future usage 
of the Tunnel. Companies in Essex and Oxfordshire are much more likely to foresee the 
need for an overall improvement in BR's passenger and freight services. 
The level of information available to companies did not vary by region; 33.1 and 30.2 
percent of companies in the South East and the South West, respectively, believe that 
information concerning the Tunnel has been easily available. Approximately 45 percent of 
companies in both regions are not satisfied with the availability of information concerning 
services offered by BR and Eurotunnel. It can therefore be argued that any regional 
differences and/or similarities in the results are not the consequence of more companies 
in either region being more informed. Closer to the opening of the Tunnel, one would 
expect both BR and Eurotunnel to step-up their publicity campaigns, as well as finalise 
service timetables and tariff rates. 
The impact of the SEM and the Tunnel on company attitudes toward Europe does not 
seem to change between regions. Over one third of companies are now re-assessing the 
potential of European markets but the Tunnel is regarded as insignificant within the wider 
- 243 -
context of the SEM; 20.2 percent of companies specifically state that the SEM would make 
them more European in outlook. However, 22.3 and 21.6 percent of companies in the 
South East and South West, respectively, believe that they are already European in outlook. 
As one would expect, companies planning to use the Tunnel are more likely to become 
more European in their outlook, 47.7 and 43.2 percent for the South East and South West 
respectively. 
Comparative analysis of the results between the South East and South West has constanUy 
highlighted important similarities in company reactions toward the Tunnel. Company 
perceptions of the overall regional economic impact of the Tunnel, however, differ 
significantly between companies in the South East and South West. Neariy two thirds of 
companies in the South East anticipate a beneficial impact, 6.0 percent 'neutral' and only 
12.0 percent 'damaging'. A larger proportion of companies in Kent, 29,2 percent, expect 
the impact to be damaging. The ferry and port-related industry represents one of the largest 
employers in Kent, thus the rationalisation of short-sea ferry services has had/will have 
important repercussions for the county, particularly the coastal towns of Dover, Folkestone 
and Ramsgate. Chapter 7, the case study of East Kent, will examine the impact of the 
Tunnel on the port and ferry industry, as well as the longer term implications of the 
Tunnel. 
Only one quaner of companies in the South West believe the impact will be beneficial, 
10.1 percent are unsure. Feelings of "insulation" are reflected in the 33.8 percent of 
companies in the South West anticipating a neutral impact but 20.1 percent also predict 
the impact of the Tunnel on the South West to be damaging. Over half of the companies 
in Cornwall (57.1%) and Wiltshire (50.0%) are optimistic as to the implications of the 
Tunnel for the South West Only 12.5 percent of companies in Devon believe the impact 
will be beneficial. The respective percentages for companies in Devon and Cornwall would 
seem to contradict each other but one has to be careful when interpreting findings at the 
county level; the absolute number of companies in both regions is 24 and 7 respectively. 
As one would expect, companies planning to use the Tunnel are more optimistic; 70.9 and 
36.4 percent in the South East and South West, respectively, anticipate a positive impact 
on their regions. 
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The apparent optimism of companies In the South East, as compared to the South West, 
contradicts the earlier findings. The regional analysis of the results has identified a 
considerable degree of similarity in company perceptions of and likely reactions to the 
Tunnel. Nonetheless, companies in the South East are much more likely to anticipate a 
positive impact on the regional economy in which they are located. The media's portrayal 
of the South East as the main beneficiary (see the Literature Review), probably accounts 
for the contrasting levels of optimism. A more detailed examination of the regional 
economic implications of the Tunnel will be carried out in the case studies of East Kent 
and the "Far South West". However, it is first appropriate to conclude the current chapter, 
outlining the likely impact of the Tunnel as perceived by the companies. 
6.2. Conclusion 
Regional differences in the perceived overall economic impact of the Tunnel cannot be 
attributed to conflicting perceptions of the Tunnel. Future plans to use the Tunnel also fail 
to show any significant differences between companies in the South East and South West. 
The most striking feature of this regional analysis is the degree of similarity between 
companies in the two regions. The widely believed South East bias of the Tunnel is not 
reflected in company perceptions, in terms of how their level of competitiveness is likely 
to be affected, or in current plans to use either BR's international through trains and/or 
Eurotunnel's Shuttle service. Nonetheless, companies in the South East generally anticipate 
a favourable overall regional impact from the Tunnel and related transport developments. 
This perception may have been influenced by the short-term construction multiplier of the 
Tunnel, which is predominately confined to the South East and the Midlands. Companies 
in Kent are more aware of the medium-term impact of the Tunnel on the cross-Channel 
ferry and port-related industry (see chapter 7); thus neariy 30 percent believe the Tunnel 
will adversely affect the region. 
It was shown in chapter 5 that the vast majority of companies do not anticipate using the 
Tunnel for business trips and/or freight exports. But, more important, no regional bias is 
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evident Approximately 19 percent of companies in both regions only plan to use the 
Tunnel for more than 20 percent of freight exports. However, 22.3 and 15.11 percent of 
companies in the South East and South West respectively are uncertain and so could be 
encouraged to use the Tunnel. I f company plans do remain relatively static, the long-term 
impact of the Tunnel is likely to be limited and the more peripheral regions are unlikely 
to be adversely affected. The findings of the questionnaire survey for Devon and Cornwall, 
which are generally regarded as exhibiting characteristics commonly associated with the 
"North" (Green 1988), reflect the regional and overall averages. 
Company perceptions of the Tunnel support the conclusion that no regional bias is 
apparent which could detrimentally affect the more peripheral UK regions. In terms of the 
impact of the Tunnel on the level of competitiveness, companies in the South West tend 
to be as optimistic as their counterparts in the South East. The overall results (analyzed in 
chapter 5) showed that neariy 30 percent of companies believe that their accessibility to 
both UK and continental markets will be improved as a result of the Tunnel. 
Approximately two thirds also cannot foresee any increase in competition in the home 
market. Since the Tunnel is not perceived to affect the South East or the South West 
differcnUy, it is unlikely that the regional economic structure of the UK will be affected 
significantiy. 
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CHAPTER 7: THE HOMOGENEOUS SOUTH EAST 
THE QUESTION OF EAST KENT 
Attention has so far focused on the main factors affecting the national and regional 
economic impact of the Tunnel and related infrastructure. As ouUined in chapter 1, the 
present thesis is structured according to three broad strands of analysis: the impact of the 
Tunnel on regional accessibility (chapter 3); the policy and legislative framework of the 
Tunnel and related infrastructure (chapter 4); and company perceptions of and likely 
reactions to the Tunnel (chapters 5 & 6). Case studies of East Kent and the "Far South 
West" will now highlight the specific hopes and fears within these areas as regards the 
Tunnel, as well as allow discussion of the findings of the preceding chapters at this local 
level of analysis. Utilising these two case studies should allow the wide spectrum of 
Tunnel-related pressures, both positive and negative, to be addressed and comparisons to 
be made. 
The case studies of both East Kent and the "Far South West" will rely on published reports 
and academic articles, as well as original data generated for the current research project. 
In terms of East Kent, the analysis will be based primarily on the Kent Impact Study (KIS 
- 1987) and the follow-up reports from the Channel Tunnel Joint Consultative Committee 
(CTJCC), especially the 'Kent Impact Study: 1991 Review^ (the Review). The present 
study critically examines these reports for the first time, contrasting the optimistic findings 
of the KIS with the more "realistic" predictions set out in the Review. In addition, the 
findings of the questionnaire survey undertaken for the present study will be drawn on but, 
as a result of the small number of respondents involved, caution must be used when 
interpreting the findings. Finally, interviews were carried-out with officials from local 
government within East Kent, including a representative of the 'East Kent Initiative* (EKI) 
set up by the CTJCC. 
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7,1. Introduction 
The Tunnel portal and the proposed International Passenger Station (IPS) at Ashford. are 
both located within East Kent. Hence, it is widely believed that East Kent, and the county 
as a whole, will experience the greatest impact of the Tunnel; economically, socially and 
environmentally: 
'By far the largest impact of the Tunnel - both positive and negative - wil l 
be felt in East Kent.' 
(CTJCC, 1987, R21) 
However, a favourable outcome is far from guaranteed. Indeed, the impact of the Tunnel 
on the port and ferry industry could seriously damage the local economies of the port and 
coastal towns, especially Dover. Furthermore, Ashford, which was to act as a 'Growthpole' 
(CTJCC 1987), is no longer regarded as a suitable base for an economic recovery of East 
Kent (CTJCC 1991a&b). Since the KIS (1987), the negative effects of the Tunnel are now 
being experienced, with both the run-down of TML construction jobs and the 
rationalisation of the port and ferry industry. The anticipated long-term positive effects of 
the Tunnel are still at best estimates. It is therefore appropriate to examine the potential 
economic impact of the Tunnel on East Kent according to three broad categories: 
(1) The short-term impact - the construction and the associated Multiplier 
effects. 
(2) The medium-term impact - the immediate impact on the competitive 
structure of the cross-Channel ferry industry. 
(3) The long-term impact - it is hoped British industry will rethink its location 
and distribution policies in favour of East Kent. 
It will become apparent that these three categories are determined by the type of impact, 
not their time-scale. For example, the closure of Folkestone harbour to traditional ferry 
services is related to the medium-term impact which looks at the effect of the Tunnel on 
the port and ferry industry. Before proceeding further with this analysis, it is useful to refer 
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to the map of East Kent (see Figure 7.1), which identifies die six districts within the area. 
Tunnel-related infrastructure is primarily located in Ashford, Shepway and Dover, tiius the 
case study will concentrate on these three districts within East Kent 
7,2. The Short-Term Impact 
East Kent does not share in the economic prosperity usually associated with the South 
East. Although the unemployment rate for East Kent nearly halved between 1986 and 
1989, from 12.4 to 6.5 percent, it has consistendy lagged behind the unemployment rate 
for the county as a whole (CTJCC 1989). Partly for this reason, the CTJCC (1986. 1987, 
1989) points to the benefits that would accrue from the short-term construction impact of 
the Tunnel, and thus provide an immediate boost to East Kent's stagnating economy. 
'Conventional economic analysis of major construction projects treat the 
cost of construction as a major injection into the regional economy which 
has an important multiplier effect.' 
(Vickerman 1989a, P.5) 
Inward investment into East Kent as a result of the Tunnel has taken the form of newly 
created construction jobs and the placement of contracts. The local orientation of the 
Tunnel during construction determines the magnitude of the multiplier effect for the East 
Kent economy. Analysis of the short-term impact will first concentrate on the number of 
construction jobs created, before focusing attention on the local placement of construction 
contracts. Since the CTJCC (1987, 1989, 1990, 1991a) has consistently been unable to 
breakdown the figures sufficiendy for East Kent, the short-term analysis is based primarily 
on statistics for the county as a whole. 
7.2.1. Local TML Recruitment 
The KIS estimates that TML would employ approximately 3,400 workers at its peak during 
1990. However, this estimate proved to be extremely conservative. Although few statistics 
are available, it is worth pointing out that the KIS believes that East Kent's large pool of 
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unemployed workers represented a good potential source of TML employment The CTJCC 
(1989) reports that the total TML workforce (full-time staff, hourly paid workers and sub-
contractors) reached nearly 5^00 by the end of 1988 (see Table 7.1). From die 'TML 
Database*, the CTJCC shows that 36 percent of the TML full-time staff were resident in 
Kent at the end of 1988 (for those working in Kent the proportion is 42 percent) as well 
as 49 percent of the hourly paid employees. Of the hourly paid employees that are resident 
in Kent, over half are believed to be from East Kent. 
FULL-TIME 
STAFF 
HOURLY 
PAID 
SUB CON-
TRACTED 
TOTAL 
SHAKESPEARE 
C L I F F 
795 1,905 614 3,314 
GRAIN 122 439 52 613 
CHERITON 201 129 382 712 
FOLKESTONE 
OFFICE 
249 - 26^ 275 
KENT 1,367 2, 473 1,068 4, 908 
SUTTON 
OFFICE 
208 - 73 281 
TOTAL 1, 575 2,473 1, 141 5, 189 
Table 7.1: T M L employment at the end of 1988. 
(Source: CTJCC 1989. P.21) 
The KIS is correct in anticipating that TML recruitment would peak during 1990. By 
October 1990, the TML construction workforce totalled 8.300 (CTJCC 1991a). more than 
double the level anticipated by the KIS. However. Kent's share of the recruits fell to 35 
percent as compared to 50 percent of hourly paid workers (3.056) at the end of 1989 
(CTJCC 1990), In addition, 1.827 people were employed as sub-contractors but the 
majority were from outside Kent. Thus, by October 1990. the total T M L labour force 
exceeded 10,000 workers, with relatively fewer people drawn from within Kent. The latest 
- 251 
available figures show that by March 1991» 6,334 construcrion staff remained; 4,957 at 
Shakespeare Cliff, 1,199 at Cheriion and 178 at the Isle of Grain (CTJCC 1991a). 
The CTJCC (1989) was only able to identify 811 of Kent residents employed by TML in 
1988 as formerly unemployed, therefore the construction of the Tunnel is likely to be of 
limited benefit to East Kent and the county as a whole. Furthermore, longer term problems 
are likely to be encountered as a result of the "run-down" of the larger than expected TML 
workforce (see Table 7.2A). Between May 1991 and the completion of the Tunnel, 
redundancies will total 8,370. The percentage and number of these redundancies accounted 
for by Kent residents is set out in Table 7.2B, with over 4,400 redundancies expected in 
the county. Of the Kent residents, more than half of the TML job losses, not including 
subcontractors, are skilled or semi-skilled operatives. The re-employment prospects for 
these skilled and semi-skilled workers will certainly compare favourably with the unskilled 
redundant TML workers. 
STAFF OPERATIVES 
A B 
SUB CON-
TRACTED 
TOTAL 
MAY 91 -
DEC 91 
300 1550 450 500 2800 
JAN 92 -
DEC 92 
915 2000 350 1000 4265 
DEC 92 -
(1993) 
235 680 40 350 1305 
TOTAL 1450 4230 840 1850 8370 
Table 7.2A: Expected 'run-down' of the T M L construction workforce. 
(Source: CTJCC 1991a, P.23) 
(A = Skilled and Semi-Skiiied, and B = Unskilled) 
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REDUNDANCIES %age KENT 
RESIDENTS 
No. of KENT 
RESIDENTS 
STAFF 
Managerial, e t c 
C l e r i c a l 
730 
720 
40 
80 
292 
576 
OPERATIVES 
S k i l l e d / 
S e m i - s k i l l e d 
U n s k i l l e d 
4230 
840 
40 
90 
1692 
756 
SUBCONTRACT 1850 60 1110 
TOTAL: 
i n c l . subcontract 8370 4426 
e x c l . subcontract 6520 3316 
Table 7.2B: Proportion and number of TIML redundancies which are Kent residents. 
(Source: CTJCC 1991c. P.8) 
Nonetheless, the magnitude of the these redundancies within such a short period of time -
less than two years - will place a considerable strain on the resources of local authorities, 
especially in East Kent where unemployment levels are already high. The Review has 
placed considerable stress on the need for an effective retraining initiative, backed by the 
Department of Employment. The shon-term beneficial impact of the Tunnel has always 
been recognised as transitory but the large-scale redundancies up to the opening of the 
Tunnel are likely to have longer term adverse effects on the local economy of East Kent 
and the county as a whole. Of the 4,400 redundancies for Kent residents, it is reasonable 
to assume that more than half will be from East Kent (CTJCC 1991a). Based on previous 
large construction projects, the KIS (1987) calculates the value of the regional multiplier 
to be 1.3. Again this has short-term beneficial effects but the run-down of the TML 
workforce will also place a further 1,320 jobs at risk in local industries (30 percent of 
4,400). 
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7.2.2. The Local Orientation of Construction Contracts 
' I t was always recognised that this (construction orders) would not have a 
very major impact on the Kent economy, or even on the south east region 
as a whole.' 
(Vickerman and Flowerdew, 1990, P.71) 
The CTG (1985a) estimated that the South East as a whole would only attract 7.25 percent 
of construction orders. However, the CTJCC (1989) shows that the South East attracted 
27 percent of TML (UK) construction contracts by March 1989, of which one third were 
located in Kent (see Table 7.3). Of the £492 million of TML (UK) contracts awarded by 
March 1989, £44 million were placed within Kent due to its advantage of proximity to the 
Tunnel. But as pointed out by the CTJCC (1989)» this represented only one percent of 
Kent turnover in manufacturing in a single year. In addition, by March 1989. the major 
orders, such as new locomotives and rolling stock, had still to be awarded. 
PERCENTAGES 
KENT 9 
REST OF THE SOUTH EAST 18 
REST OF UK 42 
EEC - REST OF WORLD 8 
MULTI-NATIONAL 23 
Table 7.3: Distribution of T M L (UK) contracts: up to 
March 1989. 
(Source: CTJCC 1989, P.25) 
Thus, the relatively high figure for Kent reflects the initial set-up costs for the Tunnel 
project, with local companies awarded contracts to build site offices and supply materials, 
as well as providing certain consultancy services. Tunnel-related construction orders also 
encompass the £600 million committed by BR to the upgrading of existing track and the 
introduction of new locomotives, and the £330 million designated by the Department of 
Transport to improve the county's road network. However, the contracts for new 
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locomotives and rolling stock have been predominately awarded to companies in the 
Midlands. The siting of the IPS at Ashford and the routing of the high-speed rail link 
through Kent have both encountered serious delays, significantly reducing the short-term 
construction impact of the Tunnel and related infrastructure. The later report by the 
CTJCC. the 1991 Review, is seriously flawed in that it fails to up-date the regional 
placement of TML contracts. 
The combined effects of TML employment and the placement of contracts within Kent, 
and the related positive multiplier effects, can only be considered as having a beneficial 
but modest impact. The beneficial construction effects of the Tunnel have always been 
regarded as short-term but little consideration has been given to the long-term problems 
created by the run-down of the TML workforce. Few statistics are available for East Kent 
but it is reasonable to assume that the above conclusion for the county is also applicable 
to East Kent. However, East Kent will have to absorb a large proportion of the 4,400 
redundant TML construction workers, relative to the other areas in Kent. 
The situation in Kent contrasts with that found in Nord-Pas de Calais. Chapter 4 has 
already highlighted the conflicting policies of the British and French Governments toward 
the short-term impact of the Tunnel. While the British Government encouraged the 
regional distribution of construction benefits throughout the UK. their French counterparts 
favoured a policy of consolidation within the relatively depressed region of Nord-Pas de 
Calais. By January 1989, the Nord accounted for 47.4 percent of the FFr2801 million 
worth of construction orders, as well as 74.9 percent of the 2145 employees. 
British Government policy has meant that the short-term construction benefits stemming 
from the Tunnel have been spread too thinly to be of any real importance to any UK 
region (Vickerman 1987), even in East Kent where most of the infrasuncture is located. 
East Kent therefore has to look towards the longer term impact of the Tunnel but the 
immediate effect of the Tunnel on the port and ferry industry will have serious adverse 
repercussions for the local economy. The rationalisation of the port and ferry industry will 
come on top of the TML redundancies and before any positive secondary development. 
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7.3. The Medium-Term Impact 
*The medium-term effects are those to be felt immediately on the Tunnel's 
opening in 1993 but prior to any longer run adjustments of industrial 
location or trade flows/ 
(Vickerman 1989a. P.6) 
The medium-term impact incorporates the effect of increased competition from the Tunnel 
on the shon-sea port and fenry industry. It is important to determine how increased 
capacity for cross-Channel traffic will ultimately affect existing ferry services. The ferry 
and port related industry has been one of East Kent's few growth industries, accounting 
for approximately 13.000 jobs in the late 1980s. The KIS considers that between 4.300 and 
6,600 jobs in the ferry and port-related industry could be lost as a result of the Tunnel. But 
the KIS has again significanUy underestimated the extent of the job losses (CTJCC 
1991a&c). The jobs created by Eurotunnel will fall far below the level of job losses in the 
port and ferry industry, resulting in a net reduction in the level of employment in East 
Kent 
Analysis of the medium-term impact of the Tunnel on East Kent will focus initially on the 
estimated net job losses in the cross-Channel surface transport industry. The rationalisation 
of the port and ferry industry will have serious repercussions for the port towns of Dover, 
Folkestone and Ramsgate. Based on work carried-oui by Chisholm (1986) and Szymanski 
and Manning (1989), the likelihood of a complete collapse of the short-sea ferry industry 
will also be examined. Finally, attention will focus on the plans of the two dominant ferry 
companies, namely P&O and Sealink. Provisions have been made to ensure the long-term 
survival of the short-sea ferry industry. A much rationalised version of the current ferry 
industry is regarded as vital to the long-term survival of this industry. 
7.3.1. The Net Employment Implications 
The CTG's (1985b) forecasts for the level of employment in the ferry and port-related 
industry for 1993 and 2003 are set-out in Table 7.4. 
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1985 1993 
WITHOUT WITH 
2003 
WITHOUT WITH 
DOVER/FOLKESTONE/ 
HYTHE: TUNNEL 
PORTS 10910 
2460 
12560 8810 
3750 
13910 8285 
ASHFORD: TUNNEL 
PORTS 
- 1330 1810 
TOTAL 10910 12560 12600 13910 13845 
Table 7.4: Employment in the East Kent port and ferry industry: with and 
without the Tunnel. 
(Source: CTG 1985b) 
Following an initial job loss, the CTG predict: 
....a slight net increase in job levels over that which might occur at the ports 
in the absence of a link by 1993.' 
(Gibb 1986b, P.340) 
The CTG does foresee the Tunnel eventually leading to a net reduction in employment 
levels by 2003 but independent commentators consider it unlikely that the Tunnel will at 
any time lead to a net gain in employment levels: 
*It is not possible to have it both ways. Either a fixed link saves labour and 
is cheaper or it provides employment and is dearer/ 
(Gibb 1986b. P.340; after Caimcross 1982) 
The CTG*s forecasts for minimal job losses by 2003 have therefore been discredited and 
are now out-dated. 
The Review (CTJCC 1991a) anticipates that only between 1,500 and 2,000 jobs will be 
created directly by Eurotunnel and associated rail operations, compared to the ICIS*s 
forecast of 3,200 job gains. This reduction in the level of expected job gains has far-
reaching implications for East Kent since the extent of job losses in the port and ferry 
industry is likely to be more severe than as originally envisaged by the KIS. The Review's 
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*most favourable likely outcome' for the level of employment in the East Kent port and 
ferry industry is outlined in Table 7.5. Based on the combined impact of the Tunnel and 
the SEM. more than 7,300 job losses are expected between 1991 and 1994, with 5.400 at 
the Port of Dover. 
1987 1991 FORECAST JOB LOSSES 
1991-1994 
DOVER 10400 10400 -5400 
FOLKESTONE 820 800 -800 
RAMSGATE 640 1050 -780 
ELSEWHERE ( i n c 
ASHFORD) 
320 740 -330 
TOTAL 12180 12990 -7310 
Table 7,5: Estimated job losses in the East Kent port and ferry industry. 
(Source: CTJCC 1991 a, P.29) 
Folkestone has already ceased operating as a traditional ferry port but the new SeaCat 
service is running between Folkestone and Boulogne, as well as a new freight service. 
Thus, some of the 800 jobs initially lost have been recovered. However, Sea Containers 
Ltd, the owners of Folkestone Harbour, are not prepared to give a long-term commitment 
to Folkestone and the SeaCat service (personal interview: Jarret 1992). In addition, the Port 
of Dover will be privatised in 1995, gaining Trust Port* status. The CTJCC (1991c) does 
not rule out the possibility diat Eurotunnel may attempt to become the new owner. 
However, this would obviously restrict competition and would be referred to the 
Monopolies and Mergers Commission. 
The Tunnel is therefore likely to result in the direct loss of between 5,480 to 5,980 jobs 
in the East Kent cross-Channel surface transport industry. However, the CTJCC (1991c) 
has based its estimates of job losses on the proposed merger of P&O and Sealink. The 
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Tunnel wil l create excess capacity in the cross-Channel transport market, leading to a 
damaging price war between Eurotunnel and ferry operators. The merger is therefore 
considered necessary to ensure the long-term survival of the ferry fleet. The Review 
accepts that the merger would have to be assessed under the Fair Trading legislation but 
a viable ferry service is regarded as sustainable after the Tunnel opens only i f the main 
ferry companies are allowed to pool resources. In the event that the proposed merger is not 
permitted, the Review fears that: 
'....there is greater risk of both companies eventually leaving the Dover-
Calais route and deploying their ships elsewhere.' 
(CTJCC 1991a, P.26) 
This scenario would therefore leave Eurotunnel with considerable monopoly powers, and 
thus sharply reduce competition and consumer choice. The CTJCC (1991c) hypothesize 
two potential scenarios: the 'five ships' or 'high' scenario and the 'low' scenario. The 
above estimates of job losses are based on the more favourable 'five ships' scenario. Both 
of these scenarios will be discussed in more detail in section 7.3.2. The Review fears that 
the SEM wil l lead to an additional loss of 1,300 jobs in freight forwarding companies, as 
well as 520 jobs in HM Customs and Excise and immigration. The net employment 
implications of the Tunnel and the SEM on the East Kent port and ferry industry are 
therefore expected to involve between 7,300 and 7,800 job losses. 
7.3.2. A Complete Collapse of the Short-Sea Ferry Industry? 
The likelihood of a complete collapse in the existing port and ferry industry is now 
examined. Using Chisholm's (1986) study, the expected level of demand for Tunnel 
services in terms of both passenger and freight traffic will be analyzed. The post-1993 
cross-Channel transport market and the patronage levels between the competing modes will 
determine ultimately the degree to which the port and ferry industry will have to 
rationalise. Attention then focuses on the likely structure of the post-Tunnel cross-Channel 
transport industry, as postulated by Szymanski and Manning (1988). 
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Market size and patronage levels 
The CTG expects almost 30 million passengers and more than 13 million tonnes of freight 
to pass through the Tunnel in its Hrst year of operation (see Table 7.6). In terms of 
passenger traffic, it is believed that the Tunnel will attract 10.7 million car and coach 
passengers in 1993, leaving 7.2 million, or 56 percent, of the 1983 level for the ferry 
operators. But the CTG believes that the Tunnel will dominate completely the excursionist 
market. However, the CTG did expect the ferry companies to retain the largest share of 
the freight market, at levels greater than those occurring in 1983. Therefore, this study 
concentrates on passenger traffic forecasts. 
1983 
MARKET 
SIZE 
1993 
MARKET TUNNEL 
SIZE TRAFFIC 
2003 
TUNNEL 
TRAFFIC 
PASSENGERS (M.) 
CAR PASSENGERS 
COACH PASSENGERS 
EXCURSIONISTS 
OTHER FOOT PASSs 
ADDITIONAL RAIL 
PASSs: wit:h IRL 
6.7 
6.1 
2.6 
30.6 
9.5 6.3 
8.4 4.4 
3.2 3.1 
46.1 10.9 
5.0 
7.3 
5.5 
3.4 
12 .9 
7.9 
TOTAL 46.0 67.2 29.7 37 .0 
FREIGHT 
(M.TONNES) 
RORO 
CONTAINER & RAIL 
WAGONS 
BULK^ 
17 .7 
5.7 
30.0 
24.2 6.0 
7.9 4.0 
41.8 3.2 
7.5 
6.8 
4.6 
TOTAL 53 .4 73.9 13.2 18.9 
Table 7.6: The potential composition of the Tunnel's cross-Channel market. 
(Source: CTG 1985a) (1, Bulk also includes new vehicles) 
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Chisholm criticises the CTG's (1985a) passenger and freight traffic forecasts as overly 
optimistic. Even though Chisholm's analysis is now somewhat dated, Eurotunnel's current 
projections for cross-Channel traffic do not diverge significantly from the CTG's initial 
forecasts (CTJCC 1989). Hence, conclusions reached by Chisholm are still relevant 
According to Chisholm, the total passenger market in 1993 will be 46.8 million, more than 
20 million below the CTG*s forecast of 67.2 million. Thus, Chisholm argues that the CTG: 
overestimated the 1983 traffic potential and, as a consequence, have 
similarly overestimated the 1993 potential. Two implications seem to 
follow. First, that there will be considerably greater traffic on routes which 
are not strongly competitive with the Tunnel than the CTG envisage - air 
and ferry services to the east and south coast ports. Second, that i f the 
Tunnel is to carry 30 million passengers in 1993 (the CTG's prediction), 
competition on the short ferry routes will indeed be fierce.' 
(Chisholm I986,P.325) 
I f Chisholm's analysis proves to be correct, the impact of the Tunnel on medium- and 
long-sea ferry routes will be minimal. This would seem to support the findings of Gibb 
(1989, 1990) which show that the port and ferry industry in the "Far South West" will not 
be significantly affected by the Tunnel. However, Chisholm also suggests that the Tunnel 
will lead to considerable over-capacity in the short-sea sector which could result in the 
complete collapse of the ferry industry in the long-term. 
Chisholm's analysis then goes on to question whether the Tunnel is in fact likely to attract 
the volume of passenger traffic in 1993 forecast by the CTG. The CTG's (1985a) assertion 
that the tariffs charged for Tunnel services would be competitive is challenged, since the 
CTG only assumes that the ferry operators would reduce their lowest fares by 10 percent 
Ferry companies, particularly P&O and Sealink, have made it clear that they expect to 
reduce tariffs by up to 40 percent by the end of the century (Hall 1987); as Chisholm 
reports: 
'The Transport Committee of the House of Commons (1985, P.XXi) state 
that the 10 percent reduction in ferry prices appears 'to be a considerable, 
perhaps cmcial, underestimation of the possible degree of reduction'.' 
(Chisholm 1986, P.327) 
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Deregulation of air services within the EC, as part of the 'Open Skies' policy adopted by 
the European Commission, is also likely to affect assumptions made with regard to airline 
fares (Graham 1992). The liberalisation of the airline industry within the EC after the I 
January 1993, will lead to immediate reductions in fares. Thus, the ability of Eurotunnel's 
Shuttie service and BR's international passenger trains to compete with air services to the 
near-Continent will be detrimentally affected. In addition. P&O and Sealink are confident 
that they can successfully meet the competition from the Tunnel, especially on the Dover-
Calais route. 
Hence, in terms of the potential passenger market, Chisholm concludes that the CTG 
overestimated the Tunnel's importance and underestimated the continuing role of the 
ferries. Although Chisholm considers the CTG's passenger traffic forecasts to be somewhat 
optimistic, with a smaller market anticipated for 1993, the continued survival of the short-
sea ferry industry is expected. The delayed opening of the Tunnel and the late introduction 
of international passenger trains, now expected during 1994, will considerably reduce the 
number of people using the Tunnel in the first year. In terms of the freight market, 
Chisholm found that the CTG's estimate of the potential volume of container and RoRo 
freight that could have used the Tunnel in 1983 is reasonable (see Table 7.6). However. 
Chisholm considers that the CTG again underestimated the annual growth rate, and thus 
the potential market for 1993. Even so. BR only forecasts 6.1 million tonnes of freight will 
be attracted to international rail freight services, considerably less than Eurotunnel's 
predictions. Thus, the ferries are expected to retain the dominant share of the cross-
Channel freight market. Therefore, the complete collapse of the port and ferry industry in 
East Kent is not regarded as likely. However, if Eurotunnel is correct in assuming that at 
least 30 million passengers will travel through the Tunnel in its first year of service and 
Chisholm's traffic forecasts prove more accurate, intense competition is likely to be 
experienced in the short-sea sector, more so than originally envisaged. 
Market structure 
The impact of Railfreight Distribution's proposed through-trains and Eurotunnel's Shuttie 
service should only postpone the continued growth in cross-Channel freight traffic 
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transported by the ferries. The complexities involved in transporting freight cargo (namely 
cost structure, delivery time-tables, EC regulations on permitted daily driving hours for 
road hauliers, the different types of freight cargo (bulk, RoRo and LoLo), and incompatible 
European rail gauges) will prevent the Tunnel dominating the market Furthermore, P&O 
and Sealink also introduced during the late 1980s freight-only ferries to offer an improved 
service to road hauliers. 
Real "head-on" competition will be encountered in the short-sea passenger market. A new 
class of "Super-Ferries" now operate between Dover and Calais, and Dover and Boulogne, 
while other innovations such as improved "turn-around" times have reduced the operating 
costs of the ferries in readiness for the Tunnel. Modemisation of the ferry fleet, including 
port practices, is expected to allow tariffs to be reduced by up to 40 percent (Tolley and 
Turton 1987). Rexilink, the ferry consortium opposed to the Tunnel, is also optimistic 
because of the massive cost overruns experienced by the Tunnel project and the strict 
financial targets imposed on Eurotunnel by the lending banks (Hall 1987). However, 
Eurotunnel (1987) still argues that it will be able to offer a more competitive journey time 
and price, due to the Tunnel's much lower operating costs. This has also to be combined 
with the possible loss of duty-free sales as a result of SEM legislation. At present this is 
an important source of revenue for ferry companies, representing up to 25 percent of total 
revenue. 
Szymanski and Manning (1988) have examined the post-1993 competitive structure of the 
port and ferry industry. Their paper outlines the two extreme scenarios: the 'Eurotunnel 
scenario', where the Tunnel will eventually force the ferries out-of-business by 
implementing predatory pricing policies; and the 'Flexilink scenario', where as a result of 
price reductions by the ferries and Eurotunnel's heavy debt burden, the Tunnel will become 
a loss-making enterprise. They, along with Kay et. al. (1989); also point out that the cross-
Channel ferry industry already operates under an oligopolistic market structure, with P&O 
and Sealink as the two dominant companies having 45 and 50 percent of the market 
respectively. Implicit collusion has in the past been forbidden by the Office of Fair 
Trading. Szymanski and Manning believe that this policy should be re-considered, since 
after 1993: 
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'....collusion between ferries is unlikely to influence prices adversely, but 
may well increase social welfare by reducing total fixed costs. Under the 
Eurotunnel scenario a strengthened ferry consortium might be able to resist 
being driven from the market and thus prevent monopoly pricing by 
Eurotunnel. Under the Flexilink scenario, prices wi l l be high anyway, and 
so collusion between the ferry companies will merely allow them to take 
advantage of economies of scale.' 
(Szymanski and Manning 1988. P.2) 
The merger of the P&O and Sealink ferry services would therefore allow the ferries to 
compete effectively with the Tunnel, ensuring a competitive market as originally desired 
by the Government (Department of Transport 1986). However, prices would still remain 
high in the 'Flexilink' scenario since it would not be in the long-term interest of the ferry 
companies to force Eurotunnel into bankruptcy. As a result of the stringent loan 
arrangements imposed on Eurotunnel by the lending bank consortium, which enables the 
banks to take control of the Tunnel in the event that Eurotunnel defaults on any debt 
repayments and refuses Eurotunnel the opportunity to borrow from elsewhere, the ferry 
companies would never drive prices down too much to cause Eurotunnel any difficulties: 
'This is because any successor to Eurotunnel, particularly i f that successor 
is the lending bank consortium, will have deep enough pockets (i.e. 
financial reserves - Note also that the banks would have to write off the 
debt for any successor company to be forthcoming; but the banks would 
retain the franchise) to engage in credible predatory pricing.' 
(Szymanski and Manning 1988, P.25) 
Hence, it is in the interest of the ferry companies to "surrender" a sufficient market share 
to Eurotunnel. The ferries*chances of survival have also been increased by the success of 
P&O and Sealink in preventing public money being used to finance international rail 
services, which would have further advantaged the Tunnel. Inadequate rail links to the 
Tunnel portal are likely to strengthen the position of the ferry companies relative to the 
Tunnel. The improved motorway network within Kent is likely to increase the proportion 
of passenger journeys to the Continent by car/coach, benefitting both the Tunnel and the 
ferries but poor access to the ports is a cause of much concem to the ferry operators. The 
ferry companies have also tried to gain assurances from the Government that no public 
money will be used to bail-out an unsuccessful Tunnel project but, as Szymanski and 
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Manning (1988) argue, it will be the lending bank consortium which refinances a bankrupt 
Eurotunnel. 
Both extreme scenarios are unlikely, but the paper is in accordance with the opinions 
expressed by Gibb (1986b) and Chisholm (1986). namely that the worst-case scenario, the 
complete collapse of the ferry industry, is a very remote possibility. Nonetheless, the post-
1993 ferry and port-related industry will incur considerable job losses. 
7.3.3. The Proposed Merger of P&O and Sealink 
As stated earlier, the CTJCC (1991c) supports the case for the proposed merger. In the 
event of the merger, it hypothesized in the so-called 'five ships' scenario that, except for 
the Dover-Calais service, all other short-sea ferry routes would all be lost. The CTJCC 
expects the viability of the Dover-Calais passenger service to be sustained, with three P&O 
and two Sealink (one with a French crew) multi-purpose vessels. In addition, freight-only 
ferries, four P&O and one Sealink. would still continue to operate on the Dover-Zeebrugge 
route. The SeaCat service is also expected to remain in service. The merged ferry fleet 
would have the capacity to take about 50 percent of the predicted cross-Channel traffic in 
1993. 
Table 7.7 sets out the implications of the 'five ships' scenario on the level of direct 
employment in the East Kent port and ferry industry. According to the CTJCC, more than 
4.300 jobs would be lost. 49 percent of the 1991 level, with 67 percent at Dover. However, 
the current recession has led to a down-turn in the rate of growth in cross-Channel traffic. 
Such a fall in the rate of traffic growth could lead to an extreme over-capacity and the start 
of a damaging price war. In this event, the CTJCC (1991c) suggests that a further 1.961 
jobs could be lost at Dover. At this level, a viable ferry service is not seen as likely. Thus, 
a complete collapse of the port and ferry industry is feared. To cater for the increased 
traffic, it is expected that Eurotunnel would create only 600 additional jobs. Nonetheless, 
based on the Review's most favourable forecast. East Kent will have to absorb nearly 
7,500 redundancies in the pon and ferry industry between 1991 and 1994. considerably 
more than envisaged by the KIS. 
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PORT/LOCATION 1991 
EMPLOYMENT 
POST-TUNNEL 
(1993-1995) 
EMPLOYMENT 
NUMBER OF 
JOB LOSSES 
DOVER: 
S e a l i n k , P&O, 
Hoverspeed, BR, 
Harbour Board, 
6541 3606 -2935 
FOLKESTONE: 
S e a l i n k , BR 554 0 -554 
RAMSGATE: 
S a l l y L i n e , 
S e h i a Hino, 
Port, Tug, Dock 
Co., Concessions 
703 123 -580 
ASHFORD: 
S e a l i n k HQ 540 250 -290 
TOTAL 8338 3979 -4359 
Table 7.7: Ferry and port-related employment in the 'five ships' scenario. 
(Source: CTJCC 1991c, P.IO) 
As pointed out by Vickerman (1989a), this problem is confined to the UK and East Kent, 
since about 80 percent of ferry traffic is on British ships. This case study has so far 
highlighted the considerable problems facing East Kent. The short-term construction impact 
of the Tunnel has proved to be more beneficial than anticipated, but East Kent will have 
to absorb 2,000-plus T M L redundancies before the Tunnel opens. The medium-term impact 
threatens to damage irreversibly one of East Kent's few expanding industries. It is hoped 
that the benefits which the Tunnel brings to the area in the long-term will more than off-
set these job losses, thus revitalising East Kent's depressed economy. However, it will 
become apparent that the long-term benefits of the Tunnel are likely to be much less than 
originally forecast by the KIS. Even the more "realistic" forecast of secondary job gains 
as calculated by the CTJCC (1991a&b) appear to be flawed. 
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7.4. The Long-Term Impact 
The CTJCC has attempted to calculate the potential secondary employment gains resulting 
from the Tunnel for the county as a whole. Thus, it was hoped that Kent would be in a 
better position to maximise the opportunities created and minimise any adverse effects. 
Hence, it is first appropriate to analyze the official reports produced by the CTJCC, 
particularly the KIS (1987) and the Review (1991a). It is important to examine critically 
the 1991 Review in comparison with the recommendations of the KIS, as well as the 
findings of the Review itself. The optimism expressed by the KIS is no longer apparent, 
with more job losses identified and fewer job gains predicted. No critical review of the 
CTJCC's official reports has been undertaken lo-date. The present study therefore 
represents an important contribution in the examination of the economic implications of 
the Tunnel for Kent, especially East Kent. 
Attention will then focus on the problems and opportunities that face East Kent from a 
theoretical perspective, including the findings of the questionnaire survey carried-out for 
die current research project. It was shown in the Literature Review (chapter 2) that a mass 
relocation of industry as a result of the Tunnel is not regarded as likely. The results of the 
questionnaire survey (chapters 5 & 6) also tend to suppon this view. However, the findings 
of a survey undertaken by the CTJCC would seem to contradict this belief, reporting a 
much higher degree of interest shown by Kent companies in Nord-Pas de Calais as a 
potential location. It will become evident that for East Kent to tackle successfully 'the 
problems created by die Tunnel, the revitalisation of the tourism industry, already 
important in the area, wil l be integral to any positive long-term strategy for the region, 
7.4.1. The Kent Impact Studv: 1991 Review 
'Dover. Shepway and Thanet District Councils are totally against a 
cross-Channel fixed link. All these councils take the view that the existing 
cross-Channel facilities are of fundamental import to the local economy and 
a reduction of services would have serious economic consequences. None 
of the above councils are convinced diat the link*s long term economic 
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advantages are sufficient to outweigh the adverse impact upon employment 
and environment/ 
(Gibb 1986b. P.342) 
The fears expressed by the District Councils that the Tunnel would lead to a net reduction 
in employment levels in East Kent now seem justified. Even in Ashford. where the 
Borough Council has always been in favour of the Tunnel, the secondary development 
opportunities are expected to be much less than originally anticipated. Nonetheless, this 
early opposition - along with the inhercndy weak nature of the economy of East Kent - did 
persuade the Government to commission an economic impact study for the county as a 
whole under the auspices of the CTJCC. The Committee was originally chaired by the 
Minister of State for Transport. David Mitchell MP. and comprised of officials from other 
central Government departments and local government within Kent. 
Whilst recognising the adverse effect the Tunnel would have on the East Kent port and 
ferry industry, the KIS highlights the potentially beneficial 'infrastructure effect'. Both the 
KIS and the Review are unable to isolate the impact of the Tunnel from other 
infrastructural effects. Thus the secondary employment opportunities referred to in these 
two reports incorporate the joint effect of the Tunnel. M25 and M20. The indirect 
employment gains identified by the CTJCC (I991a&b) are significantly lower than the 
respective estimates in the KIS and more in line with the theoretical arguments advanced 
by the Channel Tunnel Research Unit (Vickerman 1985. 1987 1988a. Henley et. aJ. 1989. 
Vickerman and Flowerdew 1990). The KIS expects the potential infrastructure effect to 
indirectiy create between 13.000 and 14,000 Jobs within the county by the mid-1990s (see 
Table 7.8). From a Kent workforce of 600.000. the additional development pressures 
resulting from the Tunnel in the long-term, even based on this optimistic forecast, are 
therefore likely to be small. Thus, it is pointed out that: 
'Only i f courageous and determined steps are taken - aiid taken well in 
advance of the opening - can East Kent as a whole expect to come out with 
the favourable employment balance....' 
(CTJCC 1987. P.i) 
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1987 KIS 
ESTIMATES 
1991 REVIEW 
ESTIMATES 
DIRECT EFFECTS: 
PORT & FERRY INDUSTRY -4300/-6600 -7480 
TUNNEL AND RAIL OPERATIONS + 3200 +1500/+2000 
SUB-TOTAL -1100/-3400 -5980/-5480 
SECONDARY EFFECTS^: 
PRODUCER SERVICES + 1800 + 1500 
MANUFACTURING + 5200 + 2760 
WHOLESALE DISTRIBUTION 
& ROAD HAULAGE 
+ 2700 + 1000 
RETAIL DISTRIBUTION + 1300 (incl u d e d i n tourism) 
TOURISM +2000/+3000 + 500 
SUB-TOTAL +14000/+13000 + 5760 
IMPACT OF THE SEM: 
CUSTOMS CLEARANCE IN 
FREIGHT FORWARDERS 
not estimated -1300 
HM CUSTOMS & EXCISE & 
IMMIGRATION 
not estimated -520 
INDIRECT IMPACT ON OTHER 
SECTORS (NET) 
not estimated + 4150 
SUB-TOTAL not estimated +2330 
TOTAL +12900/+9600 +2610 
Table 7.8: Estimated employment changes in Kent resulting from the Tunnel, related 
infrastructure and the SEM, 1991-1996. 
(Source: CTJCC 1991a. R19) 
1. Incorporates the effect of the Tunnel and the related infrastructure. 
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The CTJCC is only a consultative platform with no executive powers to enforce any 
recommendations. However, it was hoped that, since the relevant central Govemment 
departments and local govemment bodies were represented on the CTJCC, most of the 
recommendations would be implemented. This hope has not been realised because the 
necessary resources were not forthcoming from central Government. Kent is still waiting 
for the planned high-speed rail link and the proposed IPS at Ashford. Therefore, the 
implementation of the recommendations, after an initial *good start', has been 
disappointing, particularly for East Kent: 
\...the net adverse effects of the Tunnel on East Kent in the medium term 
are larger than was then (the KIS) envisaged and it is in offsetting those 
adverse effects that implementation of the 1987 strategy has largely failed.' 
(CTJCC 1991a, P.ii) 
Emplovment implications for the county 
Due to the contrasting nature of the CTJCC's employment estimates, as originally outiined 
by the KIS and later revised by the Review, it is important to look more closely at the 
predictions of indirect job employment gains for the county. The overall estimates for the 
county as a whole will be examined first before concentrating on the secondary 
employment prospects for East Kent As can be seen from Table 7.8» the Review 
anticipates 5.760 additional jobs to be created as a result of the infrastructure effect, over 
7,300-8,300 jobs less than that forecast by the KIS. The Review also states that the SEM 
will create a further 4,150 jobs in Kent; no comparative figure is given in the KIS. In 
terms of the total net employment effects, the Review forecasts a net increase of 2.610 jobs 
by 1996 but 2.330 will be as a result of the SEM. Therefore, the Tunnel and related 
infrastructure could result in a net loss of 220 jobs. The KIS estimates that the net impact 
of the Tunnel and related infrastructure will be a net gain of between 9,600 and 12,900 
jobs within the county. Thus, within a period of four years, the CTJCC have revised 
downwards their estimates of employment opportunities by more than 100 percent. 
However, it is also recognised that there is a considerable amount of uncertainty 
surrounding the indirect employment estimates. Thus, the net increase of 2,610 jobs, 
including the SEM, only represents a mid-point figure between 0 and 4,000 jobs. Hence. 
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the overall impact of the Tunnel and related infrasuiicture could be the creation of few 
additional jobs, considerably lower than the 5,760 forecast, leading to a much higher 
reduction in employment levels. 
The activities singled-out by the KIS as likely to be affected in the long-term by the 
Tunnel are: 
1. Expanding Producer Services - business services, computing, banking, 
insurance and research and development 
2. Faster Growing Manufactures - primarily Hi-Tec companies 
3. Distribution - wholesaling, road haulage and retailing 
4. Tourism 
Manufacturing industry is now expected by the CTJCC (1991a) to create an additional 
2,760 jobs, nearly half of the 5,200 gains predicted in 1987. Since North Kent has been 
successful in attracting a relatively large proportion of Hi-Tec industries; 32 percent of 
total manufacturing in 1989, compared to only 15 percent in East Kent (CTJCC 1991a), 
it is likely that North Kent will also benefit from a large proportion of this secondary 
development. Furthermore, the Kings Hill business park outside Tonbridge, in Mid Kent, 
is considered the main centre for Hi-Tec industrial growth in the county (personal 
interview: McKim 1992). The Eureka science park in Ashford will have to compete with 
the attractions of North and Mid Kent. In addition, the Review (CTJCC 1991a) estimates 
that 1,000 jobs will be created in 'wholesale distribution and road haulage' and 500 in 
'retail distribution' (including tourism), compared to the KIS's more optimistic estimates 
of 2,700 and 3,300-4,300 respectively. As pointed out by Gibb (1986b, P.346): 
'Neither Folkestone nor Dover are centres of large-scale warehousing. 
Despite cross-Channel traffic trebling since 1970, the demands for 
warehousing in the immediate hinterlands of these ports has always been 
poor. Most of the freight handled at Dover is containerised, usually roU-
on/roll-off shipments...As a result, there is no need for transhipment or 
distribution depots to be located at the ports.' 
The CTJCC's revised estimates would seem to support Gibb's eadier conclusions. 
271 -
As a result of the direct job losses in the construction and port and ferry industries, the 
CTJCC (1991c) also states that more job losses will be incurred through backward linkages 
and the multiplier effect: 
The backward linkages, whereby the loss of economic activity which 
caused the job losses reduce economic activity in some local supplier 
business, will cause a further loss of jobs....The loss of jobs, both the direct 
effects and backward linkages, reduce the amount of employment incomes 
(the multiplier effect).* 
(CTJCC 1991c, P.19) 
For local districts, the backward linkage effect is calculated to be an additional 10 percent 
of the direct job losses, 20 percent for the county as a whole. The CTJCC (1991a&x;) also 
calculate the multiplier effect to be 1.25. The total impact on Kent is therefore predicted 
to be a net loss of 5,100 jobs between 1991 and 1996. However, as will become clear, the 
net total impact on East Kent is a loss of 8,900 jobs, at least 2,000 jobs as a result 
backward linkages and the multiplier effect. The effect of backward linkages and the 
negative multiplier will be paramount in Dover, where the majority of the job losses are 
located. Dover could suffer from a "spiral of decline" without immediate Govemment 
financial assistance. Govemment intervention could take the form of designating East Kent 
an Assisted Area or Dover an Enterprise Zone. 
The Review stresses that the anticipated job gains are based on best estimates. It is 
therefore useful to examine the basis upon which these estimates are made. The CTJCC 
(1991b) carried-out a questionnaire survey of over 1,500 companies in Kent during April 
and May 1991. Fewer than 200 companies completed and returned the questionnaires, a 
response rate of less than 13 percent. The sensitivity of the findings could be undermined 
by this poor response rate. The response rate for individual questions is usually lower than 
the overall figure but no indication is given in the report. A second survey conducted 
interviews with companies recently locating some activity to Kent, only 80 out of the 200 
companies approached agreed to an interview. Again the results of some individual 
questions are based on a response rate of 40 companies or less. The significance of the 
findings is even more questionable when the results are analyzed for the three sub-regions 
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of Kent and the six districts within East Kent It is therefore necessary to be cautious when 
interpreting these findings. 
Employment implications for East Kent 
Table 7.9 breaks down the total net employment implications of the Tunnel, related 
infrastructure and the SEM for the three sub-regions of Kent. Of the 17,000 total job 
losses, 85.3 percent are located in East Kent (-14,500), compared to only 47.1 percent of 
the job gains (+5,600). Based on the CTJCC's (1991a) estimates. East Kent is tiierefore 
expected to experience a net loss of 8,900 jobs between 1991 and 1996. 
TUNNEL/RELATED 
INFRAS. & SEM^ 
SW & MID 
KENT 
NORTH 
KENT 
EAST 
KENT 
TOTAL 
JOB LOSSES -1500 -1000 -14500 -17000 
JOB GAINS + 2900 + 3400 + 5600 +11900 
NET EMPLOYMENT + 1400 + 2400 -8900 -5100 
Table 7.9: Anticipated net employment effects of the Tunnel and related 
infrastructure within Kent. 
(Source: CTJCC 1991a) (1. Including backward linkages and the multiplier effect) 
In terms of the long-term impact of the Tunnel within East Kent: 
\...the port towns will suffer employment losses through the contraction 
of ferry traffic; and the coastal towns generally, with the possible 
exception of Folkestone, seem to be relatively poorly placed to gain from 
secondary development stimulated by the infrastructure changes.* 
(CTJCC 1987, P.21) 
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As can be seen from Table 7.10, Dover will have to absorb a total loss of 10,500 jobs, 
including redundancies in both the construction and port and ferry industry. Job losses 
in Dover will affect 6.000 residents, with residents of Folkestone and Thanet also 
affected. The net employment implications for Shepway will therefore be a net loss; not 
800 job gains as shown in Table 7.10. The real impact of the job gains/losses for the 
six sub-areas of East Kent are highlighted in terms of the forecast changes in the local 
labour markets. Between 1991 and 2001, the demand for labour in Dover will not keep 
pace with the supply. leading to a further surplus of 13.300 workers. 
The KIS hopes that Ashford will : 
'....become the manufacturing and commercial hub of the sub-regions 
radiating development outwards to the depressed north-eastem areas and 
coastal towns.' 
(CTJCC 1987, P.24) 
ASHFORD CANTERBURY DOVER 
TUNNEL/INFRAS./SEM 
IMPACT by 1996:^ 
JOB LOSSES -500 -400 -11,100 
JOB GAINS + 1100 + 600 + 600 
NET CHANGE + 600 + 200 -10,500 
LABOtJR SUPPLY^: 
1991 - 2001 -1500 -800 -13,300 
2001 - 2011 0 +3000 + 1700 
(Table 7.10 continued overleaf) 
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SHEPWAY SWALE THANET TOTAL 
TUNNEL/INFRAS./SEM 
IMPACT by 1996: 
JOB LOSSES -900 -500 -1100 -14,500 
JOB GAINS + 1700 + 1000 + 600 + 5600 
NET CHANGE + 800 + 500 -500 -8900 
LABOUR SUPPLY^: 
1991 - 2001 -1900 + 1300 -5600 -21,200 
2001 - 2011 -900 +2300 0 + 6100 
Table 7.10: Estimated net employment effects of the Tunnel, related 
infrastructure and the SEM, 1991-1996, and the change in 
the supply of labour, within the six districts of East Kent. 
(Source: CTJCC 1991a, P.57) 
(1. Including backward linkages and the multiplier effect) 
(2. A minus sign indicates the supply of labour will increase by more than the growth 
in employment opportunities, i.e. unemployment will tend to increase) 
But the Review only anticipates a net increase of 600 jobs for Ashford. The uncenainty 
now associated with the IPS at Ashford has meant that the 1,100 additional railway jobs 
which would have been created can no longer be included in employment estimates, at 
least in the years immediately following the opening of the Tunnel (CTJCC 1989). 
Eurotunnel, in October 1991, put forward a temporary solution for an IPS at Ashford. 
priced at between £3 and £9 million (KCC 1992a). However, BR immediately rejected this 
'portable hut' idea, based on safety considerations. The Government on 3 December 1991, 
also released £18 million for an interim solution but little progress has been made. An IPS 
at Ashford is not only important in terms of the direct employment opportunities but also 
as a result of improved accessibility offered to the Kent business traveller. In fact the IPS 
is regarded as 'very important' in securing the main strategic objectives for East Kent as 
275 
a whole (CTJCC 1991a&b). However, die Review considers that the KIS places too much 
emphasis on Ashford as a *growthpole* for East Kent, concluding that: 
' I f tiiere was ever any doubt in 1987 (die KIS) about the need for a 
Channel Tunnel strategy for Kent, and particularly East Kent, these revised 
estimates are such as to make it absolutely essential/ 
(CTJCC 1991a, P.iii) 
The CTJCC tiierefore calls on tiie Government to designate East Kent as an Assisted Area. 
The economic problems facing East Kent as a result of tiie Tunnel and the SEM are 
regarded as severe enough to require extra Government and EC funding which would be 
forthcoming i f East Kent gained Assisted Area status. A formal bid for the designation of 
East Kent as an Assisted Area is expected by June 1993 (personal interview: McKim 
1992). In fact the Review believes that Uie Govemment is responsible for the 'poor' and 
'patchy' implementation of the CTJCC 'Strategy' for Kent, particularly in East Kent: 
'....Central Govemment Departments are largely opting out of the Strategy 
and looking to Local Authorities to implement it, whilst controlling their 
purse strings in such a way as to make it difficult i f not impossible for them 
to do so.' 
(CTJCC 1991a, P.99) 
This goes against tiie spirit of die KIS and restricts die effectiveness of die CTJCC. From 
interviews with representatives of local govemment within East Kent (personal interviews: 
Jarret 1992, McKim 1992, Vickem 1992). it is clear that everything possible has been done 
at local level with die limited finances available. County and Disnict Councils within Kent 
have been active in freeing potential development land but as recognised by the Review: 
'There is a surplus of development sites in relation to the likely demand to 
be generated by the Tunnel....' 
(CTJCC 1991a, P.74) 
The supply of development land within Kent as a whole is estimated in the Review to be 
880 hectares, whilst demand for 100 to 130 hectares only is anticipated. Thus, there will 
be considerable competition between the sub-regions of Kent to attract Tunnel-related 
development However, except for Ashford, there is a shortage of appropriate land for 
development in East Kent. The two proposed 'Flagship' development sites in Dover (die 
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International Business Park at Honeywood) and Thanet (the Kent International Business 
Park at Alland Park) are both still subject to access and infrastructure constraints. Based 
on interviews with Shepway District Council (personal interview: Jarret 1992). the current 
level of demand in Shepway for new industrial and office sites is low. Nonetheless, it is 
expected that as the UK economy comes out of recession this demand will increase. 
The long-term prospects for East Kent therefore look 'bleak' (CTJCC 1991a&b). The 
CTJCC Strategy for East Kent is based on the diversification of the industrial base, with 
certain sectors of industry specifically targeted. The lack of interest in available industrial 
and commercial sites in the area supports the above conclusion that the CTJCC's 
(1991a&b) forecasts for East Kent are also somewhat optimistic. I f East Kent is to benefit 
from the Tunnel and related infrastructure in the long-term, and compensate for the 
considerable job losses in the port and ferry industry, the designation of Assisted Area 
status for the area is vital. The 'East Kent Initiative' (EKI) was set-up in 1991 by the 
CTJCC to lobby for additional Govemment and EC funds for East Kent. The estimated 
secondary employment opportunities stemming from the infrastructure effect have been 
substantially revised by the Review. Thus, in conclusion the successful diversification of 
the East Kent economy has not and is not expected to be achieved. Indeed the question 
arises as to whether there is any real justification for anticipating secondary development 
opportunities in East Kent. 
7.4.2. The Theoretical Perspective 
The CTJCC (1987. 199la&b) makes the assumption that the Tunnel will alter the regional 
distribution of industry to the benefit of East Kent and the county as a whole. According 
to Vickerman, however, the question is still: 
'....whether, and how, the Tunnel and its associated infrastructures, will 
change the existing regional panem of the structure of activities and the 
associated flows of people, goods and services.' 
(Vickerman 1989a. P.9) 
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Vickerman argues that any secondary economic development is unlikely to be experienced 
in East Kent as a result of the Tunnel because there is no need for any change of transport 
mode close lo the Tunnel portal. Therefore, indusa7 will gain no commercial advantage 
from locating within the immediate hinterland of the Tunnel. The Tunnel and the 
international through trains wil l make possible the direct haulage of freight from most 
regions in Britain to the Continent, with no transhipment necessary. In fact, all 
international rail freight, including freight originating in East Kent, will have to go via the 
Willesdon depot located just outside London. Hence, as Vickerman asserts, the Tunnel will 
not become the catalyst behind an East Kent industrial revival. The results of the 
Economic Potential Model employed in chapter 3 show that certain peripheral UK regions 
could experience fairly uniform increases in relative accessibility compared with the South 
East. Thus, the Tunnel is not likely to further peripheralise companies to the north and 
west of London, or encourage them to relocate closer to the Tunnel portal. 
The opportunities created by the Tunnel primarily depend on companies using rail freight 
since EC legislation on permitted daily driving hours negates the time savings offered by 
the Shuttie service, as compared to the ferries, for road hauliers. Companies are therefore 
also not likely to change location as a result of Eurotunnel's Shuttie service. Dover has 
been the main port for UK-continental RoRo traffic during the 1980s and early 1990s, but 
East Kent has not benefitted from any large-scale relocation of industry. However, reduced 
transit times to centres of European business could prove to be important, with 
accessibility to Paris, Lille and Brussels increased significantiy via the Tunnel. Some 
company directors may consider it important to be near the centre of European economic 
activity; thus the reduced journey times between East Kent and near-continental cities 
could be significant. But the IPS at Ashford is vital i f companies in East Kent, and the 
county as a whole, are also to benefit from reduced journey times to the Continent 
Vickerman (1988a) considers thai the implications of the Tunnel cannot only be analyzed 
in such static terms, believing that the 'dynamic' impact of the Tunnel could bring about 
changes in 'optimal production processes'. The Tunnel will influence the price of transport, 
as an input relative to the prices of other inputs, especially for companies with strong 
trading links with Europe, and so encourage moves towards more transport-intensive modes 
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of production, namely JIT systems which remove the cost of storing raw materials and 
Snished goods in favour of buying and selling goods as required or when ordered. 
Improved reliability in cross-Channel transport via the Tunnel could prove to be the critical 
factor. But Vickerman (1988a, P.9 ) believes that: 
'....the existing industrial structure of the regions closest to the Tunnel (Kent 
and Nord-Pas de Calais) would not appear to be particulariy suitable for 
exploiting any reductions in transport costs....* 
Vickerman concludes that none of these a priori reasons may prove to be dominating 
causes of economic change resulting from the Tunnel. On the contrary, he argues that 
subjective and psychological factors could prove to be more influential: 
' I f British producers believe that the Channel Tunnel wil l make a difference 
to their ability to penetrate other European markets, then they wil l invest 
and behave in a way which is likely to bring this about. If they believe that 
a location close to the Tunnel is more likely to be beneficial, then again 
their collective actions could have important consequences for the local 
economy of Kent.' 
(Vickerman 1988a, P . l l ) 
The results of the questionnaire survey carried out for this research project show that less 
than one percent of companies anticipate relocating as a result of the Tunnel (see chapters 
5 & 6). Furthermore, neariy 30 percent of the companies which responded to the survey 
believe the Tunnel and related infrastructure will improve their existing accessibility levels 
to continental markets. The comparative percentages for companies in the South East and 
the South West do not diverge significantly. Hence, the results show that companies are 
unlikely to be influenced by the psychological attraction of areas close to the Tunnel. 
Vickerman (1988b, 1989a), incorporating work carried out by Brocker (1980), shows that 
the Community's internal borders reduced trade between neighbouring regions on opposite 
sides of national boundaries below the level one would expect for regions a similar 
distance apart within a single state. Vickerman (1988b) believes that such frontier or 
'economic shadow' regions have been hampered by these "artificial" restrictions imposed 
on their "natural" economic hinterlands, and by transport networks which focus on national 
core areas. Kent, but more precisely East Kent, exhibits all the signs associated with the 
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classic frontier region, with London casting its economic shadow over the region. The 
creation of the SEM should help to remove these artificial barriers and stimulate 
cross-frontier trade. The European high-speed rail network, of which the Tunnel will 
become an integral part, could lay the foundations for a European Transport Policy and 
reduce the national bias of transport networks. However East Kent, and other depressed 
frontier regions of North West Europe, may not necessarily benefit from the Tunnel and/or 
the European high-speed rail network, since the 'Corridor Effect' could replace the 
economic shadow cast over these regions (Holliday and Vickerman 1989). Only major 
centres wi l l be linked by the high-speed rail network, leaving the depressed border regions 
en-route between such core areas un-served. This theoretical proposition would seem to 
be supported by the experience of TGV Sud Est. Beriioz et. al. (1985) and Bonnafous 
(1987) argue that TGV Sud Est became a catalyst for economic development only where 
prior dynamism already existed, and so did not encourage growth outside the major 
metropoles served by the new line. 
However, based on the findings of the questionnaire survey undertaken for the present 
thesis, companies in Kent do currenUy plan to use the Tunnel for freight exports to die 
Continent to the same extent as all respondents (approximately 25% plan to use the Tunnel 
to some degree). In addition, a proportionately greater number of companies in Kent 
anticipate using the Tunnel for future business trips; 20.8 percent plan for more tiian 20 
percent of future business uips to go via the Tunnel, compared to 10.3 percent of all 
respondents. In both instances, companies in Kent are more likely to favour using 
Eurotunnel's Shuttle service, reflecting their proximity to this service. It would therefore 
appear that companies in Kent are as likely to realise the advantages offered by the Tunnel 
as all companies in general. Thus, the findings of the questionnaire survey suggest that 
Vickerman could be overly pessimistic. 
Companies in Kent are also more likely to anticipate that the Tunnel will have an impact 
on their level of competitiveness. Over 40 percent expect their accessibility to continental 
markets to improve after the Tunnel opens, compared to 30.5 percent of companies in the 
South East as a whole and 28.5 percent for all respondents. However. 41.7 percent of 
companies in Kent also believe they will be vulnerable to increased competition from the 
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Continent The respective figures for the South East and all respondents are 23.6 and 
22.9 percent Furthermore, die questionnaire survey showed tiiat companies in Kent are as 
likely to be optimistic about the overall regional economic impact of the Tunnel and 
related infrastructure. Those anticipating a beneficial impact account for 62.5 and 63.5 
percent of the companies in Kent and the Soudi East as a whole, respectively. However, 
more companies in Kent (29.2%) fear a damaging impact on their regional economy 
compared to the South East as a whole (12.0%) and all respondents (15.1%). It is likely 
that the adverse medium-term implications of the Tunnel on the Kent port and ferry 
industry influenced this result Nonetheless, it is apparent that company perceptions in Kent 
and their planned usage of the Tunnel, for both passenger and freight traffic, contradict to 
some extent the conclusions reached by Vickerman (1988b). 
A survey carried-out by Henley et al. (1989) shows that only 19 percent of companies in 
Kent had any European sales and none had sales greater than 50 percent The comparative 
figure for non-Kent companies is 64 percent Furthermore, only 12 percent of companies 
in Kent purchased supplies from Europe. This would appear to be a strong indictment of 
Kent as a frontier region. Therefore, the results imply that the advantage Kent 
establishments have regarding proximity to the Continent via existing transport links has 
not been an important locational factor. The CTJCC (I991a&b) also reports that die 
improvements to Kent's road and rail networks are considered more important by 
companies in Kent than the Tunnel, in that they would increase the area's accessibility to 
the major domestic markets of the South East and the Midlands. 
7.4.3. Nord-Pas de Calais 
The same argument advanced by Vickerman (1988a&b, 1989a&b), in terms of the 
'Corridor Effect' preventing East Kent benefitting from the Tunnel, would also be relevant 
to Nord-Pas de Calais. However, as discussed in the Literature Review (chapter 2), 
northern France is perceived as an alternative location for British companies. Nonetheless, 
most commentators do not regard this threat as serious: 
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'The CTG-FM (now Eurotunnel) fixed link wil l not precipitate any 
substantial movement of British manufacturing firms to the Nord. Indeed 
it wil l probably reduce the likelihood of British firms locating in Nord-Pas 
de Calais for the same reasons as those advanced in assessing the impact 
of the link upon east Kent; through traffic wil l be enhanced by the removal 
of a transport bottieneck.' 
(Gibb 1986b, P.347) 
Gibb is therefore of the opinion, as is Vickerman, that the Tunnel will not encourage a 
soutiiwards nugration of British industry to die South East or northern France. In 
contradiction, however, the Review (CTJCC 1991a) states that the reduced secondary 
employment estimates for East Kent result in part from some companies seriously 
considering locating 'some activity in Nord-Pas de Calais'. 
Given these varying fears and assessments it is important to examine the relative 
attractions or otiierwise of Nord-Pas de Calais. Land values/rents are 75-80 percent lower 
in Nord-Pas de Calais but these costs only form a small proportion of total costs (CTJCC 
1991a). Since labour costs in Kent are 25 percent lower than in Calais, Kent was 
considered to retain a significant 10 percent advantage in terms of set-up and operating 
costs. Even so, both the KIS and the Review recognise that Kent, particularly East Kent, 
cannot afford to be complacent. Since the publication of the KIS in 1987, the road and 
rail infrastructure in Nord-Pas de Calais has improved considerably. The motorway 
networks in both regions are believed to be of a similar standard, whilst TGV Nord has 
led to a relative advantage for Nord-Pas de Calais in terms of rail services. As a result of 
proximity to London's airports, Kent is seen to have 'the edge' in terms of access to 
international air sei-vices (CTJCC 1991a). 
The availability of potential development land is not regarded as a problem in either region 
but: 
'The principal difficulty facing Kent is that sites in districts where economic 
development is most needed in East Kent tend either to have poor road 
access, or poor site services or both.' 
(CTJCC I99la, P.94) 
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Environmental constraints are also more pronounced in Kent, including East Kent. 
Furthermore, Nord-Pas de Calais is in receipt of substantial French and EC financial 
assistance. The designation of East Kent as an Assisted Area would redress this imbalance. 
The KIS believes that, with the Tunnel, Kent and Nord-Pas de Calais will be perceived as 
one region within which locational decisions are made, especially by American and 
Japanese investors. KCC and the Nord-Pas de Calais Regional Council have agreed to 
cooperate actively to the benefit of both regions. More important to industrial location, 
however, could be the greater commitment shown within France towards the Tunnel: 
*Many French organisations, particularly in Nord-Pas de Calais, see the 
Tunnel as an historic opportunity to transform their region....' 
(CTJCC 1987, P.58) 
A survey undertaken by the Review (CTJCC 1991a) shows that 30 percent of companies 
in Kent now regard Nord-Pas de Calais as a possible location, with 15 percent seriously 
considering relocating part of their activity to the region. These figures are much higher 
than the comparative findings of the questionnaire survey carried out for the current 
research project. The Review (CTJCC 1991a) places much emphasis on the tourism 
industry for the successful diversification of the Kent economy but, as shown in the 
Literature Review (chapter 2), considerable effort has been made by the Regional Council 
to upgrade the Cote d'Opale in northern France. 
7.4.4. The Tourism Industry 
Tourism is seen as a potential source of development on both sides of the Channel. For 
example: 
'Overall the 1987 Strategy called for a "massive scaling up of the tourist 
industry in East Kent" and of the training measures needed to support this.' 
(CTJCC 1991a. P.63) 
The CTJCC now anticipates that less than 500 additional jobs will be created in the Kent 
tourism industry as a result of the Tunnel by 1994, compared to the KIS's eariier estimate 
of between 2,000-3,000. The CTJCC (1991a) regards the KIS's estimate as too optimistic 
since: 
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' I t roughly requires £30,000 of tourism expenditure to create an additional 
tourism job....which means that tourism expenditure generated by the 
Tunnel would have to be £60-90 million per annum.' 
(CTJCC 1991a. P.37) 
In 1989, tourism expenditure in Kent was £473.95 million. This implies that the Tunnel 
would have to encourage an increase in tourism expenditure by 12.7 to 19 percent (or 24 
to 36 percent on 1987 levels). It is estimated that in 1989, East Kent accounted for 14.3 
million of the 22.82 million holiday/day trips in Kent and £293.65 million of the £473.95 
million tourism expenditure in the county (CTJCC 1991b). Tourism expenditure direcdy 
supported 12,236 jobs in Kent in 1991, which is expected to increase to 15,580 jobs in 
2001; 529 of which are as a result of the Tunnel. Including multiplier and linkage effects, 
it is anticipated that the Tunnel will create a total of 730 jobs in the tourism industry by 
2001, It is reasonable to assume that a large proportion, nearly two-thirds based on 1991 
tourism expenditure, of these job gains will be located in East Kent. 
The Review cites the recent tourists developments within East Kent which have been 
designed to augment the opportunities created by the Tunnel; the visitor centres at 
Canterbury, the White Cliffs Experience at Dover, improvements to Dover Castle and the 
Eurotunnel Exhibition Centre at Cheriton. Nonetheless, a continued up-grading and 
improvement of the East Kent tourism industry is needed. As Gibb argues: 
'Although there was a 29 per cent increase in leisure and tourism-related 
employment in the South East between 1971 and 1981, this sector actually 
declined by five per cent in east Kent as a result of outdated holiday 
accommodation and the lack of modem facilities.' 
(Gibb 1986b. P.342) 
The East Kent Tourism Development Action Programme' (TDAP) initiative was 
established in 1989, and originally planned to run for three years. The TDAP initiative is 
intended to improve the quality and image of the tourism sector in East Kent: 
'There will be an on-going requirement to continue to stimulate the tourism 
industry to improve the product and standards of service if the East Kent 
area is to compete successfully with other destinations to maximise the 
benefits from the Tunnel....' 
(CTJCC 1991b, P.131) 
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One of the 'other destinations' will be the Nord-Pas de Calais. As shown in the Literature 
Review (chapter 2), the Regional Council has made significant attempts to improve the 
tourism attractions and facilities in the region. As pan of "Region Transmanche" (the 
frontier region agreement signed by KCC and the Regional Council), Kent and Nord-Pas 
de Calais will be marketed as one joint region. Based on a discussion with the KCC 
Tourism Officer (personal interview: Ormiston 1992), it is hoped that although northern 
France and Belgium will become more attractive to traditional British visitors to Kent after 
the Tunnel opens in 1993, this will be more than offset by the increased number of foreign 
visitors to Kent. KCC is eager to attract more transit tourists to stay within the county. The 
Council therefore plans to market Kent as being in easy reach of London. However, the 
effectiveness of the TDAP will be limited as a result of its relatively small budget, £0.5 
million over three years (personal interview: McKim 1992). 
7.5. Summary and Conclusion 
*The Strategy (the KIS) was originally designed to provide Kent with an 
opportunity to share in the economic and other benefits generated by the 
Channel Tunnel and to minimise the substantial adverse impact of the 
Tunnel, panicularly on East Kent, through the contraction of the ferry 
industry.' 
(CTJCC 1991a, P.i) 
The CTJCC (1991a) accepts that the implementation of the Strategy for East Kent has 
largely failed. The initial optimism associated with the Tunnel in East Kent expressed in 
the KIS is no longer apparent, with more job losses and fewer job gains anticipated. The 
direct impact of the Tunnel on the port and ferry industry is estimated to be a net loss of 
nearly 6,000 jobs. In addition, at least a further 2,000 jobs will be lost in East Kent 
through the 'run-down* of the TML workforce. The priority of the EKI is seen to be the 
retraining and re-employment of these redundant workers. However, significant 
employment opportunities will have to be created if East Kent is not to suffer a negative 
long-term impact. The early fears of several East Kent District Councils are now likely to 
be realised. The Strategy for East Kent, as oudined in the Review (CTJCC 1991a), seems 
285 -
to be primarily dependent on the "massive scaling" up of the tourism industry. The Review 
states that the KIS places too much emphasis on tourism but very little seems to be able 
to take its place. 
The net employment estimates for Kent as a whole, based on the effects of the Tunnel, 
related infrastructure and the SEM, forecast a gain of 2,610 jobs (CTJCC 1991a). In terms 
of just the Tunnel and related infrastructure, however, the net impact on the county is only 
a net gain 280 jobs or even a net loss of 220 jobs. This represents less than two to three 
percent of the 12.900-9,600 net job gains estimated by the KIS. The KIS has continually 
been regarded as over-confident in its estimations, the Review believing that 
*The boom of 1987 to 1989 generated an air of optimism about the Tunnel 
and the opportunities it presented....' 
(CTJCC 1991a, P.i) 
Nonetheless, the Review (CTJCC 1991a) avoids highlighting the extent of this 'optimism*. 
Analyzing the Review's findings in more detail, two implications become evident. Firstly, 
the statistical evidence on which the estimates of indirect job gains are based can at best 
be considered semi-accurate. The more modest estimates of job gains have to be treated 
with some degree of scepticism and a higher number of job losses are now more likely, 
in terms of TML redundancies and the rationalisation of the port and ferry industry. 
Secondly, since both North and Mid Kent are expected to experience a net positive impact, 
2,400 and 1,400 job gains respectively, the burden of the job losses will fall almost 
entirely on East Kent. As Table 7.9 shows, the total net impact of the Tunnel, related 
infrastructure and the SEM, including backward linkages and the multiplier effect, on East 
Kent is a loss of nearly 9.000 jobs. Even this extremely pessimistic forecast for East Kent 
is conservative compared to the CTJCC's (1991a&c) more "dire" scenario, which 
encompasses a complete collapse of the East Kent ferry industry. 
In terms of the impact within East Kent, Ashford is still regarded as the main beneficiaiy. 
But it is no longer seen as the basis for an East Kent economic recovery. Its role as a 
"growthpole" within East Kent has been undermined by the delays associated with both 
the IPS and the high-speed rail link. The 1991 Review considers the IPS at Ashford to be 
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critical for East Kent, allowing companies and residents in the area to benefit fiilly from 
improved accessibility to the Continent. Without the IPS, Holliday and Vickerman (1989) 
argue that any induced development from the Tunnel will by-pass East Kent in favour of 
the wider South East region. 
The CTJCC calls on central Government to designate East Kent an Assisted Area, but such 
a designation is far from certain (personal interview: McKim 1992). Thus, financial 
assistance for East Kent wil l have to be sought elsewhere. To compound this problem, East 
Kent is likely to lose its status as an area benefitting from European Coal and Steel 
Community assistance. However, i f East Kent is successful in gaining Assisted Area status, 
the attraction of the area to potential companies will be improved significantly. An East 
Kent Development Agency has again been proposed by the CTJCC (1991a) but moves 
toward such a body are still unlikely as a result of the unwillingness of certain District 
Councils to co-operate. Furthermore, central Government departments are criticized by the 
Review for the 'poor' and 'patchy' implementation of the Strategy. Concerted action is 
needed to help East Kent absorb the large-scale redundancies in the port and ferry industry 
following the opening of the Tunnel. Many therefore believe that without full Government 
support little wil l be achieved. Local government within East Kent believes that with the 
limited resources available, all that can be done has been done (personal interview: Jarret 
1992). The EKI and the TDAP initiative for the area will allow the problems and 
opportunities to be identified but the necessary Government assistance has to be 
forthcoming. The designation of East Kent as an Assisted Area is of paramount importance 
to the area, thus it is only possible to conclude that the long-term prospects for East Kent 
look "bleak". 
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C H A P T E R 8: T H E "FAR SOUTH WEST" (DEVON & C O R N W A L L ) 
In terms of railway infrastructure and service provision, the South West, but more 
particularly the Far South West, is one of the most isolated regions from the Tunnel and 
any associated development benefits (see Figiu-e 8.1). In addition, many commentators 
believe that the Far South West exhibits characteristics commonly associated with the 
"North" (see Champion and Green 1988, Green 1988, Martin 1988, TCPA 1987. 1989). 
Therefore, the case study of Devon and Cornwall can be seen, to some extent, as 
representative of the likely implications of the Tunnel on the "North" in general. Thus, it 
is a continuation of the "North-South" theme which is pursued throughout the present 
thesis. This chapter will examine whether Devon and Cornwall are likely to be 
disadvantaged by an inadequate transport infrastructure. The concepts of "isolation" (i.e. 
whether the region will be prevented from taking advantage of the opportunities created) 
and "insulation" (i.e. whether Devon and Cornwall will be protected from the adverse 
effects) will be juxtaposed to determine the economic impact of the Tunnel on the Far 
South West 
Local authorities within the Far South West, principally the Devon and Cornwall County 
Councils and Plymouth City Council, have commissioned several reports examining the 
economic implications of the Tunnel (Comwall C.C. et. al. 1989a&b). These reports 
represent a useful starting point for the current analysis. More up-to-date information was 
generated during August 1992, through personal interviews with representatives of local 
government, commerce and industry. Reference will also be made to the results of the 
questionnaire survey undertaken for the current research project. However, due to the small 
number of companies responding in Devon and Comwall, care must be taken when 
interpreting the results. 
To determine the economic implications of the Tunnel on the Far South West, attention 
will focus fu-st on the likely impact on the Devon and Comwall port and ferry industry. 
The short-sea ferry industry will experience head-on competition with the Tunnel but the 
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Figure 8.1 The 'Far South West ' : Devon and Cornwall Source ; Gibb et al 1990b 
long-sea sector is also likely to be affected, albeit marginally. The adequacy of the Far 
South West transpon network will then be examined, since the long-term impact will be 
strongly influenced by the quality of transport links serving the region. The effect of the 
Tunnel on the Devon and Comwall tourism industry, already an important component of 
the regional economy, will also be examined. Finally, the "unforeseen" threat of improved 
accessibility between the UK and the Continent with respect to the Far South West will 
be analyzed. This "Third Market" effect has been largely ignored by earlier regional 
reports. Devon and Comwall will not be "insulated" from potential adverse effects if 
"isolation" from the Tunnel proves to be cosily in terms of lost market share in the South 
East and the Midlands as a result of increased import penetration by continental producers. 
8.1. The Long-Sea Ferry Industry 
The post-Tunnel long-sea ferry indusuy is likely to be marginally affected (Gibb 1989, 
1990). Time and cost savings, i f any, are considered to be negligible for both passenger 
and freight traffic going via the Tunnel. However, head-on competition in the short-sea 
sector could indirectly affect ferry services in the western Channel. Therefore a brief 
discussion of existing ferry services operating from Devon and Comwall is required, before 
examining the likely impact of the Tunnel and the potential for a westward redeployment 
of excess ferry capacity from the short-sea sector. 
8.1.1. Existing Ferry Services 
The ferry services operating across the English Channel are shown in Figure 8.2, with the 
three Channel sectors identified. The western Channel or long-sea sector incorporates the 
ports of Cherbourg, St. Malo, Roscoff, Plymouth, Weymouth, Poole and Southampton. The 
current analysis is applicable to other ports in the westem Channel outside Devon and 
Comwall, albeit less so as distance from the Tunnel decreases. Although the short-sea 
sector accounts for approximately 75 percent of passenger, 70 percent of car-accompanied 
and 55 percent of RoRo traffic. Gibb (1990) emphasizes the substantial rate of growth 
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Figure 8.2 Cross Channel Ferry Services Source; Gibb 1990a 
experienced in the western sector (see Table 8.1). Anglo-French cross-Channel passenger 
and car-accompanied traffic nearly doubled in die long-sea sector between 1971 and 1980 
but RoRo traffic recorded an increased market share from 1.7 to 18.2 percent in the same 
period. This rapid increase in RoRo traffic was at the expense of the central Channel and 
is attributed by Gibb to the expansion of services operated from Plymouth by Brittany 
Ferries (Bretagne. Angleterre, Irlande (BAI)). 
The only regular ferry services out of Devon and Cornwall are run by Brittany Ferries. By 
1974, both freight and passenger/car-accompanied ferry services were operating on the 
Plymouth-Roscoff route and by 1978, a similar service was established on the Plymouth-
Santander route. Figures 8.3 to 8.5 outline the rate of growth experienced on these routes 
between 1978 and 1988 for passenger, car-accompanied and freight traffic respectively. 
SECTOR YEAR 
1971 
(PERCENT) 
1975 1980 
PASSENGERS 
Short-sea 77 .8 76.4 75.4 
C e n t r a l 16.6 16.1 14 .0 
Western 5.6 7.5 10.6 
CAR-ACCOMPANIED 
Short-sea 70.6 69.8 68.9 
C e n t r a l 20.8 19.6 15.0 
Western 8.6 10.6 16.1 
ROAD HAULAGE (RORO) 
Short-sea 53 .3 56.6 57 .7 
C e n t r a l 45.0 29.9 24 .1 
Western 1.7 13.5 18.2 
Table 8.1: Cross-Channel traffic by sector. 
(Source: Gibb 1990, P.7; after Conseil Superieur de la Marine Marchande 1981) 
- 292 -
300-
250 
^ 200 
C 
in 
O 
^ 150 
<D D) C 
0) 
C/) 
(/) 
TO 
Q- 100 
50 
est 
est. 
1978 ' 80 ' 82 ' 84 ' 86 88 
Year 
Figure 8.3 Rate of growth on the Roscoff and Santander routes ; 
passenger traffic. 
Source ; Gibb 1990a 
60 
50 
^ 40 
X5 
c 
03 
CO 
I 30 
(/5 
(T3 
o 20-
10-
1978 
fiSS'^^^'J'j' .-est-
est, 
80 82 84 
Year 
86 88 
Figure 8.4 Rate of growth on the Roscoff and Santander routes ; 
car accompanied traffic. 
Source ; Gibb 1990a 
14 
12 
cn 10 
T3 
C 
CO 
<D 
3 
O e 8 
CO 
o 
0) 
6 -
4^ 
1978 
est, 
est. 
80 82 84 
Year 
86 88 
Figure 8.5 Rate of growth on the Roscoff and Santander routes ; 
freight traff ic. 
Source ; Gibb 1990a 
During the early 1980s, Brittany Ferries suffered considerable operating losses, but the 
French Government, in collaboration with the local authorities from the Brittany region, 
invested £8.6 million in the company: 
'BAFs operations cannot be considered outside the broader economic and 
political environment of the Breton region of Westem France. BAI's aim, 
shared by the French state, is to create a new European axis of 
communication centred on Brittany.* 
(Gibb 1990, R8) 
Gibb therefore assumes that i f Brittany Ferries was to be adversely affected by the Tunnel, 
further suppon would be forthcoming from the French Government. 
8.1.2. The Post-Tunnel Westem Channel 
Eurotunnel (1987) anticipates all of the EC (except Eire), plus Austria, Switzeriand and the 
former Yugoslavia, to be within the catchment area of the Tunnel. It is therefore expected 
that 90 percent of the classic passenger market and 63 percent of the car-accompanied 
market would be captured respectively by BR*s international through trains and 
EurotunnePs Shuttle service. In addition, 25 percent of RoRo and 50 percent of 
container/wagon traffic is also expected to go via the Tunnel. As Gibb (1990) suggests, i f 
these market shares are attracted evenly from the three cross-Channel ferry sectors the 
impact on Brittany Ferries will be *disasu-ous'. However, utilising the earlier study by 
Chisholm (1986), it is argued in chapter 7 that Eurotunnel's traffic forecasts are overiy 
optimistic, with the hypothesized catchment area regarded as too extensive. 
Gibb (1990) also employs the analysis carried-out by Chisholm (1986) to determine the 
relevance and implications of Eurotunnel's forecasts for the Far South West port and ferry 
industry. Any immediate lime savings enjoyed when using the Tunnel in comparison with 
the Plymouth ferry routes for both passenger and freight U"affic are shown to be 'partially 
or fully offset' by the additional driving lime incurred and the associated extra costs (Gibb 
1990). Thus, the car-accompanied passenger market is considered to be relatively safe from 
Tunnel competition. In addition, since the Plymouth-Santander ferry service attracts very 
few classic foot passengers, it does not represent a 'competing service' with the Tunnel 
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(Gibb 1990). The Plymouth-Roscoff service does, however, carry a proportionately greater 
number of foot passengers which could be attracted by BR's intemadonal through trains. 
But with no day-time service planned by BR and existing links to London Waterloo/King's 
Cross considered inadequate, the attraction of international rail travel is likely to be much 
reduced in the Far South West As reported by Gibb, the CTG, in the original submission 
to the Government, estimated that 31 percent of the passenger market in the central and 
western sectors would be captured by the Tunnel. This figure would seem very optimistic; 
especially for ferry services operating out of Plymouth, given that they are the most 
geographically protected. Therefore, the overall impact of the Tunnel on passenger traffic 
is likely to be minimal, with any immediate loss in market share expected to be made-up 
by the continued rate of growth in the westem sector (Gibb 1990). 
In terms of the freight market, Gibb (1989) again concludes that the Tunnel will only 
marginally affect the Devon and Comwall port and ferry industry. Based on Department 
of Transport 1987 data, Gibb points out that 91 percent of freight exports from the Far 
South West are bulk or non-unitised goods. Only Plymouth and Exmouth handle unitised 
freight, with 95 percent going through Plymouth. Low value bulk goods can only be viably 
transported by sea, not by rail. Thus, most pons in Devon and Comwall handling freight 
traffic will be unaffected by competition from the Tunnel. In terms of unitised freight, EC 
legislation on permitted daily driving hours (not more than nine hours in any 24 hour 
period) makes it unlikely that road hauliers from the Far South West will favour the 
Tunnel. Therefore, any loss of market share to BR is also likely to be more than 
compensated for by the continuing growth in the cross-Channel freight traffic. 
Thus, it is reasonable to assume that the Devon and Comwall port and ferry industry will 
only be marginally affected by increased competition from the Tunnel. However, the 
prospect of excess ferry capacity in the short-sea sector being redeployed westwards also 
needs to be examined. 
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8.1.3. A Westward Redeployment of Ferry Services? 
It is hoped within Devon and Cornwall that the western Channel will benefit from over-
capacity in the short-sea sector, with new ferry routes being established between the Far 
South West and the Iberian peninsular (personal interviews: Griffin 1992). As the former 
Chairman of Sea Containers, owners of Sealink, John Sherwood states: 
' I can say with certainty that once the tunnel is open SEALINK UK and all 
other ferry operators will be out of business on the routes which connect 
South East England and the range of ports from Dieppe to Zeebrugge.... 
given notice we will have deployed our resources elsewhere.* 
(Gibb 1990, P.38) 
As outlined in chapter 7, both P&O and Sealink are now confident that they will be in a 
position to continue to operate ferry services on the Dover to Calais route after the Tunnel 
opens. Nonetheless, both P&O and Sealink still expect that a substantial redeployment of 
excess ferry capacity will be necessary. At the 'Moving into Europe' conference, Strover 
(1991) stated P&O's interest in operating a ferry service to the Iberian peninsular from 
either Devon or Cornwall. However, where these extra services would operate from poses 
real difficulties, since Brittany Ferries have leased the berths at Plymouth until the turn of 
the century. In 1986, the Olau Line showed interest in operating a Falmouth-Bilbao route 
but the 'appalling road network to the port' was regarded as a major drawback (Gibb 
1989). A similar service from Falmouth is again under negotiation, with the County 
Council's full support. Based on discussions with the County Planning Officer for 
Cornwall, the County Council accepts that certain road improvements schemes to the port 
may be necessary to increase the attractiveness of Falmouth for a new ferry service 
(personal interview: Griffin 1992). 
Nevertheless, by August 1992, no firm commitment has been made to operate a new ferry 
route from the Far South West. Port accessibility, by both road and rail, is likely to be 
critical to the potential redeployment of ferry services from the short-sea fleet to Devon 
and Cornwall, as well as of prime importance to the existing port and ferry industry. 
Transport links between the Far South West and the Tunnel portal will be crucial to the 
overall economic impact of the Tunnel. The next section therefore focuses attention on 
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the perceived inadequate nature of the region^s transport network. It will then be possible 
to examine the long-term impact of the Tunnel on Devon and Cornwall, contrasting the 
benefits of "insulation" as against the costs of "isolation". 
8.2. Transport Links to the Far South West 
*With just three years to go before the Channel Tunnel opens to traffic it 
is becoming more and more likely that the potential that this project once 
offered to benefit all parts of the United Kingdom will not be fully 
realised.' 
(TCPA 1990, P.l) 
The TCPA is concerned that the opportunity for the regionalisation of benefits created by 
the Tunnel has already been missed as a result of inadequate transport infrastructure and 
services. In fact, without decisive action, the TCPA foresees the Tunnel exacerbating 
existing "Centre-Periphery" divisions in the UK. Devon and Cornwall County Councils and 
Plymouth City Council commissioned an ^Impact Study' (Cornwall C.C. et. al. 1989a), to 
identify potential opportunities for the Far South West. Their recommendations were also 
outlined in an 'Action Plan' (Cornwall C.C. ei. al. 1989b). However, these opportunities 
have not been realised or the recommendations acted upon (personal interviews: 
Franceschini 1992, Griffin 1992). As argued in chapter 3 and recognised by the TCPA 
(1990), the benefits of the Tunnel for most UK regions will primarily depend on 
companies switching their distribution practices in favour of rail freight Thus, the 
proposed level of intemational rail services to the Far South West is first examined, before 
focusing attention on the quality of the road network serving Devon and Cornwall (see 
Figure 8.6). 
8.2J, Intemational Rail Services 
\...the tunnel's benefits for the southwest may not materialise because of 
a failure to invest in convenient connecting services or new infrastructure 
to the peripheral regions.' 
(Gibb, Essex and Charlton 1990, P.46) 
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Outside the South East, the highest regional passenger demand for international services 
is recorded by the South West/South Wales region (Gibb et. al. 1990). However, BR 
(1989b) does not plan to operate a direct daytime international passenger service to and 
from the South West/South Wales region. A nighttime service which splits at Bristol and 
continues on to Plymouth/Cardiff is planned to start operating in 1995. The South West 
and South Wales are treated as one region by BR because both are served by the former 
Great Western Railway (GWR) from Paddington, with Bristol in a strategic position to 
serve both areas. 
The reasons behind BR's decision not to run a daytime through train to the West Country 
is partly as a result of the difficulty posed by the existence of three separate rail corridors 
(see Figure 8.6). In addition, passenger volumes are not considered sufficient to justify 
such a service. International passenger services to the South West/South Wales would only 
serve one region, unlike through trains to the North of England and beyond; which 
incorporate the West Midlands, the North West and Scotland (Glasgow) on the WCML and 
the East Midlands, the North East and Scotland (Edinburgh) on the ECML. More 
important, however, is that for a region to be served by a daytime international through 
train, the rail line has to be electrified to accommodate the new rolling stock for 
international services. The main Paddington to Penzance route is at present served by the 
125 diesel locomotive fleet but Sir Bob Reid, Chairman of BR, has stated BR's intention 
to electrify this line by the turn of the century (Devon C.C. 1992). Despite this assurance, 
however, there is some concern that existing InterCity services to Cornwall will be 
terminated (personal interviews: Puzey 1992, Strandring 1992). The Paddington main line 
could therefore be electrified only as far as Plymouth. 
The Far South West will only be served by a nighttime through train to Plymouth and 
connecting services during the day, from Penzance to Paddington or Exeter to Waterloo. 
There are no plans at present to continue the nighttime service into Cornwall, although BR 
are currently re-examining the potential to do so. Nighttime services from Plymouth, 
Swansea and Glasgow will be amalgamated at Olympia into two trains, one for Paris and 
one for Brussels. The reverse will also apply, with nighttime services from Paris and 
Brussels. 
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In terms of daytime international services, the Government's decision in favour of the Ove 
Arup East London high-speed rail link via Stratford to King's Cross could further 
disadvantage the Far South West: 
'As far as the West Country is concerned, King's Cross is not particularly 
relevant to the provision of direct through services to the Continent....' 
(Devon C.C. 1992, P.17) 
In contrast to other UK regions. King's Cross would not provide a useful interchange for 
international services to the Far South West. Devon County Council therefore recognise 
the importance of 'establishing an electrified link from Stratford across North London to 
Acton on the Faddington to Bristol route and electrification onwards to Bristol and Devon 
and Cornwall' (Devon C.C. 1992). However, with £200 million being currently invested 
in the Waterloo IPS, it is unlikely that international passenger services would cease to run 
into Waterloo after the high-speed rail link is built. With no direct daytime international 
passenger service on offer to the Far South West, an interchange facility at Exeter, with 
hourly services to the Waterloo IPS, was initially regarded as the optimal solution for 
Devon and Cornwall (Cornwall C.C. et. al. 1989a&b). Connecting services to Waterloo via 
Exeter may not significantly disadvantage the Far South West, at least in terms of journey 
times. But the psychological importance of not having direct through services could prove 
to be costly, particularly in terms of the tourism industry (personal interview: Strandring 
1992). The decision by BR not to extend the motorail service to the West Country is likely 
also to affect adversely the attraction of Devon and Cornwall to incoming tourists, since 
nearly 95 percent visit the Far South West by car (personal interview: Strandring). The 
impact of the Tunnel on the Devon and Cornwall tourism industry will be discussed in 
section 8.3.2. Nonetheless, local government in Devon and Cornwall believe it necessary 
to lobby BR at every opportunity to ensure the electrification of the Paddington to 
Penzance main line and encourage the provision of direct daytime international passenger 
services to and from the Far South West (personal interviews: Franceschini 1992, Griffin 
1992). 
The Joint South Wales/South West Counties' 'Channel Tunnel Rail Strategy' (Welsh 
Counties Committee 1990) highlights the potential of an 'around London service' to the 
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proposed Ashford IPS, via Reading and Redhill. The Transport Users Consultative 
Committee for western England (TUCC - 1991) also argues for a 'direct route by-passing 
London for passenger and freight* traffic. The TUCC considers the upgrading of the North 
Downs route, the line between Reading and Ashford, as the best, and only practicable, 
solution: 
'Reading....is a natural gateway to the West and Wales, the Midlands, the 
North and Scotland.' 
(TUCC 1991, P.vi) 
The North Downs route would avoid the need for across London links, by underground or 
taxi, and the capacity problems likely to arise at King's Cross. An around London route 
would be beneficial for the Far South West, and other peripheral UK regions, for both 
passenger and freight traffic but the indefinite postponement of the Ashford IPS 
undermines the whole proposal, at least in the short-term. Furthermore, BR (1989b) has 
indicated that it has no plans to develop a by-pass route via Reading. 
The constraints imposed on BR, particularly through Section 42 of the 1987 Channel 
Tunnel Act, are widely appreciated (see chapter 4). However, BR has stated that with 
respect to the South West/South Wales region: 
'EPS (European Passenger Services) will carefully monitor the initial traffic 
flows and respond i f it can be demonstrated that an insufficient service is 
being offered, either in terms of through or connecting trains.' 
(BR 1989c, P.5) 
A continuation of the nighttime service on to Penzance would seem the first test of BR's 
commitment to offer an adequate intemational service to Cornwall. In the long-term, the 
electrification of the Paddington to Penzance main line will enable BR to improve 
considerably the level of international services proposed for the Far South West. In the 
meantime, a good connecting service via Exeter to Waterioo is likely to provide the best 
option for daytime passenger services to the Continent. 
BR's (1989b) plans for freight services to the Continent for the Far South West are also 
widely regarded as inadequate (Cornwall C.C. et. al. 1989a, Gibb 1990). Devon and 
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Cornwall County Councils and Plymouth City Council consider an intermodal terminal at 
Plymouth as vital for both counties, but BR does not believe demand will justify such a 
facility. BR's (1989b) forecasts for rail freight are believed by most commentators to be 
very conservative (CLES 1989, Pieda 1989a&b, TCPA 1990). The TCPA (1990) argues 
that BR's policy of concentrating entirely on new intermodal technology is misguided. 
Continental UIC B+ gauge freight routes throughout the UK are considered to be important 
to allow the regions to maximise the opportunities created by the Tunnel. This conclusion 
is supported by the study carried out by the NUR (1987). 
Since the high-speed rail link between London and the Tunnel portal may be built to the 
continental loading gauge, Devon C.C. (1991) believes that the proposed electrification of 
the main line to the Far South West should also encompass plans to change the loading 
gauge to the continental Berne UIC B+ gauge standard. This would facilitate direct 
international freight services between the Far South West and the Continent. The 
continental Berne gauge allows loads six inches wider and substantially higher than the UK 
loading gauge. The re-engineering of existing rail lines would be a massive undertaking, 
involving the rebuilding of bridges, tunnels and stations, as well as necessitate new rolling 
stock for all other rail services on those lines. For these reasons, BR currently favours the 
introduction of new vehicle technology to accommodate continental-sized containers and 
trailers within the UK. 
8.2.2. Road links to the Tunnel 
Since the benefits of the Tunnel for the more peripheral UK regions primarily depend on 
companies using rail freight (explained in detail in chapter 3), it is only necessary to 
examine briefly the implications of poor road links to the Far South West. Cornwall C.C. 
et. al. (1989a) considers improved road access to be critical i f the benefits created by the 
Tunnel for the tourism industry are to be realised. Nearly 95 percent of tourists visiting the 
Far South West travel by car. In addition, an inadequate road network could adversely 
affect the attraction of Devon and Cornwall ports in terms of the redeployment of ferries 
from the short-sea sector. 
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As can be seen from Figure 8.6, road links between the Far South West and the Tunnel 
portal are 'tied* to the M25 (Cornwall C.C. et. al. 1989a). Improvements to the M4/M5 and 
M3/A303/A30 are therefore considered important but a route by-passing the M25 is 
favoured: 
'Both routes are congested and circuitous and an upgraded through route 
from Kent to the southwest, bypassing the heavily trafficked M25. would 
be of considerable value.' 
(Gibb et al. 1990, P.46) 
However, the necessary investment is unlikely to be forthcoming from central Government 
The Department of Transport has argued that increased road traffic as a result of the 
Tunnel will be insufficient to justify increased investment in the road network outside Kent 
(Department of Transport 1986). Improvements to the trunk road network within Devon 
and Comwall have been made, including the Okehampton and Blackwater by-passes and 
the Nonh Devon link road. But Comwall CC. et al. (1989a) also propose the extension 
of the M5 to Plymouth, a second Tamar Crossing and the completion of the improvements 
to the A30. 
8.2.3. An Inadequate Transport Network: a summary 
It is apparent that many regional actors think that considerable improvements to the 
transpon network to the Far South West and within Devon and Comwall are vital i f the 
regional economic impact of the Tunnel is to be positive: 
*Road and rail infrastructure to and from Devon and Comwall needs to be 
improved to enable the counties to compete better with more accessible 
regions of Britain.' 
(Comwall C C et al. 1989a, P.38) 
The TCPA (1990) recognises that the benefits created by the Tunnel for the regions 
primarily depend on companies exporting goods to the Continent via the rail network, and 
thus calls for a T G V North*. However, like most other regional reports, the TCPA seems 
to have overiooked the interests of the Far South West. Devon and Comwall are not only 
geographically peripheral but also isolated in terms of road and rail links to the Tunnel. 
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The local authorities in the Far South West have been active in stating the case for 
transport infrastrxicnire investment in the region, lobbying both BR and the Department of 
Transport at every opportunity (personal interview: Franceschini 1992). Nonetheless, 
recommendations outlined in the Action Plan (Cornwall C.C. et. al. 1989b), including 
extending the nighttime passenger service to Penzance and the siting of an inter-modal 
freight terminal at Plymouth, have not been implemented. It will become evident that the 
initial optimism expressed in the Impact Study (Comwall CC. et. al. 1989a) has now 
largely diminished (personal interviews: Franceschini 1992, Griffin 1992). 
8.3. Regional Implications 
This section will also examine the implications of peripherality for the regional economy, 
juxtaposing the cost of "isolation" from the Tunnel against the benefits of "insulation" 
(from any adverse effects). The experience of the Far South West may have important 
implications for the "North" in general. It is first important to examine the significance of 
the Tunnel to local industry within Devon and Comwall. The long-term impact of the 
Tunnel for the UK will be determined by companies realising improvements in journey 
times and costs to the Continent, and vice versa. Industrial relocations and/or a switch in 
distribution practices favouring rail freight are seen as the likely reactions of companies. 
8.3.1. Local Industry 
Before examining how the Tunnel will affect local industry in Devon and Cornwall, it is 
first useful to provide a brief outline of the Far South West regional economy. Gripaios 
(1990) in 'The South West Economy: Trends and Prospects', after employing 18 economic 
indictors to study intra-regional comparisons, concludes that: 
'A clear picture emerges of reduced prosperity the further South West one 
travels.' 
(Gripaios 1990. P.23) 
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AGRIC. 
1987 % of 
ENERGY 
EMPLOYEES: 
MANU. SERVICES 
SOUTH WEST 2.9 1.6 22.6 68.5 
AVON 1.2 1.9 21.8 70.8 
CORNWALL 5.3 1.3 15.6 73.3 
DEVON 3.4 1.4 19.7 71.3 
DORSET 2.2 1.3 20.3 72.2 
GLOUCS 2.7 2.1 28.2 62.7 
SOMERSET 5.1 2.2 28.1 59.5 
WILTSHIRE 2.8 1.2 25.6 65.5 
Table 8.2: Employment by industryt. 
(Note: t Excludes self-employed and unemployed.) 
(Source: Gripaios 1990, P.28) 
OCT 1983 SEPT 1988 OCT 1989 
SOUTH WEST 11.3 7.4 4.1 
AVON 10.8 7.5 4.4 
CORNWALL 15.7 11.8 6.7 
DEVON 13 .0 9.0 4.9 
DORSET 10.8 5.8 3.8 
GLOUCS 9.9 5.9 3.6 
SOMERSET 9.3 6.5 4.3 
WILTSHIRE 9.8 5.5 3.1 
Table 8.3: Unemployment ^ate^ 
(Note: t Figures for 1983 and 1988 express unemployment as a percentage of 
employees and unemployed. 1989 figures express it as a percentage of the 
total workforce.) 
(Source: Gripaios 1990, P.29) 
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Devon and Cornwall are ranked sixth and seventh respectively of the seven counties in die 
South West region, with the eastern counties of Wiltshire, Avon and Dorset ranked the top 
three. In terms of employment by industry (see Table 8.2), more than 70 percent of 
employees in the Far South West are employed in the service sector. Manufacturing only 
accounts for 19.7 and 15.6 percent, respectively, of the Devon and Cornwall workforce, 
compared to a South West average of 22.6 percent. Devon and Cornwall also record the 
highest unemployment rales within the South West (see Table 8.3). 
The unemployment rate for Cornwall in October 1989 was more than double that for 
Wiltshire and over 60 percent above the South West average. Although improvements in 
some economic indictors for Cornwall are recorded, Gripaios states: 
'Unfortunately, the reason is that Devon and, in some cases. Somerset are 
now slipping down towards the Comish level relative to the South West as 
a whole.' 
(Gripaios 1990, R23) 
From this rather brief synopsis of the Far South West economy, it is possible to ascertain 
that Devon and Comwall do not share in the prosperity commonly associated with the 
"South". In fact, the TCPA (1989) categorises the Far South West as pan of the "North", 
whilst defining the "South" as: 
'....embracing broadly the South East standard region, East Anglia, Dorset, 
Wiltshire, Avon and Gloucestershire, as well as parts of the East and West 
Midlands....' 
(TCPA 1989, P.30) 
The "North" is believed to comprise of 'everything else' to the north and west Champion 
and Green (1988) define the "North-South" divide as a line traversing Britain between the 
Severn and the Wash but identify local 'North-South divides' throughout the UK, including 
the Far South West. Therefore, it is widely accepted that the Far South West exhibits 
characteristics commonly associated with the "North". 
It is generally argued that most of the benefits created will be confined to the "South" 
(Keebleet. al. 1982a, Simmons 1985, 1989, Button 1989, Vickerman 1989a&b). Comwall 
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C.C. et. al. (1989a) agree with this belief but also foresee the Tunnel leading to increased 
land values, rents and labour costs in the South East. Therefore, with reduced profitability, 
it is hoped that: 
'In due course, the South West, could become a more attractive industrial 
location, as the economic advantages of the South East spread westwards 
in a ripple effect ' 
(Comwall C.C. et. al. 1989a, P.30) 
The findings of the questionnaire survey carried-out for the present study show that no 
companies outside the South East anticipate relocating as a result of the Tunnel. Only two 
companies in London believe they will move closer to the Tunnel portal. As discussed in 
the Literature Review (chapter 2), South East regional reports also regard a southwards 
migration of industry as unlikely (SEEDS 1989, SERPLAN 1989). Hence, with no 
increased economic pressure within the South East, the South West, particularly the Far 
South West, will not derive benefit from a 'ripple effect'. Poor transport links further 
reduce the possibility of a westward movement of industry to Devon and Comwall. Such 
a ripple effect for other peripheral UK regions would also seem unlikely. 
Nonetheless, the long-term impact of the Tunnel will depend ultimately on companies 
switching their distribution practices in favour of rail freight, since: 
'An important factor....is the cost of transport relative to time and with the 
opponunities that the Tunnel presents for a shift towards rail, the economics 
of transport should favour rail in the future/ 
(Comwall CC. et. al. 1989a, P.30) 
Inadequate rail freight facilities and services will disadvantage the Far South West relative 
to other UK regions. The findings of the questionnaire survey show that fewer companies 
in Devon and Comwall anticipate using the Tunnel for freight exports (see Table 8.4). 
Over 70 percent of companies in the two counties plan to use the Tunnel for less than 20 
percent of freight exports. The respective values for the South West and all respondents 
in general are 66.2 and 61.0 percent In addition, only 12.9 percent of companies in the 
Far South West currendy expect to send more than 20 percent of their freight exports via 
the Tunnel (none greater than 60 percent), compared to 18.6 percent for the South West 
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and 19.0 percent for all respondents in general. This apparent difference in company plans 
to use the Tunnel for freight exports cannot be explained by preferences for existing modes 
of cross-Channel transport (see Table 8.5). However, companies in Devon and Comwall 
are less likely to be influenced by journey times (35.5, 46.0 and 43.8 percent respectively). 
% OF FREIGHT 
EXPORTS VIA 
THE TUNNEL 
DEVON & 
CORNWALL 
SOUTH WEST OVERALL 
(SOUTH EAST 
& SOUTH WEST) 
0 - 2 0 71.0 66.2 61.0 
20 - 40 3.2 7.9 8.3 
40 - 60 9.7 8.6 7.8 
60 - 80 0.0 1.4 1.6 
80 - 100 0.0 0.7 1.3 
Table 8.4: Percentage of companies anticipating using the Tunnel for freight 
exports. 
MODE OF 
TRANSPORT 
DEVON & 
CORNWALL 
SOUTH WEST OVERALL 
(SOUTH EAST & 
SOUTH WEST) 
AEROPLANE 22.6 23.0 21.5 
RAIL 19.4 13.7 17.2 
RORO 41.9 48.9 50.5 
LOLO 16.1 16.6 16.9 
OTHER 19.4 14.4 10.2 
Table 8.5: Percentage of companies using existing cross-Channel modes of 
transport for freight exports. 
Thus, with relatively fewer companies in the Far South West planning to send freight 
exports via the Tunnel, the opportunities created, in terms of rail freight, are less likely to 
be realised. However, as a direct consequence of closer proximity to regional freight 
terminals, companies located in other peripheral UK regions are more likely to anticipate 
using the Tunnel for freight exports. Since, as argued above, a westward movement of 
industry to Devon and Cornwall is considered unrealistic, the long-term benefits of the 
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Tunnel for the region are likely to be minimal. The Far South West would appear therefore 
to be "isolated" from the potential opportunities created by the Tunnel. Whether the two 
counties are also "insulated" from the adverse effects of the Tunnel is not as evident. 
Continental companies are more 'geared up' to rail freight than their British competitors 
(Pieda 1989b), placing them in a stronger position to maximise the benefits created by the 
Tunnel. This is likely to lead to increased continental imports penetrating UK markets, and 
thus capturing the "Third Markets" of the more peripheral UK producers, including 
companies in the Far South West. The "Third Market" impact of the Tunnel on Devon and 
Cornwall is examined in section 8.3.3. 
% OF 
BUSINESS 
TRIPS VIA 
THE TUNNEL 
DEVON & 
CORNWALL 
SOUTH WEST OVERALL 
(SOUTH EAST 
& SOUTH WEST) 
0 - 2 0 87.1 87.1 84.4 
20 - 40 0.0 4.3 5.4 
40 - 60 9.7 4.3 3.0 
60 - 80 0,0 0.0 1.1 
80 - 100 3.2 0.7 1.1 
Table 8.6: Percentage of companies anticipating using the Tunnel for future 
business trips. 
The Tunnel is also considered unlikely to affect significantly continental business trips to 
and from the Far South West. Air travel will still be too competitive in terms of journey 
times, especially in the absence of day-time international train services. However, as is 
evident from Table 8.6, companies in Devon and Cornwall are as likely to anticipate using 
the Tunnel for future business trips, even though more than 80 percent of companies do 
not plan to use the Tunnel. The 'Impact Study' (Cornwall C.C et. al. 1989a) regards 
information technology to be of more importance than the Tunnel, making offices more 
mobile and thus increasing the prospects for Devon and Cornwall. But, contradicting this 
premise, the TCPA (1987) states that information technology wil l lead to the increased 
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centralisation of high-level functions, leaving only manual and clerical jobs for the 
periphery. 
In conclusion, Comwall C.C. et al. (1989a) consider the econonruc benefits of the Tunnel 
to be only marginal. The present study agrees to some extent with this conclusion, in that 
the benefits created by the Tunnel are not likely to be augmented within the Far South 
West. However, the potential adverse effect of the Tunnel is seen as a cause for much 
concern. The impact on the tourism industry is hoped to be beneficial but, as shown in 
chapter 7, xhc positive effects of the Tunnel on the East Kent tourist trade are now 
believed to be much less significant (CTJCC 1991a&b). 
8.3.2. The Tourism Industry 
Tourism is a critical component in most aspects of Comwall's economy. 
It should thus be promoted as the key trigger-mechanism for nearly all 
forms of development in moving towards a sound multi-strand economy.' 
(Travis 1991, P.3) 
Tourism is an important industry within both Devon and Comwall. The effect on the Far 
South West tourist trade is therefore significant in the overall economic impact of the 
Tunnel. Comwall attracts more than 3-3.5 million visitors to the county each year, 
spending neariy £600 million and accounting for more than 33,000 jobs within Comwall 
or 21 percent of the workforce (Travis 1991, personal interview: Strandring 1992). From 
a report commissioned from the then Plymouth Polytechnic (Charlton and Essex 1989), the 
Impact Study (Comwall C.C. et al, 1989a) states that: 
'In terms of tourism, the three Councils recognise that die Channel Tunnel 
is a potential opportunity.' 
(Comwall C.C. 1989a, P.30 
Charlton and Essex (1989) believe that since tourism is already an important growth 
industry in Devon and Comwall, the Tunnel is likely to create more opportunities. In the 
10 year period up to 1987, overseas tourist visits to the West Country increased by 53 
percent, compared to the average for all the tourist board regions in England of 27 percent 
(Comwall C.C. et. al. 1989a). However, transport infrastructure limitations are again 
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regarded as a major cause for concern (Chariton and Essex 1989). Primarily for the above 
reason, the Comwall Tourist Board (personal interview: Strandring 1992) is no longer 
optimistic as to the impact of the Tunnel. With only limited improvement in transport 
infrastructure and services to the Far South West, it is now considered that improved 
accessibility between the UK and the Continent can only be detrimental to the Devon and 
Cornwall tourism industry. 
The West Country is the most popular destination for domestic tourists and the largest, 
outside the South East, for overseas visitors. In terms of ovemight stays in the West 
Country, Devon and Comwall account for two thirds of the domestic market and over half 
of the overseas market (Comwall C.C. et. al. 1989a). From European Tourist Board and 
West Country Board statistics, Chariton and Essex (1989) show that Devon and Cornwall, 
in 1987, attracted approximately 52 percent of the 1.2 million overseas tourists, 10.5 
million 'nights' and £249 million tourist expenditure in the West Country. The principal 
source countries of overseas visitors to the West Country are North America (372,000 in 
1987), Australia (120.000) and Europe; 168,000 from both France and (West) Germany, 
and 72,000 from the Netherlands (Comwall C.C. et. al. 1989a). Thus, some feel that: 
'The European market still has great potential and the opening of the 
Channel Tunnel presents an opportunity for that market to expand.' 
(Comwall C.C. et. al. 1989a, P.31) 
The influence of the Tunnel will more than likely be restricted to visitors from the 
Continent, particulariy the near Continent. Therefore, the respective Councils' tourist 
boards will make a strong effort to attract customers from this market. 
The Far South West tourist trade is 'highly dependent on the traditional holiday market', 
with business/conference trips forming a very low proportion of the total (Chariton and 
Essex 1989). The West Country's main competitor in the traditional holiday market is the 
Mediterranean; thus the Tunnel is unlikely to affect significantly tourists plans to visit 
either region. Nonetheless, i f the Tunnel does alter perceptions and attitudes, more 
domestic tourists may be encouraged to take their main annual holiday on the Continent. 
Considering that by the late 1990s, journey times between Penzance and London, and 
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London and Milan will both be approximately five hours, 30 minutes, it is not 
inconceivable that perceptions will change. 
The growth in the Devon and Comwall tourism industry over the last decade is accounted 
for by short-stay visits. But it is argued that: 
'The Tunnel will bring the greatest advantage to destinations up to 3 hours 
drive from the exit. Regions closer to the Tunnel will be the main 
generators of outbound short stay tourism.* 
(Comwall C.C. et. al. 1989a, P.31) 
In 1987. 43 percent of all visits to the West Country were from London and the South 
East. The West Midlands is another imponant source region for the short-stay market in 
the West Country. Both regions have good road and rail links to the Tunnel. I f there is a 
net fall in the short-stay market in the Far South West, with more domestic tourists 
encouraged to have breaks on the Continent than vice versa, the Tunnel will adversely 
affect the Devon and Comwall tourism industry. Hence, Charlton and Essex (1989) 
emphasize the need to improve the 'tourism product', with higher quality accommodation 
and more facilities. In addition, a more professional altitude among the people employed 
in the tourist industry is regarded as critical. This is particularly important considering the 
investment now being directed towards the tourism industry in the regions on either side 
of the Tunnel (see chapter 7). The Comwall Tourist Board (personal interview: 1992) is 
now marketing the county as a year-round tourist destination, with more activity/theme 
holidays, in an attempt to retain existing tourist levels. 
BR's reluctance to provide a daytime through train service from the Tunnel to the Far 
South West will be extremely detrimental to the Devon and Comwall tourism industry. 
Charlton and Essex believe that inadequate transport links by both road and rail from the 
Tunnel to the Far South West will reduce the potentially large European market and, 
furthermore, it is feared that poor connectivity will : 
'....reduce the attractiveness of Devon and Comwall to foreign visitors and 
increase the relative popularity of other more accessible regions in the UK. 
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Similarly, the domestic market, particularly for shon breaks, could be 
diverted to the Continent.* 
(Gibb et. al. 1990, P.59) 
The "double-edged" nature of improved accessibility between the UK and the Continent 
is therefore regarded as potentially damaging. Devon and ComwalFs tourist industries 
could lose in terms of short-break holidays, with their traditional catchment area, the South 
East and the West Midlands, being exposed to the attractions of the near Continent 
Furthermore, overseas visitors to the Far South West may in future be persuaded, by direct 
daytime intemational train services, to travel to other UK tourist destinations, such as the 
Lake District, the Pennines and the Scottish Highlands. The Deputy Tourism Officer for 
Cornwall (personal interview: Strandring 1992) cites the present lack of direct international 
train services to the county as being of critical importance to Comwall as a destination for 
continental visitors. Developing existing air services between the Far South West and the 
Continent, including chaner flights, is seen as one means to increase accessibility to the 
region (personal interview: Griffin 1992). 
Therefore, as a consequence of an inadequate transport network, the opportunity presented 
by the Tunnel to expand the European tourist market has been lost. In fact, the Tunnel is 
now regarded as a real threat to the Devon and Cornwall tourism industry. 
8.3.3. The "Third Market" Impact 
The "Third Market" effect of the Tunnel poses a real threat to most peripheral UK regions, 
including the Far South West (see chapter 2). Significantly more companies on the 
Continent already use rail freight, placing them in a stronger position to realise the 
advantages offered by the Tunnel. Domestic UK markets will experience increased 
competition from the Continent, particularly from the near Continent. The South East and 
the Midlands represent the main domestic or "Third Markets" for most peripheral UK 
regions. Increased import penetration by continental producers could have serious 
repercussions for regions such as the Far South West. 
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However, no comprehensive study of the "Third Market" impact has yet been undertaken. 
It is therefore only possible to highlight this specific threat to companies in the Far South 
West Based on the findings of the questionnaire survey, companies in Devon and 
Cornwall are more aware of the likelihood of greater import penetration by continental 
producers than all respondents in general. When asked whether the Tunnel and related 
transport infrastructure are likely to make companies vulnerable to increased competition, 
the results show that nearly one third of companies in Devon and Cornwall anticipate 
increased competition, compared to 21.6 and 22.9 percent respectively for the South West 
and all respondents in general (see chapter 5). More than two thirds of companies in 
Devon and Cornwall also do not expect their accessibility to continental markets to be 
improved. Thus, the Tunnel is likely to have serious implications for the Far South West 
economy. 
REGIONAL 
ECONOMIC IMPACT 
DEVON & 
CORNWALL 
SOUTH WEST OVERALL 
(SOUTH EAST & 
SOUTH WEST) 
BENEFICIAL 22.6 25.2 48.9 
NEUTRAL 38.7 33.8 16.4 
DAMAGING 29.0 20.1 15.1 
DON'T KNOW 6.5 10.1 10.8 
Table 8.7: Company perceptions of the regional economic impact of the Tunnel. 
However, despite this, no companies in Devon and Cornwall believe it necessary to 
relocate. But companies in the Far South West are in general less optimistic about the 
overall regional economic impact of the Tunnel (see Table 8.7). More companies are likely 
to anticipate an overall damaging impact than a beneficial one. Nevertheless, no 
substantive conclusions can be drawn from this limited data base, especially considering 
the small number of respondents in the Far South West (31). However, company 
perceptions in Devon and Comwall do seem to diverge from the South West and overall 
averages. Companies in Devon and Comwall are more likely to perceive the threat posed 
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by a "Third Market" effect than those in the South West as a whole and all respondents 
in general. 
8.4. Conclusion 
'The Tunnel and the Single European Market are forcing a level of 
competitiveness on local companies which many may well be ill-equipped 
to meet.' 
(personal interview: Blacker 1992) 
This conclusion by the head of the Devon and Cornwall Development Company is a 
further reflection of the concern that is now expressed about the regional economic 
implications of the Tunnel for the Far South West. The optimism apparent in the Impact 
Study (Cornwall C.C. ei. al. 1989a) has receded. Inadequate transport infrastructure and 
services are now widely seen as limiting the potential benefits created by the Tunnel, 
whilst at the same time enhancing the likely adverse effects. International rail services for 
both passenger and freight traffic are considered critical to the Far South West. However, 
the role of local government is confined to one of only lobbying BR for improved services. 
BR have no plans to operate a daytime iniemaiional passenger service to the West 
Country. Only a nighttime service as far as Plymouth is proposed. Potential rail freight 
volumes are also regarded as insufficient to justify an inter-modal terminal at Plymouth. 
The ability of companies within the Far South West to exploit the opportunities generated 
by the Tunnel is therefore likely to be restricted. 
Devon and Cornwall's relative isolation from the Tunnel does, however, seem to protect 
the region's ferry and port related industry from increased competition, since time savings 
for both passenger and freight u-affic. would be negligible. However, such isolation is 
likely to be detrimental to Devon and Cornwall's tourism indusuy, which is of particular 
importance to the local economy. The lack of daytime intemational passenger services and 
a nighttime service which terminates at Plymouth will place the Far South West at a 
relative disadvantage to other UK regions. If. as a consequence, more domestic tourists are 
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attracted to the Continent, particularly from the main markets of the South East and the 
Midlands, and fewer European visitors attracted to the South West, the net impact on the 
Devon and Cornwall tourism industry is likely to be extremely damaging. 
A larger proportion of companies in the Far South West also anticipate increased 
competition from the Continent, compared to the South West and all respondents in 
general. This study has only been able to highlight the threat posed by the "Third Market" 
effect. However, without further academic study of the potential "Third Market" impact 
of the Tunnel, no substantive conclusions can be drawn. Nonetheless, the findings of the 
questionnaire survey carried out for the current research project do indicate cause for 
concern. Companies in Devon and Cornwall are less optimistic than all respondents in the 
South West about an overall positive impact on the regional economy. In fact, nearly 30 
percent fear an overall damaging impact, twice as many as all respondents in general 
(South East and South West). 
The conclusion of this chapter therefore reinforces the widespread belief that the 
opportunities created by the Tunnel for most peripheral UK regions will be restricted as 
a result of Government (and BR) policy. I f a co-ordinated and cohesive national transport 
policy - as called for by Harmen (1987), Simmons (1989) and the TCPA (1990) - was in 
place, the situation for the Far South West and other peripheral regions could be much 
different. Only a change in policy at the national level, as indicated in chapter 4, will allow 
Devon and Cornwall to maximise the benefits created by the Tunnel and minimise the 
adverse effects. 
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CHAPTER 9: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
In this concluding chapter, the main aims and objectives of the project are reiterated The 
results generated in the preceding chapters are then summarised before a discussion of the 
overall conclusions. Issues requiring further research are also outlined. 
9.1 Aims and Objectives 
The principle aim of this study was to investigate the potential regional economic impact 
of the Tunnel and identify some local consequences of such a major transport infrastructure 
project. It was hypothesized that the Tunnel represents an opportunity to redress the 
economic imbalance between "North" and "South". Following the Literature Review 
(chapter 2), which highlighted a widespread perception that South East England would 
benefit the most from the Tunnel, Econonruc Potential Analysis (chapter 3) was employed 
to determine the likely effect of the Tunnel on UK regional accessibility in relation to the 
Continent. The aim of the model was to identify potential gains or losses for the more 
peripheral UK regions as well as the South East. 
However, British Government policy towards the Tunnel and related transport 
infrastructure wil l influence critically the potential regional economic impact; thus a review 
of the legislative and policy framework is fundamental to any study of the Tunnel. It was 
argued in chapter 4 that Government policy is likely to limit the opportunities created by 
the Tunnel for regions outside the South East. The contrast between the British 
Government's policy of inaction with the interventionist approach favoured on the 
Continent, especially in France, was emphasized. The confusion and delay associated with 
the proposed high-speed rail lii\k between London and the Tunnel portal illustrates the 
"failure" of British Govemment policy to take advantage of the potential regional 
advantages offered by the Tunnel 
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A questionnaire survey was undertaken to determine the reactions of British companies to 
the opportunities and problems that are likely to be created by the Tunnel. The results of 
all the respondents were first examined (chapter 5), before a regional analysis was carried-
out (chapter 6). The information generated provided a strong empirical foundation for the 
present study. Finally, attention was focused on a local scale, with case studies of East 
Kent (chapter 7) and the "Far South West" (chapter 8). In both instances, the differing 
conclusions of previous studies were drawn together for the first time, but data was also 
generated via personal interviews. One of the original features of this study is that the 
information obtained by questionnaire and interview techniques was compared and 
contrasted with the results of the Potential Model. The originality of the present diesis is 
also complemented by its comprehensive analysis of published statistics and critical 
synthesis of Government and private sector consultancy reports (chapter 4). 
9.2. Summary of the Results 
Discussion of the results generated will be structured according to the lay-out of the thesis 
(see Figure 1.9). First, the main findings of the Economic Potential Model (chapter 3) will 
be outlined. A critique of the legislative and policy framework of the Tunnel, botii within 
the UK and on the Continent, will then follow. The main results of the questionnaire 
survey are also highlighted, before attention focuses on the information derived from the 
case studies of East Kent and the "Far South West". 
As was evident from the Literature Review (chapter 2), the South East is generally 
perceived as the region that wil l gain the most from the Tunnel, with the advantages 
derived from the region's proximity to the European mainland expected to be enhanced. 
However, it is also generally considered that even in die South East die benefits wil l be 
smaU. Regional commentators (Campaign for die North 1981, NOERC 1988. CLES 1989, 
Pieda 1989a&b, TCPA 1990) link the impact of the Tunnel on regions outside die Soudi 
East to the quality of the supporting transport network. The British Government's policy 
of non-intervention is therefore criticised for preventing the regions from maximising the 
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benefits created by the Tunnel and minimising the adverse effects. The call for a 'National 
Impact Study' is echoed in most academic articles and consultancy reports (Gossop 1987, 
A M A 1989, Harmen 1989, Simmons 1989, TCPA 1990, Holliday et. al. 1991). From the 
outset this study has challenged the general assumption that the South East has the most 
to gain from the Tunnel. 
9.2.1. Improved Accessibility to the Periphery? 
The Economic Potential Model developed for this study showed that certain peripheral UK 
regions, such as Scotland, the North and East Anglia, could experience increases in relative 
accessibility of the same magnitude as the South East (see Table 3.9). The planned average 
running speed of post-Tunnel international freight trains, i.e. 75 mph (BR 1989b, personal 
interview: Jenkins 1990), was incorporated into the model (Simulation 3). Since the results 
for Simulation 3 are based on a realistic running speed for international freight services 
after the Tunnel opens, they are of critical importance, as compared to Simulations 1 and 
2 (30 and 40 mph respectively), to the more peripheral UK regions. 
It was also argued that because more than 75 percent of British-continental trade originates 
from, or is destined for, regions to the north and west of London, improved access to the 
Continent would represent as much as, or more of, an opportunity for these peripheral 
regions. Rail freight also becomes increasingly competitive, compared to road haulage, 
over distances in excess of 250/300 kms. Thus, the advantages of rail freight are just as 
likely to be enjoyed by companies in the more peripheral UK regions as their counterparts 
in the South East, particulariy with respect to exports to the near Continent. 
Therefore, based on the results for Simulation 3 and the above arguments, it was concluded 
that regions to the north and west of London could benefit to the same degree as, or 
relatively more than, the South East from direct rail freight services between the UK and 
the Continent. If, as suggested in chapter 3 (see section 3.7), a more narrow, and reliable, 
data set (regional exports or industrial output instead of GDP values) was available to 
measure regional economic activity, the advantages of improved accessibility to the 
Continent could have be shown to be even more significant to the more peripheral UK 
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regions. This conclusion contradicts most earlier studies, as well as the general assumption 
that the South East will be the main beneficiary. Furthermore, the results add further 
weight to criticisms of British Government inaction towards the Tunnel, in that it can be 
seen as failing to help the UK's more peripheral regions. 
9.2.2. A Policy of Inaction 
The Govemment's overriding objective was to avoid any delays before construction of the 
Tunnel commenced, which also meant that the scope for public consultations was limited. 
The Tunnel was at no time seen by the British Government as an opportunity to narrow 
the "North-South" divide, although the findings of the Economic Potential Model (chapter 
3) highlight such a potential. Government policy was successful in avoiding the delays so 
harmful to the 1970s project. However, at what cost was this achieved? 
The consequence of British Govemment policy has been inadequate investment in the 
national transport infrastructure, particularly in terms of the rail network. Britain's rail 
network will remain a product of "Victorian enterprise", whilst most other EC member 
states support the European Commission's initiative on high-speed rail travel. Section 42 
of the 1987 Act prevents BR from using public money to finance intemational rail 
services. The delays associated with the high-speed rail link between Lxjndon and the 
Tunnel portal are primarily a result of this provision. The House of Lords' Section 40 
amendment to the 1987 Act (which established a series of regional consultations) only 
succeeded in identifying the great disparity between regional aspirations for improved rail 
services and commercially justified investment by BR. Thus, it is argued that the 
modification or complete repeal of Section 42, along with other measures to ease the strict 
financial remit imposed on BR by the Govemment, are essential i f the regions are to be 
allowed to benefit from the Tunnel. 
The series of delays associated with the high-speed rail link between London and the 
Tunnel portal is an example of the British Govemment's failure to ensure adequate 
investment in supporting transport infrastructure. Since the rail link was widely regarded 
in the Section 40 consultations as crucial to the regionalisation of potential benefits from 
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die Tunnel (Knowles et. al. 1989. Fanington et al. 1990). it is therefore only possible to 
conclude that, as a result of the Govemment 'market solutions' policy, the opportunity 
created is almost certain to be missed. The planned franchising of rail services from 1994 
is also a cause for concern in that deregulation of rail services is likely to engender 
considerable confusion and could undermine the ability of BR to attract freight from roads 
to the rail network. 
The British Government's policy towards die Tunnel contrasts strongly with the 
interventionist strategies adopted in France. The French Govemment considers the Tunnel 
as an opportunity to revitalise the economic fortunes of the depressed region of Nord-Pas 
de Calais. Qose consultation between national, regional and local govemment is the 
foundation of the French Tunnel policy. The Nord-Pas de Calais Regional Council was 
aware that 70 percent of its demands were already agreed to before officially presenting 
'Plan Transmanche* to the Government The effective marginalisation of Kent County 
Council in the British planning process has ensured that the county, especially East Kent, 
wiU have to absorb many of the adverse effects of die Tunnel. SNCF's 1990-1994 FFr20 
billion investment programme is designed to establish France as the route focus of the 
European railway network. The UK, however, is likely to retain its European branch line 
status. 
9.2.3. Company Reactions to the Tunnel 
In terms of company plans to use the Tunnel and its services, the questionnaire survey 
carried-out for this research project showed that approximately 25 percent of all 
respondents anticipate using the Tunnel for future business trips and/or freight exports. 
This means that nearly 75 percent of the companies surveyed presendy have no plans to 
use the Tunnel and its services. Compared to the earlier studies by the LCCI (1989), 
Eurotunnel and BR (1988), companies are also shown to be less optimistic about the 
impact of the Tunnel on their own level of competitiveness. Since, as argued in chapter 
3, the impact of the Tunnel depends ultimately on the reactions of British companies, it 
would appear that the implications for the UK as a whole are likely to be limited. 
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However, nearly half of the companies surveyed believe the Tunnel will have a beneficial 
impact on the regional economies in which they are located, a further 16.4 percent 
anticipate a neutral impact and only 15.1 percent fear a damaging impact This level of 
optimism can be accounted for by the proportionately greater number of companies 
expecting the Tunnel and related transport infrastructure to increase their accessibility to 
UK and continental markets (28.5%), than companies concemed that they will be 
vulnerable to increased competition (22.9%). In addition, only two companies out of the 
372 respondents planned to relocate as a result of the Tunnel, both were from London. 
Therefore, a southwards drift of industry as feared by many regional interest groups would 
appear unfounded. 
More central to the present thesis, however, is the analysis of the regional reactions in the 
questionnaire results. It was shown in chapter 6, that perceptions and anticipated usage of 
the Tunnel for companies in the South East and South West do not reveal significant 
regional differences. In fact, the most striking feature of the regional analysis is the degree 
of similarity between companies in the two regions. Nevertheless, companies in the South 
East are more than twice as likely to anticipate a beneficial impact on their regional 
economy (63.5 and 25.2 percent for the South East and South West respectively). One fifth 
of companies in the South West believe the Tunnel will have an overall damaging impact 
on their region, compared to only 12.0 percent of companies in the South East. The 
apparent optimism in the South East may be explained by the beneficial short-term 
construction impact of the Tunnel. However, the picture is not the same throughout the 
whole South East. For example, nearly 30 percent of companies in Kent, where most of 
the adverse medium-term effects of the Tunnel are located, expect the overall impact to 
be damaging. 
No significant differences between the two regions were identified in terms of the 
perceived impact of the Tunnel and related transport infrastructure on company 
competitiveness in both the domestic and continental markets. Approximately 30 and 25 
percent of companies in the South East and South West respectively expect the Tunnel to 
increase their accessibility to continental markets. Companies in the two regions are also 
as likely to fear that they will become vulnerable to increased competition (23.6 and 21.6 
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percent for the South East and South West respectively). Company plans to use the Tunnel 
for either futiu*e business trips and/or freight exports are also similar within the two 
regions, although demand is slightly lower in the South West. Since company perceptions 
of and their likely reactions to the Tunnel do not diverge significandy between the South 
East and South West, the Tunnel is only likely to affect marginally the regional economic 
structure of the UK. Therefore, to a large extent, the results of the questionnaire survey 
contradict the usual assumptions that the South East will be the main beneficiary from the 
Tunnel, and support the earlier findings of the Economic Potential Analysis. ^ 
9.2.4. Local Considerations 
From the information collected in the case studies, it is evident that the general euphoria 
surrounding the construction of the Tunnel has now receded. The original hopes that the 
Tunnel engendered, not only in the South East but throughout the UK, have diminished 
as the necessary improvements to the supporting transport infrastructure have not 
materialised. Thus, the Government's policy of not commissioning national and/or regional 
impact studies, in conjunction with its strategy of non-intervention, can only be regarded 
as seriously limiting the ability of the regions to exploit the advantages created by the 
Tunnel. 
Implications for East Kent 
The case study of East Kent (chapter 7) highlighted the great anxiety that is now apparent 
within the area adjacent to the Tunnel portal. The optimistic forecasts of a beneficial 
impact as expressed by the CTJCC in the 1987 KIS, have been largely replaced by more 
sober predictions in the 1991 Review (CTJCC 1991a). Estimates of secondary job gains 
as a result of the Tunnel and other major transport infrastructure projects in Kent have 
been scaled down, whilst at the same time the actual number of job losses in the port and 
ferry industry have increased. A complete collapse of the ferry industry in East Kent is no 
longer regarded as a realistic possibility. Nonetheless, a substantial rationalisation is still 
necessary (CTJCC 1991a&b) to meet the challenge of competition from the Tunnel. The 
short-term construction impact of the Tunnel has been more beneficial than initially hoped, 
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but the run-down of the TML employment workforce will coincide with redundancies in 
the port and ferry industry. 
The effect of the Tunnel in East Kent is likely to involve a net loss of at least 9,000 jobs 
(CTJCC 1991a). thus further exaggerating the relatively high rate of unemployment in the 
area. This figure is arrived at without even questioning the CTJCC's (1991a) "estimated" 
secondary job gains. Closer examination of the 1991 Review reveals the possibility of a 
net reduction in employment levels for the county as a whole, let alone East Kent. 
Although Kent had the benefit of a Govemment commissioned "Impact Study" (i.e. the 
KIS), the inability of the CTJCC to enforce its recommendations has meant that the 
county, especially East Kent, has been left to absorb many of the adverse effects of the 
Tunnel. 
Implications for the Far South West 
The implications of the Tunnel for the more peripheral UK regions are also less than 
promising. The case study of the Far South West (chapter 8) emphasized the perceived 
need to improve transport links from Devon and Comwall to the Tunnel portal, particularly 
via the rail network. BR only plans to run a nighttime service to the South West which 
terminates at Plymouth (BR 1989b). In addition, an inter-modal freight terminal at 
Plymouth has been ruled out BR*s plans for international services have been criticised as 
inadequate for most regions (see chapter 2), not least in the Far South West. Unless the 
financial remit imposed on BR, including Section 42 of the 1987 Channel Tunnel Act, is 
relaxed, the Far South West could be further peripheralised from the centres of European 
economic activity. 
Distance from the Tunnel has, however, ensured that the port and ferry industry in Devon 
and Comwall is likely to be left untouched. Indeed, the redeployment of excess ferry 
capacity from the short-sea sector could encourage further growth in the westem Channel. 
But isolation from the Tunnel does have its costs. Far South West tourism could be 
detrimentally affected i f the Tunnel, as expressed by Strandring (personal interview: 1992), 
encourages fewer domestic and foreign visitors to travel to the region. The lack of a 
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daytime international passenger service to the Far South West is considered to be of 
critical importance (personal interviews: Franceschini 1992, Griffin 1992). 
Based on the 5ndings of the questionnaire survey, companies in Devon and Cornwall also 
appear to believe that the benefits of "insulation" (i.e. protected from the adverse effects) 
are more than outweighed by the costs of "isolation" (i.e. prevented from taking advantage 
of the opportunities created). Nearly twice as many companies in the Far South West 
(29.0% as opposed to 15.1% for all respondents) expect the Tunnel to have a damaging 
impact on the regional economy. Companies in Devon and Cornwall are more likely to 
anticipate a negative impact on their level of competitiveness; 29.0 percent believe that the 
Tunnel will increase their accessibility to continental markets whilst neariy one third expect 
to be vulnerable to greater competition. It is therefore argued in Chapter 8, that companies 
in the Far South West are more aware of the "Third Market" effect of the Tunnel and the 
"double-edged" nature of improved accessibility. 
93. The Conclusion: A Case of Missed Opportunities? 
The central hypothesis of this research project, that the Tunnel has the potential to reduce 
regional inequalities, is fully supported by the findings of the Economic Potential Model 
(see chapter 3). For the first time, evidence has been produced which specifically identifies 
potential gains for the more peripheral regions of the same magnitude as, or more than, 
the South East. This directly contradicts the widely held belief that the Tunnel will 
exaggerate existing "Core-Periphery" differences in the UK. However, i f BR does not 
introduce, as planned, a new fleet of electric locomotives which would allow international 
freight trains to achieve running speeds of 75 mph, the results of the Potential Model 
indicate that the South East would indeed be the main beneficiary. The results for 
Simulations 1 and 2, which are based on the average running speeds of 30 and 40 mph for 
British and continental rail freight services respectively (personal interview: Jenkins 1990), 
both show the South East experiencing increases in relative potential significantly higher 
than the more peripheral regions. Absolute increases in potential values are also 
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consistentiy higher in all three simulations for the South East. But, as pointed out in 
chapter 3, one has to be careful when interpreting these results because regional GDP 
values used to measure economic activity emphasized the dominance of the South East. 
I f a reliable data set was available for regional exports or industrial output, increases in 
absolute potential would have been more uniform throughout the UK. Overall, however, 
the Potential Model developed for this thesis has shown that the Tunnel does represent a 
potential to narrow the economic imbalance between "Core" and "Periphery". 
The hypothesis of the present study is further supported by the results of the questionnaire 
survey which revealed no bias towards the South East in terms of the perceived 
opportunities offered by the Tunnel. Again, this finding contradicts the general assumption 
that the South East will be die main beneficiary. In fact, the most striking outcome of die 
analysis of regional reactions was the considerable degree of similarity in perceptions of 
the Tunnel and reactions to it for companies in the South East and South West. 
Geographical location is shown not to infiuence company perceptions of the Tunnel and/or 
the planned usage of its services. However, companies in the South East are significanUy 
more likely than their counterparts in the South West to anticipate the Tunnel having a 
positive impact on the regional economy in which they are located. But, as explained in 
chapter 6, this contradicts their own belief on how the Tunnel will affect individual 
companies. The general consensus of opinion that the South East will benefit the most 
from the Tunnel is also likely to have affected this particular result. Therefore, it is 
possible to conclude that because the economic impact of the Tunnel wil l be determined 
ultimately by the reactions of the business community, the regional economic structure of 
the UK is likely to be only affected marginally. 
However, based on a critical synthesis of the legislative and policy environment of the 
Tunnel and related infrastructure, it is argued that the British Government's policy of non-
intervention is likely to be cosUy for the UK. The lack of foresight on the part of the 
Government to ensure adequate investment in supporting transport infrastructure is not 
likely to persuade British producers to send more of their goods by rail. Thus, British 
companies are less likely than their continental competitors to exploit the advantages 
offered by the Tunnel (more than 25 percent of continental freight is carried by rail 
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compared to only 7 percent in the UK). Hence, the opportunity created by the Tunnel to 
redress the economic imbalance between "North" and "South" is likely to be missed. The 
consequence of British Government inaction, in contrast to the interventionist policies 
adopted in France, could be an exaggeration of the 'Third Market" effect for the more 
peripheral UK regions. This research project drew attention to the implications of increased 
continental imports for the more peripheral UK regions, but a more comprehensive study 
is needed (see section 9.4). The case studies of East Kent and the Far South West also 
reveal that the regions have become more pessimistic as regards to the potential effects of 
the Tunnel. The initial optimism associated with the Tunnel has receded because 
improvements to the supporting transport network have fallen far below regional 
expectations. 
The potential impact of the Tunnel on the UK needs to be placed in context The 
questioiuiaire siuvey carried-out for this study showed that nearly three quarters of 
companies had no plans to use the Tunnel for either fiitiu'e business trips and/or freight 
exports. Even fewer anticipate using rail freight services after the Tunnel opens. Thus, the 
implications for the UK as a whole are likely to be modest Nonetheless, this thesis has 
achieved its main objective in tiiat it has proved for the first time tiiat the Tunnel does 
represent an opportunity to narrow regional inequalities in the UK. 
9.4. Future Research 
Two important issues have emerged during this research project which require further 
examination: firsdy, the "Third Market" effect of the Tunnel on the more peripheral U K 
regions; and secondly, the implications of the legislative and policy environment of the 
Tunnel and related transport infinstructure both within the UK and on the Continent In 
addition, the nature of the Tunnel project itself means that a study of the actual regional 
econonruc impact of the Tunnel following its opening would be important to determine 
whether company perceptions of Tunnel and their reactions to it have changed. 
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As argued in Chapter 8. the "Third Market" impact of the Tunnel could adversely affect 
the more peripheral UK regions. The "Third Markets" of these regions, especially the 
South East and the Midlands, are likely to experience increased import penetration from 
continental producers. As pointed out by Pieda (1989b), continental companies are more 
'geared up* to rail freight and thus, are more likely than their British counterparts to 
exploit the advantages offered by the Tunnel. The threat of increased continental imports 
is likely to be more pronounced from die near Continent, especially Nord-Pas de Calais. 
Thus, a UK-French survey of regional imports and exports after the Tunnel opens is 
needed. 
The British Govemment's policy towards the Tunnel has been criticised in this study, 
particularly in relation to strategies favoured in France and by the European Commission. 
As argued in Chapter 4, British Govemment inaction is likely to be to the detriment of the 
UK, especially in the more peripheral regions. The "failure" to ensure adequate invesunent 
in the supporting transport network could seriously disadvantage regional companies in 
terms of their competitiveness in the home and continental marketplace. I f progress is 
made by the European Commission on the proposed pan-European high-speed rail network, 
Britain's "branch line" status will become more apparent. An up-date of the interventionist 
policies adopted by the Nord-Pas de Calais Regional Council, and by the French 
Govemment in general, might also identify the relative success or failure of this proactive 
strategy as compared to the British Govemment's "market solutions" approach. 
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APPENDIX 2: POTENTIAL ANALYSIS RESULTS 
SIMULATION 1 = 30MPH, NO DELAY 
DISTANT EXPONENT = 1.0 
KEEBLE ET A L ' S SELF POTENTIAL FORMULA WAS USED, i . e 
C I - ABSOLUTE POTENTIAL VALUES FOR FERRY 
C2 - ABSOLUTE POTENTIAL VALUES FOR TUNNEL 
C3 - CHANGE I N ABSOLUTE VALUES 
C4 - RELATIVE POTENTIAL VALUES FOR FERRY 
C5 - RELATIVE POTENTIAL VALUES FOR TUNNEL 
C6 - % CHANGE 
K 0.333 
Node C I C2 C3 C4 C5 C6 
1 192714 230564 37850 11 .653 12 .826 10 .0661 
2 125186 153036 27850 7 .570 8 .513 12 .4571 
3 281167 339028 57861 17 .002 18 .860 10 .9281 
4 396569 483820 .87251 23 .980 26 .914 12 .2352 
5 258753 311227 52474 15 .647 17 .313 10 . 6474 
6 331531 405757 74226 20 .047 22 .572 12 .5954 
7 142330 173170 30840 8 .607 9 .633 11 .9205 
8 285327 352649 67322 17 .254 19 .617 13 .6954 
9 110168 130563 20395 6 .662 7 .263 9 .0213 
10 1381648 1862631 480983 83 .547 103 .615 24 .0200 
11 46250 63368 17118 2 .797 3 .525 26 .0279 
12 101278 154696 53418 6 .124 8 . 605 40 .5127 
13 87467 92385 4918 5 .289 5 .139 -2 .8361 
14 172771 185565 12794 10 .447 10 .323 - 1 .1869 
15 359334 422729 63395 21 .729 23 .516 8 .2240 
16 165045 183855 18810 9 .980 10 .228 2 .4850 
17 132164 146902 14738 7 .992 8 .172 2 .2522 
18 1653733 1797644 143911 100 .000 100 .000 0 .0000 
19 170624 176928 6304 10 .318 9 .842 -4 .6133 
20 192266 200937 8671 11 .626 11 .178 -3 .8534 
21 197346 208727 11381 11 .933 11 .611 -2 .6984 
22 103745 109314 5569 6 .273 6 .081 -3 .0607 
23 42180 44347 2167 2 . 551 2 .467 -3 .2928 
24 158290 165530 7240 9 .572 9 .208 -3 .8028 
25 108508 112851 4343 6 . 561 6 .278 -4 .3134 
26 98295 102372 4077 5 .944 5 .695 -4 .1891 
27 219826 229075 9249 13 .293 12 .743 -4 .1375 
28 80310 84401 4091 4 .856 4 .695 -3 .3155 
29 407927 429140 21213 24 .667 23 .872 -3 .2229 
30 84797 89326 4529 5 . 128 4 .969 -3 .1006 
31 132326 140741 8415 8 .002 7 .829 -2 .1620 
32 209733 231701 21968 12 .682 12 .889 1 .6322 
33 174712 195016 20304 10 .565 10 .848 2 .6787 
34 122200 129954 7754 7 .389 7 .229 -2 .1654 
35 52547 56098 3551 3 .177 3 .121 - 1 .7627 
36 51592 54879 3287 3 .120 3 .053 -2 . 1474 
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Node C I C2 C3 C4 C5 C6 
37 94826 103331 8505 5 .734 5 .748 0 .2442 
38 200132 219207 19075 12 .102 12 .194 0 .7602 
39 140658 151466 10808 8 .505 8 .426 -0 .9289 
40 352178 379037 26859 21 .296 21 .085 -0 .9908 
41 441238 482427 41189 26 .681 26 .837 0 .5847 
42 35904 39872 3968 2 .171 2 .218 2 .1649 
43 258993 284303 25310 15 .661 15 .815 0 .9833 
44 118666 138244 19578 7 .176 7 .690 7 .1628 
45 133892 146916 13024 8 .096 8 .173 0 .9511 
46 175605 193003 17398 10 .619 10 .736 1 .1018 
47 123203 137361 14158 7 .450 7 .641 2 .5638 
48 44860 49180 4320 2 .713 2 .736 0 .8478 
49 135559 150878 15319 8 .197 8 .393 2 .3911 
50 373641 407990 34349 22 .594 22 .696 0 .4515 
51 271760 299287 27527 16 .433 16 .649 1 .3144 
52 89825 98686 8861 5 .432 5 .490 1 .0678 
53 19358 21098 1740 1 .171 1 .174 0 .2562 
54 58118 61413 3295 3 .514 3 .416 -2 .7888 
55 732660 745958 13298 44 .303 41 .496 -6 .3359 
56 1065057 1084237 19180 64 .403 60 .314 -6 .3491 
57 143383 153090 9707 8 .670 8 .516 - 1 .7762 
58 57504 61208 3704 3 .477 3 .405 -2 .0708 
59 191277 202649 11372 11 .566 11 .273 -2 .5333 
60 715477 771924 56447 43 .264 42 .941 -0 .7466 
61 1005679 1081619 75940 60 .813 60 .169 - 1 .0590 
62 341094 360438 19344 20 .626 20 .051 -2 .7877 
63 283399 297883 14484 17 .137 16 .571 -3 .3028 
64 118976 125173 6197 7 .194 6 .963 -3 .2110 
65 211062 218989 7927 12 .763 12 .182 -4 .5522 
66 303444 315223 11779 18 .349 17 .535 -4 .4362 
67 116848 121479 4631 7 .066 6 .758 -4 .3589 
68 207283 214982 7699 12 .534 11 .959 -4 .5875 
69 298675 309845 11170 18 .061 17 .236 -4 .5679 
70 254848 267056 12208 15 .410 14 .856 -3 .5951 
71 146466 152181 5715 8 .857 8 .466 -4 .4146 
72 591598 627567 35969 35 .773 34 .911 -2 .4096 
73 125791 131674 5883 7 .606 7 .325 -3 .6945 
74 749650 780649 30999 45 .331 43 .426 -4 .2024 
75 140510 145467 4957 8 .497 8 .092 -4 .7664 
76 98157 101260 3103 5 .935 5 .633 -5 .0885 
77 236875 243709 6834 14 .324 13 .557 -5 .3547 
78 103721 106585 2864 6 .272 5 .929 -5 .4687 
79 99027 101828 2801 5 .988 5 .665 -5 .3941 
80 497615 513388 15773 30 .090 28 .559 -5 .0881 
81 178551 184345 5794 10 .797 10 .255 -5 .0199 
82 604231 628859 24628 36 .537 34 .982 -4 .2560 
83 184681 192143 7462 11 .168 10 .689 -4 .2890 
84 198347 210521 12174 11 .994 11 .711 -2 .3595 
85 177623 179854 2231 10 . 741 10 .005 -6 .8523 
86 545179 602126 56947 32 .967 33 .495 1 .6016 
87 40350 42544 2194 2 .440 2 .367 -2 .9918 
88 132777 141234 8457 8 .029 7 .857 -2 . 1422 
89 4858 5184 326 0 .294 0 .288 -2 .0408 
90 28218 29927 1709 1 .706 1 .665 -2 .4033 
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SIMULATION 1 = 30MPH, 6 HRS DELAY 
DISTANT EXPONENT = 1 . 0 
KEEBLE ET A L ' S SELF POTENTIAL FORMULA WAS USED, i . e . K 
C I - ABSOLUTE POTENTIAL VALUES FOR FERRY 
C2 - ABSOLUTE POTENTIAL VALUES FOR TUNNEL 
C3 - CHANGE I N ABSOLUTE VALUES 
04 - RELATIVE POTENTIAL VALUES FOR FERRY 
05 - RELATIVE POTENTIAL VALUES FOR TUNNEL 
C6 - % CHANGE 
0.333 
Node C I C2 C3 C4 05 C6 
1 174946 230564 55618 10 .742 12 826 19 4005 
2 113054 153036 39982 6 .942 8 .513 22 .6304 
3 257045 339028 81983 15 .783 18 .860 19 .4956 
4 362184 483820 121636 22 .239 26 .914 21 .0216 
5 233418 311227 77809 14 .332 17 .313 20 .7996 
6 299412 405757 106345 18 .385 22 .572 22 .7740 
7 127323 173170 45847 7 .818 9 .633 23 .2156 
8 255205 352649 97444 15 . 670 19 .617 25 . 1882 
9 93854 130563 36709 5 .763 7 .263 26 .0281 
10 1184065 1862631 678566 72 .704 103 .615 42 .5162 
11 42121 63368 21247 2 .586 3 .525 36 .3109 
12 91556 154696 63140 5 .622 8 .605 53 .0594 
13 85642 92385 6743 5 .259 5 .139 -2 .2818 
14 169014 185565 16551 10 .378 10 .323 -0 .5300 
15 352119 422729 70610 21 . 621 23 .516 8 .7646 
16 161882 183855 21973 9 .940 10 .228 2 .8974 
17 130277 146902 16625 7 .999 8 .172 2 .1628 
18 1628604 1797644 169040 100 .000 100 .000 0 .0000 
19 167701 176928 9227 10 .297 9 .842 -4 .4188 
20 189492 200937 11445 11 .635 11 .178 -3 .9278 
21 194953 208727 13774 11 . 971 11 .611 -3 .0073 
22 102506 109314 6808 6 .294 6 .081 -3 .3842 
23 41663 44347 2684 2 .558 2 .467 -3 .5575 
24 156498 165530 9032 9 .609 9 .208 -4 .1732 
25 107247 112851 5604 6 .585 6 .278 -4 .6621 
26 97289 102372 5083 5 .974 5 .695 -4 .6702 
27 217622 229075 11453 13 .362 12 .743 -4 .6326 
28 79365 84401 5036 4 .873 4 .695 -3 .6528 
29 403861 429140 25279 24 .798 23 .872 -3 .7342 
30 83953 89326 5373 5 .155 4 .969 -3 .6081 
31 130896 140741 9845 8 .037 7 .829 -2 .5880 
32 207415 231701 24286 12 .736 12 .889 1 .2013 
33 173065 195016 21951 10 .627 10 .848 2 .0796 
34 121118 129954 8836 7 .437 7 .229 -2 .7968 
35 52002 56098 4096 3 .193 3 .121 -2 .2549 
36 51111 54879 3768 3 .138 3 .053 -2 .7087 
37 93806 103331 9525 5 .760 5 .748 -0 .2083 
38 198122 219207 21085 12 .165 12 .194 0 .2384 
39 139257 151466 12209 8 .551 8 .426 - 1 .4618 
40 348359 379037 30678 21 .390 21 .085 - 1 .4259 
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Noffle C I 02 03 04 05 06 
41 435725 482427 46702 26 .755 26 .837 0 .3065 
42 35440 39872 4432 2 .176 2 .218 1 .9302 
43 256271 284303 28032 15 .736 15 .815 0 .5020 
44 117543 138244 20701 7 .217 7 .690 6 .5540 
45 131832 146916 15084 8 .095 8 .173 0 .9635 
46 173409 193003 19594 10 .648 10 .736 0 .8264 
47 121735 137361 15626 7 .475 7 .641 2 .2207 
48 44405 49180 4775 2 .727 2 .736 0 .3300 
49 134304 150878 16574 8 .247 8 .393 1 .7703 
50 369716 407990 38274 22 . 701 22 .696 -0 .0220 
51 268696 299287 30591 16 .499 16 .649 0 .9092 
52 88909 98686 9777 5 .459 5 .490 0 .5679 
53 19148 21098 1950 1 .176 1 .174 -0 .1701 
54 57651 61413 3762 3 .540 3 .416 -3 .5028 
55 730943 745958 15015 44 .882 41 .496 -7 .5442 
56 1062565 1084237 21672 65 .244 60 .314 -7 .5562 
57 142458 153090 10632 8 .747 8 .516 -2 .6409 
58 57122 61208 4086 3 .507 3 .405 -2 .9085 
59 189939 202649 12710 11 .663 11 .273 -3 .3439 
60 710275 771924 61649 43 .613 42 .941 - 1 .5408 
61 997954 1081619 83665 61 .277 60 .169 - 1 .8082 
62 338502 360438 21936 20 .785 20 .051 -3 .5314 
63 281185 297883 16698 17 .265 16 .571 -4 .0197 
64 118289 125173 6884 7 .263 6 .963 -4 .1305 
65 209402 218989 9587 12 .858 12 .182 -5 .2574 
66 301264 315223 13959 18 .498 17 .535 -5 .2060 
67 116031 121479 5448 7 .125 6 .758 -5 .1509 
68 205712 214982 9270 12 . 631 11 .959 -5 .3202 
69 296533 309845 13312 18 .208 17 .236 -5 .3383 
70 252884 267056 14172 15 .528 14 .856 -4 .3277 
71 145397 152181 6784 8 .928 8 .466 -5 .1747 
72 587085 627567 40482 36 .048 34 .911 -3 . 1541 
73 124963 131674 6711 7 .673 7 .325 -4 .5354 
74 745132 780649 35517 45 .753 43 .426 -5 .0860 
75 139646 145467 5821 8 .575 8 .092 -5 .6327 
76 97534 101260 3726 5 .989 5 .633 -5 .9442 
77 235615 243709 8094 14 .467 13 .557 -6 .2902 
78 103163 106585 3422 6 .334 5 .929 -6 .3941 
79 98463 101828 3365 6 .046 5 .665 -6 .3017 
80 494719 513388 18669 30 .377 28 .559 -5 .9848 
81 177532 184345 6813 10 .901 10 .255 -5 .9261 
82 600772 628859 28087 36 .889 34 .982 -5 .1696 
83 183545 192143 8598 11 .270 10 .689 -5 .1553 
84 196984 210521 13537 12 .095 11 .711 -3 .1749 
85 175281 179854 4573 10 .763 10 .005 -7 .0426 
86 539904 602126 62222 33 .151 33 .495 1 .0377 
87 39890 42544 2654 2 .449 2 .367 -3 .3483 
88 130774 141234 10460 8 .030 7 .857 -2 .1544 
89 4823 5184 361 0 .296 0 .288 -2 .7027 
90 27925 29927 2002 1 .715 1 .665 -2 .9154 
- 339 
SIMULATION 1 = 30MPH, 18 HRS DELAY 
DISTANT EXPONENT = 1 . 0 
KEEBLE ET A L ' S SELF POTENTIAL FORMULA WAS USED, i . e 
C I - ABSOLUTE POTENTIAL VALUES FOR FERRY 
C2 - ABSOLUTE POTENTIAL VALUES FOR TUNNEL 
C3 - CHANGE I N ABSOLUTE VALUES 
C4 - RELATIVE POTENTIAL VALUES FOR FERRY 
C5 - RELATIVE POTENTIAL VALUES FOR TUNNEL 
C6 - % CHANGE 
K = 0.333 
Node C I C2 C3 C4 C5 C6 
1 151497 230564 79067 9 .463 12 .826 35 .5384 
2 97729 153036 55307 6 .104 8 .513 39 .4659 
3 227609 339028 111419 14 .217 18 .860 32 .6581 
4 320943 483820 162877 20 .046 26 .914 34 .2612 
5 204215 311227 107012 12 .755 17 .313 35 .7350 
6 262454 405757 143303 16 .393 22 .572 37 .6929 
7 109730 173170 63440 6 .854 9 .633 40 .5457 
8 220531 352649 132118 13 .775 19 .617 42 .4101 
9 75949 130563 54614 4 .744 7 .263 53 .0986 
10 975305 1862631 887326 60 .919 103 .615 70 .0865 
11 36610 63368 26758 2 .287 3 .525 54 .1320 
12 79099 154696 75597 4 .941 8 .605 74 .1550 
13 83651 92385 8734 5 .225 5 .139 - 1 .6459 
14 165168 185565 20397 10 .317 10 .323 0 .0582 
15 344934 422729 77795 21 .545 23 .516 9 .1483 
16 158626 183855 25229 9 .908 10 .228 3 .2297 
17 128161 146902 18741 8 .005 8 .172 2 .0862 
18 1600996 1797644 196648 100 .000 100 .000 0 .0000 
19 164308 176928 12620 10 .263 9 .842 -4 .1021 
20 186114 200937 14823 11 .625 11 .178 -3 .8452 
21 192068 208727 16659 11 .997 11 .611 -3 .2175 
22 100968 109314 8346 6 .307 6 .081 -3 .5833 
23 41012 44347 3335 2 .562 2 .467 -3 .7081 
24 154137 165530 11393 9 .628 9 .208 -4 .3623 
25 105559 112851 7292 6 .593 6 .278 -4 .7778 
26 95929 102372 6443 5 .992 5 .695 -4 .9566 
27 214611 229075 14464 13 .405 12 .743 -4 .9385 
28 78169 84401 6232 4 .883 4 .695 -3 .8501 
29 398592 429140 30548 24 .896 23 .872 -4 . 1131 
30 82889 89326 6437 5 .177 4 .969 -4 .0178 
31 129138 140741 11603 8 .066 7 .829 -2 .9383 
32 204665 231701 27036 12 .784 12 .889 0 .8214 
33 171033 195016 23983 10 .683 10 .848 1 .5445 
34 119841 129954 10113 7 .485 7 .229 -3 .4202 
35 51363 56098 4735 3 .208 3 .121 -2 .7120 
36 50550 54879 4329 3 .157 3 .053 -3 .2943 
37 92622 103331 10709 5 .785 5 .748 -0 .6396 
38 195878 219207 23329 12 .235 12 .194 -0 .3351 
39 137731 151466 13735 8 .603 8 .426 -2 .0574 
40 344135 379037 34902 21 .495 21 .085 - 1 .9074 
340 
Node C I C2 C3 C4 C5 06 
41 429871 482427 52556 26 .850 26 .837 -0 .0484 
42 34916 39872 4956 2 . 181 2 .218 1 .6965 
43 253231 284303 31072 15 .817 15 .815 -0 .0126 
44 116239 138244 22005 7 .260 7 .690 5 .9229 
45 129761 146916 17155 8 .105 8 .173 0 .8390 
46 171147 193003 21856 10 .690 10 .736 0 .4303 
47 120149 137361 17212 7 .505 7 .641 1 . 8121 
48 43906 49180 5274 2 .742 2 .736 -0 .2188 
49 132905 150878 17973 8 . 301 a .393 1 .1083 
50 365549 407990 42441 22 .833 22 .696 -0 .6000 
51 265427 299287 33860 16 .579 16 .649 0 .4222 
52 87892 98686 10794 5 .490 5 .490 0 .0000 
53 18907 21098 2191 1 .181 1 .174 -0 .5927 
54 57102 61413 4311 3 .567 3 .416 -4 .2333 
55 728759 745958 17199 45 .519 41 .496 -8 .8381 
56 1059395 1084237 24842 66 .171 60 .314 -8 .8513 
57 141277 153090 11813 8 .824 8 .516 -3 .4905 
58 56646 61208 4562 3 .538 3 .405 -3 .7592 
59 188310 202649 14339 11 .762 11 .273 -4 .1575 
60 704132 771924 67792 43 . 981 42 .941 -2 .3647 
61 988924 1081619 92695 61 .769 60 .169 -2 .5903 
62 335413 360438 25025 20 .950 20 .051 -4 .2912 
63 278539 297883 19344 17 .398 16 .571 -4 .7534 
64 117381 125173 7792 7 .332 6 .963 -5 .0327 
65 207185 218989 11804 12 .941 12 .182 -5 .8651 
66 298417 315223 16806 18 .639 17 .535 -5 .9231 
67 114952 121479 6527 7 .180 6 .758 -5 .8774 
68 203730 214982 11252 12 .725 11 .959 -6 .0196 
69 293870 309845 15975 18 .355 17 .236 -6 .0965 
70 250495 267056 16561 15 . 646 14 .856 -5 .0492 
71 144055 152181 8126 8 .998 8 .466 -5 .9124 
72 581767 627567 45800 36 .338 34 .911 -3 .9270 
73 123931 131674 7743 7 .741 7 .325 -5 .3740 
74 739424 780649 41225 46 .185 43 .426 -5 .9738 
75 138520 145467 6947 8 .652 8 .092 -6 .4725 
76 96689 101260 4571 6 .039 5 .633 -6 .7230 
77 233935 243709 9774 14 .612 13 .557 -7 .2201 
78 102410 106585 4175 6 .397 5 .929 -7 .3159 
79 97696 101828 4132 6 .102 5 .665 -7 .1616 
80 490744 513388 22644 30 .652 28 .559 -6 .8283 
81 176147 184345 8198 11 .002 10 .255 -6 .7897 
82 596240 628859 32619 37 .242 34 .982 -6 .0684 
83 182037 192143 10106 11 .370 10 .689 -5 .9894 
84 195172 210521 15349 12 .191 11 .711 -3 .9373 
85 172418 179854 7436 10 .769 10 .005 -7 .0944 
86 532572 602126 69554 33 .265 33 .495 0 .6914 
87 39210 42544 3334 2 .449 2 .367 -3 .3483 
88 128335 141234 12899 8 .016 7 .857 - 1 .9835 
89 4766 5184 418 0 .298 0 .288 -3 .3557 
90 27474 29927 2453 1 .716 1 .665 -2 .9720 
341 
SIMULATION 2 = 40MPH, NO DELAY 
DISTANT EXPONENT = 1.0 
KEEBLE ET A L ' S SELF POTENTIAL FORMULA WAS USED, i . e . K = 0.333 
C I - ABSOLUTE POTENTIAL VALUES FOR FERRY 
02 - ABSOLUTE POTENTIAL VALUES FOR TUNNEL 
03 - CHANGE I N ABSOLUTE VALUES 
04 - RELATIVE POTENTIAL VALUES FOR FERRY 
C5 - RELATIVE POTENTIAL VALUES FOR TUNNEL 
06 - % CHANGE 
Node C I 02 C3 C4 05 06 
1 231773 285378 53605 10 .952 12 .361 12 .8652 
2 150387 186623 36236 7 .106 8 .084 13 .7630 
3 340519 416751 76232 16 .091 18 .052 12 .1869 
4 489815 595656 105841 23 .145 25 .801 11 .4755 
5 318181 377220 59039 15 .035 16 .339 8 .6731 
6 407921 490480 82559 19 .276 21 .245 10 .2148 
7 173988 208448 ,34460 8 .222 9 .029 9 .8151 
8 349075 420285 71210 16 .495 18 .205 10 .3668 
9 129623 152950 23327 6 .125 6 .625 8 .1633 
10 1642799 2108610 465811 77 .628 91 .335 17 .6573 
11 54971 78007 23036 2 .598 3 .379 30 .0616 
12 118305 189614 71309 5 .590 8 .213 46 .9231 
13 112298 119381 7083 5 .306 5 .171 -2 .5443 
14 220748 238094 17346 10 . 431 10 .313 - 1 .1312 
15 446589 524509 77920 21 .103 22 .719 7 .6577 
16 210415 233272 22857 9 .943 10 .104 1 .6192 
17 168246 187134 18888 7 .950 8 .106 1 .9623 
18 2116245 2308666 192421 100 .000 100 .000 0 .0000 
19 220587 230539 9952 10 .424 9 .986 -4 .2019 
20 249120 261901 12781 11 .772 11 .344 -3 .6357 
21 255823 271578 15755 12 .089 11 .763 -2 .6967 
22 134630 142420 7790 6 .362 6 .169 -3 .0336 
23 54753 57787 3034 2 .587 2 .503 -3 .2470 
24 206045 216396 10351 9 .736 9 .373 -3 .7284 
25 141424 147708 6284 6 .683 6 .398 -4 .2646 
26 128075 134004 5929 6 .052 5 .804 -4 .0978 
27 286270 299853 13583 13 .527 12 .988 -3 .9846 
28 104282 110062 5780 4 .928 4 .767 -3 .2671 
29 528931 560064 31133 24 .994 24 .259 -2 .9407 
30 109330 116310 6980 5 .166 5 .038 -2 .4777 
31 170682 182851 12169 8 .065 7 .920 - 1 .7979 
32 265619 296789 31170 12 .551 12 .855 2 .4221 
33 219691 248819 29128 10 .381 10. .778 3 .8243 
34 156393 168424 12031 7 .390 7 .295 - 1 .2855 
35 67043 72575 5532 3 .168 3 . 144 -0 .7576 
36 66005 71105 5100 3 .119 3 .080 - 1 .2504 
37 119422 132564 13142 5 .643 5 .742 1 .7544 
38 253099 281296 28197 11 .960 12 .184 1 .8729 
39 178860 195158 16298 8 .452 8 .453 0 .0118 
40 447784 488702 40918 21 .159 21 .168 0 .0425 
342 
Node C I C2 C3 C4 C5 C6 
41 556665 617806 61141 26 .304 26 .760 1 .7336 
42 45051 50814 5763 2 .129 2 .201 3 .3819 
43 326484 364272 37788 15 .428 15 .778 2 .2686 
44 146269 173329 27060 6 .912 7 .508 8 .6227 
45 169978 187538 17560 8 .032 8 .123 1 .1330 
46 223430 246670 23240 10 .558 10 .685 1 .2029 
47 156219 174897 18678 7 .382 7 .576 2 .6280 
48 57059 63077 6018 2 .696 2 .732 1 .3353 
49 171236 192391 21155 8 .091 8 .333 2 .9910 
50 476651 523641 46990 22 .523 22 .682 0 .7059 
51 344780 382704 37924 16 .292 16 .577 1 .7493 
52 113958 126418 12460 5 .385 5 .476 1 .6899 
53 24642 27130 2488 1 .164 1 .175 0 .9450 
54 75349 79877 4528 3 .561 3 .460 -2 .8363 
55 968185 987754 19569 45 .750 42 .785 -6 .4809 
56 1407533 1435770 28237 66 .511 62 .190 -6 .4967 
57 185101 198748 13647 8 .747 8 .609 - 1 .5777 
58 74325 79594 5269 3 .512 3 .448 - 1 .8223 
59 247160 263814 16654 11 .679 11 .427 -2 .1577 
60 917233 997674 80441 43 .342 43 .214 -0 .2953 
61 1288425 1398344 109919 60 .883 60 .569 -0 .5157 
62 440105 468945 28840 20 .797 20 .312 -2 .3321 
63 366410 388351 21941 17 .314 16 .821 -2 .8474 
64 152982 162507 9525 7 .229 7 .039 -2 .6283 
65 273589 286950 13361 12 .928 12 .429 -3 .8598 
66 391243 410876 19633 18 .488 17 .797 -3 .7376 
67 151575 159184 7609 7 .162 6 .895 -3 .7280 
68 269794 281658 11864 12 .749 12 .200 -4 .3062 
69 388759 405984 17225 18 .370 17 .585 -4 .2733 
70 330138 348575 18437 15 .600 15 .099 -3 .2115 
71 190543 199324 8781 9 .004 8 .634 -4 .1093 
72 762360 815601 53241 36 .024 35 .328 - 1 .9320 
73 163458 172139 8681 7 .724 7 .456 -3 .4697 
74 976989 1022976 45987 46 .166 44 .310 -4 .0203 
75 183612 191016 7404 8 .676 8 .274 -4 .6335 
76 128394 133072 4678 6 .067 5 .764 -4 .9942 
77 310510 320783 10273 14 .673 13 .895 -5 .3023 
78 136064 140375 4311 6 .430 6 .080 -5 .4432 
79 129837 134061 4224 6 .135 5 .807 -5 .3464 
80 652053 675550 23497 30 .812 29 .261 -5 .0338 
81 233806 242422 8616 11 .048 10 .501 -4 .9511 
82 788413 824723 36310 37 .255 35 .723 -4 .1122 
83 240898 251940 11042 11 .383 10 .913 -4 .1290 
84 256295 273969 17674 12 .111 11 .867 -2 .0147 
85 228683 233878 5195 10 .806 10 .130 -6 .2558 
86 684308 772288 87980 32 .336 33 .452 3 .4513 
87 51517 55433 3916 2 .434 2 .401 - 1 .3558 
88 163841 178720 14879 7 .742 7 .741 -0 .0129 
89 6196 6720 524 0 .293 0 .291 -0 .6826 
90 35645 38747 3102 1 .684 1 .678 -0 .3563 
343 -
SIMULATION 12= 40MPH, 6 HRS DELAY 
DISTANT EXPONENT = 1 . 0 
KEEBLE ET A L ' S SELF POTENTIAL FORMULA WAS USED, i . e . K 
0 1 - ABSOLUTE POTENTIAL VALUES FOR FERRY 
02 - ABSOLUTE POTENTIAL VALUES FOR TUNNEL 
03 - OHANGE I N ABSOLUTE VALUES 
04 - RELATIVE POTENTIAL VALUES FOR FERRY 
05 - RELATIVE POTENTIAL VALUES FOR TUNNEL 
06 - % OHANGE 
0.333 
Node 0 1 02 03 04 05 06 
1 208871 285378 76507 10 .018 12 .361 23 .3879 
2 135205 186623 51418 6 .485 8 .084 24 .6569 
3 311508 416751 105243 14 .941 18 .052 20 .8219 
4 444924 595656 150732 21 .340 25 .801 20 .9044 
5 285943 377220 91277 13 .715 16 .339 19 .1323 
6 367018 490480 123462 17 .603 21 .245 20 .6897 
7 154772 208448 53676 7 .423 9 .029 21 .6355 
8 310949 420285 109336 14 . 914 18 .205 22 .0665 
9 109827 152950 43123 5 .268 6 .625 25 .7593 
10 1404082 2108610 704528 67 .344 91 .335 35 .6245 
11 49511 78007 28496 2 .375 3 .379 42 .2737 
12 105829 189614 83785 5 .076 8 .213 61 .8006 
13 110080 119381 9301 5 .280 5 .171 -2 .0644 
14 216274 238094 21820 10 .373 10 .313 -0 .5784 
15 437341 524509 87168 20 .976 22 .719 8 .3095 
16 206291 233272 26981 9 .894 10 . 104 2 .1225 
17 165677 187134 21457 7 .946 8 .106 2 .0136 
18 2084928 2308666 223738 100 .000 100 .000 0 .0000 
19 216905 230539 13634 10 .403 9 .986 -4 .0085 
20 245511 261901 16390 11 .776 11 .344 -3 .6685 
21 252715 271578 18863 12 .121 11 .763 -2 .9536 
22 132990 142420 9430 6 .379 6 .169 -3 .2921 
23 54051 57787 3736 2 .592 2 .503 -3 .4336 
24 203580 216396 12816 9 .764 9 .373 -4 .0045 
25 139647 147708 8061 6 .698 6 .398 -4 .4790 
26 126649 134004 7355 6 .075 5 .804 -4 .4609 
27 283126 299853 16727 13 .580 12 .988 -4 .3594 
28 102996 110062 7066 4 .940 4 .767 -3 .5020 
29 523315 560064 36749 25 .100 24 .259 -3 .3506 
30 108183 116310 8127 5 .189 5 .038 -2 .9100 
31 168770 182851 14081 8 .095 7 .920 -2 .1618 
32 262375 296789 34414 12 .584 12 .855 2 .1535 
33 217341 248819 31478 10 .424 10 .778 3 .3960 
34 155066 168424 13358 7 .437 7 .295 - 1 .9094 
35 66378 72575 6197 3 .184 3 .144 - 1 .2563 
36 65420 71105 5685 3 .138 3 .080 - 1 .8483 
37 118186 132564 14378 5 .669 5 .742 1 .2877 
38 250730 281296 30566 12 .026 12 . 184 1 .3138 
39 177238 195158 17920 8 .501 8 .453 -0 .5646 
40 443314 488702 45388 21 .263 21 .168 -0 .4468 
344 
Node C I C2 C3 C4 C5 C6 
41 550401 617806 67405 26 .399 26 .760 1 .3675 
42 44500 50814 6314 2 .134 2 .201 3 .1396 
43 323275 364272 40997 15 .505 15 .778 1 .7607 
44 144907 173329 28422 6 .950 7 .508 8 .0288 
45 167579 187538 19959 8 .038 8 .123 1 .0575 
46 220832 246670 25838 10 .592 10 .685 0 .8780 
47 154430 174897 20467 7 .407 7 .576 2 .2816 
48 56499 63077 6578 2 .710 2 .732 0 .8118 
49 169676 192391 22715 8 .138 8 .333 2 .3962 
50 471919 523641 51722 22 .635 22 .682 0 .2076 
51 341074 382704 41630 16 .359 16 .577 1 .3326 
52 112823 126418 13595 5 .411 5 .476 1 .2013 
53 24376 27130 2754 1 .169 1 .175 0 .5133 
54 74749 79877 5128 3 .585 3 .460 -3 .4868 
55 965963 987754 21791 46 .331 42 .785 -7 .6536 
56 1404307 1435770 31463 67 .355 62 .190 -7 .6683 
57 183900 198748 14848 8 .820 8 .609 -2 .3923 
58 73838 79594 5756 3 .542 3 .448 -2 .6539 
59 245482 263814 18332 11 .774 11 .427 -2 .9472 
60 910848 997674 86826 43 .687 43 .214 - 1 .0827 
61 1279013 1398344 119331 61 .346 60 .569 - 1 .2666 
62 436903 468945 32042 20 .955 20 .312 -3 .0685 
63 363669 388351 24682 17 .443 16 .821 -3 .5659 
64 152198 162507 10309 7 .300 7 .039 -3 .5753 
65 271724 286950 15226 13 .033 12 .429 -4 .6344 
66 388856 410876 22020 18 .651 17 .797 -4 .5788 
67 150669 159184 8515 7 .227 6 .895 -4 .5939 
68 267774 281658 13884 12 .843 12 .200 -5 .0066 
69 386031 405984 19953 18 .515 17 .585 -5 .0230 
70 327676 348575 20899 15 .716 15 .099 -3 .9259 
71 189172 199324 10152 9 .073 8 .634 -4 .8385 
72 756829 815601 58772 36 .300 35 .328 -2 .6777 
73 162401 172139 9738 7 .789 7 .456 -4 .2753 
74 971168 1022976 51808 46 .580 44 .310 -4 .8733 
75 182473 191016 8543 8 .752 8 .274 -5 .4616 
76 127550 133072 5522 6 .118 5 .764 -5 .7862 
77 308823 320783 11960 14 .812 13 .895 -6 .1909 
78 135311 140375 5064 6 .490 6 .080 -6 .3174 
79 129072 134061 4989 6 . 191 5 .807 -6 .2026 
80 648095 675550 27455 31 .085 29 .261 -5 .8678 
81 232423 242422 9999 11 .148 10 .501 -5 .8037 
82 783839 824723 40884 37 .595 35 .723 -4 .9794 
83 239381 251940 12559 11 . 481 10 .913 -4 .9473 
84 254473 273969 19496 12 .205 11 .867 -2 .7694 
85 225711 233878 8167 10 .826 10 .130 -6 .4290 
86 676668 772288 95620 32 .455 33 .452 3 .0720 
87 50933 55433 4500 2 .443 2 .401 - 1 .7192 
88 161433 178720 17287 7 .743 7 .741 -0 .0258 
89 6141 6720 579 0 .295 0 .291 - 1 .3559 
90 35269 38747 3478 1 .692 1 .678 -0 .8274 
345 
SIMULATION 2 = 40MPH, 18 HRS DELAY 
DISTANT EXPONENT = 1 . 0 
KEEBLE ET A L ' S SELF POTENTIAL FORMULA WAS USED, i . e . K = 0.333 
C I - ABSOLUTE POTENTIAL VALUES FOR FERRY 
C2 - ABSOLUTE POTENTIAL VALUES FOR TUNNEL 
C3 - CHANGE I N ABSOLUTE VALUES 
04 - RELATIVE POTENTIAL VALUES FOR FERRY 
C5 - RELATIVE POTENTIAL VALUES FOR TUNNEL 
C6 - % CHANGE 
Node 0 1 02 03 C4 C5 C6 
1 180073 285378 105305 8 .774 12 .361 40 .8822 
2 116879 186623 69744 5 .695 8 .084 41 .9491 
3 277452 416751 139299 13 .519 18 .052 33 .5306 
4 394183 595656 201473 19 .206 25 .801 34 .3382 
5 250805 377220 126415 12 .220 16 .339 33 .7070 
6 322516 490480 167964 15 .714 21 .245 35 . 1979 
7 133477 208448 74971 6 .504 9 .029 38 .8223 
8 269391 420285 150894 13 .126 18 .205 38 .6942 
9 89032 152950 63918 4 .338 6 .625 52 .7202 
10 1163055 2108610 945555 56 .669 91 .335 61 .1728 
11 42591 78007 35416 2 .075 3 .379 62 .8434 
12 90609 189614 99005 4 .415 8 .213 86 .0249 
13 107774 119381 11607 5 .251 5 .171 - 1 .5235 
14 211897 238094 26197 10 .325 10 .313 -0 .1162 
15 428752 524509 95757 20 .891 22 .719 8 .7502 
16 202341 233272 30931 9 .859 10 .104 2 .4850 
17 163012 187134 24122 7 .943 8 .106 2 .0521 
18 2052349 2308666 256317 100 .000 100 .000 0 .0000 
19 212854 230539 17685 10 .371 9 .986 -3 .7123 
20 241363 261901 20538 11 .760 11 .344 -3 .5374 
21 249177 271578 22401 12 . 141 11 .763 -3 .1134 
22 131074 142420 11346 6 .387 6 .169 -3 .4132 
23 53223 57787 4564 2 .593 2 .503 -3 .4709 
24 200526 216396 15870 9 .771 9 .373 -4 .0733 
25 137417 147708 10291 6 .696 6 .398 -4 .4504 
26 124843 134004 9161 6 .083 5 .804 -4 .5865 
27 279096 299853 20757 13 .599 12 .988 -4 .4930 
28 101470 110062 8592 4 .944 4 .767 -3 .5801 
29 516494 560064 43570 25 .166 24 .259 -3 .6041 
30 106827 116310 9483 5 .205 5 .038 -3 .2085 
31 166562 182851 16289 8 .116 7 .920 -2 .4150 
32 258816 296789 37973 12 . 611 12 .855 1 .9348 
33 214662 248819 34157 10 .459 10 .778 3 .0500 
34 153573 168424 14851 7 .483 7 .295 -2 .5124 
35 65631 72575 6944 3 .198 3 .144 - 1 .6886 
36 64768 71105 6337 3 .156 3 .080 -2 .4081 
37 116814 132564 15750 5 .692 5 .742 0 .8784 
38 248187 281296 33109 12 .093 12 .184 0 .7525 
39 175535 195158 19623 8 .553 8 .453 - 1 .1692 
40 438556 488702 50146 21 .368 21 .168 -0 .9360 
- 346 -
Node CI C2 C3 C4 C5 C6 
41 543958 617806 73848 26 .504 26 .760 0 .9659 
42 43903 50814 6911 2 .139 2 .201 2 .8985 
43 319832 364272 44440 15 .584 15 .778 1 .2449 
44 143396 173329 29933 6 .987 7 .508 7 .4567 
45 165265 187538 22273 8 .052 8 .123 0 .8818 
46 218275 246670 28395 10 .635 10 .685 0 .4702 
47 152594 174897 22303 7 .435 7 .576 1 .8964 
48 55917 63077 7160 2 .725 2 .732 0 .2569 
49 168031 192391 24360 8 .187 8 .333 1 .7833 
50 467139 523641 56502 22 .761 22 .682 -0 .3471 
51 337315 382704 45389 16 .436 16 .577 0 .8579 
52 111630 126418 14788 5 .439 5 .476 0 .6803 
53 24087 27130 3043 1 .174 1 .175 0 .0852 
54 74086 79877 5791 3 .610 3 .460 -4 .1551 
55 963284 987754 24470 46 .936 42 .785 -8 .8440 
56 1400415 1435770 35355 68 .235 62 .190 -8 .8591 
57 182447 198748 16301 8 .890 8 .609 -3 .1609 
58 73261 79594 6333 3 .570 3 .448 -3 .4174 
59 243539 263814 20275 11 .866 11 .427 -3 .6997 
60 903654 997674 94020 44 .030 43 .214 -1 .8533 
61 1268504 1398344 129840 61 .807 60 .569 -2 .0030 
62 433267 468945 35678 21 .111 20 .312 -3 .7848 
63 360550 388351 27801 17 .568 16 .821 -4 .2520 
64 151187 162507 11320 7 .367 7 .039 -4 .4523 
65 269280 286950 17670 13 .121 12 .429 -5 .2740 
66 385786 410876 25090 18 .797 17 .797 -5 .3200 
67 149494 159184 9690 7 .284 6 .895 -5 .3405 
68 265354 281658 16304 12 .929 12 .200 -5 .6385 
69 382811 405984 23173 18 .652 17 .585 -5 .7206 
70 324827 348575 23748 15 .827 15 .099 -4 .5997 
71 187538 199324 11786 9 .138 8 .634 -5 .5154 
72 750609 815601 64992 36 .573 35 .328 -3 .4042 
73 161151 172139 10988 7 .852 7 .456 -5 .0433 
74 964194 1022976 58782 46 .980 44 .310 -5 .6833 
75 181067 191016 9949 8 .822 8 .274 -6 .2117 
76 126466 133072 6606 6 .162 5 .764 -6 .4589 
77 306696 320783 14087 14 .944 13 .895 -7 .0195 
78 134351 140375 6024 6 .546 6 .080 -7 .1188 
79 128089 134061 5972 6 .241 5 .807 -6 .9540 
80 642957 675550 32593 31 .328 29 .261 -6 .5979 
81 230647 242422 11775 11 .238 10 .501 -6 .558i 
82 778164 824723 46559 37 .916 35 .723 -5 .7838 
83 237478 251940 14462 11 .571 10 .913 -5 .6866 
84 252183 273969 21786 12 .288 11 .867 -3 .4261 
85 222259 233878 11619 10 .829 10 .130 -6 .4549 
86 666712 772288 105576 32 .485 33 .452 2 .9768 
87 50102 55433 5331 2 .441 2 .401 -1 .6387 
88 158628 178720 20092 7 .729 7 .741 0 .1553 
89 6055 6720 665 0 .295 0 .291 -1 .3559 
90 34709 38747 4038 1 .691 1 . 678 -0 .7688 
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SIMULATION 3 = 75MPH, NO DELAY 
DISTANT EXPONENT =1.0 
KEEBLE ET AL'S SELF POTENTIAL FORMULA WAS USED, i . e . K = 0.333 
CI - ABSOLUTE POTENTIAL VALUES FOR FERRY 
C2 - ABSOLUTE POTENTIAL VALUES FOR TUNNEL 
C3 - CHANGE IN ABSOLUTE VALUES 
C4 - RELATIVE POTENTIAL VALUES FOR FERRY 
C5 - RELATIVE POTENTIAL VALUES FOR TUl^EL 
C6 - % CHANGE 
Node CI C2 C3 C4 C5 C6 
1 340368 505632 165264 9 .552 12 .481 30 .6637 
2 223167 327232 104065 6 .263 8 .077 28 .9638 
3 523275 737020 213745 14 .685 18 .192 23 .8815 
4 770631 1054445 283814 21 .627 26 .027 20 .3449 
5 496981 661787 164806 13 .947 16 .335 17 .1220 
6 638029 859228 221199 17 .906 21 .209 18 .4463 
7 266912 363483 . 96571 7 .491 8 .972 19 .7704 
8 538599 730213 191614 15 . 115 18 .024 19 .2458 
9 183249 261370 78121 5 .143 6 .451 25 .4326 
10 2388646 3553835 1165189 67 .036 87 .720 30 .8550 
11 76219 137600 61381 2 .139 3 .396 58 .7658 
12 158049 334604 176555 4 .436 8 .259 86 .1812 
13 191359 212798 21439 5 .370 5 .253 -2 .1788 
14 371786 419607 47821 10 .434 10 .357 -0 .7380 
15 702321 862210 159889 19 .710 21 .282 7 . 9756 
16 350422 404022 53600 9 .834 9 .973 1 .4135 
17 277754 322832 45078 7 .795 7 .969 2 .2322 
18 3563233 4051316 488083 100 .000 100 .000 0 .0000 
19 381977 415489 33512 10 .720 10 .256 -4 .3284 
20 432891 472210 39319 12 .149 11 .656 -4 .0579 
21 444789 488115 43326 12 .483 12 .048 -3 .4848 
22 234670 256575 21905 6 .586 6 .333 -3 .8415 
23 95445 104134 8689 2 .679 2 .570 -4 .0687 
24 361600 392095 30495 10 .148 9 .678 -4 .6314 
25 248884 268198 19314 6 .985 6 .620 -5 .2255 
26 225094 242958 17864 6 .317 5 .997 -5 .0657 
27 502057 543066 41009 14 .090 13 .405 -4 .8616 
28 181765 198369 16604 5 .101 4 .896 -4 .0188 
29 916182 1005631 89449 25 .712 24 .822 -3 .4614 
30 186611 206835 20224 5 .237 5 .105 -2 .5205 
31 291781 325179 33398 8 .189 8 .027 -1 .9783 
32 432233 507380 75147 12 . 130 12 .524 3 .2481 
33 351542 419244 67702 9 .866 10 .348 4 .8855 
34 263646 295825 32179 7 .399 7 .302 -1 .3110 
35 111904 127002 15098 3 .141 3 .135 -0 .1910 
36 111160 124885 13725 3 .120 3 .083 -1 .1859 
37 192919 226227 33308 5 .414 5 .584 3 .1400 
38 414294 482603 68309 11 .627 11 .912 2 .4512 
39 297899 338748 40849 8 .360 8 .361 0 .0120 
40 743364 849306 105942 20 .862 20 .964 0 .4889 
348 
Node CI C2 C3 C4 C5 C6 
41 908622 1058489 149867 25 .500 26 .127 2 .4588 
42 72110 86245 14135 2 .024 2 .129 5 .1877 
43 529833 621780 91947 14 .869 15 .348 3 .2215 
44 224885 281891 57006 6 .311 6 .958 10 .2519 
45 281557 324575 43018 7 .902 8 .012 1 .3920 
46 372402 427155 54753 10 .451 10 .544 0 .8899 
47 257128 300558 43430 7 .216 7 .419 2 .8132 
48 94650 109058 14408 2 .656 2 .692 1 .3554 
49 280030 327360 47330 7 .859 8 .080 2 .8121 
50 798593 910293 111700 22 .412 22 .469 0 .2543 
51 569840 658791 88951 15 .992 16 .261 1 .6821 
52 187814 217616 29802 5 .271 5 .371 1 .8972 
53 40765 47096 6331 1 .144 1 .162 1 .5734 
54 131996 142988 10992 3 .704 3 .529 -4 .7246 
55 1774583 1825959 51376 49 .803 45 .071 -9 .5014 
56 2580244 2654518 74274 72 .413 65 .522 -9 .5163 
57 319854 353014 33160 8 . 977 8 .714 -2 . 9297 
58 128641 141738 13097 3 .610 3 .499 -3 .0748 
59 427730 469887 42157 12 .004 11 .598 -3 .3822 
60 1562385 1747664 185279 43 .847 43 .138 -1 .6170 
61 2192231 2448929 256698 61 .524 60 .448 -1 .7489 
62 761064 833387 72323 21 .359 20 .571 -3 . 6893 
63 636452 693163 56711 17 .862 17 .110 -4 .2101 
64 264090 288779 24689 7 .412 7 .128 -3 .8316 
65 479728 519716 39988 13 .463 12 .828 -4 .7166 
66 680518 737161 56643 19 .098 18 .196 -4 .7230 
67 266198 288044 21846 7 .471 7 .110 -4 .8320 
68 475501 509671 34170 13 .345 12 .580 -5 .7325 
69 685617 734129 48512 19 .241 18 .121 -5 .8209 
70 575476 624858 49382 16 .150 15 .424 -4 .4953 
71 335255 360217 24962 9 .409 8 .891 -5 .5054 
72 1314097 1445677 131580 36 .879 35 .684 -3 .2403 
73 286881 309959 23078 8 .051 7 .651 -4 .9683 
74 1727037 1851161 124124 48 .468 45 .693 -5 .7254 
75 326646 347599 20953 9 .167 8 .580 -6 .4034 
76 229001 242802 13801 6 .427 5 .993 -6 .7528 
77 557121 586774 29653 15 .635 14 .484 -7 .3617 
78 244529 257148 12619 6 .863 6 .347 -7 .5186 
79 232982 245447 12465 6 .538 6 .058 -7 .3417 
80 1167367 1235285 67918 32 .761 30 .491 -6 .9290 
81 418064 442706 24642 11 .733 10 .927 -6 .8695 
82 1397387 1495138 97751 39 .217 36 .905 -5 .8954 
83 426436 456842 30406 11 .968 11 .276 -5 .7821 
84 443258 487842 44584 12 .440 12 .042 -3 .1993 
85 396473 419935 23462 11 .127 10 .365 -6 .8482 
86 1072186 1307197 235011 30 .090 32 .266 7 .2316 
87 85704 98644 12940 2 .405 2 .435 1 .2474 
88 248475 292517 44042 6 .973 7 .220 3 .5422 
89 10162 11723 1561 0 .285 0 .289 1 .4035 
90 57662 67844 10182 1 .618 1 .675 3 .5229 
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SIMULATION 3 = 75MPH, 6 HRS DELAY 
DISTANT EXPONENT =1.0 
KEEBLE ET AL'S SELF POTENTIAL FORMULA WAS USED, i . e 
CI - ABSOLUTE POTENTIAL VALUES FOR FERRY 
C2 - ABSOLUTE POTENTIAL VALUES FOR TUNNEL 
C3 - CHANGE IN ABSOLUTE VALUES 
C4 - RELATIVE POTENTIAL VALUES FOR FERRY 
C5 - RELATIVE POTENTIAL VALUES FOR TUNNEL 
C6 - % CHANGE 
K = 0.333 
Node CI C2 C3 C4 C5 C6 
1 304484 505632 201148 8 .655 12 .481 44 .206 
2 200640 327232 126592 5 .703 8 .077 41 .627 
3 482901 737020 254119 13 .726 18 .192 32 .537 
4 699589 1054445 354856 19 .885 26 .027 30 .888 
5 448365 661787 213422 12 .744 16 .335 28 .178 
6 576301 859228 282927 16 .381 21 .209 29 .473 
7 237631 363483 125852 6 .754 8 .972 32 .840 
8 481739 730213 248474 13 .693 18 .024 31 .629 
9 155621 261370 105749 4 .423 6 .451 45 .851 
10 2060224 3553835 1493611 58 .560 87 .720 49 .795 
11 67388 137600 70212 1 .915 3 .396 77 .337 
12 139020 334604 195584 3 .952 8 .259 108 .983 
13 188310 212798 24488 5 .353 5 .253 -1 .868 
14 365837 419607 53770 10 .399 10 .357 -0 .404 
15 688248 862210 173962 19 .563 21 .282 8 .787 
16 343936 404022 60086 9 .776 9 .973 2 .015 
17 273351 322832 49481 7 .770 7 .969 2 .561 
18 3518149 4051316 533167 100 .000 100 .000 0 .000 
19 376575 415489 38914 10 .704 10 .256 -4 .185 
20 427264 472210 44946 12 .145 11 .656 -4 .026 
21 439958 488115 48157 12 .505 12 .048 -3 .655 
22 232026 256575 24549 6 .595 6 .333 -3 .973 
23 94253 104134 9881 2 .679 2 .570 -4 .069 
24 357291 392095 34804 10 .156 9 .678 -4 .707 
25 245609 268198 22589 6 .981 6 .620 -5 .171 
26 222431 242958 20527 6 .322 5 .997 -5 .141 
27 496096 543066 46970 14 .101 13 .405 -4 .936 
28 179565 198369 18804 5 .104 4 .896 -4 .075 
29 906273 1005631 99358 25 .760 24 .822 -3 .641 
30 184656 206835 22179 5 .249 5 .105 -2 .743 
31 288626 325179 36553 8 .204 8 .027 -2 .157 
32 426328 507380 81052 12 .118 12 .524 3 .350 
33 347082 419244 72162 9 .865 10 .348 4 .896 
34 261796 295825 34029 7 .441 7 .302 -1 .868 
35 110981 127002 16021 3 .155 3 .135 -0 .634 
36 110355 124885 14530 3 .137 3 .083 -1 .721 
37 191230 226227 34997 5 .436 5 .584 2 .723 
38 411210 482603 71393 11 .688 11 .912 1 .916 
39 295853 338748 42895 8 .409 8 .361 -0 .571 
40 737615 849306 111691 20 .966 20 .964 -0 .010 
35
Node CI C2 C3 C4 C5 C6 
41 900951 1058489 157538 25 .609 26 .127 2 .023 
42 71383 86245 14862 2 .029 2 .129 4 .929 
43 525658 621780 96122 14 .941 15 .348 2 .724 
44 223024 281891 58867 6 .339 6 .958 9 .765 
45 278480 324575 46095 7 .916 8 .012 1 .213 
46 368983 427155 58172 10 .488 10 .544 0 .534 
47 254647 300558 45911 7 .238 7 .419 2 .501 
48 93861 109058 15197 2 .668 2 .692 0 .900 
49 277790 327360 49570 7 .896 8 .080 2 .330 
50 792160 910293 118133 22 .516 22 .469 -0 .209 
51 564774 658791 94017 16 .053 16 .261 1 .296 
52 186192 217616 31424 5 .292 5 .371 1 .493 
53 40368 47096 6728 1 .147 1 .162 1 .308 
54 131082 142988 11906 3 .726 3 .529 -5 .287 
55 1771154 1825959 54805 50 .343 45 .071 -10 .472 
56 2575260 2654518 79258 73 .199 65 .522 -10 .488 
57 317990 353014 35024 9 .039 8 .714 -3 .596 
58 127909 141738 13829 3 .636 3 .499 -3 .768 
59 425290 469887 44597 12 .088 11 .598 -4 .054 
60 1553467 1747664 194197 44 .156 43 .138 -2 .305 
61 2179256 2448929 269673 61 .943 60 .448 -2 .414 
62 756539 833387 76848 21 .504 20 .571 -4 .339 
63 632566 693163 60597 17 .980 17 .110 -4 .839 
64 263126 288779 25653 7 .479 7 .128 -4 .693 
65 477495 519716 42221 13 .572 12 .828 -5 .482 
66 677774 737161 59387 19 .265 18 .196 -5 .549 
67 265137 288044 22907 7 .536 7 .110 -5 .653 
68 472417 509671 37254 13 .428 12 .580 -6 .315 
69 681536 734129 52593 19 .372 18 .121 -6 .458 
70 571899 624858 52959 16 .256 15 .424 -5 .118 
71 333175 360217 27042 9 .470 8 .891 -6 .114 
72 1306392 1445677 139285 37 .133 35 .684 -3 .902 
73 285294 309959 24665 8 .109 7 .651 -5 .648 
74 1718133 1851161 133028 48 .836 45 .693 -6 .436 
75 324823 347599 22776 9 .233 8 .580 -7 . 072 
76 227568 242802 15234 6 .468 5 .993 -7 .344 
77 554335 586774 32439 15 .756 14 .484 -8 .073 
78 243265 257148 13883 6 .915 6 .347 -8 .214 
79 231682 245447 13765 6 .585 6 .058 -8 .003 
80 1160537 1235285 74748 32 .987 30 .491 -7 .567 
81 415716 442706 26990 11 .816 10 .927 -7 .524 
82 1390015 1495138 105123 39 .510 36 .905 -6 .593 
83 423949 456842 32893 12 .050 11 .276 -6 .423 
84 440262 487842 47580 12 .514 12 .042 -3 .772 
85 392069 419935 27866 11 .144 10 .365 -6 .990 
86 1057189 1307197 250008 30 .050 32 .266 7 .374 
87 84817 98644 13827 2 .411 2 .435 0 .995 
88 245225 292517 47292 6 .970 7 .220 3 .587 
89 10027 11723 1696 0 .285 0 .289 1 .404 
90 57093 67844 10751 1 .623 1 .675 3 .204 
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SIMULATION 3 = 75MPH, 18 HRS DELAY 
DISTANT EXPONENT = 1.0 
KEEBLE ET AL'S SELF POTENTIAL FORMULA WAS USED, i . e . K 
CI - ABSOLUTE POTENTIAL VALUES FOR FERRY 
C2 - ABSOLUTE POTENTIAL VALUES FOR TUNNEL 
C3 - CHANGE IN ABSOLUTE VALUES 
C4 - RELATIVE POTENTIAL VALUES FOR FERRY 
C5 - RELATIVE POTENTIAL VALUES FOR TUNNEL 
C6 - % CHANGE 
0.333 
Node CI C2 C3 C4 C5 C6 
1 263749 505632 241883 7 .588 12 .481 64 .483 
2 175910 327232 151322 5 .061 8 .077 59 .593 
3 439306 737020 297714 12 .639 18 .192 43 .935 
4 628150 1054445 426295 18 .072 26 .027 44 .018 
5 400792 661787 260995 11 .531 16 .335 41 .662 
6 515992 859228 343236 14 .846 21 .209 42 .860 
7 208528 363483 154955 6 .000 8 .972 49 .533 
8 425907 730213 304306 12 .254 18 .024 47 .087 
9 128979 261370 132391 3 .711 6 .451 73 .835 
10 1755611 3553835 1798224 50 .510 87 .720 73 .669 
11 57294 137600 80306 1 .648 3 .396 106 .068 
12 117902 334604 216702 3 .392 8 .259 143 .485 
13 185402 212798 27396 5 .334 5 .253 -1 .519 
14 360470 419607 59137 10 .371 10 .357 -0 .135 
15 676802 862210 185408 19 .472 21 .282 9 .295 
16 338539 404022 65483 9 .740 9 .973 2 .392 
17 269448 322832 53384 7 .752 7 .969 2 .799 
18 3475742 4051316 575574 100 .000 100 .000 0 .000 
19 371197 415489 44292 10 .680 10 .256 -3 .970 
20 421476 472210 50734 12 .126 11 .656 -3 .876 
21 435039 488115 53076 12 .516 12 .048 -3 .739 
22 229277 256575 27298 6 .596 6 .333 -3 .987 
23 93017 104134 11117 2 .676 2 .570 -3 .961 
24 352593 392095 39502 10 . 144 9 .678 -4 .594 
25 242030 268198 26168 6 .963 6 .620 -4 .926 
26 219495 242958 23463 6 .315 5 .997 -5 .036 
27 489453 543066 53613 14 .082 13 .405 -4 .808 
28 177275 198369 21094 5 .100 4 .896 -4 .000 
29 895752 1005631 109879 25 .772 24 .822 -3 .686 
30 182626 206835 24209 5 .254 5 .105 -2 .836 
31 285416 325179 39763 8 .212 8 .027 -2 .253 
32 420840 507380 86540 12 .108 12 .524 3 .436 
33 342790 419244 76454 9 .862 10 .348 4 .928 
34 259884 295825 35941 7 .477 7 .302 -2 .341 
35 110029 127002 16973 3 .166 3 .135 -0 .979 
36 109528 124885 15357 3 .151 3 .083 -2 .158 
37 189502 226227 36725 5 .452 5 .584 2 .421 
38 408122 482603 74481 11 .742 11 .912 1 .448 
39 293834 338748 44914 8 .454 8 .361 -1 .100 
40 731893 849306 117413 21 .057 20 .964 -0 .442 
352 
Node CI C2 C3 C4 C5 C6 
41 893480 1058489 165009 25 .706 26 .127 1 .638 
42 70651 86245 15594 2 .033 2 .129 4 .722 
43 521480 621780 100300 15 .003 15 .348 2 .300 
44 221120 281891 60771 6 .362 6 .958 9 .368 
45 275729 324575 48846 7 .933 8 .012 0 .996 
46 365884 427155 61271 10 .527 10 .544 0 .161 
47 252336 300558 48222 7 .260 7 .419 2 .190 
48 93120 109058 15938 2 .679 2 .692 0 .485 
49 275661 327360 51699 7 .931 8 .080 1 .879 
50 786228 910293 124065 22 .620 22 .469 -0 .668 
51 560088 658791 98703 16 .114 16 .261 0 .912 
52 184654 217616 32962 5 .313 5 .371 1 .092 
53 39983 47096 7113 1 .150 1 .162 1 .043 
54 130182 142988 12806 3 .745 3 .529 -5 .768 
55 1767424 1825959 58535 50 .850 45 .071 -11 .365 
56 2569836 2654518 84682 73 .936 65 .522 -11 .380 
57 315957 353014 37057 9 .090 8 .714 -4 .136 
58 127123 141738 14615 3 .657 3 .499 -4 .320 
59 422715 469887 47172 12 .162 11 .598 -4 .637 
60 1544240 1747664 203424 44 .429 43 .138 -2 .906 
61 2165918 2448929 283011 62 .315 60 .448 -2 .996 
62 751832 833387 81555 21 .631 20 .571 -4 .900 
63 628517 693163 64646 18 .083 17 .110 -5 .381 
64 261932 288779 26847 7 .536 7 .128 -5 .414 
65 474665 519716 45051 13 .657 12 .828 -6 .070 
66 674334 737161 62827 19 .401 18 .196 -6 .211 
67 263801 288044 24243 7 .590 7 .110 -6 .324 
68 469079 509671 40592 13 .496 12 .580 -6 .787 
69 677167 734129 56962 19 .483 18 .121 -6 .991 
70 568127 624858 56731 16 .345 15 .424 -5 .635 
71 330932 360217 29285 9 .521 8 .891 -6 .617 
72 1298431 1445677 147246 37 .357 35 .684 -4 .478 
73 283592 309959 26367 8 .159 7 .651 -6 .226 
74 1708494 1851161 142667 49 .155 45 .693 -7 .043 
75 322801 347599 24798 9 .287 8 .580 -7 .613 
76 225929 242802 16873 6 .500 5 .993 -7 .800 
77 551193 586774 35581 15 .858 14 .484 -8 .664 
78 241827 257148 15321 6 .958 6 .347 -8 .781 
79 230193 245447 15254 6 .623 6 .058 -8 .531 
80 1152640 1235285 82645 33 .162 30 .491 -8 .054 
81 413026 442706 29680 11 .883 10 .927 -8 .045 
82 1381809 1495138 113329 39 .756 36 .905 -7 .171 
83 421155 456842 35687 12 .117 11 .276 -6 .941 
84 436890 487842 50952 12 .570 12 .042 -4 .200 
85 387412 419935 32523 11 .146 10 .365 -7 .007 
86 1040266 1307197 266931 29 .929 32 .266 7 .808 
87 83645 98644 14999 2 .407 2 .435 1 .163 
88 241738 292517 50779 6 .955 7 .220 3 .810 
89 9845 11723 1878 0 .283 0 .289 2 .120 
90 56295 67844 11549 1 .620 1 .675 3 .395 
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APPENDIX 3: 
THE QUESTIONNAIRE 
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APPENDIX 3: THE OUESTIONNAIRB 
D e t a i l s about your company: 
1. Name and address: 
Ovmership s t a t u s : ( t i c k as appropriate) 
• P r i v a t e 
n Partnership 
• Public L i m i t e d Company 
• Branch Plant 
• Other (please s t a t e ) 
3. a) I s your company a m u l t i n a t i o n a l e n t e r p r i s e or 
s u b s i d i a r y of a m u l t i n a t i o n a l e n t e r p r i s e ? 
• Yes 
• No 
• Don't Know 
b) Where are the others l o c a t e d : 
n The United Kingdom 
n European Community 
• Rest of Co n t i n e n t a l Europe 
• Rest of the World 
What i n d u s t r i a l a c t i v i t i e s are your company i n v o l v e d in? 
How many years has your company been o p e r a t i n g from t h i s 
present l o c a t i o n ? 
• 0-5 • 10-20 • 50+ 
• 5-10 • 20-50 
6. a) I n i t i a l number of employees (approx): 
• 0-50 • 100-500 n 1000-5000 
n 50-100 • 500-1000 • 5000+ 
355 
b) Current number of employees: 
• 0-50 • 100-500 • 1000-5000 
• 50-100 • 500-1000 • 5000+ 
7. a) Percentage of sales dependent on exports (approx)? 
• 0-20 • 40-60 n 80-100 
• 20-40 • 60-80 
b) Market o r i e n t a t i o n (approx percentage of sales) 
(%) 
Domestic ( B r i t i s h ) 
European Community 
Rest of Cont i n e n t a l Europe 
Rest of the World 
The Channel Tunnel and the L o c a t i o n of the Company 
8. Why d i d your company e s t a b l i s h operations at i t s present 
l o c a t i o n ? What were the main a t t r a c t i o n s ? 
• Rent/rates 
• Proximity t o market(s) 
n Proximity t o supplies 
• Good t r a n s p o r t l i n k s 
• Labour force 
• Room f o r expansion 
n Other (please s t a t e ) . 
a) How important i s l o c a t i o n t o your company's o v e r a l l 
business strategy? 
• Very important 
n Quite important 
• Not too important 
• Unimportant 
b) Please e x p l a i n why. 
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10. W i l l the Channel Tunnel and r e l a t e d t r a n s p o r t 
d e v e l o p m e n t s a l t e r t h e l o c a t i o n a l 
advantages/disadvantages of your company? 
• Yes 
• No 
• Don't Know 
Please e x p l a i n why 
11. More s p e c i f i c a l l y , w i l l the Channel Tunnel and r e l a t e d 
t r a n s p o r t developments make your company more accessible 
t o domestic and European markets? 
• Yes 
• No 
• Don't Know 
Please e x p l a i n why. . 
12. I s the Channel Tunnel and r e l a t e d t r a n s p o r t developments 
l i k e l y t o make your company v u l n e r a b l e t o increased 
domestic and European competition? 
n Yes 
• No 
n Don't Know 
Please e x p l a i n why. 
13. Does your company foresee the need t o r e l o c a t e t o take 
f u l l advantage of the Channel Tunnel? 
n Yes 
n No 
• Don't know 
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I f yes, where and f o r what reasons? 
P o t e n t i a l usage of the Channel Tunnel 
Passenger T r a f f i c : 
14. a) How f r e q u e n t l y do r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s of your company 
undertake business t r i p s t o the Continent? 
• D a i l y • Q u a r t e r l y • Annually 
• Weekly • Bi-annually • Other 
n Monthly 
b) What are the prime d e s t i n a t i o n s ? 
• France, Germany and the Low Countries 
• Rest of the European Community 
• Other C o n t i n e n t a l 
c) By which mode of t r a n s p o r t ? 
• Aeroplane 
• R a i l / f e r r y 
• Road/ferry 
• Other (please s t a t e ) 
15. a) What percentage of f u t u r e business t r i p s are l i k e l y 
t o go v i a the Channel Tunnel? 
• 0-20 • 40-60 n 80-100 
n 20-40 • 60-80 
b) What p r o p o r t i o n (of 15a) by BR's i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
through t r a i n s ? 
• 0-20 • 40-60 n 80-100 
n 20-40 • 60-80 
c) What p r o p o r t i o n (of 15a) by Eurotunnel's S h u t t l e 
service? 
• 0-20 • 40-60 • 80-100 
• 20-40 • 60-80 
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16. What f a c t o r s are l i k e l y t o be considered important i n the 
determination of Question 15? 
• Cost/price 
• Journey time 
• R e l i a b i l i t y 
• Comfort 
• Other (please s t a t e ) 
F r e i g h t T r a f f i c 
17. By which mode of t r a n s p o r t does your company p r e s e n t l y 
export i t s products t o Con t i n e n t a l markets? 
• Aeroplane 
• Rail/sea 
• R o l l - o n / R o l l - o f f f e r r y 
• Load-on/Load-off f e r r y 
• Other (please s t a t e ) 
18. a) What percentage of your company's exports are l i k e l y 
t o go v i a the Channel Tunnel a f t e r June 1993 
• 0-20 • 40-60 • 80-100 
• 20-40 • 60-80 
b) What p r o p o r t i o n (of 18a) by BR's i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
r a i l f r e i g h t services? 
• 0-20 • 40-60 • 80-100 
• 20-40 • 60-80 
c) What p r o p o r t i o n (of 18a) by Eurotunnel's S h u t t l e 
service? 
• 0-20 • 40-60 • 80-100 
• 20-40 n 60-80 
19. What f a c t o r s are l i k e l y t o be considered important i n the 
determination of Question 18? 
• Cost/price 
• Journey time 
• R e l i a b i l i t y 
n Other (please s t a t e ) 
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wider C o n s i d e r a t i o n s 
20. What Government/BR s t r a t e g i e s would be necessary t o 
encourage the increased u t i l i s a t i o n of the Channel Tunnel 
by your company, i n terms of both passenger and f r e i g h t 
seirvices? 
21. Has i n f o r m a t i o n about the Channel Tunnel and i t s services 
been e a s i l y a v a i l a b l e t o your company? 
22. Has the Single European Act ('1992') and the Channel 
Tunnel forced your company t o look more towards Europe? 
I f so, how? 
23. Based on your company's knowledge of the l o c a l / r e g i o n a l 
economy, i s the Channel Tunnel l i k e l y t o have a 
b e n e f i c i a l or damaging e f f e c t on the South East/South 
West? 
Thank you f o r your co-operation. As s t a t e d i n the i n t r o d u c t o r y 
l e t t e r , a l l i n f o r m a t i o n obtained w i l l be t r e a t e d w i t h complete 
c o n f i d e n t i a l i t y and used only f o r the purposes of the research 
t h e s i s . Please use the enclosed self-addressed envelope t o 
r e t u r n the completed qu e s t i o n n a i r e . 
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L I S T O F ABBREVIATIONS 
BAI Brittany, Angleterre and Irlande 
BR British Rail 
BTA British Tourism Authority 
CBI Confederation of British Industry 
CER Community of European Railways 
CTFI Channel Tunnel Freight Interchange 
CTG-FM Channel Tunnel Group-Franch Manche 
CTJCC Channel Tunnel Joint Consultative Committee 
E C European Community 
ECML East Coast Main Line 
ECU European Currency Unit 
E F L External Finance Limit 
EFTA European Free Trade Association 
EIB European Investment Bank 
EKI East Kent Initiative 
GDP Gross Domestic Product 
GWR Great Western Railway 
JIT *Just-in-Time* systems 
IPS International Passenger Station 
K C C Kent County Council 
LMS London-Midlands Service 
LNER London-North Eastern Railways 
LOLO Load-on/Load-off Ferries 
MMC Monopolies and Mergers Commission 
MNC Multi-National Company 
NKML New Kent Main Line 
PBKA Paris-Brussels-Koln-Amslerdam high-speed rail network 
PLC Public Limited Company 
FSO Public Sector Grant 
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L I S T O F ABBREVIATIONS (CONT'D) 
RORO RolI-on/RoIl-off Ferries 
SEM Single European Market 
SE Southern Railways 
SNCB Soci6i6 Nationale des Chemins de Per Beiges 
SNCF Soci6t6 Nationale des Chemins de Per Prangais 
SOEC European Commssion Statistical Office 
TDAP Tourism Development Action Programme 
TGV Trains Grande Vitesse 
TML Transmanche Link 
TUCC Transport Users Consultative Committee 
UK United Kingdom 
WCML West Coast Main Line 
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LIST OF ABBREVIATED REGIONAL CONSULTANCY REPORTS 
AMA 
BR 
CLES 
Eurotunnel/BR 
KCC 
K I S 
LCCI 
NOERC 
1991 Review 
Association of Metropolitan Authorities (1989) Getting the 
Best from the Channel Tunnel. A Local Government 
Initiative, AMA, London. 
British Rail (1989b) International Rail Services for the 
United Kingdom, BRB, London. 
Centre for Local Economic Studies (1989) Channel Tunnel: 
Vicious Circle. Pilot Study: The Impact of the Channel 
Tunnel on the North of England, CLES, Manchester. 
Eurotunnel and British Rail (1988) Making the Pieces Fit. 
Regional Smdies of Business Opportunties. 
Kent County Council (1989) Independent Assessment of Rail 
Services in Kent between London and the Channel Tunnel, 
a report by Steer Davis and Cleave, and Maunsell, KCC, 
Maidstone. 
Channel Tunnel Joint Consultative Committee (1987) Kent 
Impact Study - A Strategy for Kent, Department of Transport, 
London. 
London Chamber of Commerce and Industry (1989) 
Impact of the Channel Tunnel on London's Business 
Community, LCCI, London. 
North of England Regional Consortium (1988) A Minimum 
Programme of Investment in the North - a paper presented 
at 'The Channel Tunnel Conference - Making Most of the 
Link in the Nonh\ 
Channel Tunnel Joint Consultative Committee (1991a) Kent 
Impact Study 1991 Review: The Channel Tunnel - A Strategy 
for Kent, CTJCC, Maidstone. 
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LIST OF ABBREVIATED REGIONAL CONSULTANCY REPORTS 
SEEDS South East England Development Strategy (1989) The 
French Connection. Impact of the Channel Tunnel on the 
South East, a repon by Transnet, SEEDS, Stevenage. 
SERPLAN South East Regional Planning Conference (1989) The 
Channel Tunnel: Implications for the South East Regions, 
Repon of the Channel Tunnel Working Group» RPC. 
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